This is a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court hearing a suo motu petition (DBP No. 10 of 2022) concerning irregularities in Vazhipadu sales at Vaikom Sree Mahadeva Temple, notably Koovalamala. Initiated by a news item in Manorama News Online dated 18 March 2022, the proceedings examine the supply chain, quality, and handling of Vazhipadu items, including garlands made from Koovalamala leaves, and the roles of the temple’s governance bodies and the Travancore Devaswom Board. The Court reviews whether sub-standard Vazhipadu items were supplied by the vendor and whether Devaswom officials failed in statutory duties, invoking the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, particularly Sections 15A, 31, and 31A, along with the Travancore Devaswom Manual (Chapter XIX). It orders preservation of CCTV footage, directs that Nalambalam duties be performed by Devaswom staff, and requires proper accounting and storage of Vazhipadu items. It also contemplates termination of Kuthaka rights for non-compliance and permits alternative arrangements for Santhies under Chapter XIX, if entry to temple is restricted. The judgment anchors its reasoning in fiduciary duties of the Board as trustee, citing related case law, and emphasizes the need to protect devotees’ interests and ensure authentic ritual practices.
This Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous petition (CRL.M.C. No. 6574 of 2014) challenges the order in CC No. 931/2013 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam. The petitioners, nine entities and individuals connected with Mathrubhoomi Illustrated Weekly (publisher, printer, editor, and staff), are accused in a private defamation complaint filed by the RSS State Secretary alleging offences under IPC sections 120B, 153A, 500 read with 34, 501, and 502. The ACJM (EO) took cognizance only on counts of 500, 501 against R2–R9, and 502 against R2, while cognizance under 120B and 153A was not taken. The petition contends lack of locus standi of RSS to sue, emphasizing that the article published (27.02.2011) was based on factual research by Badri Raina and published for the public good; it argues that defamation requires a definite, identifiable body and that RSS is not such a body. It relies on authorities including Krishnaswami v. C.H. Kanaran and the general defamation principle that a class cannot be defamed unless the imputations relate to identifiable individuals. The court surveys several precedents (Eastwood v. Hamles; Government Advocate v. Gopal Bandu; Sahib Singh Mehra; Achuthanandan v. Varughheese; Tek Chand Gupta; G. Narasimhan) and ultimately holds RSS to be a definite, identifiable body; the petition is dismissed, and the trial is directed to be expedited and completed within six months.
This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by Sreekala, widow of late P. Sasidharan, challenging Ext.P7 (dated 30.10.2022) eviction notice issued by the Administrative Officer of Oachira Devaswom and Ext.P7(2) communications directing eviction from shop rooms Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the first floor of the Oachira Devaswom Shopping Complex. The petitioner also sought a mandamus to accept rent in respect of those shop rooms. The matter traces to prior orders, including Ext.P1 in W.P.(C) No.22031 of 2010, which the court noted had concluded that the late husband had no legal right to continue occupancy beyond a three-month period for re-auction, while acknowledging disputes about tenancy versus sub-tenancy. The respondents contend that Sasidharan was not a tenant but a sub-tenant, and emphasize the Board’s duty to generate income from Devaswom properties, fixing rent per Delhi Schedule of Rates and ensuring proper management. The bench directed scrutiny of related cases such as T. Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board and H.N. Vijayan, and ultimately held that the petitioner is not entitled to continue occupancy. The writ petition is dismissed, with the Board urged to initiate eviction proceedings and recover arrears, guiding future conduct by principles in Krishnakumar and Vijayan. The decision reinforces that Devaswom properties are to be safeguarded and income-generating."
This petition challenges a faceless assessment regime under the Income Tax Act, 1961, culminating in the assessment for AY 2013-14. The petitioner contests issuance of Ext.P5 notice under Sec. 143(2) read with Sec. 147 and the subsequent reopening of the assessment via Sec. 148, proceeding through the National Faceless Assessment Centre using the new IT Portal. The petitioner objects to the validity of the notices on grounds that there was no recording of satisfaction or approval by a higher authority for reopening, and that no Draft Assessment Order (DAO) was prepared or served as required under Sec. 144B. Despite objections and the portal’s glitches, the 2nd respondent issued the assessment order (Ext.P13) and penalty notices (Exts.P14 and P14(a)). The petitioner argued that natural justice demands a pre-finalization decision on objections before final orders, a principle reinforced by the Supreme Court in JKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer. The court examined whether Sec. 144B procedures were adhered to, noting absence of a DAO served on the petitioner. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed, Ext.P13 and the penalty notices are set aside, and the 2nd respondent is directed to completed reassessment for AY 2013-14 in accordance with law.
OP(C) Nos. 585, 591 and 594 of 2022 These original petitions, under Article 227 of the Constitution, challenge three separate orders dated 31 January 2022 passed by the Munsiff Court, Chavakkad in IA 5/2022 in OS 287/2018; IA 6/2022 in OS 353/2018; and IA 6/2022 in OS 354/2018. The petitioner-bank contends the orders granting permission to put leading questions to witnesses during their examination were legally unsound and non-speaking; such questions are ordinarily prohibited in a party’s own examination unless the court grants permission under the Evidence Act. The court considers sections 135, 137, 141, 142, 143 and 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, and Order 18 Rule 1 CPC, to delineate the proper sequence of witness examination: chief, cross, and re-examination, and when leading questions may be allowed with court approval. The petition cites that the plaintiff normally has the right to begin, and that permission for leading questions should not be granted before witnesses are on the box. The learned Judge explains that Section 142 permits leading questions in limited circumstances and Section 154 permits the calling party to cross-examine, typically when the witness is on the box. The court relies on Thankamani v. Prabhakaran and Ramraj N. to affirm such procedures and sets aside the impugned orders, directing that the parties may invoke Sections 142 or 154 as issues arise. The petitions are allowed, clarifying the proper framework for leading questions and cross-examination in civil suits.
WA 48/2020 (batch of connected WA nos.) This batch judgement of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court deals with a large set of writ appeals challenging the validity and retrospective/ prospective operation of amendments to Kerala’s VAT law in the GST era. The central issue is whether the State Legislature could extend the period for reopening escaped assessments under Section 25(1) of the KVAT Act via Finance Acts 2017 and 2018, and whether those amendments could operate retrospectively or only prospectively, particularly in light of the 2016 Constitution (CAA) changes and the subsequent repeal of KVAT and introduction of KGST. The court examines textual language, commencement versus operation, saving clauses, and the wider constitutional framework (Article 246A) to determine the legislature’s power and the effect on accrued rights and existing assessments. After a detailed statutory and jurisprudential analysis, the court ultimately holds that the relevant amendments are validly enacted and applicable within the prescribed periods, and that the writ appeals fail. The judgement emphasizes interpretation principles, including the presumption against retrospection, and cites leading authorities on retrospective legislation, vesting/accrued rights, and the interaction of VAT with GST regimes.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a suit for damages for cutting rubber saplings and a permanent injunction, and the subsequent decree and its dismissal on appeal. The appellants, Thampan Thomas and M C Philip, challenge the dismissal of their appeal in AS No.124/2012 and the execution proceedings in OS No.36/2010, which followed a trial court decree awarding damages of Rs.17,700 with costs and a permanent injunction against trespass. The appellants seek condonation of a substantial delay of 880 days in filing the second appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, arguing that they were not informed about the dismissal of the appeal earlier due to the conduct of their advocate, combined with the age of the first appellant (85 years) and pandemic-related difficulties. The respondent, K.S. Varghese, contends that the delay is inordinate and unjustified, supported by the fact that the same advocate represented before the trial court and the appellate court, and that Rule 22 notices and execution proceedings revealed knowledge of the dismissal well before 2022. The Kerala High Court examines principles of condonation, citing liberal standards and the ends of justice, but concludes that the appellants failed to show sufficient cause. Consequently, the CMA is dismissed and RSA 289/2022 stands dismissed, effectively upholding the lower orders against execution.
WP(C) No.13388/2022 and connected cases This batch of writ petitions challenges the selection process for Schedule Caste Promoters (SC Promoters) on a contract basis in the Kerala Government’s Scheduled Caste Development Department. Petitioners, working as SC Promoters in various Local Self-Government institutions, assail the revised eligibility framework introduced by Government Order No. 6/2022 (dated 22 January 2022) which fixes an upper age limit of 18–30 years and imposes stricter educational qualifications. They contend that contract engagements and even possibilities of regularization existed under earlier schemes; excluding those who had completed eight years of service from fresh recruitment lacks rational nexus to the scheme’s objectives and discriminates against long-serving employees. The State, defending the policy, argues that engagement is contractual and policy-driven; age and qualification norms are within executive prerogative to meet evolving needs and ensure a younger, tech-savvy workforce. The Kerala Administrative Tribunal and this Court had previously held that excluding eight-year veterans from eligibility had no rational nexus and was discriminatory, but the present challenge focuses on the new age cap. After examining policy considerations and precedents, the Court held that the government’s age prescription is a valid policy decision and dismissed the petitions.
Mat.Appeal No. 321 of 2017 This is a matrimonial appeal from the Family Court, Ottappalam, challenging a dismissed O.P. seeking a decree of dissolution under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Sections 13(1)(i) and 13(1)(ia). The appellant-wife (Sreeja B.) contends that the marriage, solemnized on 5 May 2011, has irretrievably broken down and that she suffered sustained cruelty (physical and mental) by the respondent Anees hkumar, including coercive demands for money, misappropriation of ornaments, and a violent incident on 20 June 2012 during which she was assaulted and hospitalised. The respondent denies misconduct and asserts that any incident was resolved and cohabitation resumed; he contends that the petition should be dismissed. The High Court clarifies that irretrievable breakdown is not a ground under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and examines whether cruelty has been established under Section 13(1)(ia) by applying civil-standard proof (preponderance of probabilities) as laid down in N.G. Dastane, Sobha Rani and Samar Ghosh. It canvasses several precedents on cruelty, including the illustrative tests for mental cruelty, the effect of condonation, and the role of Article 142 powers. Ultimately the court reverses the Family Court, finding cruelty proved and granting a decree of dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia), holding the marriage dissolved with effect from the date of the judgment. The decision engages with well-known authorities on cruelty and the limits of judicial relief in matrimonial disputes.
Ramesan Achari, the appellant, challenged the II Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kollam's common award in OP(MV) No.110/2004, which partially allowed his claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision on 5 April 2003. He alleged severe injuries in the left forearm, femur and right tibial condyle; he was employed as an Executive Engineer in the Irrigation Department, Kerala, earning about Rs.15,000 per month. The Tribunal awarded the third respondent-insurer Rs.1,66,114 with Rs.3,000 costs, but the appellant sought a higher compensation, particularly in the head of loss of earning capacity (LEC). At issue was whether the amount of LEC adequately reflected his post-accident diminished earning capacity and his long-term prospects after retirement. The High Court found the Tribunal's overall compensation otherwise reasonable but held that LEC required enhancement in light of evidence of a 15% functional disability, 1 inch shortening of the right leg, and the appellant’s near-retirement life expectancy. Citing Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy to emphasize that split multiplier must be grounded in cogent reasons, and relying on Ramachandrappa and Alliance Insurance principles for determining LEC, the court adopted a multiplier of 11 and a notional income of Rs.7,500 per month, resulting in Rs.99,000 for LEC and total enhanced compensation of Rs.74,000 beyond the Tribunal’s award. The insurer was directed to deposit the amount with interest and costs within 60 days, with disbursement by the Tribunal thereafter.
This writ petition challenges two notices: Ext P2, a possession notice against item No.2 property, and Ext P3, an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate appointing an Advocate Commissioner to take possession of item No.2. The petitioner Jijin J.S., who availed a term loan by creating an equitable mortgage with the second respondent bank, argues that the bank has proceeded against two properties in a single drive while item No.1 had already been subjected to Ext P1 notice and a pending auction. He asserts that this simultaneous action is high-handed and unfair, and violates the due process and the statutory remedies under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI). The respondents counter that Ext P1 disclosed a true position: item No.1 was offered for auction with a reserve price of Rs 79,25,000 to recover Rs 1,34,04,371.64; because of the shortfall, the bank proceeded against item No.2. They submit Ext P3 is appealable under Sec 17 of the Act, and that the writ petition should be dismissed in light of the alternative remedy. The petition was heard; the learned counsel for both sides relied on a recent Supreme Court decision in South Indian Bank Ltd v. Naveen Mathew Philip, which held that High Courts generally should not interfere with SARFAESI proceedings. The judge ultimately held there is no legal impediment to proceeding against item No.2, but granted a pathway: the petitioner may submit a concrete proposal to the bank or approach the DRT under Sec.17; if a proposal is received within a week, it shall be considered after hearing, and the writ petition is dismissed.
Smitha B., a teacher at VIM Higher Secondary School, Pallassana, challenged multiple orders-reversions and a revised seniority list affecting her service status. She began as UPSA in 1999, was later promoted to HSA, and from 12.01.2013 onward continued in leave vacancies with periodic reversion; in 2014 she was reverted from HSA to UPSA (notified to be in effect from 17.02.2014). Several writ petitions and judgments followed (Ext.P4, Ext.P6, Ext.P9), including a direction to review reversions and to consider a period when Anitha Kumari’s leave complications existed. Notably, Ext.P12 (DEO’s order) declared another teacher senior by relying on the notion of notional service, limiting salary for that period. The petitioner contends that notional service should be counted as actual service for seniority, relying on the Kerala High Court’s decision in Valsala Kumari Devi M. v. State of Kerala and Others (2016 (2) KLT 163). The petitioner seeks quashing of Exts. P12, P13, P14 and restoration of seniority as per prior orders; she argues that the administrator should count the reverted period as HSA service for seniority. The court ultimately held that Exts. P12–P14 must be quashed and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with hearing, guided by the Valsala Kumari Devi principle.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.M.C. Nos. 4828/2020 & 1250/2021) decided by Dr. Justice Kauser Edappagath on 29 November 2022. The petitioners, accused Nos. 13 and 10, BMW India Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. and Ravi Batra, seek to quash Annexure A FIR in Crime No. 51/2020 of Vellayil Police Station (path to quash under section 482 Cr.P.C.). The 2nd respondent, P.P. Ashique, Managing Director of Platino Classic Motors India Private Limited, is the complainant along with the State of Kerala and Platino’s associates as respondents. The offences alleged are under IPC sections 406, 420, 465, and 471 read with 34, and related provisions. The core dispute stems from BMW’s dealership and a Deferred Payment Facility, where a credit line to Platino allegedly expanded without consent, leading to claims of misutilization, falsified minutes, and unlawful gains amounting to around ₹100 crore. The court’s analysis rejects that the credit limit constitutes ‘property’ for the purposes of criminal breach of trust under Section 405/406 IPC, finds no established entrustment, and questions the alleged forgery and cheating. It emphasizes that the dispute is contractual/civil in nature, cites Bhajan Lal and Ajay Mitra, and finds no prima facie offence; quashes the FIR and all further proceedings. The petitions are allowed.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a dispute over the status of a temple at Madaikonam, Ernakulam district, whether it is private to the Animangalath Illom family or a public temple governed by public participation. The plaintiffs (second plaintiff being the senior member of the Animangalath Illom) challenge interference by defendants in temple management, seeking a declaration of private ownership and an injunction against public management. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, while the first appellate court reversed and decreed in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants’ appeal to the Kerala High Court contends the temple has remained private and that any outward public involvement does not convert its status absent an assignment of family rights. The High Court re-examines the evidence, including the formation of a registered society (Exts. B2-B3), accounts and renovations by the temple committee, public poojas, and income from public contributions. It scrutinizes PW testimonies (especially the second plaintiff’s admissions) and numerous documentary exhibits (Exts. B4-B13), concluding that the temple has effectively become public through implied dedication, even without a formal assignment. Relying on various Supreme Court and Kerala cases, the court concludes there is a dedication to public and sets aside the trial and appellate decrees, dismissing the suit with no costs.
This criminal appeal challenges a 2019 conviction under sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, arising from alleged gratification offered by the appellant in exchange for issuing a building permit at Muzhuppilangad Grama Panchayath. The trial court (Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thalassery) found the appellant guilty based on prosecution evidence, trap testimony, and recovery of bribe money (MO2), as well as a positive phenolphthalein test. The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove essential elements, notably the demand for illegal gratification; according to him, the money was placed by the trap team and the accused merely picked it up, which cannot alone establish either demand or acceptance. The prosecution's key witnesses described the sequence of events, but the defence argued that no independent corroboration supported a required demand. The Kerala High Court, evaluating the record, held that the evidence does not establish the required demand of illegal gratification and that mere recovery of bribe money does not suffice to convict under the Act. Relying on established jurisprudence that demand is essential, the High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, setting aside the trial court’s conviction and sentence.
This High Court of Kerala (Ernakulam) appeal arises from a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kottayam order awarding partial compensation to Sushamma C.R., who sustained severe injuries in a road accident on 6 May 2009 while a pillion rider on her husband’s motorcycle. The bus involved, owned by the first respondent and insured by the third respondent, allegedly struck the motorcycle, leading to catastrophic injuries including a compression fracture of the D4 vertebra with spinal cord compression, extensive cord contusion, dislocation of T4-T5, and paraplegia. The Tribunal granted Rs. 10,93,000 in compensation, which the appellant challenged as inadequate. The Respondents 1 and 2 contested proceedings; the insurer contended the compensation was excessive. On appraisal, the High Court found the appellant completely paralyzed and re-fixated her monthly income at Rs.6,000, following notional income doctrines from Ramachandrappa, and held a functional disability of 80% with 40% future prospects. It applied the Sarla Verma multiplier of 15, increased loss-of-earnings, added bystander and nourishment expenses, and re-assessed pain, loss of amenities, and future medical treatment. The Court concluded that enhanced compensation was warranted, but not to the extent claimed, and ultimately allowed the appeal in part, prescribing a further enhancement to Rs.11,09,028 and total compensation to Rs.22,02,028, with deposit and disbursement within 60 days and limited interest on a portion of the amount.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.MC 1383/2022) filed before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam by nine petitioners (Arshad, Jisham, Bilal, Muhammed Shafi, Muhammed Musthafa, Anjin Anandh, Sharafudheen, Mubasheer, Vishnu Bhaskar) seeking to quash proceedings in CC No.9/2017 arising from Crime No.679/2016 of Kalpetta Police Station. The accused face offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323 and 324 r/w 149. The prosecution case concerns a private dispute linked to political rivalry at Government NMSM College, Kalpetta on 20-10-2016. The respondents 3-5 (Ashik, Subhilesh, Avishith) filed affidavits indicating settlement and expressing no grievances against petitioners; respondents 3-5 also conveyed lack of objection to quashing. The petitioners rely on the private nature of the dispute, the absence of serious offences, and the likelihood of a fruitless trial. The court relies on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another and exercises its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. The High Court accordingly allows the CRL.MC and quashes all further proceedings in CC No.9/2017 before the CJM Kalpetta. The outcome underscores the principle that a settlement between private parties can justify quashing criminal proceedings when public interest and the chances of successful prosecution are bleak.
CUS.APPEAL Nos.9/2020, 10/2020, 2/2021, 3/2021, 2/2022 This batch of Customs Appeals under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 challenges the orders of the CESTAT Bangalore in MEIS-related shipping bill amendments. The Kerala High Court, constituting a Division Bench of Justices S. V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji, hearing Cus.Appeal Nos. 9/2020, 10/2020, 2/2021, 3/2021 and 2/2022, addresses uniform issues arising from exporters LMJ International Ltd, Universal Oleoresins, MRF Limited, Kancor Ingredients Ltd and RBG Trading Corporation Pvt. Ltd. The core grievance concerns an inadvertent clerical error in MEIS shipping bills where the reward column was marked 'N' instead of 'Y'. The Tribunal had allowed amendments in similar proceedings, deeming the omission procedural and curable given that a declaration of MEIS intent appeared on the shipping bills, and steps could be taken to rectify. The Revenue relied on decisions of Madras High Court (Pasha International), Delhi High Court (Kedia Agencies Pvt. Ltd.), and Kerala High Court (Mangalath Cashews) along with CESTAT precedents (N.C. John & Sons; Kuruwa Enterprises) to oppose amendment. The High Court, while noting these authorities, ultimately follows the view in Customs Appeal No.5/2020 as confirmed by the Supreme Court and dismisses the batch, indicating that the issues are settled by higher authorities and MEIS amendments in these circumstances are not warranted. The judgment records that the appeals are disposed of with the final outcome: dismissal.
Surendran, the appellant, was convicted under Section 8(2) of the Abkari Act for possession of 20 litres of arrack and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1 lakh by the Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc)-II, Kalpetta. The High Court scrutinizes whether the contraband material seized at Thrikkaipetta on 25.03.2006 was properly linked to the sample sent for Chemical Analysis, and whether the chain of custody and production of properties were established without undue delay. The prosecution relied on seizure mahazar Ext.P2, sample Ext.P4, and Ext.P7 (Certificate of Chemical Analysis) showing two sealed bottles. The defense contended the delay in producing properties, the genuineness of the sample, and the possibility that the analysed sample did not originate from the seized contraband, undermining the link required to sustain a conviction. The court notes that the sample was produced only on 27.03.2006, with no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and that the specimen of the seal and its authenticity were not established, casting doubt on sample integrity. It cites Ravi v. State of Kerala and other authorities to emphasize that production should be expeditious and that a delay requires explanation. Ultimately, the court finds the link to be missing and acquits the appellant, allowing the appeal and directing disbursement of any deposits.
W.P.(C). No. 14138 of 2022 This writ petition challenges notices issued by the Kottakkal Municipality seeking license prerequisites for a beauty parlour operated by the petitioner in two shop rooms on premises owned by the third respondent. The petitioner contends that the licensing authority can grant the licence without the landlord’s written consent, arguing that tenancy provides implied authority for lawful use of the premises and that consent is only required for obtaining a licence for the first time. The municipality argued that processing the application requires the landlord’s consent and other documents, while the third respondent contended that the petitioner is not a tenant and is not entitled to any relief from the court. The matter traverses through rent control and civil proceedings (RCP 18/2021; OS No. 230/2020), and the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions had passed interim orders and later dismissed the revision petition (RP No. 5/2022), which the petitioner challenged in this writ petition. The court relies on the Apex Court’s decision in Sudhakaran v. Corporation of Trivandrum and Another, extracting the proposition that consent of the landlord is applicable only for a first-time licence; renewal or tenancy in progress does not bar licensing. The court ultimately allows the petition, quashing Exhibits P1, P7 and P9, and directs the licensing authority to consider the D&O licence application without insisting on landlord’s consent if the application is otherwise in order, thereby enabling the petitioner to operate pending ongoing disputes.
