This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No.1903/2017) before the High Court of Kerala, challenging the cognizance taken in CC No.761/2016 by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam. Accused 1 and 2 (D. Jayakumar and J. Paul Pradeep Kumar) contend that the original complaint (MP No.100/2007) filed by the defacto complainant (Selvaraj) led to Crime No.18/2007 and that the matter was referred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to CBCID after a preliminary report by the police, which concluded the complaint to be vexatious. The court below later issued cognizance following a protest complaint filed by the defacto complainant, based on Annexure-VI proceedings. The petition challenges whether the learned Magistrate properly considered Annexure-III (refer report) and Annexure-IV (final report) before taking cognizance; it relies on jurisprudence like Parameswaran Nair v. Surendran and Another (2009 (1) KHC 801) which emphasizes that the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. must be considered, and a protest complaint is not a substitute that vitiates cognizance. The High Court ultimately sets aside Annexure-VI, remitting the matter to the lower court to reconsider in light of the principles in Parameswaran Nair’s case, thereby ensuring proper application of refer/final reports in cognizance decisions.
This Kerala High Court jail appeal challenges the conviction of the accused for multiple offences arising from the 9 October 2014 assault at the residence of PW2 and his wife, Shylaja, at M.S. Palace, Kilimanoor. The Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram, in SC No.527/2015, convicted Dileep Kumar under Sections 302, 307, 394, 397 and 449 IPC, while acquitting under Section 201 IPC and holding that the accused was entitled to set off under Section 432 Cr.P.C. The High Court, in a Division Bench, heard the appeal on 13 June 2023 and delivered judgment on 3 July 2023. The prosecution alleged that the accused entered the home under the pretext of pledging gold, attacked PW2 with a hammer (MO1), inflicted fatal head injuries on Shylaja, and stole valuables including gold ornaments and cash totaling about ₹19 lakhs, destroying evidence thereafter. The defence contends that the evidence only shows an aggravated assault on PW2 and that crucial circumstantial links to Shylaja’s death are weak, with several inconsistencies and unexplained gaps, notably regarding MO1 and MO14, the timing of events, and the almirah contents. The court scrutinised the chain of circumstances and the forensic and testimonial material, including the last-seen-before-the-crime narrative, and found that the proof for murder under 302 IPC did not meet the required standard beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed: the 302 IPC conviction is set aside, while the convictions under 449, 307 and 394 IPC are affirmed, and interlocutory applications are to stand closed. The decision reinforces that last-seen-together alone cannot sustain a murder conviction without robust corroboration.
This writ petition challenges pension benefits under the Employees’ Provident Scheme, specifically seeking higher pension benefits under the 2014 amendment. The petitioners, a group of retired employees from HIL Consumer Co-operative Store Ltd., contend that the amended scheme provides for enhanced pension and seeks relief consistent with the amended framework. The court situates the petition within the broader backdrop of the Employees’ Provident Scheme and acknowledges the jurisprudence surrounding the 2014 amendment, noting that the validity of the amended scheme was upheld by the Supreme Court in Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation and Another v. Sunil Kumar.B. The respondents, represented by senior government counsels, argue that after the Supreme Court’s validation of the amended scheme, petitioners may file fresh applications under the amended scheme, which can be considered in accordance with the directions in the judgment. The bench, recording the stance of the parties, appears to adopt a pragmatic route: allow the petitioners to submit fresh applications seeking enhanced pension under the amended scheme and direct the appropriate authority to consider them without delay. The decision underscores adherence to the amended scheme and directs expeditious evaluation of any subsequent application.
WP(C) Nos. 38755 and 38790 of 2022 Two writ petitions challenge the Pharmacy Council of India's refusal to grant approvals for starting Diploma in Pharmacy courses on the ground that the applicants did not produce the required Consent of Affiliation from the Examinating Authority. The petitioners, educational agencies running B.Pharm and seeking to commence D.Pharm courses, allege that PCI rejected their applications solely for lack of consent of affiliation, despite the Examining Authority’s non-response to prior inquiries. They rely on the decision in Principal, DM Wims College of Pharmacy v. Pharmacy Council of India (2022) 2 KLT 567 to contend that the Scheme for approval of D.Pharm under Section 12 of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and the Education Regulations, 2020 do not mandatorily require such consent, and that the PCI overstepped by applying that ground. The PCI and state counsel defend the scheme as a prudent safeguard to prevent situations where examinations might be jeopardized if the Examining Authority refuses or delays exams after approval. The court, having examined the Regulations and the cited decision, holds that the consent requirement is at best directory and not mandatory, and directs the PCI to consider the applications on merits after inspections, expeditiously, not later than one month from the date of judgment, and to include the petitioners’ institutions in the approved list if compliance is found.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal under MACA No. 3303 of 2014, heard by the Kerala High Court. The appellants—Bindu T., Abhija (a minor) represented by her mother, and Radhamani—sought enhancement of compensation following the death of Anil Kumar, who was the husband of the first appellant and father of the second appellant, in a road collision on 26 December 2011 involving an autorickshaw (KL11/AE-837) and a car owned by Cross Freight India Pvt. Ltd. The vehicle accident, in which the car allegedly driven negligently by the 2nd respondent was involved, resulted in fatal injuries treated at the Medical College Hospital, Kozhikode. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode, had awarded Rs. 6,60,000 with 8% interest and directed the 3rd respondent (insurer) to satisfy the award. The Tribunal’s assessment relied on Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and various heads including loss of dependency, funeral expenses, loss of estate, and love/affection. The High Court systematically applied the principles laid down in Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi, along with subsequent case law (Ramachandrappa, Syed Sadiq, Reshma Kumari), to re-fix notional income, account for future prospects, apply the appropriate multiplier (15), and make proportional deductions for personal living expenses. The result is a substantial upward revision of the compensation, including enhanced conventional heads (loss of estate, funeral expenses, loss of love and affection) under the Magma framework, with an overall additional compensation of Rs.9,26,750, plus interest, and a direction for disbursement within two months.
BAIL APPL. NO. 1790 OF 2023; BAIL APPL. NO. 1797 OF 2023 Pribin Shajan, the petitioner/accused in bail petitions No. 1790/2023 and 1797/2023, is arraigned as the 6th and 7th accused in two ORs of Mupliyam Forest Station, Thrissur, concerning alleged sandalwood theft from a Notified Reserve Forest. The common allegations are about transport of sandalwood cut and removed in the two crimes, with the accused allegedly discharging the role of moving the wood in his taxi. The petitioner contends his involvement is limited to transporting sandalwood entrusted by a confessor, Thomas Midhun, and possibly by associates Manu and another friend, with no role in the actual theft or procurement. He relies on his lack of direct involvement and the confession statement’s limited thrust to show innocence. The State contends otherwise, arguing the petitioner had knowledge of the transport of sandalwood from within the forest, where taxi usage is prohibited, and that he is closely associated with a notorious sandalwood offender (Veerappan Joy). Given these factors, the court acknowledges the need for investigation and custodial interrogation but finds that anticipatory bail can be granted with strict conditions to ensure cooperation and prevent interference with witnesses. The order permits the petitioner to be released on bail subject to specified conditions, including surrender, vehicle production, bonds, and regular appearance for interrogation and reporting while safeguarding the investigation framework.
The petitioner, T O Sooraj, is the fourth accused in VACB case V.C.01/2019 and has challenged Ext. P1, the vigilance enquiry report, and Ext. P2, the FIR, in VACB Ernakulam Unit, arising from alleged irregularities in the Palarivattom Flyover project on NH-66. The flyover opened in 2016 and soon developed potholes and cracks. A government letter-led chain of directions culminated in a vigilance enquiry by VACB; Ext. P1 found fault with the project, alleging conspiratorial acts by several entities including KRFB, RBDCK, KITCO, and the contractor. The enquiry led to an FIR (Ext. P2) for offences under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act and Section 120B IPC. The petitioner contends that Section 17A of the PC Act, inserted in 2018, requires prior government approval for enquiries into offences relatable to recommendations or decisions by a public servant, and that Ext. P1 and the FIR are therefore invalid for lack of such approval. The respondents submit that the government ordered the enquiry, and that once prior approval was granted for the preliminary enquiry, it is not necessary to obtain it again for FIR registration or investigation if cognizable offences are disclosed. The High Court examines Section 17A’s scope, the executive chain of authority, and the protective aims of 17A, concluding that Ext. P1 and Ext. P2 need not be quashed and dismissing the writ petition. The judgment relies on constitutional and statutory precedents on the Governor’s role, rules of business, and anti-corruption doctrine.
This writ petition (C) challenges Ext.P10, an appellate authority’s order dismissing an application to renew a gun license issued under Form No.3 (Ext.P4) for the petitioner, who is an agriculturalist with documented awards and agricultural activities. The petitioner contends Ext.P4 was issued for self/crop protection and seeks renewal for crop protection to safeguard crops from wildlife; he argues renewal must be governed by Section 15 of the Arms Act and revocation under Section 14, and that he already holds another license for self-protection (barrel loaded). The appellate authority reportedly rejected the renewal, and the petitioner asserts the order ignores directions from a prior judgment (Ext.P9) and the dictum in Chandran Nair v. Addl. District Magistrate and Muhammed Shafi v. District Collector. The Government Pleader counters that Form No.3 ordinarily licenses sport/protection/display and, despite the “self/crop” annotation, it cannot be treated as a crop-protection license; no independent evidence of agricultural activity requiring crop protection is produced, and crop protection licenses are typically under Form No.4 (old Form No.5) under Rule 35 of the Arms Rules, 2016. The court finds confusion in Ext.P4’s labeling, but directs a fresh, reasoned reconsideration by the appellate authority, allowing the petitioner to adduce additional documents, and to hear the matter expeditiously (within three months), while keeping all contentions open, including Sec.3 Arms Act considerations.
WP(C) Nos. 17180/2021; 17247/2021; 18249/2021 (and connected cases) These connected writ petitions challenge a common order dated 16 August 2021 by the Vice-Chancellor of the Cochin University of Science and Technology, which sought to regulate the status of sweeper-cum-cleaner posts held by temporary daily wage workers. The petitioners had secured ranks in a 2018 rank list based on a 2010 written test and subsequent interview; despite long service, they were not absorbed on regular posts. They claimed that the interim arrangement had become a de facto regularization, and that the proposed 240-day cap-plus-disengagement violates their right to continuity and the pay scale. They sought permanency in service or, at minimum, continuation on the pay scale until regular appointments are made. The respondents argued that daily wage engagements are regulated by the 2015 University Order, limiting such engagements to 240 days per year and that there were no regular vacancies; they contended the court's direction in earlier cases had to be respected, with no right to regularization. The court found that the impugned order was inconsistent with the court's own directions and with the principle that ad hoc arrangements should not simply be replaced by new ad hoc engagements. It held that petitioners should be continued in service, with minimum pay, until regular appointments are made, and that regularization should be guided by the last-come, first-go principle; the order was quashed and the petitions allowed. The court thus preserves service continuity and directs the University to fill posts through regular appointments while respecting pay scales.
This writ petition (criminal) under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed in the Kerala High Court by Asif Azad, party-in-person, challenging the conduct of public servants and seeking drastic reliefs against the Union of India, the State of Kerala, and several police officers. The petitioner prayed for a writ of mandamus directing suspension of respondents 3–38 from official duties on grounds of undue influence, disobedience of law, and violation of constitutional oath, and also sought directions to the Registrar of the High Court not to intervene in constitutional rights, while insisting writ petitions be registered purely on merits, irrespective of nomenclature. Allegations included influencing others to destroy his life, forged signatures on government security documents, and alleged influence inside the court, with Ext. P2 (order of a Magistrate dismissing a complaint) referenced to bolster the narrative. The pleadings, however, were found vague, lacking specific acts by the respondents, and bereft of substantiation of any concrete right infringed. The court noted the petitioner had prior filings and alleged similar matters, and observed that access to justice cannot be misused as a license to file frivolous petitions. Citing a Supreme Court principle, the court held the petition to be without merit, dismissing it with costs of Rs.25,000 to the Kerala Legal Services Authority. Corrigendum clarifies terminology of Kerala court rules. The petition is thus dismissed.
CRL.M.C Nos. 6796 & 7565 of 2022 These petitions (CRL.M.C. Nos. 6796/2022 and 7565/2022) arise from Section 145 Cr.P.C disputes concerning the administration and possession of the Sree Dharma Sastha Temple, Poonthura, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioners challenge summonses in Annexures-2 and -3, alleging they were issued to accused persons without proper opportunity and that representation through pleaders was unduly restricted. The background involves two groups contending for temple management, with police reports indicating law-and-order problems. Prior orders allowed appearance by pleader (30.09.2022) and stayed or deferred certain proceedings (22.10.2022; 27.10.2022 interim stay). On 27.11.2022, a further order stopped proceedings under Section 145, prompting these Crl.M.Cs. The court undertakes a jurisdictional analysis: it endorses the principle that when a dispute concerns possession of temple properties and there is a threat to law and order, the Sub Divisional Magistrate (SDM) retains jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr.P.C to continue proceedings and issue appropriate orders, subject to any interim or final orders of competent Civil Courts. It cites St. George Syrian Church, Mannathur and Another v. Revenue Divisional Officer (2013) KHC 36 as authority that pending civil litigation does not automatically bar Section 145 proceedings, so long as no civil interim orders affect the rights of the parties. The court disposes of the petitions, directing the SDM to continue proceedings where necessary and allowing parties to appear through pleaders, with all actions subject to civil court orders.
This bail petition, filed by the third accused in Crime No.22/2022 of Nilambur Excise Range Office, Malappuram, under the NDPS Act, is heard by a single judge of the Kerala High Court. The prosecution information, conveyed by the Excise Commissioner on 11.09.2022, alleged that Aslamudheen (1st accused), his wife Shifna N.K., Muhammed Sadath and another were transporting contraband MDMA in three vehicles — a Jeep, a Scooter, and a Pulsar — and that 75.458 grams of MDMA were seized upon inspection, leading to offences under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The 3rd accused contends that the MDMA attributed to him is only 8.388 grams, and that possession of this intermediate quantity cannot attract Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act; hence he seeks regular bail, especially since he has been in custody since 11.09.2022. The State contends that the information was recorded at 6.30 p.m. and the search yielded a commercial quantity, with Section 29 also involved for conspiracy/abetment; reliance is placed on the report under Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act. The court discusses Muthu Kumar & Ors. v. Station House Officer (2008(2) KHC 592) and Jiju Maran’s case to address bail principles under NDPS, but ultimately holds that the joint recovery and the gravity of the case merit denial of bail. The petition is dismissed.
The petitioner, Sreelath .T, a quarrying operator in Raroth Village, Kozhikode, challenges condition 6 of Ext. P1 and seeks Environmental Clearance (EC) without requiring clearance from the National Board for Wildlife (SCNBWL). He had been granted a letter of intent for a quarry lease conditioned on wildlife clearance. The petition asserts that the quarry lies about 8.4 kilometres from the Malabar Wildlife Sanctuary, and the proposed buffer zone would not encroach upon the quarry area; he relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India that ESZ restrictions are restricted to the proposed area, not beyond it. The respondents contend that prior SCNBWL clearance is mandatory for development activities within 10 kilometres of National Parks or Sanctuaries and that SEIAA minutes (Ext. P10) are binding. The petitioner argues that Ext. P10 and related ESZ measures should not bar clearance if the applicant is otherwise eligible. The court references Apex Court directions (paragraph 44) and guiding precedents, including Goa Foundation and 2011 Guidelines. After consideration, the High Court disposes of the petition by quashing Exts. P1 and P10 to the extent they require SCNBWL clearance and directs the 4th respondent to grant EC if the petitioner is otherwise eligible.
WP(C) Nos. 18470/2021 & 23774/2021 These connected writ petitions challenge the promotion/appointment of the Principal of Koodali Higher Secondary School, with two petitioners, C. Pushpaja and Vineetha K. T., contending for the proper application of qualification rules for the post of Principal. The Court examines the eligibility criteria under Rule 6 of Chapter XXXII of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (KER), including the requirement of a Master’s degree, B.Ed., and a minimum six years’ service as a Higher Secondary School Teacher (Senior/Junior), along with Notes 1–3 clarifying how experience at HSST/Jr. and HSST levels should be treated for qualifying service and seniority. The primary dispute is which petitioner was first qualified to be appointed as Principal after the vacancy arose (01.06.2017). The 2nd respondent’s letter Ext.P5 indicated Vineetha’s claim of six years’ experience and the 3rd respondent’s Ext.P6/Ext.P7 orders directed the appointment of Vineetha as Principal starting 12.12.2017 or 13.12.2017, while Pushpaja argues she was the only qualified candidate on 12.12.2017. The court ultimately holds that Ext.P12 (which limited counting of HSST/Jr. experience for seniority) is unsustainable in light of Note 3 and Ext.P11’s judgment, and it directs reconsideration. The outcome: WP(C) No.18470/2021 is allowed (Ext.P12 quashed) with benefits to the petitioner from 12.12.2017; WP(C) No.23774/2021 is dismissed.
This revision petition challenges an order in a Kerala VAT penalty proceeding under Section 67 of the KVAT Act, where the Revenue alleged under-valuation of chicken sales by a group of dealers led by P.T. Johnson and relatives. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) remanded the matter to the Primary Authority for fresh disposal, contending the assessment/penalty process violated natural justice and that the Appellate Authority lacked power to remand. The Kerala VAT Tribunal had upheld the remand, and the Revision Court addressed a central legal question: whether the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) can order remand under Section 55 while considering penalties, and whether such remand complies with the statutory framework and principles of natural justice. The petition also canvassed whether denial of reasonable opportunity to cross-examine witnesses tainted the penalty order and whether the open-ended remand aligns with the 2014 proviso to Section 55. The court examined precedents on remand powers, the right to cross-examination (citing State of Kerala v. Shaduli Yusuf and Jose v. Addl. STO), and the need for fair inquiry (citing V.S. Narayan Nair, Dharmadas, Kochukunju Pillai, and others). The bench ultimately held that there was a violation of natural justice at the Primary Authority stage, set aside the penalty order, and remanded to the Primary Authority for fresh disposal, while noting that remand powers are permissible, subject to due process. The revision petition was dismissed with directions to proceed as held.
V.V. Charly, the appellant before the Kerala High Court in MACA No. 1639 of 2011, challenges a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award arising from injuries sustained in a road traffic accident on 28 October 2008. The car involved was owned by the 1st respondent and insured with the 3rd respondent. The appellant, a field worker, claimed compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act after being hospitalized at MIMS, Kozhikode from 28 October to 16 November 2008 and thereafter continuing outpatient treatment. The Tribunal allowed the petition in part, awarding Rs. 1,22,707 with interest and costs, and fixed the appellant’s notional income at Rs. 3,000 per month. The appellant contends that the quantum is inordinately low and that several heads of compensation should be augmented in light of evidence of permanent disability (15%), five months of indisposition, and substantial medical expenses. The High Court (C.S. Dias, J.) re-appraises the matter, relying on Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd and Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, to fix a higher notional income (Rs. 6,500/month) and apply a 16-multiplier for a 34-year-old with 15% disability. It recalculates losses on earnings, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, and by-stander expenses, and arrives at a total enhanced sum of Rs. 2,68,957. The appeal is allowed by further enhancement of Rs. 1,46,250, with 7% interest from filing to payment and costs; the insurer is ordered to deposit the enhanced amount within 60 days.
The petitioner, A.N. Sadasivan Nair, is the Managing Partner of Popular Granites and seeks permission to establish a building-stones quarry in the Panchayat area under Sec. 233 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, based on licenses Exts. P1–P4, and also contends entitlement to a Deemed Licence under Sec. 236(3) of the Act for the 2021–22 year. He applied for a trade licence under Sec. 232/233 (Ext. P5) and was acknowledged (Ext. P6), but no decision was communicated within the statutory 30 days, triggering the deeming provision. Respondents opposed the grant citing safety, environmental concerns, and public opposition: quarries functioned previously causing damage to wells and homes; a Special Grama Sabha resolution against the quarry; proximity to a water shed and road width issues; concerns about blasting, pollution, and dust. The court, noting the petitioner possesses LOI (Ext. P1), Environmental Clearance (Ext. P2), Consent to Operate (Ext. P3), and Explosives licence (Ext. P4), and recognizing the established precedents that Grama Sabha resolutions cannot defeat licensing powers (Abdulla v. Trippangottur Grama Panchayat) and that even in absence of a formal licence a Secretary may issue a certificate to enable compliance with other permissions (V. Sudhakaran v. Pallichal Grama Panchayat), allows the writ petition. It directs the Respondents 1 and 2 to issue a Deemed Licence in paper form for the period sought, within one month. The EC and other environmental permits remain unchallenged; the decision emphasizes statutory scheme over local resolutions and technical road-width arguments in this context.
WP(C).No.17379/2020(V); WP(C).No.22072/2020(H); WP(C).No.22608/2020(A) These are three consolidated writ petitions challenging detention orders issued under Section 129 of the CGST Act, concerning goods and conveyances in transit. The Kerala High Court, with Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar presiding, first lays down the broad framework for detention: detention under GST is a machinery provision intended to check tax evasion and must be read along with the substantive tax provisions; although detention touches fundamental freedoms, it is justified only if reasonable, necessary for public interest, and narrowly tailored. The court notes that, where effective provisional clearance and an appeal are available against alleged unlawful detention, writ petitions for release are generally not appropriate, citing Kay Pan Fragrance Pvt. Ltd. The statutory scheme requires that Section 129(1) detains goods on contravention, with tax and penalties payable and limited discretionary releases; sub-sections (3)-(4) provide for notice and hearing, while sub-section (6) contemplates enforcement via Section 130 if payment is not made, and bank guarantees or bonds may be used for provisional release. The petitions turn on mis-classification or mis-description of goods in transport documents. In WP 17379, mis-classification alone cannot justify detention; hence the impugned detentions are quashed and bank guarantees returned. In WP 22608, detention is sustained on the ground of incomplete e-way bill details, with the petitioner relegated to appellate remedy while bank guarantees remain uninvoked for two months. The petitions are disposed accordingly.
W.P.(C) No.17113 of 2020(L) The petitioner, Krishna Vigneswara Sankunni.K S/o Appukutti Tharakan, filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging threats to life and property arising from alleged illegal conversion of Paddy lands by local residents, alleged to violate the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008. He sought a writ of mandamus directing the District Police Chief Palakkad and the Station House Officer, Cherupulassery, to provide adequate police protection and to maintain law and order in the locality. The case touches on the police’s duty to protect citizens and uphold rights, in the context of ongoing land-conversion disputes and associated threats. During proceedings, the court noted that the petitioner had made complaints to the Revenue Divisional Officer and that police action included warnings to all parties. The Kerala Police Act, 2011, specifically Sections 3 and 4, was discussed, emphasizing police duties to enforce the law impartially and to protect life, liberty, property and human rights. The court also cites established principles from Manohar Lal Sharma and Ankush Maruti Shinde regarding police protection and the protection of life and property, invoking due process. Ultimately, the writ petition was disposed of with directions to the SHO to ensure no threat to law and order and to consider police protection upon request, if such threat re-emerges, applying the statutory provisions and cited precedents.
This Division Bench of the Kerala High Court heard a writ appeal challenging a Lokayukta order in Complaint No. 599/2008. The Special Tahsildar challenged the Lokayukta’s directive to refer the land acquisition dispute under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to a competent court. The respondents claimed the award notice was served on 23.06.2003 and that a reference application under Section 18, or an objection under Section 12(2) or a Form No. 22A reference, was filed within the prescribed time, with Ext. P2 dated 17.07.2003 cited as the timely objection. The Lokayukta, however, found that Ext. P2 could be treated as timely and directed a reference to the Sub Court, effectively bypassing strict compliance with the statute. The court undertook a detailed analysis of the three permissible modes of making a reference under Section 18(2) and the proviso to that sub-section, emphasizing that the proviso is mandatory and timing is strictly governed. It cited Mahalekshmi Jayanthi and subsequent jurisprudence to reaffirm rigid timelines and that the Land Acquisition Authority is not a court and cannot condone delays. The judgment ultimately allows the writ appeal, quashes the Lokayukta’s order dated 05.08.2009, and directs the return of original files to the relevant office.
