This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA) from the Kerala High Court arising out of an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in a road accident on 3 May 2010 involving bus KL-10Z/0520. The appellant, Moidu K, claimed compensation for injuries sustained as a pedestrian; the respondent bus owner and insurer contested, with the insurer admitting the policy but contesting the quantum. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kalpetta, granted partial relief, awarding Rs. 1,07,380 against the third respondent (insurer) and holding respondents 1 and 2 (driver and owner) liable, with others or ex parte. The appellant sought higher compensation, supported by Ext A4 police charge-sheet establishing driver negligence, Ext C1 disability certificate, and evidence of income. The High Court re-evaluated the award by applying Ramachandrappa’s approach to notional income for a coolie worker and Sarla Verma’s multiplier principle. Notional monthly income was raised from Rs.3,000 to Rs.7,500, with an 11-year multiplier. The court recalculated various heads of damage, increasing loss of earnings to Rs.30,000, bystander expenses to Rs.8,500, extra nourishment to Rs.4,250, pain and suffering to Rs.30,000, and loss due to disability to Rs.1,08,900, among others, resulting in a total enhanced compensation of Rs.2,25,150. The appeal was allowed, with enhanced compensation of Rs.1,17,770 plus 7% interest and Rs.10,000 costs, to be deposited within 60 days and disbursed in accordance with law.
WP(C) No.10661/2020; Cont.Case No.1613/2021 This writ petition, filed by the Chairman of a minority unaided college, challenges CAP admissions and the SC/ST/OEC fee concessions for students admitted through CAP. The college, a minority institution, asserts that 50% of seats are filled through CAP and that SC/ST/OEC fee concessions granted to CAP entrants are funded by the government; Ext.P2 GO and the University Prospectus allegedly entitle such concessions, and denying them would amount to deprivation of property without legal authority and violate equality principles. The petitioner seeks a mandamus to secure payment of the entire CAP-allocated SC/ST/OEC fees from the government/university, and to declare that these concessions are due to SC/ST/OEC students admitted through CAP from inception; he also asks that government and university not pursue further CAP-based reservations in the college. The respondents contend unaided institutions are not legally bound to extend such concessions; CAP is a government policy with sector-specific GO provisions; Ext.P2 (GO 2009) clarifies concessions are not universal; GOs through 2015-2019 govern CAP; the Apex Court has stayed the Akhil P. Pushkar decision, so its applicability is limited. Relying on Vishnu Priya, the court holds that denying CAP concessions would be discriminatory and directs reimbursement of the full CAP-conferred fees to the petitioner, closing the contempt case.
W.P.(C) Nos.9599/2022, 12358/2022, 23354/2022, 27663/2022 The cluster of writ petitions concern refunds of fees collected under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Rules, 2008 for changing the nature of land (Nilam) to other uses, where the petitioners held land less than 25 cents. The petitions argued that (i) after the 01.04.2020 amendment to Section 2(viA), fee calculation must be based on the “fair value” of the specific land as fixed under the Stamp Act, and that pre‑amendment applications should be exempt from the revised formula; (ii) there should be exemption from payment of fees for lands up to 25 cents in line with circulars and prior decisions; and (iii) the land description in revenue records should not be altered contrary to rules. The Government Pleader resisted, asserting that after orders granting change of land use, prescribed fees are payable and that the classifications and rules apply. The Court, relying on earlier rulings like Baby v. District Collector and W.P.(C) No. 5449/2019, held that (a) there cannot be further classification based on the date of submission; (b) lands up to 25 cents are exempt from fee, and (c) refunds of erroneously collected fees are required. The court directed refund within two months and ordered proper classification of land in the Basic Tax Register. All petitions were disposed by a common judgment (2 Nov 2022).
MFAR Hotels and Resorts Private Ltd. challenged the ITAT Cochin Bench’s 2018 order in ITA 334/CoCH/2015 that disallowed Rs.12,61,890 under section 14A read with Rule 8D for AY 2011-12. The Kerala High Court heard ITA 58/2020 on 14 October 2022. The appellant contends that its investments in shares of group/sister companies were corporate cross-holding funded from its own funds and that no exempt income was earned in the relevant year; hence no portion of expenditure is disallowable. The revenue argues that Section 14A disallows expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income (dividend income is exempt under section 10(34)) and Rule 8D prescribes the method for quantification. The Tribunal had upheld the disallowance, holding that the dominant purpose of the investment is irrelevant and that expenditure incurred to earn exempt income must be disallowed. The High Court, while applying well-known precedents (Maxopp, Walfort, Kedarnath Jute, Taikisha, Godrej & Boyce), emphasizes that the Assessing Officer must determine whether exempt income exists and then apply 14A with 8D if warranted, noting Kedarnath Jute’s caution that legal conclusions must rest on statute, not inadvertent omissions. Ultimately, the court remands the matter to the AO for fresh evaluation, permits the assessee to file additional details, and resolves substantial questions in the assessee’s favour for statistical purposes.
This writ appeal arises from a writ petition filed in the Kerala High Court challenging actions under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by HDB Financial Services and its officials against the petitioners, who are the borrowers. The writ petition sought (i) a mandamus restraining further legal action in pursuance of an Ext. P8 SARFAESI notice; (ii) quashing Exts. P7 and P9 notices under Section 13(2) and the Ext. P5 prepayment statement; (iii) consideration of Ext. P10 valuation report and protection against sale below value; and (iv) a direction to take over the secured assets at Ext. P10 value, adjusting the loan balance and releasing any excess proceeds. The Kerala High Court, after hearing, allowed the borrowers to repay the overdue amount Rs.26,22,000 in 10 equal installments with conditions including first payment by 30.04.2022, continued EMI payments, and keeping coercive actions in abeyance, disposing of the writ petition. On appeal, the Division Bench (Chief Justice S. Manikumar and Justice Shaji P. Chaly) held that writ petitions challenging SARFAESI proceedings are not maintainable, citing the Supreme Court in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., and ultimately dismissed the appeal. The decision underscores the principle that courts should not entertain writ petitions against SARFAESI actions where statutory remedies exist and emphasizes prudent public-money recovery.
This is a bail application before the High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam, concerning four petitioners accused in Crime No.152/2022 of Elamakkara Police Station for alleged criminal conspiracy, cheating and offences under Sections 420 and 120B r/w 34 IPC. The complainant deposited Rs.20,000 on 02.07.2021 in the name of Mavensworth India Nidhi Ltd. Petitioners had previously been associated with Vishwadeepti Multi-State Cooperative Society and later formed the Nidhi and related entities (Mavensworth Credit and Financial Services) with licences under the Kerala Money Lenders Act. They claim false implication by competitors and argue they merely conducted legitimate business with requisite licences; the defacto complainant asserts violations of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act (BUDS Act) and that the Nidhi undertakings breached norms, relying on Sections 8, 19 and 34 of the BUDS Act and references to 438 IPC. The Public Prosecutor notes licences/permissions appear in annexures and investigation is ongoing. The High Court held that, given the licences, Sections 420 IPC may not apply as framed, rejected the argument that the BUDS Act bars the petition for anticipatory bail, and found custodial interrogation not required though limited custody is permissible. The court granted anticipatory bail with conditions, directing surrender on 08.12.2022 and release on bail if arrested, and affirmed police powers of investigation citing Sushila Aggarwal. The order emphasizes that bail does not foreclose investigation and that safeguards under constitutional principles apply.
FAO (RO) Nos.183 & 184 of 2016 This judgment arises from two connected first appeals from orders (FAO (RO) Nos.183 & 184 of 2016) filed by Manoharan V. against a preliminary partition decree in OS No.2010 and the subsequent appellate decree in AS 239/2011 and AS 256/2011 before the Palakkad judiciary. The dispute centers on a partition of a property with five items; item 5 is the subject of Ext.B3 Will and Ext.B8, a 1993 gift by the mother. Ext.B8 is treated as the same person as the 6th defendant, which allegedly impacts the necessity to prove the bequeath under Ext.B3. The trial court did not take Ext.B8 into account; the first appellate court reversed and ordered a remand under Order XLI CPC. The High Court, however, finds that the first appellate court exceeded its remit: remand is not warranted to re-open issues already settled and that the legal position on remand is governed by Rule 23, 23A and 24 of Order XLI CPC, as settled in Gopalakrishnan v. Ponnappan and Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Ranadhir Chandra Dutta. It is held that item 5 should have been excluded from the preliminary decree, and that the production of Ext.B8 did not necessitate remand. The High Court sets aside the remand order, directs the matter back to proceed in the first appellate court, and notes that the appeals are allowed with no costs. The parties are to appear before the appellate court on 30/09/2022 to continue proceedings.
This Motor Accidents Claims Appeal arises from an award in OP(MV) No.2162/2006 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam dated 26.04.2011, challenging compensation to the claimant for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on 01.03.2004 involving his motorcycle KL-8/G-7431 and a car KL-7/F-4908. The Tribunal awarded Rs.71,167 as compensation and held the appellant 50% contributorily negligent, with Rs.35,584 already granted (half). The appellant contends the Tribunal erred in fixing 50% negligence, relying on Ext.A15 (charge sheet) and asserting that Ext.A14 journal shows the first respondent pleaded guilty; Ext.A3 scene mahazar and other materials were not determinative since Ext.A14 indicates acquittal or guilty plea and cognizance under IPC Sections 279 and 338 was taken. The appellant also argues the 7% disability from the Medical Board was not considered, despite evidence of a comminuted fracture and disability. The insurer defends the Tribunal’s findings, arguing that Ext.A14 and Ext.A15 support contributory negligence and that the compensation awarded was reasonable. The High Court ultimately finds fault with the 50% negligence finding, adjusts the monthly income to Rs.4,500, accepts 7% disability (7% of earnings with multiplier 16), and recalculates total compensation to Rs.1,38,200, directing deposit and payment by the insurer with appropriate court-fee adjustments. The decision clarifies how evidence and prior proceedings influence liability and compensation in MACT appeals.
This is a Motor Accidents Claims Appeal arising from an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pala, in O.P.(M.V.)No.147/2009, for injuries sustained by the claimant in a road accident on 11 October 2008 on National Highway 220 near Kuttikanam Junction. The tribunal held that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the first respondent’s jeep, with the insurer held liable to pay the awarded amount of Rs. 50,589 with interest at 7.5% per annum. The appellant contends that the tribunal erred in method and quantum: it adopted a lower monthly income (Rs.4,000 instead of Rs.6,000) and a lower disability percentage (3% instead of 6%), and failed to adequately compensate various heads such as loss of earnings during treatment, nourishment, clothing, bystander expenses, and pain and suffering. The appellant invokes Ramachandrappa to justify the higher income and relies on Raj Kumar and the Sarla Verma/Pranay Sethi framework to argue for just compensation, including a loss of amenities and appropriate multiplier. After evaluating Exts. A1–A15 and medical evidence, the High Court enhances total compensation to Rs.57,300, with interest at 7.5%, and directs the insurer to pay within two months, along with bank details for payment and party costs.
This appeal before the Kerala High Court arises from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) decision awarding compensation to the appellant for injuries suffered in a car accident on 8 April 2003. The appellant, who was a minor at the time of the incident, sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming substantial damages for injuries including amputation below the knee. The MACT, Attingal, in a common award, partly allowed the petitions and directed the insurer to pay Rs. 4,59,884. The insurer admitted the policy but contested liability and urged that the claimed amount was excessive. The appellant’s counsel argued for greater compensation by acknowledging the severe disability and loss of earning capacity, and by relying on precedents permitting future prospects in serious injury cases. The insurer’s counsel countered the amount and liability. The High Court undertook detailed analysis of disability, notional income for a minor, and the admissibility of future prospects. It fixed the functional disability at 50% in view of amputation and applied a multiplier of 15 with a notional income of Rs. 2,500 per month, while allowing future prospects at 40%. The court enhanced the compensation by Rs. 2,56,600 for disability loss, imposed costs, and directed deposit of the enhanced amount with 7% interest, to be disbursed by the Tribunal after deposit.
Kajahussain, the petitioner, is the accused in Crime No.38/2022 of Kuzhalmannam Excise Range, Palakkad, facing charges under Sections 55(i) and 67B of the Abkari Act for allegedly possessing Indian Made Foreign Liquor in excess of prescribed limits (9.1 litres) seized from a Tata Sumo bearing KL-49A/5828. The bail application, under Section 438 CrPC, was heard on 04.05.2022. The petitioner’s counsel argued that even if the allegations are accepted, no offence is made out; at most possession of contraband liquor beyond prescribed quantity, which may not attract the stated Abkari sections. The petitioner reportedly has no criminal antecedents. The Public Prosecutor opposed bail but conceded lack of antecedents; the central issue remains whether the offences under Sections 55(i) and 67B are made out. The High Court, citing established bail jurisprudence, held that while the offences require consideration, bail can be granted with stringent conditions given the gravity of the case and absence of antecedents. Relying on Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement and Siddharth v. State of UP, and Joginder Kumar, the court emphasized that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, provided conditions ensure fair investigation. Accordingly, the bail is allowed with conditions: appearance before IO, bond of Rs.50,000 with two sureties, restricted travel, no coercion, regular reporting, and possible cancellation for breach. The order underscores cautious, rights-protective bail in non-heinous offenses under the Abkari Act.
The petition is CRP(WAKF) No. 19 of 2022, arising from O.S. No.141 of 2019 before the Wakf Tribunal, Kozhikode, challenging the maintainability of a suit filed for a mandatory injunction to reclaim vacant possession of a Wakf property and to secure consequential injunction. The Wakf Tribunal had held the suit not maintainable under the Wakf Act, and by an order dated 8 October 2021, returned the plaint for non-compliance with Order VII Rule 10 CPC. The petitioner contends that the dispute relates to Wakf and that the Wakf Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate all disputes, questions or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property, including the questions under Sections 6(1) and 7(1), and that the second limb of Section 85 covers matters to be determined by the Tribunal. Citing Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari (2021) 6 KLT 482 (SC), he argues that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction extends to the specified questions and other Wakf-related matters, and that the order is bad in law and should be set aside and the plaint accepted. The Court, after noting the Tribunal’s focus on noncompliance and the settled position on maintainability under Section 83 Wakf Act, disposes of the CRP with a direction that the petitioners may present the plaint before the Wakf Tribunal after curing defects within three weeks from today.
Bindu James, the claimant in O.P.(M.V.) No.113/2009 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kalpetta, appeals from an award of Rs. 64,900 awarded for injuries sustained in a road accident on 23 December 2008 involving Tata Sumo KA-17/A-3614 at Meenangady. The Tribunal held the driver negligent and the insurer liable to indemnify the owner; it awarded Rs. 64,900 with interest at 7.5%. The appellant argues that her daily earnings as a tailor were not properly proven; Ext.A6 suggests Rs. 6,000 monthly income, while the Tribunal fixed a lower figure. The appellant claims that the Medical Board’s 5% permanent whole-body disability underestimates her functional impairment, and seeks to treat it as 10% disability in line with Raj Kumar. She contends that the award should reflect not only medical costs but loss of earning during treatment, bystander expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of amenities. The insurer contends that the policy coverage is established and that the Tribunal correctly adopted the 5% disability and the existing loss calculations. The Kerala High Court, applying Ramachandrappa and Syed Sadiq for income, and Raj Kumar, Sarla Verma, and Pranay Sethi for compensation principles, recalculates. It fixes monthly income at Rs.6,000, applies a 16 multiplier, and, after deducting earlier awards, awards an enhanced total of Rs.1,13,000 with 7.5% interest, directing payment within two months.
ALFA Horizon, a multi-storey commercial complex developed by Alfa Ventures (P) Ltd. at Mulavukad, Ernakulam, was completed by 2017 with an occupancy certificate issued in 2018. With the Real Estate Regulation and Development Act, 2016 (RERA) and Kerala’s Rules coming into force, the Kerala Real Estate Regulatory Authority (K-RERA) began enforcement demanding registration of real estate projects under Section 3 from 01.01.2020. The petitioner challenged notices requiring registration (Ext.P11) on the ground that Alfa Horizon was completed before the Act’s applicability and that occupancy certificates pre-dated registration; it relied on the 1st proviso to Section 3(1) and Ext.P6 clarifications permitting non-registration if not an ongoing project. The respondents argued Alfa Horizon falls within the ambit of an 'ongoing real estate project' and thus must be registered, supported by the statutory definitions of completion certificate (Section 2(q)), competent authority (Section 2(p)) and real estate project (Section 2(zn)) and by Section 20 and related Kerala RERA Rules (2018). The petition also cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP (2021) to argue retroactivity. The High Court, after examining the definitions and the Newtech decision, held the Alfa Horizon project was ongoing as on the date of Section 3’s commencement (01.05.2017) and thus liable to registration, dismissing the writ petition. The ruling underscores retroactive operation of the Act for ongoing projects and consumer protection goals.
The petitioners, three Senior Assistants in Kannur University, claim they belong to the differently-abled category with benchmark disability exceeding 40%. They challenge the University’s denial of promotion to the post of Assistant Section Officer and seek implementation of reservations for Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in promotions, drawing on Supreme Court precedents that promote PwD rights in career progression. They argue that, under the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, posts identifiable for PwD must be reserved and that promotions must be included within reserved posts, citing Siddaraju v. State of Karnataka and Rajeev Kumar Gupta v. Union of India, among others. The respondents contend that there is no statutory rule for reservation in promotions and await government directions; they rely on rules and pending orders, asserting there is no automatic grant of such reservations in promotions. The court reviews the statutory framework (Sections 33-34 of the 2016 Act and Section 32 of the 1995 Act) and contemporary jurisprudence, including Leesamma Joseph, Viklang Sangh, and National Federation of the Blind, concluding that reservation in promotions is required and that identification of promotional posts is a prerequisite. The court ultimately allows the petition, directing expeditious implementation of promotions in line with Siddaraju, Leesamma, and other precedents, within six weeks.
Mat.Appeal Nos. 446 of 2014; 447 of 2014; 448 of 2014 These matrimonial appeals arise from Family Court Ernakulam decisions in O.P. Nos. 968/2010, 1968/2009 and 1993/2009. The appellant Happy Maxwell challenges (i) a decree of declaration that two sale deeds are sham and a prohibition against trespass, (ii) a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery, and (iii) an order for recovery/transfer of a Toyota Innova. The Family Court, after trial, dismissed the declaration petition, granted a divorce on adultery, and ordered repossession of the car, while dismissing the co-ownership petition. The High Court, noting the petitions were tried together with maintenance (M.C. No.138/2010), found serious procedural defects: Exts X1–X3 (medical records) admitted without calling the doctors; the appellant had no effective opportunity to contest evidence; reliance on evidence recorded in M.C. No.138/2010 for the other petitions; and erroneous handling of joint trial under Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. Citing Mukundan v. Katyusha, the court held there is no embargo on joint trials and that such proceedings align with the Act’s objective of speedy justice. The appeals are allowed, with remand to the Family Court for a fresh trial, recall of witnesses, and potential further evidence, with directions to dispose within three months and appearances set for 19.12.2022.
OT.Rev Nos.63/2021, 74/2021 These OT.Revision petitions arise from the Kerala KVAT regime challenging the orders of the Kerala Value Added Tax/Appellate Tribunal Kozhikode (TA(VAT) Nos. 238/2017 and 239/2017) dated 20.01.2021. The petitioner-dealer, engaged in civil and allied works, sought VAT exemption under Section 6(7)(b) of the KVAT Act, 2003 for works executed in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Nellikode, Kozhikode, where ULCCS has engaged the petitioner as a sub-contractor. The three-tier tax authorities rejected the exemption claim. The petitions raise whether the pre-amendment provision barred the exemption and whether the Finance Act, 2014 proviso to Section 6(7)(b) should apply retrospectively to cover sub-contracted works in SEZs, and whether transfer of property in goods under the works contract falls within the exempted category. The petitioners rely on interpretative principles of provisos to argue that the 2014 proviso is curative/clarificatory and retroactive so as to extend relief to the present assessment years. The State contends for a careful application of law and that the Tribunal’s interpretation aligns with statutory intent. The High Court ultimately holds the 2014 proviso to be curative and retrospective in nature, allows the revisions, sets aside the Tribunal’s orders, and remits the cases for fresh merits before the Tribunal.
CRL.M.C Nos. 2052/2019 & 5807/2022 This High Court of Kerala, in a common order dated 23 November 2022, disposed of two Criminal Miscellaneous Cases (Crl.M.C. Nos. 2052/2019 and 5807/2022) arising from Crime No. 461/2017 of the Marayoor Police Station and now pending as C.C. No. 614/2018 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Devikulam. The petitioners, two accused in the crime, sought to quash the final report and further proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The prosecution alleges offences under Sections 328 and 394 read with Section 34 of the IPC, including poisoning and theft. Crucially, the respondents informed the court that a settlement had been reached with the de facto complainant, who had sworn an affidavit (Annexure-A3) expressing no objection to quashing, and that the Station House Officer had verified the settlement’s genuineness. The court observed that the dispute is private in nature, and applying the Gian Singh principle, it is appropriate to exercise inherent jurisdiction under 482 Cr.P.C. where a bona fide settlement exists and continued prosecution would not serve any fruitful purpose. The court highlighted absence of criminal antecedents and concluded that quashing the final report and all further proceedings would be in the interest of justice, ending the case at this stage.
OT.Rev No. 160 of 2020; OT.Rev No. 165 of 2020; OT.Rev No. 164 of 2020; OT.Rev No. 163 of 2020 This batch of four revision petitions under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 arises from orders of the Kerala Value Added Tax Appellate Tribunal, Kozhikode in respect of assessments for the year 2010-11 and related years. The petitioner, M/S. Ideal Developers and Builders Pazhery Plaza, challenges the Tribunal’s orders that denied adjustment of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) credits claimed by the petitioner against tax payable. The core dispute centers on whether the awarder’s deduction of tax at source, evidenced by Form 20F certificates, suffices for adjustment when the awarder did not deposit the deducted tax into the Treasury. The petitioner contends that withholding certificates prove deduction and that non-deposit by the awarder should not preclude the adjustment, asserting rights under Section 10 of the KVAT Act and Rule 42(2) & (8). The respondent State counters that deduction alone does not guarantee adjustment; the statutory obligation on awarders must be read with the KVAT Rules, and the remitted amount must be paid to the proper authority with evidence of remittance for adjustment to be permissible. The court discusses Harsha Constructions v. Commercial Tax Officer and Others, distinguishing it as dealing with a different statutory regime (APGST) and not controlling the KVAT framework. Ultimately, after considering arguments, the revisions are dismissed, with no order as to costs, and the lead decision in OT.Rev.160/2020 is adopted for the batch.
The petitioner Rahees, son of a person with disability and aged over 60, challenges Ext.P8, an eviction order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal under the Kerala Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The background facts show that a local level committee under Section 14 of the National Trust Act, 1999 appointed the 2nd respondent as the legal guardian of the petitioner’s father. The guardian approached the Maintenance Tribunal, which issued an order directing the petitioner to vacate the residential home owned by the father, while allowing visitation and restricting obstruction. The petitioner contends that eviction is not within the Tribunal’s remit and relies on Thoppil Anto v. Glanson T.A and others (2020) and C.K. Vasu v. Circle Inspector of Police and Others (2012) to argue that the Act provides for maintenance, not eviction. The respondents counter that Thoppil Anto supports the notion that the District Magistrate may pass or authorize eviction orders under Rule 19 of the Kerala Maintenance and Welfare of Senior Citizens Rules, 2007. The High Court holds that the Tribunal cannot order eviction (citing C.K. Vasu), but acknowledges Thoppil Anto’s remark that the DM or authorized Tribunal may decide in such matters. Consequently, Ext.P8 is quashed; the petitioner cannot be dispossessed from the 40 cents of property settled in his name, and the DM or Tribunal should pass appropriate orders consistent with law to protect the senior citizen’s right to live with dignity.
