The Kerala High Court hears an appeal by the complainant (appellant) challenging the acquittal of the first respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act) by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kottayam, in ST No. 516/2007. The complainant alleges that the first respondent issued Ext. P1 cheque for Rs. 3,00,000 in discharge of a legally enforceable debt; the cheque bounced (Ext. P3) for insufficiency of funds; Ext. P4 was a statutory notice that the accused did not reply. The trial court recorded the accused as not guilty under Section 255(1) CrPC and acquitted. The High Court reframes the legal issue, reiterating the long-standing preference for restraint in disturbing acquittals, but proceeds to apply the reversed-onus doctrine under Sections 139 and 118 of the N.I. Act, as clarified by Rangappa and Kalamani Tex (and Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel, cited through Kalamani Tex), and the recent Rupesh Manger decision, to conclude that the prosecution had established a legally enforceable debt and that the burden had shifted to the accused to present a probable defence. The court finds that inconsistencies in PW1 and PW2 do not obliterate the statutory presumption. Consequently, the appeal is allowed: the acquittal is set aside, the first respondent is convicted under Section 138, and sentenced to one day’s imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 3.5 lakh, directed to pay compensation to the appellant, and to appear for sentence on 14.12.2023 with provisions for default and execution of sentence as stated.
This writ petition challenges Exhibit-P3, an order of the Upa Lok Ayukta directing the respondent, a minor, to participate in the Malappuram Revenue District Kalolsavam (2015-16) in the Keralanadanam, Girls category, at Govt. Higher Secondary School, Areacode (3-7 January 2016). The petitioners, comprising three officials and Kalolsavams’ committees, contend that the Lok Ayukta had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the averments do not attract the definition of grievance under the Kerala Lok Ayukta Act, 1999. They seek quashing of Ext.P3 and a mandamus directing the Upa Lok Ayukta to abstain from interference in the Kalolsavam decision-making by the district-level Appeal Committee. The record shows an earlier interim order of 18 January 2016, which provided that if the student had ranked first district-wide, participation would be allowed in the state festival; the petition relies on this and argues that interim orders at quasi-judicial bodies disrupt schedules and merit-based selection. The court cites a Division Bench decision in W.P.(C) No. 18950 of 2018 (08.06.2018) and a 2022 Kerala High Court decision (2022 (5) KHC 473) to emphasize that interim permissions to non-qualifying contestants can cause injustice and scheduling chaos. After considering the facts and authorities, the court interferes, sets aside Exhibit-P3, and allows the writ petition, directing adherence to lawful eligibility and contest procedures.
This Regular Second Appeal challenges the concurrent decrees in a dispute about the installation of a transformer on the plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs (plaintiff No.2 and supplemental plaintiffs 3–11) sought, in O.S. No. 430/2016 before the Munsiff, Manjeri, a permanent injunction restraining the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) from charging the transformer and a mandatory injunction to remove it. The Munsiff rendered a decree in favor of the plaintiffs, but on appeal the Additional District Court, Manjeri, dismissed the suit, holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in light of the Electricity Act, 2003 (Section 164) read with the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (Sections 10, 16, 17) and concluded that Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars such injunction where an equally efficacious remedy exists. The High Court framed substantial questions of law, including whether the installation of an electric transformer falls within the Telegraph Act’s scope, whether Sections 10/17 of the Telegraph Act apply to such installations, and whether the civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted. After considering Section 145 of the Telegraph Act and related provisions, the Court held that civil court jurisdiction is barred in this context and that the District Magistrate has authority to decide removal or compensation; accordingly, the Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. The matter is directed to be processed for action by the District Magistrate with timelines, and plaintiffs may pursue Section 16 compensation if applicable.
OP (FC) No. 494/2023; Mat.Appeal Nos. 132/2023, 708/2022 This judgment of a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court arises from OP (FC) No. 494 of 2023 and connected Matrimonial Appeals Nos. 132 of 2023 and 708 of 2022, challenging the Family Court, Chavara’s order/directions in OP No. 466/2017 and the subsequent proceedings. The core dispute concerns maintenance for two minor children and a wife following a divorce agreement dated 23.10.2013, under which the father/husband (Binu Somarajan) had agreed to open fixed deposits in the names of the children and to bear their educational and medical expenses. The 2014 divorce decree under Hindu Marriage Act s.13B (read with the Family Courts Act, s.7) mandated monthly maintenance for the daughter Rs. 15,000 and for the son Rs. 5,000, with the right to adjust deposits. The Bank account attachment orders and execution petitions in EP/EA proceedings led to contentious arguments about compliance, actual assets, and the validity of the FD deposits. The Court ultimately allowed Mat.Appeal No.132/2023, dismissed the other appeal, and modified the 2022 decree to raise the daughter’s maintenance to Rs.25,000 till marriage, while deleting one conditional clause (Condition 3) and keeping the rest of the decree intact. Costs were awarded in favor of the appellants in 132/2023.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a suit for injunction in which the appellants (defendants) challenge concurrent decrees granting a mandatory injunction against them regarding plaint schedule property, a forest land at Piravathoor. Plaintiff Sasidharan (now represented by his legal heirs) claimed possession for about 35 years, having constructed a house and run a licensed shop on the land. During a period when the plaintiff was in jail, defendant No.1 allegedly trespassed, took possession, and started business from the premises. The trial court held that the plaintiff had settled possession of the plaint schedule property and that the defendants trespassed during the plaintiff’s incarceration. The first appellate court confirmed this finding. The appellants argued that there was no title in the plaintiff’s name and that a mandatory injunction could not be decreed in the absence of title; they also contended that the plaintiff had already settled part of the property in favor of his minor daughter, undermining possession. The High Court reformulated two substantial questions of law: (i) whether a decree of mandatory injunction is justified without title; (ii) whether, where possession is asserted without title, a suit for recovery of possession should have been filed. Relying on established jurisprudence on possession, particularly the tests of settled possession and the evidentiary value of admissions, the Court held that the plaintiff is in settled possession. It affirmed that in such cases, an injunction simpliciter can be appropriate, and dismissed the Regular Second Appeal with costs.
This MACA arises from two linked Motor Accidents Claims petitions (O.P. MV 866/2015 and 766/2015) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tiruvananthapuram, seeking compensation for the death of Sivarama Subramonian and injuries to the first petitioner. The car accident occurred on 21 September 2014 near Kazhakuttom Police Station when the motorcyclist was allegedly struck by a Tata Nano driven by the first respondent owner-driver; the insurer (second respondent) issued the policy. The Tribunal, consolidating the petitions, awarded Rs.16,07,000 against the insurer. The insurer (appellant) challenges two aspects: (i) notional monthly income fixed by the Tribunal (Rs.15,000) for the deceased, supported by Exts. A15–A16 evidencing his avocation as a Gold Appraiser and LIC Agent, and (ii) the rate of interest at 8% per annum on the awarded amount. The court affirms the Tribunal’s finding on income, citing Pushkar Mehra for 2010 notional income benchmarks but accepting Rs.15,000/month given evidence of the deceased’s occupations in 2014. On interest, it cites Kishan Gopal, Anjani Singh, and MCD v Uphaar for 9% in some contexts but maintains 8% as reasonable in the present case. It also references New Insurance Co v Kiran Singh to condemn routine contestation of genuine claims. Ultimately, the appeal is dismissed under Order XLI CPC, with the Tribunal’s award upheld and the insurer liable to pay Rs.16,07,000 with 8% interest.
WP(C) Nos.4729 of 2023 and 5079 of 2023 These linked Writ Petitions concern the Kaliyoottu festival at Major Vellayani Bhadrakali Temple, a temple under the Travancore Devaswom Board. The Temple Advisory Committee petitioners seek mandamus to direct respondents to consider Ext.P1 (dated 08.02.2023) demanding the use of saffron/orange decorative materials and to ensure law and order and protection during the Kaliyoottu festival (14.02.2023 to 24.04.2023). They also seek protection against interference by the Nemom Police and the authority of police to compel decor for the festival. The second petition is by a devotee challenging Ext.P1 (10.02.2023) directing the use of politically neutral colours and contesting actions by District Magistrate under Section 81 of the Kerala Police Act, 2011. Respondents rely on prior judicial guidance to regulate crowd safety, traffic and pedestrian rights, citing Satheesh v. Travancore Devaswom Board and other authorities, and emphasise the Board's duty to conduct festivals in accordance with temple custom. The judgment upholds that temple rites must follow local custom, while police and administration may act to maintain law and order. It ultimately disposes of the petitions with directions aligned to the cited authorities, reaffirming Temple Advisory Committee powers and the Board’s authority in festival conduct, while ensuring pedestrian safety and non-encroachment of public spaces.
This Public Interest Litigation filed in the Kerala High Court by Albert K.P. seeks government intervention to mitigate COVID-19 related disruption in private schools and to safeguard free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14. The petition asserts that CBSE/ICSE/private unaided schools have been pressing for tuition payments despite lockdown, threatening discontinuation of studies for economically vulnerable children. Relying on Article 21-A of the Constitution (right to education) and the Right to Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) along with the RTE Rules and Kerala Rules, the petitioner argues that the State and Central Governments should step in to provide financial support to these schools or reimburse the cost of elementary education to the extent of actual per-child expenditure. He also asks for the appointment of a Deputy Director of Education in each district to monitor and prevent discontinuation due to non-payment, and for mechanisms to identify eligible students based on parental income. The case traced the relationship among central and state authorities, CBSE, and CISCE, and considered Kerala’s 2011 RTE Rules and 1959 Education Rules. On 01.12.2020, and again on 03.04.2023, the Division Bench issued directions emphasizing the 25% admission quota for weaker/disadvantaged students, reimbursement through government channels, and the establishment of a monitoring framework. The Kerala High Court ultimately disposed of the petition with directions, mandating a per-child expenditure assessment, reimbursement, and reporting by the education authorities.
BAIL APPL. NO. 5619 OF 2023 This is a regular bail application (Bail Appln. No. 5619 of 2023) by Sivakumar, the 1st accused in Crime No. 12/2021 of the Excise Enforcement & Anti-Narcotics Special Squad, Thiruvananthapuram, under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(II)(c), and 25 r/w 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The prosecution alleged that on 01.12.2021, information from reliable sources led to observation at NIMS Hospital car parking, where a Red Scorpio with Regn KL-16A-4595 was allegedly to complete a ganja transaction; the accused handed over a large shopper to the Scorpio occupants who, in turn, paid cash. 22.5 kg of ganja was seized from the 2nd accused’s house and 2.5 kg from the Scorpio. The petitioner was arrested on 01.12.2021 and has remained in custody for about 580 days. He claims innocence and contends that CCTV footage exists in the car parking area, but was not accessed, which would establish innocence. The defense points to a phone number (8075998480) believed to belong to another person, Binu of Pathanamthitta, and argues the number was in use for years. The petitioner highlights grave family health issues—wife’s severe vocal loss from a cyst, fibroids, and IVF-related complications, along with a dying infant twin, requiring the petitioner’s presence. The trial has not commenced, despite directions. Citing Supreme Court decisions on bail amid delay and Article 21 rights, the court grants bail under stringent conditions due to prolonged detention and serious family health issues, while acknowledging the gravity of the charges.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (CRL.MC 5478 of 2023) filed by the accused Farooks under Section 482 CrPC to quash Crime No.780 of 2023 registered at Karunagapally Police Station for offences under Sections 341, 294(b) and 323 IPC. The petition was admitted on 02.08.2023. The prosecution case, as per records, is that on 25.05.2023 the accused allegedly restrained and assaulted the complainant because he believed the complainant had given drugs to his friend. The petitioner contends that the dispute has been amicably settled and both parties do not wish to pursue the prosecution; this is supported by an affidavit filed by the second respondent. The Public Prosecutor expresses reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement but concedes there are no other serious crimes against the accused and that the complainant has stated that he bears no lasting grievances. The Court, invoking State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan and the line of cases summarized therein (Gian Singh v. Punjab, Narinder Singh v. Punjab), lays down the governing principles: quashing is permissible for non‑compoundable offences where the dispute is civil/private in nature and the parties have resolved it; however, it should not be used for heinous or public‑interest crimes. After weighing the gravity of offences, injuries, antecedents, and the amicable settlement, the Court finds no adverse societal impact and concludes that quashing would serve ends of justice. The petition is allowed; FIR No. 780/2023 and all further proceedings against the petitioner are quashed. Annexures include the certified copy of the FIR.
This Review Petition challenges the 2 November 2021 order in W.P.(C) No. 21298 of 2021 by deferring hearing of the writ petition in light of constitutional challenges to the 103rd Amendment Act, which provides 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections. The Kerala High Court noted a direct bearing between the writ petition and the validity of the amendment, and considered the Supreme Court’s stay in a Transfer Petition involving Nujaim P.K. as well as its directive to transfer similar cases to avoid conflicting findings. Consequently, the court deferred the writ petition pending a decision by the Apex Court. The petitioners contend that the order lacks a clear explanation of how the state government orders under challenge are impacted by the ongoing challenge to the amendment and that the mere pendency before the Supreme Court should not automatically bar the High Court from considering the petition on its merits. The respondents submit that the challenged government orders are entwined with the amendment’s validity and that Article 139A permits withdrawal or transfer of cases when substantial questions of general importance are involved, especially to prevent conflicting judgments. The court observes that it has not examined the merits and that the order only defers, relying on the Supreme Court’s ongoing disposition. It holds there is no error apparent on the face of the record and dismisses the Review Petition, indicating the proper remedy is appeal if a meritorious grievance exists.
This writ petition, filed in 2008, challenges Ext.P6, a Kerala Government order denying recommendation to the Central Government for the Swathantra Sainik Samman Pension (SSSP) for Edadan Chindan Nair. The petitioner claimed INA service and imprisonment during 1943–45, supported by Ext.P1 (INA certificate) and Ext.P2 (Kerala Freedom Fighters’ Pension). He asserted eligibility for SSSP despite the lack of a six-month imprisonment record in mainland jails, noting ex-INA status could count imprisonment outside India. Ext.P5, his application for pension, described service in the INA and detention in Rangoon Central Jail for six months; Ext.P6 rejected the claim on technical grounds, and the State contended Ext.P5 lacked documents and Ext.P1 could not be treated as conclusive proof. After the petitioner’s death, his widow and son were impleaded as petitioners. The respondents argued the six-month mainland imprisonment criterion and that KFFP eligibility does not guarantee SSSP eligibility, and that Ext.P5 did not satisfy evidentiary requirements. The Court found Ext.P6 to be a hyper-technical, incorrect rejection and invoked liberal, probabilistic criteria from Gurdial Singh v Union of India and Augusthy Mathai, directing a fresh assessment of Ext.P5 in light of probabilities. It ordered notice to the new petitioners and a decision within four months, disposing of the petition with these directions.
These writ petitions challenge the initiation and continuation of surcharge proceedings under the Kerala Local Fund Audit Act, 1994, against a government official and several Gram Panchayats for alleged irregular payments during 1997–1998. The core issue is whether there is any limitation in initiating surcharge proceedings under the Act, and whether the Local Fund Audit Act’s overriding effect excludes the Panchayati Raj Act’s four-year limitation. The State petitioners contended that the Local Fund Audit Act is a special statute that prevails over other enactments, and that Section 22 settles conflicts in favor of the Act; they argued that there is no four-year time bar for surcharge notices or certificates, and that Rule 20(11) merely prescribes service deadlines within four months of the notice. The respondents argued that Section 215(9) of the Panchayati Raj Act imposes a four-year limitation for surcharges, and that the four-month constraint in Rule 20(11) should bind the recovery process. The High Court held that the Local Fund Audit Act, 1994 is a special enactment, with overriding effect under Section 22, and that there is no period of limitation prescribed for surcharge certificates. The impugned District Judge’s findings to quash recovery on limitation were set aside, and the State petitions were allowed, with directions for fresh proceedings in accordance with law.
This writ petition challenges Exts. P9 and P10 orders of the Kodakara Grama Panchayat, which permitted parking of five autorickshaws at a time in front of the petitioners’ shops at Kodakara junction on the Old National Highway road. The petitioners contend that parking is not authorized at this location and obstructs ingress and egress to their premises, contributing to traffic congestion. They point to three authorised autorickshaw stands under the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Landing places, halting places, cart stands and other vehicle stands) Rules, 1995 (near the bus stand, near Santhi Hospital, and under the flyover) and rely on Ext. P5 judgment mandating a pedestrian margin of at least 1.5 metres beyond the tarred edge (Rule 6 of the Rules). The Panchayat counters that Exts. P9 and P10 were issued in pursuance of Traffic Regulatory Committee decisions and are binding, supported by representations from unions claiming no traffic issues. The Court cites Noushad M. v. State of Kerala to uphold that Panchayats may determine parking locations in consultation with District Police Chief and RTO, under MV Act provisions and the Kerala Police Act rules. It directs reconsideration, requiring the Traffic Regulatory Committee to re-evaluate with notices and site visits, within six weeks, and disposes of the petition with no costs.
W.P.(C) Nos. 29772 & 29859 of 2021 These writ petitions, heard together, challenge the e-tender process and award for the Kuthaka item No.119 (maintenance of the Pamba toilet block) at Sabarimala Devaswom for the Mandala-Makaravilakku season 1197 ME (2021-22). The petitions contend that the award to the 6th respondent was arbitrary, tainted by malafides, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and they seek quashing of the award, a fresh auction, and a full inquiry into the related contracts including items 115 and 213. The court records the tender process, the quotations and the bid dynamics, and notes alleged cartelisation and irregularities in Exts. R2(b)-(d) and Ext. P3. It directs a controlled, transparent re-examination, including access to entire files, and impleades Ullas as an additional respondent to facilitate scrutiny. The Court emphasizes the Travancore Devaswom Board’s fiduciary duty to manage temple property in the interests of the deity, drawing on precedents that protect temple assets and require prudent, income-generating management. It ultimately disposes of the petitions by directing a detailed enquiry by the Chief Vigilance Officer post-Mandala-Makaravilakku season 1198 ME, with a forthcoming re-tender process for Kuthaka rights from 1199 ME onwards, and related public disclosures and safeguards.
This writ petition, WP(C) No. 27112/2021, is by Mathews Varkey, President of Paipra Grama Panchayath, challenging a letter (Exhibit P5) issued by the 6th respondent and a Government Order (Exhibit P6) that, in the petitioner’s submission, bar the engagement of Agricultural Officers in Krishibhavans for Life Mission project proceedings and thereby hamper Panchayath function. The petitioner contends that the measures are arbitrary, illegal, and violative of the Kerala Panchayath Raj Act and the Rules. The prayers seek quashing the P5 letter and P6 order, mandamus to compel respondents 7 to 9 to assist the Grama Panchayath as required by the Act, and to ensure timely completion of works assigned (Exhibit P4). The core grievance is the alleged displacement of field staff for Life Mission projects, undermining the statutory framework that requires interdepartmental support to Panchayaths. On 14 January 2022, after hearing, the Court observed that the dispute is essentially between two government departments and proposed resolution by a High Power Committee; later, it directed that the committee may resolve matters. Subsequently, Government Order G.O.(MS) No.80/2022/LSGD dated 14.01.2022 was issued, setting out guidelines for field staff deployment to support life mission and related schemes, with the aim of enabling local bodies to fulfill their duties. The Court recorded this order and closed the petition, noting that the grievance had been redressed.
The petitioners, fifteen aspiring candidates for the post of High School Assistant (Natural Science) under the Kerala Government Service, approached the High Court challenging Ext.P33, a Government Order that excludes graduates/postgraduates in Microbiology, Home Science and Family & Community Science from being treated as eligible basic qualifications for the HSA (Natural Science) post. They argued that the exclusion is arbitrary, illegal and violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, and sought quashing Ext.P33 and a declaration of their eligibility. The matter also touches Ext.P31, which indicates posts in the Kerala Government Service, raising concerns about effects on teachers in aided schools. The Court considered maintainability under S.15(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and examined whether recruitment and service matters should lie with the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) rather than the High Court. The Judge invoked K. Narayanan v State of Karnataka and Others and L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India to discuss the jurisdictional and basic structure principles related to tribunals and constitutional challenges. Ultimately, the Court held that the petition falls within S.15(1) and is not maintainable before the High Court. The Registry is to return the Writ Petition; petitioners may approach the KAT; rights to pursue relief in the Tribunal are preserved. No costs.
This Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CRL.A No. 1090 of 2022) arises from the Special Court for SC/ST (POA) Act, Thodupuzha order in Crl.M.C 2096/2022. The appellant, Renjini, is the 2nd accused in a case of alleged offences under IPC sections 324, 308 and 506(ii) read with 34, and Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (POA) Act. The facts date to 23.09.2022 when the first accused allegedly restrained and assaulted a defacto complainant belonging to the Scheduled Caste community; the 2nd accused is said to have beaten him with a stick. The defacto complainant and accused are from different communities (SC and Ezhava, respectively). The defense contends the entire case is false and points out that the defacto complainant is the accused in a separate POCSO case (crime No. 369/2019) involving the accused’s daughter, suggesting ulterior motives to sour family relations. The Public Prosecutor contends the injury report supports an offence, the victim’s caste animus is relevant, and anticipatory bail constraints apply under Sections 18 and 18-A SC/ST (POA) Act. The court discusses Prathvi Raj Chauhan and Mishra, J.’s observations on anticipatory bail in light of prima facie materials. Ultimately, the High Court sets aside the impugned order, allowing the appeal and directing bail for the 2nd accused with stringent conditions, including surrender, bond, and non-interference with witnesses.
CRL.MC NO. 1684/2023; 1687/2023; 1874/2023 This is a Kerala High Court decision by a single judge (Justice K. Babu) in CRL.MC Nos. 1684/2023, 1687/2023 and 1874/2023 arising from CC Nos. 152/2012, 150/2012 and 151/2012 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pathanamthitta. The petitioners, accused Nos. 1 and 5 in CC 152/2012 and likewise involved in the connected cases, faced charges under Sections 406, 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC. They sought exemption from personal appearance under Section 205 Cr.P.C. on medical grounds and requested representation by counsel. The trial court had rejected these applications. The petitioners argued that their presence during trial was not essential given the nature of the charges, that they could identify themselves and that counsel could attend and the evidence could be taken in their absence with the counsel present as their representative. Relying on Bhanujan v. Jayabhanu (1993) (2) KLT 889), M/s Bhaskar Industries Ltd v. Bhiwani Denim and Apparels Ltd. (AIR 2001 SC 3625), Sarath v. State of Kerala (2017 (3) KLT 95) and Moosa Pattupura v. State of Kerala (2022 (2) KHC 293), the court held that the Magistrate has discretion to dispense with personal appearance in appropriate cases and that Section 205(1) Cr.P.C. permits permanent exemption under defined conditions. The High Court is of the view that appearance is not imperative and granted the petitions, set aside the 12.01.2023 orders in CRL.MP Nos. 204–209/2023 and associated orders, and directed that the petitioners be represented by counsel at trial. The petitions were allowed, with directions to file affidavits aligned with Bhaskar Industries and related authorities.
CRL.MC Nos. 3441/2018; 3427/2018; 3434/2018; 3729/2018; 3733/2018; 4656/2018 This is a consolidated set of Criminal Miscellaneous Cases (CRL.MC Nos. 3441/2018, 3427/2018, 3434/2018, 3729/2018, 3733/2018, 4656/2018, and connected cases) arising from prosecutions under Section 22A of the Minimum Wages Act, pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thalassery. The petitioners, a Trust and its trustees, challenge the validity of the complaints/ proceedings on the ground that there are no specific averments that they were in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Trust, a prerequisite for vicarious liability under Section 22C of the Act. The petition relies on judicial principles from several higher court decisions interpreting 22C, particularly that liability attaches only to persons in-charge and responsible for daily conduct, and that the proviso to 22C(1) provides immunity only if the accused proves lack of knowledge or lack of due diligence. The court surveys precedents such as Dayle De’Souza, Girdhari Lal Gupta, Pratap Chand and others, and National Small Industries Corporation v. Harmeet Singh Paintal to emphasize the necessity of specific averments and the limited scope of vicarious liability. On these grounds, the High Court quashes the prosecutions against the petitioners, holding that the complaints do not satisfy the prescribed in-charge and responsible test, and thus the proceedings are unsustainable.
