WP(CRL.) NO. 512 OF 2023; WP(CRL.) NO. 515 OF 2023 These are two concurrent writ petitions challenging detention orders under the Kerala Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAA(P)A) against two detenues—Anju Joy (WP(Crl).512/2023) and Raveendran M. Vaged (WP(Crl).515/2023). The Kerala High Court scrutinises detention orders issued on 27 February 2023, their confirmation under Section 10(4) for a six-month term, and the Advisory Board’s report. The detaining authorities assert that the detenues were involved in multiple criminal cases from 2016 to 2023 and that the last prejudicial activity (14 February 2023) created a proximate link to public order concerns, justifying detention to prevent recurrence. The petitioners contend defects including alleged mala fide, lack of mindful application of the detention authority, and delay between the last prejudicial activity and the order; they question the propriety of a communication addressed to the Chief Minister and challenge the necessity of detention where bail conditions might suffice. The respondents submit that the offences and public-order risk warrant detention irrespective of bail. The court reviews the factual matrix, rejects the delay argument, and upholds the detention orders as legal, emphasizing the primacy of public order over individual liberty in this context. The petitions are dismissed with no interference in the orders.
This is a Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 390 of 2003) in the High Court of Kerala, challenging a trial court judgment in a money suit based on a dishonoured cheque. The plaintiff-appellant, Ashok Kumar Nallaveettil Tharayil, claimed that in March 1995 the first defendant borrowed Rs 5,50,000 and that a post-dated cheque dated 02.11.1996 was issued as security and was dishonoured on presentation. The defendants admitted a smaller loan amount (Rs 50,000) and contended that the cheque was issued only as security and could not be enforced, arguing the instrument was not payable on demand. The trial court dismissed the suit, primarily on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction and failure to prove the quantum. On appeal, the High Court held that a cheque dishonour gives rise to statutory liability and that the present suit was maintainable within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction, rejecting the defence that the original borrowal occurred abroad. The court emphasized timely challenge to territorial jurisdiction under Section 21(1) CPC and that, if contested late, the plaint could have been returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. The court noted admissible evidence showing the debt was more than Rs 50,000 and that the cheque, issued as security, could be enforced upon default. The appeal was allowed: the trial court’s decree was set aside and a decree for Rs 5,50,000 with 6% interest from 12.11.2003 (date of appeal) until realization, plus costs, was granted to the plaintiff.
Abdul Khader, the appellant/first defendant in O.S. No. 44 of 2015, challenged an ex parte decree obtained by Rapheal T George and Renil Shaju for Rs 20,00,000 with interest and costs. He filed R.P.I.A. No. 20 of 2022 under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree, along with I.A. No. 1 of 2022 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of a delay of 2110 days. The Sub Court dismissed these applications in a cryptic order dated 23.12.2022. The High Court admitted the FAO on 29.03.2023 and heard arguments. It held that the lower court’s order failed to address the legal tests for “sufficient cause” and the liberal approach to condonation of delay, relying on Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee and other precedents. The High Court emphasized that limitation law is designed to subserve ends of justice and should not be a license to delay; inordinate delays attract prejudice. It allowed the appeal, set aside the cryptic order, and restored R.P.I.A. No. 20 of 2022 and I.A. No. 1 of 2022 to file, directing the Sub Court to pass a reasoned order within a month after considering rival contentions, with both parties directed to appear on 11.07.2023.
Manojkumar P., a Driver Grade-I at the Chadayamangalam KSRTC depot, challenges Ext.P-3 transfer order transferring him mid-academic year to Parassala depot, alleging mala fides and injustice. He also moved Ext.P-2 to the Chairman & Managing Director seeking reversal. The respondents contend the transfer is part of a general exercise affecting thousands of KSRTC employees to streamline administration and maintain operational efficiency, citing administrative exigencies and the employer’s prerogative to transfer. The court locates the governing principle in established law: transfer is an incidence of service and employees have no hard entitlement to prevent it unless the transfer is vitiated by statutory violations or mala fides; it emphasizes that administrative transfers are permissible to maintain internal discipline and public interest. It relies on Nixy James and Babu v. State of Kerala, among others, to reject the notion that guidelines are binding statutory constraints on transfers. It also notes that the Long-Term Settlement Agreement 2012 Transfer Guidelines (Appendix-IV, Clause 11) authorize transfers on administrative grounds to preserve harmony. While refusing to stay the transfer, the court directs the 2nd respondent to consider the petitioner’s Ext.P2 representation in accordance with law, within two months, ensuring compliance with the judgment. The petition is disposed with these directions, preserving the employer’s discretion subject to lawful scrutiny.
CRL.M.C Nos. 9260/2023, 9324/2023, 9646/2023, 9872/2023 and 9936/2023 These five Criminal Miscellaneous Cases (CRL.M.C. Nos. 9260/2023, 9324/2023, 9646/2023, 9872/2023 and 9936/2023) were heard by Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan in the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The petitions filed by E.K. Susil Kumar challenge orders of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Talipparamba, declining to quash proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act initiated in connection with a financial dispute associated with the Official Liquidator. The petitions invoked Section 446 of the Companies Act, arguing that the criminal provisions should yield to the remedies offered by the company law regime and that quashing would serve the ends of justice. The Official Liquidator and the State of Kerala are named as respondents across the matters. In a short, consolidated order, the court noted the relief sought and, citing Devassy v. Official Liquidator, held that the relief cannot be granted; the NI Act proceedings cannot be quashed under the circumstances. The court indicated that if any other legitimate grievance remains, the petitioner may pursue appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. Accordingly, the five petitions were disposed of with liberty to file appropriate remedies. The order underscores adherence to the governing principle in Devassy and brings the proceedings to a conclusion with the explicit disposal language. The Appendix notes annexures including a certified complaint and a judgment dated 04.02.2019 in Company Petition No 43/2016 of the High Court of Kerala.
J. Rajendran Pillai, the 7th defendant, challenges in a constitutional petition under Article 227 an order chain starting from a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction filed by the plaintiff against the co-owners of a 21-cent property. The plaintiff claimed a 1/8 share through her predecessor’s partition litigation and sought injunction to prevent construction on the plaint schedule property and to exclude outsiders pending disposal of the suit. The trial court granted a temporary injunction (Ext. P8) restraining the defendants from continuing construction and from inducting outsiders; the District Court, Kollam, confirmed this interim relief in CMA No. 40/2018. The III Additional District Court, Kollam, dismissed the appeal, and the concurrent findings are challenged in this Original Petition. The petitioner contends that injunction cannot bar a co-owner’s action against others and relies on precedents including Omana Amma, Ashok Kumar T.G., and other SAs to support lis pendens principles. The High Court, however, undertakes a comprehensive review of co-ownership jurisprudence, including Calcutta, Madras, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab & Haryana, and other Indian High Courts, and holds that there is no rigid rule prohibiting injunction against a co-owner. It enumerates several propositions governing co-ownership, noting that injunction can be permitted to protect co-ownership rights, provided the court weighs justice, equity, and the balance of convenience. Ultimately, the court dismisses the petition and affirms the impugned orders, leaving the interim injunction intact.
The appellant Mathew K. Cherian challenges the acquittal of the accused by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, IV, Kottayam, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant filed the complaint through his power of attorney PW1, alleging that the accused issued Ext. P6 a cheque for Rs. 19,000 in discharge of a debt; upon presentment the cheque was dishonoured as per Ext. P7 for insufficient funds, and Ext. P9 furnished a statutory notice which the accused did not heed. The trial court examined PW1, DW1 and documentary evidence (Exts. P1–P11, D1) and held that Ext. P6 was not issued toward a legally enforceable debt, acquitting the accused under Sec. 255(1) CrPC. The appellant contends this acquittal is unsustainable: the evidence, including PW1’s testimony and authorities under POA for NI Act complaints (cited as AC Narayanan), supports a debt and the cheque’s issuance in discharge of that debt; the failure to pay after notice should establish the offence. The trial court’s re-appreciation is challenged on the ground that the law permits reversal if the acquittal is perverse or not plausible, as discussed in Jafarudeen v. State of Kerala and Rupesh Manger (Thapa) v. State of Sikkim. The High Court, after review, finds no error in the trial court’s judgment and dismisses the appeal, upholding the acquittal.
The petitioner, Suhara K., a High School Assistant in Arabic, seeks judicial intervention to obtain approval of her earlier appointments in two government-aided schools (5th and 6th respondents) and to secure the consequent monetary benefits. She was initially appointed as HSA (Arabic) in the 5th respondent school from 17.8.2004 to 29.12.2008, resigning on 28.9.2005. She then joined the 6th respondent school on 10.10.2005 in a resignation vacancy, but the approval for that appointment was rejected. Subsequently she was appointed in a regular vacancy at Chothavoor Higher Secondary School, where the appointment was approved. She moves for approval of the earlier spells in the 5th and 6th schools on the basis of Ext.P8, which concluded that approvals could be granted since there was no material showing a list of protected teachers. The respondents counter that the resignations violated Rules 48 and 53 of Chapter XIVA KER, and that the earlier appointments cannot be approved. They rely on Rule 7 (appointment effective from joining if approved) and on Sreeja v. Asst. Educational Officer (2000) KLJ 970, and argue that the 5th and 6th appointments were not approved. The High Court holds that since the appointments were not approved, Rule 53 is inapplicable to termination, and directs the 4th respondent to consider the petitioner’s claim for approval of Exts.P1 and P3 after hearing, within two months, if otherwise in order.
OT.Rev Nos. 130/2016; 115/2016; 118/2016; 119/2016; 120/2016; 122/2016; 125/2016; 131/2016 (connected with OT.Rev 130/2016); TAVAT Nos. 56/12 to 59/12 and 1557/11 to 1560/11 This batch judgment of the Kerala High Court, delivered on 13 January 2023 by Justices S. V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji, consolidates OT.Rev Nos. 130/2016 and connected matters along with several companion revisions (OT.Rev Nos. 115/2016, 118/2016, 119/2016, 120/2016, 122/2016, 125/2016, 131/2016) and related TAVAT matters arising from assessments of Popular Vehicles & Services Ltd. The State challenges orders of the KVATA Tribunal in common order TA(VAT) Nos. 1557–1560/11 and 56–59/12, which largely allowed the dealer’s appeals and dismissed the revenue’s revisions. The core issues include the legality of deductions for credits passed through credit notes under KVAT Section 2(x/ix)(ii) (explanation III), the treatment of warranties and reimbursements, tax on repair charges and fixed assets, use of RC books, and admissibility of concessional rates for defence/distribution sales (CSD). The court canvassed authorities including Mohammed Ekram Khan and Sons, TVS & Sons Ltd, ABT Industries Ltd., GMMCO Ltd., and Prerana Motors, to determine whether the Tribunal’s findings require reversal. Ultimately, the revisions are dismissed and the Tribunal’s common order is upheld, with relief to the dealer while confirming several of the Tribunal’s factual and legal conclusions.
The Kerala High Court, in a criminal miscellaneous case filed under Section 482 CrPC, considered quashing the criminal proceedings against five petitioners (accused Nos. 1–5) in CC No.315 of 2023 pending before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class-III, Perumbavoor. The accused faced charges arising from an incident on 25 January 2020, where they allegedly formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted the respondents, resulting in injuries, under IPC Sections 143, 147, 149, 323, 324, 506(ii) read with Section 149. The petitioners sought quashing of proceedings on the ground of an amicable settlement between the parties, with affidavits from the respondents supporting withdrawal of proceedings. The learned Public Prosecutor opposed quashing on the grounds that the offences are non-compoundable and grave, though he acknowledged no other serious crimes against the petitioners. The court reviewed established jurisprudence, citing State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, to emphasize that Section 482 CrPC can quash non-compoundable offences where the dispute is civil/private and settled, while not applying to heinous offences or offenses under special statutes. It concluded that the amicable settlement, lack of lasting grievances, and the overall context justify quashing the proceedings, holding that continuing prosecution would not serve ends of justice. The petition was allowed, with quashing of the Final Report and all further proceedings in CC 315/2023. The judgment was delivered by Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V.
This writ appeal arises from a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman for Local Self Government Institutions (the 3rd respondent in W.P.(C.) Nos. 26781/2021 and 6706/2022) to entertain complaints regarding construction based on building permits issued by Local Self Government bodies. The Kerala High Court, in a common judgment dated 22.11.2022, held that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to adjudicate such complaints, and quashed several Ombudsman exhibits (Exts. P5, P15, P16). The Ombudsman challenged this order by filing W.A. No. 1959/2022, arguing that Rules and statutory provisions empower the Ombudsman to entertain complaints arising out of building permits and related municipal actions. The respondents, Prestige Estates Projects Ltd., Thrikkakara Municipality, and related parties, contended that the issue was squarely settled by a Division Bench decision in W.A. No. 1123/2013 (State of Kerala & Others v. M. Noushad), and that Ombudsman cannot be an aggrieved party to maintain a writ appeal. The Division Bench noted the 2013 decision and also relied on Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477) to emphasize that authorities like Ombudsman should not be drawn into merits of disputes in superior courts unless peculiarly necessary. In light of these authorities, the writ appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The outcome affirms the non-maintainability of the Ombudsman’s challenge to the writ court’s jurisdiction.
Sunu Thomas, the sole accused in Crime No.1491/2023 of Muvattupuzha Police Station, is before the Kerala High Court, Krishnankur? No—Ernakulam, via CRL.MC No.399 of 2025, seeking quashment of proceedings in CC No.8/2024 (Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Muvattupuzha) under Section 482 CrPC. The offences alleged are under IPC sections 323 (causing hurt) and 294(b) (obscene act). The petitioner relies on a settlement between the parties: he, the accused, and the defacto complainant Sudha Varghese and the injured Baby Varghese. Statements of the defacto complainant and the injured were recorded; affidavits sworn by them (Annexures-A3 and A4) affirm that the disputes are settled amicably, they have no subsisting grievances, and they have no objection to quashing the criminal proceedings. The court noted that the settlement is genuine and bonafide, endorsed by respondents 3 and 4, and that proceeding with the criminal case would amount to abuse of process and would be contrary to ends of justice. Relying on Kulwinder Singh (2007) 4 CTC 769, Gian Singh (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh (2014) 6 SCC 466 and Madan Mohan Abbot (2008) 4 SCC 582, the court held that the parameters for quashing are satisfied, especially since Section 323 is compoundable and the settlement is favorable to all. The petition is allowed, and FIR, final report, and all further proceedings are quashed; Annexures A1–A4 are quashed.
This writ appeal challenges a learned Single Judge’s order in W.P.(C).No.11601/2021 concerning the registration of nine workers as headload workers under Rule 26A of the Kerala Headload Workers Rules, 1981. The writ petitioner, Nishad M.B., a wholesale vegetable and onion merchant at Muvattupuzha, sought registration for nine workers he claimed were employed by him to perform headload tasks. The Assistant Labour Officer and the District Labour Officer rejected registration, citing that the petitioner’s establishment largely relied on pool workers and that granting registration would deprive those pool workers of livelihood; they also found that the petitioner’s claim that the nine workers were doing headload work was not factually correct. The Kerala Headload Workers Welfare Board argued that registration must be strictly tethered to the definition of a headload worker under Section 2(m) and that the Act’s welfare scheme aims to regulate and safeguard workers’ health and welfare. The Full Bench and Division Bench authorities discussed, among others, the distinction between attached and unattached headload workers, the implications of Section 9A (as amended in 2018), and the Scheme’s provisions. The High Court ultimately held that the earlier decisions in Rajeev and Manzoor relaxing unattached-worker registration were overruled, and that attached workers may be treated differently from unattached workers. The court remanded for a fresh, focused enquiry by the registering authority into whether the nine workers are engaged in headload work of a predominant nature in the petitioner’s establishment, directing completion within six weeks. The Writ Appeal was partly allowed with these directions.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous petition (Crl.M.C. No. 8065/2018) challenging an order directing the accused to undergo DNA profiling under CrPC Section 53A and 164A, coupled with 173(8) investigation, in a long-drawn rape case. The petitioner, accused no. 1 in SC No. 19/2012 before the Additional Sessions Court-I (Special Court), Pathanamthitta, faces trial for offences punishable under Sections 376 and 511 read with Section 34 IPC, arising from a 1997 incident in Konni where the victim contends she was raped on two occasions and impregnated. Following investigation, Annexure A3 indicated further inquiry and a blood-sample collection for DNA testing; though notices were issued, the accused allegedly cooperated reluctantly. The court below allowed the prosecution’s application (Annexure A5). The petitioner argues that Article 20(3) of the Constitution protects him against self-incrimination and that DNA testing is not linked to the rape charge; it is belated and lacks bonafides, and that the victim’s earlier deposition in SC No.79/2004 did not prove paternity. The Public Prosecutor counters that DNA profiling under 53A/164A is vital to prove rape, supported by decisions of Krishan Kumar Malik, Sunil, Selvi, Kathi Kalu Oghad, and Siva Vallabhaneni. The High Court ultimately upholds the impugned order, finds no illegality in it, and dismisses the Crl.M.C., thereby keeping the DNA testing direction in place.
WP(C) NO. 33322 OF 2016 & Connected Cases The writ petitions challenge the upper age limit of 20 years prescribed for admission to the Integrated Five-year LLB course in 2016-17 under Clause 28(a) of the Legal Education Rules, 2008. Petitioners, who had applied under the notification dated 28.07.2016 issued by the Commissioner of Entrance Examinations (CEE), contend that the notification and the accompanying prospectus did not impose an upper age limit, and that the later imposition of a 20-year cap after admission proceedings began is arbitrary, irrational, and violative of fundamental rights and the Advocates Act. They argue that the amendment to the prospectus after the entrance examination and the publication of provisional rank lists was improper and could not be applied retroactively to those who had acted upon the original rules. The Bar Council of India had, through its circular of 17.09.2016, directed compliance with Clause 28, and Government orders followed in 2016 restricting age. The petitioners rely on decisions that Clause 28 has been declared unconstitutional by other High Courts (Punjab & Haryana in Rajan Sharma; Allahabad in Devasheesh Pathak) and on Madras High Court’s upholding of Clause 28 (Santhosh Antony Vareed), while the Supreme Court later entertained but dismissed SLPs and referred the matter to a committee. The Kerala High Court stayed the 21.10.2016 GO and allowed all candidates to participate in the selection process, staying the effect of the upper age limit, and directed extended documentation. The court ultimately makes the interim stay absolute, closes the petitions, and holds that petitioners are entitled to certificates on completion of the course, balancing equity with educational timelines and the realities of admission processes.
The petitioners challenge Exhibit P8, a Government order rejecting Exhibit P2, and seek a declaration that the 7th respondent’s oath of office on 11 August 2022 was illegal, and to issue a notification declaring the 7th respondent vacated as Councillor of Division 29, Willington Island North, Kochi. They also seek a writ of quo warranto to compel the 7th respondent to vacate. The background is the 2020 Kochi Corporation election, where the 7th respondent won by a margin of one vote after a draw of lots; the Munsiff’s Court in OP (Election) No.1/2021 partially set aside the election. The core issue is Section 143(4) of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, which empowers the Government to declare a Councillor’s office vacant if an oath is not taken within 30 days “from the date by which he was elected as a Councillor,” and without sufficient cause. The 7th respondent took oath on 11 August 2022; the Government concluded the delay was not without sufficient cause, but still did not declare vacancy. The High Court held that Section 143(4) is an enabling provision, and delay can be explained; it rejected automatic vacancy. It noted that a prior decision cited by the petitioner (Ram Pal Singh) is distinguishable, and relied on Balasubramanian to emphasize the enabling nature of the provision. The petition was dismissed, and the 7th respondent’s office was not declared vacant. The bench clarified that non-subscription within 30 days does not automatically vacate the seat, though participation in proceedings may be restricted.
This is a first appeal from orders (F.A.O. No.244 of 2018) before the Kerala High Court, arising from O.S. No.322 of 2010 on the file of the Sub Court, Kottarakkara. The appellants—six plaintiffs—moved I.A. Nos.143 and 144 of 2018 seeking condonation of delay (17 days) and restoration of the suit which had been dismissed for default on 6 January 2018. The respondents/defendants opposed restoration, alleging the appellants repeatedly avoided appearance and that the delay in filing the appeal was not justifiable. The Sub Court, in a common order dated 31 July 2018, dismissed the applications. The High Court, after hearing both sides, ultimately allowed the appeal and set aside the Sub Court’s order, directing restoration of O.S.322/2010 on payment of costs. The judgment discusses whether the delay can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and whether the absence of the appellants on the critical date constitutes a “sufficient cause.” It cites landmark decisions (Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee, Rafeek) to stress a liberal yet principled approach, balancing ends of justice with potential prejudice to respondents. The final order requires the Sub Court to restore the suit and proceed in accordance with law, subject to costs of Rs.10,000 to the respondents.
This Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (CrM.C. No. 61 of 2023) concerns a petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash an Annexure-A1 complaint in CC 1908/2017 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-XII, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner, Jeevan Telecasting Corporation Ltd., contends that the alleged debt evidenced by cheque no. 286951 dated 28.11.2014 for Rs. 5,89,890 has been discharged. It points to a payment of Rs. 30,00,000 made by demand draft on 30.12.2015 and argues that, since the substrate of the complaint no longer exists, continuing the prosecution would amount to abuse of the court’s process. The respondent contends that the cheque was issued to discharge an obligation arising from an agreement for channel carriage and placement dated 20.07.2015, and the payments reflected in bank statements do not conclusively prove discharge of the liability. The court notes that bank remittances exist but do not definitively establish discharge of the cheque amount without further evidence from the bank manager. Relying on Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and a suite of subsequent decisions, the court restates the test for quashing: the complaint must not disclose an offence, must not be an abuse of process, and should not be a bare or baseless continuation of a civil dispute as a criminal allegation. Applying these principles to the present facts, the court finds the quashing prayer meritless and dismisses the petition, allowing the prosecution to proceed. The bench emphasizes that the trial court may examine evidence later, and the presence of default or employee status does not by itself defeat the allegations at this stage.
GAC Shipping (India) Private Limited, a shipping streamer/agency, challenged three invoices issued by the Cochin Port Trust (CoPT) for anchorage charges under the Tariff Policy for Major Port Trusts, 2018, and the Scale of Rates (SoR) notified on 22.10.2019. The petitioner had called three foreign vessels at Cochin Port in April–May 2020; after initially paying port dues etc., CoPT raised anchorage charges by issuing invoices dated 04.07.2020, relying on a Trade Circular (04.07.2020) and amendments to the SoR, including a deeming provision in 2.3.4 that vessels not calling for berthing could attract anchorage charges. The SoR had come into force on 29.11.2019, and the Tariff Policy 2018 provided the framework for tariff determinations by TAMP. The petitioner argued that the 04.07.2020 circular and the retrospective amendments to SoR to levy anchorage charges on vessels that had called for berthing but were berthed in berth-without-hire categories were substantive, not clarificatory, and therefore could not be applied retrospectively. Respondents contended the amendments clarified and regularized existing practice and that SoR was already in force with charges embedded, with TAMP’s approval. The High Court reviewed authorities on retrospective operation, clarificatory vs substantive amendments, and the doctrine of lex prospicit non respicit. It held that the amendment creating the deeming provision was substantive, not clarificatory, thus not retroactive, and quashed Exts P5–P7, while allowing the petition in part and directing GST considerations appropriately.
WP(C) NO. 31731 OF 2010 & CONN This batch of writ petitions (WP(C) No. 31731 of 2010 and connected matters) challenges Union Bank of India's staff circular no. 5690 dated 27 August 2010 (Ext. P3), which extended a “second option” for pension to employees who were in service before 29 September 1995 or who continued in service or retired up to 27 April 2010, by requiring a 56% contribution by the employees toward the pension fund deficit. The petitions contend the 56% levy and the 1 September 2010–30 October 2010 window for submission of options are discriminatory against those who retired after 1 April 2008 but before 27 April 2010, creating two classes of employees for the same pension facility. The petitioners rely on the 1995 Pension Regulations and a settlement (Ext. P2) to argue equality, and refer to Avirah C.A. v. Canara Bank for guidance. The respondents defend Ext. P3 as a policy decision implementing Ext. P2, arguing the matter falls within legitimate policy and fund-deficit considerations, not fundamental rights violations. The court, evaluating Article 14 and the policy nature of pension reform, declines to strike down the circular, holding there is no arbitrary discrimination and dismisses the petitions as no ground for interference is made out.