Rajagopal, the revision petitioner, stands convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for issuing a cheque of Rs.78,000 to the complainant with an offer of employment that allegedly failed. The Trial Court sentenced him to three months of simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.80,000, with a default additional three months’ SI. The Sessions Court on appeal upheld the conviction but enhanced the fine to Rs.90,000, directing that the amount be paid to the complainant with compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C. The High Court, in revision, analyzed the power under Sections 397–401 Cr.P.C., emphasising that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and sparing, not an avenue for re‑evaluating evidence absent patent illegality. It underscored the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act and the reverse‑onus principle in Section 139, requiring a probable defence to rebut the presumption. Citing Rangappa, Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel, Kalamani Tex, and Ramrao Chavan, the court also distinguished Krishna Janardhan Bhat’s observations. The court concluded that the revision petition fails to demonstrate a reversible error, and dismissed it. Consequently, the appellate and trial court judgments remain intact, and the sentence must be executed, notwithstanding prior conditional orders not complied with by the petitioner.
This group of Original Petitions arises from a common order passed by the Kerala Administrative Tribunal on 18.06.2018 (in OA/ID Nos. including OA 922/2018) concerning the general transfer of HSST/HSST (Junior) teachers for the year 2018-2019 under the Higher Secondary Education Department. The petitioners, the State of Kerala and the Director of Higher Secondary Education, challenge the Tribunal’s directions which directed reconsideration of the provisional transfer list, in light of earlier government orders and expert-committee recommendations, and to publish a revised draft list with an objection window and a final list by 31.08.2018, extending to 25.10.2018. The Respondents (teachers) had challenged the manner of implementation of the transfer norms, not the norms themselves. The Tribunal had relied on GO(Rt).5035/2015, GO(P).06/2017/G.Edn, and the expert-committee recommendations from GO dated 26.10.2015 to rectify anomalies and ensure a fair, transparent process, avoiding arbitrariness as required by Article 14. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, reviewed whether the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction and held that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction mirrors Article 226 of the Constitution and that there was no illegality in the common order. The petitions are disposed of with directions to proceed in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions, and the final transfer list deadline extended to 25 October 2018.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. by the second accused in S.T. No. 96/2014, Thrissur, challenging a conviction for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) and the appellate affirmation of that conviction. The trial court convicted the second accused (ex-Managing Director of Sowmy Kuries and Loans (P) Ltd) for issuing a cheque dishonoured for Rs. 75,000 towards part payment of a chit prize; the First Additional Sessions Court, Thrissur, and the High Court upheld the conviction. The revision petitions contend that the company was in liquidation and therefore the criminal prosecution should be stayed, invoking the principle that liquidation affects “other legal proceedings” under Section 446 of the Companies Act. The petitioner relies on Poly K. Ayyampalli v. Pradeep Kumar to argue that such proceedings cannot proceed against a company in liquidation. The court surveys a chain of decisions on revisional jurisdiction and NI Act presumptions, reiterating that the High Court’s revisional power is supervisory and not an appellate reappraisal, and that NI Act presumptions under sections 118 and 139 are rebuttable with a standard of proof of preponderance of probabilities. Ultimately, the Court holds that liquidation does not bar NI Act prosecutions and upholds the lower courts’ verdicts, dismissing the revision, while ordering compensation to be paid and deferring the default sentence.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case in which Manoj, a practicing advocate, seeks to quash proceedings in Crime No. 384/2019 of Edathwa Police Station, arising from an incident at St. Aloysius College, Edathwa, on 25 March 2019 during an inquiry into a complaint against the college principal. The de facto complainant, a Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, alleged that the petitioner and other accused conspired to obstruct her official duties, with the petitioner acting as a legal advisor and allegedly insulting her, threatening consequences, and hindering the inquiry. The prosecution charged offences under Sections 353, 509, 120B read with 34 IPC, as well as later references to Sections 506, 341 and 503/other provisions. The petitioner argued that even if the allegations are accepted, they do not satisfy the elements of these offences, particularly Section 353, which requires assault or use of criminal force to deter a public servant in the execution of duty; mere words or professional status do not amount to the requisite force. The court reviews several precedents, including Hariprasad and Another v. State of Kerala, Prasanth v. State of Kerala, Ashish s/o Yuvraj Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, Rev. Fr. Mathew Pulimoottil Episcopa v. State of Kerala, Basheer v. State of Kerala, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill, Jose v. Subramanyan, and the Bhajan Lal framework, to assess whether the allegations prima facie establish offences or constitute abuse of process. Finding no compelling evidence of the essential elements, the High Court holds the proceedings would amount to abuse of process and quashes them, exercising inherent powers under Bhajan Lal categories. The decision is delivered by Justice M.R.Anitha as a Single Judge.
These batch writ appeals challenge the retrospective amendment to Section 42(3) of the KVAT Act introduced by the Kerala Finance Act, 2016, and seek to limit the reopening of time-barred assessments under the VAT regime. The court examines whether Section 42(3) can revive assessments whose limitations have expired, how the phrase “treated as pending” operates, and the relationship between Section 42(3) and Sections 21–25 of the KVAT Act. It considers the government’s contention that retrospective amendments are within the Legislature’s competence and that the amendment is to ensure certainty in assessment processes, clarifying the scope of reopening in a GST-transition era. The dealers contend that retroactivity defeats vested rights, erodes time limits, and creates an indefinite power to reopen, undermining the statutory framework for assessment and self-assessment. The bench relies on constitutional interpretation principles and precedents on retrospective legislation, the primacy of the statute’s text, and the need for reasonable limitations. It holds that retrospective operation is permissible but must be bounded within harmonized limits, cannot undo five-year caps under Section 25, and must respect vested rights. The judgment dismisses the writ appeals, upholds the common order, and emphasizes a coherent interpretation of KVAT in the GST era.
This Kerala High Court supervision petition arises from an interim custody order of the Family Court, Thrissur, in GOP No. 1076 of 2022, which granted overnight custody of a four-year-old girl to the father. The petitioners—mother Sajna P.J. and others—challenge Ext. P6, dated 02.09.2022, which permitted custody from 11.00 a.m. on the second Saturday to 4.00 p.m. on the following Sunday during Onam and Christmas vacations and during the first ten days of April and May. The petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution, seeking supervisory relief. The respondent-father counters that he must have proper contact with the child to preserve social, physical, and psychological ties, and that the child’s welfare requires his involvement. The court canvasses the welfare principle, relying on Supreme Court authorities such as Yashita Sahu and Vasudha Sethi to reiterate that the child’s welfare is paramount and that custody decisions must weigh all circumstances, including visitation rights. The High Court concludes that, in the present facts, overnight custody should not be granted before establishing visitation; it modifies Ext. P6 to grant visitation on alternate Saturdays (11:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m.), with handover at Mathilakam Masjid, and a two‑month period to reassess custody, plus daily phone contact (5:00–7:00 p.m.) for 15–20 minutes.
Joby P.G., the claimant in O.P.(MV) No.59/2009 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, seeks enhancement of compensation for injuries suffered in a road accident on 16 October 2008 when his motorcycle KL-44/3913 was struck by a bus KL-40/A-8355. The Tribunal held the bus driver negligent and the insurer liable, awarding Rs 1,46,297 with 8% interest, though the total claimed was Rs 2,42,500 and the court fee was limited to Rs 1,60,000. The appellant contends that the award undervalues damages in light of the injuries, disability and economic loss, and that the notional income should reflect 2008-era conditions. The insurer argues the compensation claimed is excessive. The High Court surveys the constitutional standard of 'just compensation' and the Supreme Court jurisprudence on awards of damages (notably State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur; Pranay Sethi) and applies notional income assessments based on Ramachandrappa and Syed Sadiq decisions. It re-fixes the claimant’s notional monthly income at Rs 5,000, adopts a multiplier of 18 for a 23-year-old, and recalculates heads for loss of earnings, disability, loss of amenities, medical expenses, travel, attendant care, pain and suffering, and future income. The result is an enhanced total of Rs 83,350 as additional compensation, with Rs 39,500 more for loss of earning, Rs 32,400 for disability, and Rs 1,000–1,500 adjustments for other heads, plus interest. The insurer must pay within two months after certified copy.
WP(C) Nos. 82/2021, 155/2021, 509/2021, 496/2021, 497/2021, 489/2021, 285/2021, 318/2021 This is a batch of writ petitions filed by Trivandrum Club, a society registered under the Travancore Cochin Literary and Scientific Charitable Societies Act, 1955, challenging a common Labour Court order dated 19.11.2020 that quashed the domestic enquiry into misconduct of several Club employees. The Labour Court held that the enquiry was defective, pre-planned, and that the officer failed to address each of the 12 charges separately, thus rendering the enquiry arbitrary. The Petitions (WP(C) Nos. 82/2021 et al.) argue that the Labour Court erred in issuing a common preliminary award on eight/several disputes and that the charges were not properly dealt with, contending the enquiry officer’s approach compromised due process. The High Court, however, in a single-judge decision, refrained from interfering with the Labour Court’s preliminary order, noting the Division Bench’s view in Chelamattom Sree Krishna Swami Devaswom Trust v. State of Kerala that parties challenging preliminary orders should be relegated to the Labour Court with liberty to challenge the preliminary order along with the final award. The court observed that the Labour Court’s award does not exhibit perversity or resulting failure of justice and disposed of the writ petitions, reserving the petitioners’ right to challenge the preliminary order along with the final order as per the cited authority. The judgments underscore deference to the Labour Court in pre-empting final adjudication, while preserving a pathway to challenge at the final stage.
An Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the Kerala High Court’s supervisory stance in a Family Court execution matter. Sukumaran, the 2nd judgment-debtor in E.P.75/2017 in O.P.212/2007, seeks to stall further execution and obtain restoration of a previously dismissed Mat.Appeal (861/2008). He contends that the lapse of his counsel led to default and that Ext.P4 (Restoration Petition) and the order of readmission are pending, hence a stay of proceedings should be ordered pending Ext.P4. The proceedings in E.P.75/2017 are thus sought to be kept in abeyance until these ancillary applications are decided. The Court cites Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi to emphasize that Article 227 grants supervisory powers but must be exercised with restraint and within constitutional bounds, not as a tool to correct every error as a “bull in a china shop.” It also relies on Subaida v. Deputy Tahsildar (RR), which describes the power under Article 227 as discretionary and to be exercised sparingly to uphold public confidence in judicial administration, with limitations in interfering with interlocutory orders. Ultimately, the petition is held not maintainable as a pure stay remedy, but the Court uses its inherent power to direct the Family Court to decide EA No.1/2022 in EP 75/17 within two weeks and keep the execution proceedings in abeyance until then.
This petition concerns an execution challenge under Section 47 CPC by the decree-holder in OS 153/2002 (Sub Court, Attingal) against an order dated 07.01.2016 by which E.A. No. 229/2011 in EP 73/2007 was allowed to set aside the sale of item No.2 of the decree schedule. The suit for money (O.S. 153/2002) decreed the plaintiff’s entitlement to realise Rs.1,25,220 with interest on Rs.1,20,000 at 6% per annum, charging decree schedule properties. Item Nos.1 and 2 were charged; item No.2 is claimed by the respondent as belonging to the wife of the deceased debtor, Venu, and not liable for the debt. The respondent, with others, challenged the liability of item No.2 in AS 16/2011, which the District Court dismissed for default; subsequently, the executing court permitted EA 229/2011 to set aside sale of item No.2. The petitioner argues that Sec.47 governs questions arising in execution only and cannot adjudicate ownership, which ought to have been raised in appeal or separate proceedings, and that the decree’s liability over item No.2 cannot be turned into a matter of execution. The Kerala High Court found the lower court’s order unsustainable under Sec.47, emphasized that Sec.47 deals with execution, discharge, or satisfaction and not broad challenges to the decree itself, and quashed the impugned order, allowing the petition with no cost order.
This Kerala High Court bail petition concerns two accused in Crime No.219 of 2025, Pallikkathode Police Station, Kottayam. The petitioners, DEEPU N.B. and ADARSH DEEPU, are charged under multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhitha (BNS) for alleged acts of violence on 06.03.2025 near a pan shop, including injuring the informant with a wooden log and twisting his arm; the informant sustained grievous hurt. The petitioners have been in custody since 06.03.2025. They contend that the incident did not occur as described and seek bail with stringent conditions. The Public Prosecutor opposes bail but notes there are no criminal antecedents against the petitioners. The High Court weighs the seriousness of the allegations against the petitioners’ liberty: indefinite incarceration is not necessary when there is no antecedent and the accused are willing to comply with conditions. Citing established bail jurisprudence, the court recalls that bail is the rule and jail the exception, citing Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement, Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, and Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement. The court further invokes Anzar Azeez v. State of Kerala to apply relevant principles. Ultimately, the court allows bail on conditions: Rs. 50,000 bond with two sureties, appearance before IO, restrictions on travel, no further offences, and termination of bail if conditions are violated.
Mat.Appeal No. 503 of 2014; OS 360/2000; Mat.Appeal No. 949 of 2017; OS 360/2000 (Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram) Chandrika, the appellant-wife, challenged two Matrimonial Appeals (Mat.Appeal Nos. 503 of 2014 and 949 of 2017) arising from OS 360/2000, a Family Court partition suit at Thiruvananthapuram. The marriage took place on 6 November 1988 and produced two children. The core dispute was whether the jointly purchased property, with a house constructed thereon, should be partitioned, with Chandrika contending that the funds for acquisition came from the sale of her gold ornaments and parental contributions, and therefore she was entitled to the entire property or to a reserved portion. The Family Court, after considering the evidence (PW1, RW1, RW2) and documentary Exts A1–A9, B1–B3 and C1, C3, found no reliable proof that Chandrika solely funded the purchase, and thus decreed partition of the property. Chandrika’s challenge relied on the assertion that her gold ornaments financed the purchase; the husband’s income during the relevant period was disputed. The High Court, noting Chandrika’s contradictory statements before the Women’s Commission and the Court, held that the property was purchased with funds from both spouses and rejected the reservation claim. It relied on Pathumma and Others v. Muhammed (2015 (1) KHC 756) to reiterate that reservation at preliminary decree cannot be granted absent exclusive rights. The Advocate Commissioner’s report valued the property, and the final decree divided it into two plots, with Plot No.1 allotted to Chandrika (including the building). The appeals were dismissed, upholding the partition.
Joy Scaria v. Meenachil Grama Panchayat is a Kerala High Court writ petition challenging Ext.P26, the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions' order rejecting the petitioner’s appeal against a building permit granted for an M-Sand unit. The petitioner argues the access road serving the site does not have the mandated width of seven metres, rendering the building permit illegal since mandatory requirements, including Rule 61(4) of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011, were not satisfied. He contends the roadway width must be maintained even where it runs along bridges, citing various decisions to support the mandatory nature of the road width and compliance with statutory norms. He also relies on this Court’s own precedents (including Joy Scaria v. Meenachil Grama Panchayat Committee; Seana Shanth v. Union of India; Joice Joseph v. Ayarkunnam Grama Panchayat) and other foreign cases like Ravindra Ramchandra Waghmare and Kunal Saha to bolster the position that the access road width and related procedural compliance cannot be ignored. The respondents counter that the petitioner is a foreign citizen with restricted constitutional rights, that Ext.P26 challenges only the order of the Tribunal, and that the building permit is supported by layout approvals and licenses; the appeal was time-barred and the writ petition is not maintainable. The Court dismissed the petition, noting the petitioner’s non-citizen status and limited rights.
This Original Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenges the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) Ext.P21 final order dated 18-05-2022 in OA(Ekm) No.1268/2020, which dismissed the petition. The petitioners, Shalu Varghese and Prabitha C. (applicants), approached the High Court seeking directions to notify and fill vacancies for the post of Legal Assistant Grade II in the Law Department, Government Secretariat, Kerala. They contended that the cadre strength for Legal Assistants Grade II should be 122 posts (as per Annexure A11 doctrine) and that 93 advices had already been given from Annexure A2 ranklist dated 25-09-2017, which expired on 24-09-2020, leaving 29 substantive vacancies unaccounted for. They claimed interim relief and argued that 60 vacancies were provisionally reported to PSC before lapse of the ranklist, these must be treated as substantive and that the remaining vacancies arising in 2021-2023 should be filled from Annexure A2. The State Government countered that cadre strength is fixed at 93 posts with 31 allocated to Legal Assistant Grade II as per GO (MS) No.82/2016; Rule 7(2) and Rule 13 of PSC Rules govern the retention and validity of ranklists. The High Court, after examining the factual matrix and relevant constitutional and procedural rules, upheld the Tribunal’s decision, observing that (i) cadre strength fixed at 93 cannot be inflated to 122, (ii) the ranklist expired, (iii) the new ranklist finalized in 2023 indicates ongoing recruitment, and (iv) equal opportunity principles do not mandate filling all vacancies from an expired list. The petition is dismissed with finality, leaving the Tribunal’s extant order intact.
Mat.Appeal No.1189 of 2017; OP(Div.)455/2015 The Kerala High Court hears Mat.Appeal No.1189 of 2017 challenging the Family Court, Pathanamthitta’s 2015 Order in OP (Div.) 455/2015. The couple married on 30.08.2003; no issue was born. The husband contends matrimonial cruelty by the respondent, who allegedly insulted and denied sexual relations due to his congenital absence of sperm ducts and infertility, while the wife cooperated with infertility treatment. The wife denies cruelty, asserts cooperation with treatment, and admits separation since 2014, noting she had demanded Rs.30 lakh to agree to mutual divorce. The Family Court found the relationship strained but held that irretrievable breakdown is not a ground for divorce and that the husband failed to prove cruelty. The appellant contends that the marriage has irretrievably broken down and that public policy and judicial precedent permit dissolution where salvage seems impossible, citing Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh and Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli. It is argued that even though the wife received monetary claims (Rs.17.5 lakh plus transfers), she remains unwilling to join a joint petition, which the appellant contends constitutes cruelty. The High Court, applying the cited precedents, finds the marriage wrecked beyond salvage and accordingly allows the appeal, dissolving the marriage solemnized on 30.08.2003. No costs are awarded. The decision emphasizes that continued wedlock where the relationship is deadwood serves neither party and may amount to cruelty.”
This writ petition filed by the Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Association seeks declaratory and procedural relief to treat Assistant Public Prosecutors (APAs) as eligible advocates for appointment as Special Public Prosecutors (SPPs) in Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs) established for expeditious trial of offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). The petition relies on government orders and High Court directions (Exts. P1–P2) that set up 28 FTSCs with one SPP per court, to be appointed contractually under Section 24(4) CrPC and Section 32 of the POCSO Act, and to be functionalized by March 2020. It argues that senior and experienced APAs, including Deputy Directors of Prosecution, are qualified advocates who should be considered for such posts, invoking precedents like Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik and others, emphasizing that a public prosecutor on the rolls of the Bar Council is an advocate eligible for posts. Respondents contend there is no regular cadre of prosecuting officers in Kerala, appointments followed due process under Section 24(4) CrPC and the POCSO Rules, and that the petition lacks locus standi. They rely on limitations in the cadre and on prior judgments such as John v. State of Kerala and State of Kerala v. Saju George. The court holds that while the cause merits policy consideration, Kerala has no regular cadre; nevertheless, the issue may be revisited upon proper representation. Accordingly, substantial prayers are disallowed and the petition is disposed, with leave to the petitioner to file a representation for cadre formation for proper consideration by the Government.
This is a criminal revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. by the sole accused Preethy Reji challenging concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for issuance of a cheque for Rs. 56,875 dated 08.01.2018 which was dishonoured. The case arises from a chitty transaction in which the accused, wife of Reji K.K., stood as guarantor for her husband’s default. The complainant Allianz Financial Corporation had conducted a chitty; the husband was a subscriber and obtained a prize of Rs. 34,000; upon default, the accused issued the cheque to discharge the liability. The trial court convicted the accused under S.138 NI Act and ordered payment of the cheque amount as compensation; the Sessions Court affirmed. In revision, the petitioner contends that the chitty business may have operated without licence and that the accused, a non-working housewife, acted as guarantor without proper consideration of those facts. She offers to deposit 80% of the liability (Rs. 45,500) if given breathing time. The High Court, reiterating the limits of revisional jurisdiction (not being a second appellate or a fact-reappraisal forum), cites leading Supreme Court decisions to emphasize that the court should not reweigh evidence except in cases of gross miscarriage of justice. The court ultimately dismisses the revision petition but grants two months’ time to comply with the sentence and defers execution.
S.A. Nos.659 and 751 of 1996 These second appeals arise from a partition suit in which Malaya kammala families of Cochin contested the law applicable to their personal property. The trial court and the first appellate court had held that Malaya kammalas followed Hindu Mitakshara law modified by custom, with daughters potentially entitled to equal shares in the family property if not married under the kudivaippu form with streedhanam. The parties, who are kammalas domiciled in Cochin, urged that Mitakshara law in its pure form is inapplicable and that customary law and sub-divisional distinctions among kammalas (Malaya-la kammalas, Pandi kammalas, ordinary kammalas) govern inheritance. The High Court, by a reference from a learned single judge, examined authorities from Travancore and Cochin and concluded that for Cochin kammalas prior to 1956 the governing personal law is Mitakshara law as modified by custom, not the Travancore/Malabar variants. It relied on Lilly Mercilin Lewis v. Chanji Nani (1954 KLT 631) and the four essential attributes of custom from Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari to evaluate evidence of custom, distinguishing Travancore-era authorities such as Kittu Eacharan, Parameswaran Asari Sanku Asari, Thankammal and Damodaran. The court thus allowed the appeals, dismissed the cross-appeals, and held that the Cochin kammalas are governed by Mitakshara law modified by custom; the other contentious issues were left untroubled. Neutral citation not provided.
This intra-court appeal arises from a writ petition (WP(C) 8675/2020) challenging a Single Judge’s order granting police protection to protect petitioners from alleged obstruction by the appellant, Sasi, in demolishing sheds on plots part of a property claimed by the writ petitioners Lovely and Jimmy. The petitioners had obtained Lok Adalat settlement Ext.P3 in OS No.152/2009 leading to specific exchange of properties and a monetary sum; Ext.P4 execution petition sought two-fold relief: (i) a delivery notice and dismantling/removal of the shed in plot A by the judgment debtor (Sasi), and (ii) actual delivery of the plaint B schedule property. While delivery of plot A occurred, the first limb (demolishing the shed) was not completed by the execution court, and disputes about the exact demarcation of plots persisted. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, held that police protection cannot substitute unfinished execution proceedings, and that discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be used to complete such tasks. The impugned grant of police protection was set aside to the extent it attempted to compel demolition; however, directions were issued to consider reopening EP and to encourage mediated settlement, with safeguards against recurrences of encroachment. The appeal ends with disposal of the writ appeal and directions for remedy in accordance with law.
This petition challenges the seniority and promotion prospects of the petitioner, Ramesh M.E., a confirmed staff member of Velom Higher Secondary School, Cherapuram. The core dispute centers on whether the 7th respondent, Smt. V. R. Ajithakumari, who availed leave without allowance abroad for about a decade (02.07.1997 to 01.07.2007) and who remained outside the establishment for extended periods, should be treated as ceasing to be in service under Rule 56(4) of Chapter XIV(A) Kerala Education Rules (KER). The petitioner argues that continuous absence of five years, with or without leave, triggers automatic cessation, and therefore the 7th respondent’s post and seniority should be erased from Ext. P1 (seniority list as on 01.01.2019), prompting a revision of seniority to promote the petitioner to the post of Headmaster. The respondents rely on Ext. P10 (G.O. 2022) and various rulings (notably Sreedevi Amma, Devaky, Elsy Poomman) to contend that leave without allowance for a long period can be reckoned for seniority, and that belated challenges to seniority are barred under the “sit back” doctrine (Sajeeve N.J.), while stressing that due process under Rule 75 of KER must be observed for terminations. The High Court examines the interplay of rules (KER, KSR) and prior judgments, upholding Ext. P10 and dismissing the petition, thereby maintaining the seniority order and denying the petitioner relief for promotion.
