This Regular Second Appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional District & Sessions Court (Adhoc), Kollam, in A.S. No. 79/2005, which itself arose from OS 326/1998 before the Additional Munsiff Court, Kollam. The plaintiff (legal heirs of the deceased plaintiff) claimed title to plaint 'A' schedule property and asserted rights to a public B schedule pathway and portions of the adjacent C schedule wall (C1 and C2), contending co-ownership with the defendant over the C schedule wall. The defendant, who purchased the southern property from a predecessor-in-interest, argued that the B schedule pathway was a common passage created by prior owners and later widened, thereby giving him a right to use it; he denied exclusive rights of the plaintiff over the C wall. The Trial Court dismissed the injunction but held the parties as co-owners of the wall portions. The First Appellate Court reversed this on the co-ownership issue and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim regarding the C schedule wall. The High Court reframes the substantial questions and, after considering authorities on easements, holds that non-user does not extinguish a grant and that the First Appellate Court’s reversal on the C wall requires proper reasoning. It remands the matter to the First Appellate Court for fresh adjudication limited to the C schedule wall under Order 41 Rule 33, with a three-month deadline from 10.01.2022 and costs to each side.
MACA Nos. 2222/2009, 1965/2009 and 2204/2009 These connected Motor Accident Claims Appeals arise from a catastrophic road accident on 14 May 1996 involving a bus (KL-3/9399) carrying a marriage party colliding with a push-pull Railway Train at an unmanned level crossing near Mampra-Alummoodu Junction on NH-47. About 36 bus passengers died and eight were seriously injured. Legal heirs filed OP(MV) petitions under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for compensation for death and injuries. The Tribunal passed a common award with separate determinations for each petition. The appellants (claimants) challenge the Tribunal’s quantum, contending under-valuation of income and incorrect multiplier, especially for a priest-deceased and a housewife. In MACA 1965/2009, the appellant argues the deceased’s monthly income should be Rs.3,000 with a multiplier of 7, citing Sarla Verma; seeks higher amounts for love and affection, funeral expenses, and loss of estate. The Court, applying Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi and Magma decisions, recalculates dependency, adjusts multiplier to 7, and grants appropriate sums for consortium, funeral expenses, and loss of estate where warranted. In MACA 2222/2009 and MACA 2204/2009, similar adjustments are made for dependency, consortium, and funeral expenses, including minor claimants. The three appeals are allowed in part, with enhanced compensation and 7% interest, to be paid 50:50 by insurer and Union of India, as modified by this Court.
The petitioner, Joby Chacko, an Indian citizen, seeks to marry Sherlyn Verghese, a United States citizen, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. He filed WP(C) No.12456 of 2021 challenging the Marriage Officer’s demand that his fiancée produce an affidavit attested by a competent officer at the Embassy/Consulate of the United States to the effect that she has no spouse living. The petitioner contends that such a foreign-embassy attestation is unnecessary and inconsistent with the Act, and that notarized affidavits should suffice, as is common for Indian–Indian marriages. The State, through the Government Pleader, argues that Section 4(a) of the Act obliges the Marriage Officer to ensure neither party has a living spouse before solemnization, and notes that for a foreign national the Embassy/Consulate attestation ensures identity and reliability since a Notary in India may not be able to attest a foreign national’s statements. It is observed that this court previously settled the question in Rajeev v. State of Kerala (2001) 1 KLT 578, allowing notary-attested affidavits in many cases, and that several decisions followed that dictum. The court ultimately holds that there is no bar to notary attestation and that the embassy-attestation requirement cannot be insisted upon, directing the respondent to accept a notarized affidavit and register the marriage upon compliance with the Act’s conditions.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case filed in the Kerala High Court by four accused/petitioners—Venugopal V, Anto Thomas, P. Sathar and K.P. Udayan—seeking to quash Annexure-A1 FIR registered by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (VACB), Thrissur, in V.C.No.04/2021/TSR. The case involves alleged corrupt practices in the Guruvayur Urban Co-operative Bank during 2017, where four bank posts were filled after manipulating written examination results and interview markings with the connivance of bank officials who demanded bribes. A de facto complainant Rajeev challenged the VACB’s preliminary enquiry, prompting this Court to set aside the first enquiry and direct a new one, as per a March 2021 writ petition decision (W.P.(C) No.27091/2019). In compliance, a second preliminary enquiry recommended filing an FIR under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, along with IPC Sections 465, 471 and 120B, against the petitioners. The petition contends that Annexure-A1 FIR was registered without prior approval under Section 17A (amended 2018), violating procedure and exempting protection to public servants. The respondents argue that Section 17A bars police inquiry only; constitutional courts may order enquiries, and the 17A amendment is prospective. The Court interprets Lalita Kumari and CPDR to conclude that a constitutional court directing an enquiry does not require prior approval, especially where proceedings commenced before 17A. The petition is dismissed, with the court upholding the ongoing FIR and investigation.
This Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA) challenges an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, II, Thodupuzha, on a death claim arising from a road accident dated 23.04.2012 involving a tipper lorry KL-5/H-6478. The petitioners (claimants) sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, alleging the driver’s negligence caused the death of Joseph, leaving his wife and two children as dependants. The Insurance Company, as appellant, contends that the tribunal’s remand proceedings produced a contradictory finding that the deceased was a third party and not a gratuitous passenger, and challenges the notional income fixed for the deceased as well as other heads of compensation. The insurer also points to the prior acquittal of the driver on the negligence charge as a factor, arguing the petitioners’ claim should be disputed more stringently. The Tribunal had held the owner and insurer liable to indemnify. On appeal, this Court, after reviewing evidence (PW2, RW1, RW2) and the remand materials, finds no error in the Tribunal’s concurrent factual findings or in the application of legal principles, including established precedents (notably Ramachandrappa, Sarla Verma, and New India Assurance). The Court upholds the Tribunal’s approach, fixes income at Rs. 4,500 per month, and dismisses the appeal, thereby maintaining the award in its entirety. The insurer remains liable to indemnify the vehicle owner as determined by the Tribunal.
This is a writ petition filed by Philips Grano Products seeking to quash Ext.P7 and compel the respondents to consider and renew the licence under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Rules, 1996 despite belated submission, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitioner operates a stone crushing unit at Anicadu, Mallappally, with several pre-existing licences and consents (P1–P5). The renewal application for the licence was submitted after expiry, and Ext.P7 indicated that renewal would be considered only if submitted within the prescribed period. The petitioner argued that due to COVID-related restrictions and directives from higher courts, belated renewal could be entertained; otherwise, stopping operations would cause unemployment. The respondents contended that Rule 10 mandates timely renewal and required a fresh application, with deeper scrutiny including NOC from pollution control and other authorities. The court cites Swapna Jestus K. V. and Abdul Rasheed K.V. to support belated renewal upon payment of an additional fee, and exceptions where such belated renewal is not permissible. The court ultimately allows the petition, sets aside Ext.P7, and directs the authorities to accept the belated renewal upon payment of the additional fee, directing processing within four weeks."
This High Court of Kerala appeal arises from MACA No. 1495 of 2010 involving Bindhu, a coolie, who sustained injuries in a motor accident on 18 May 2006 while travelling in a Maruthi Omni van owned by the first respondent and insured by the third respondent. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakuda, had consolidated several petitions and, by a common award, awarded Rs. 18,400 with interest at 7% per annum and costs against the insurer, after finding the second respondent negligent. The appellant challenged the quantum, arguing that the notional income of a coolie should be recalibrated in light of Supreme Court guidance (Ramachandrappa) and that compensation for loss of earnings and loss of amenities required enhancement. The tribunal had fixed the appellant’s notional income at Rs. 1,500/month, while the appellant claimed Rs. 3,000/month. The High Court, citing Ramachandrappa (2011) to fix notional income at Rs. 3,000/month for 2006 and after analyzing the injury and hospitalization, increased the loss of earnings and loss of amenities, resulting in an overall enhancement of Rs. 12,000. The insurer was directed to deposit the enhanced amount with costs within 60 days, with disbursal to the appellant thereafter. The appeal was partially allowed.
This writ petition challenges Note (1) appended to Ext.P13 Fee Schedule under Rule 12(9) of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Rules, 2008, as being ultra vires the enabling Act. The petitioner seeks calculation of fees based on the fair value of his land (16.86 ares in Re-Survey No.178/9, Block 8, Chengannoor) and to pass final orders under Section 27A(2) of the 2008 Act. The petitioner relies on decisions in Vimal Vincent (DR) v. Revenue Division Officer/Sub Collector, Irinjalakuda (2020(1) KHC 123), Ajith Kumar Shenoy and Another v. R.D.O. (2020(5) KLT 683), and Cheranelloor Grama Panchayath, Ernakulam and Another v. Joe Thattil (2020(5) KHC 669), arguing that the fee must reflect the fair value of the subject property only, not the neighbouring land. The application (Form No.6, Exhibit P3) was submitted on 27.07.2019, before amendments to Section 2(viA) of the 2008 Act, so the unamended definition should govern. The government pleader contends that amendment makes the revised fair value applicable and that the notice reflects fair value for adjoining land, with exemptions for land up to 25 cents. The court considers the cited authorities and holds that the pre-amendment fair value must be applied to Exhibit P3 as on the date of filing; hence the impugned demand is unsustainable. The petition is allowed, and respondents are directed to recompute under the old definition, including considerations of buildings already constructed and potential exemptions.
This writ appeal, emanating from the Kerala High Court, concerns M. Hameed’s challenge to orders denying him a preferential appointment under Rule 51A of Chapter XIVA KER for a permanent Arabic Teacher vacancy. Appellant was initially appointed to a leave vacancy from 27.10.1986 to 30.9.1991, with approvals from educational authorities. After the permanent vacancy arose on 20.3.2006 (the regular incumbent having resigned), the Manager of the school appointed Smt. M. Soudha to the post, a move also approved by the Educational Authorities. The appellant challenged Ext.P3 (the order permitting Soudha’s appointment) and, after annual appeals, Ext.P8 (the Government order), arguing that he had not resigned and that his right to Rule 51A should be recognized. The authorities found that the appellant had effectively relinquished or resigned his claim, based on contemporaneous findings that his 1991 departure was a resignation, and that the vacancy continued thereafter, with other teachers being appointed to the vacancy. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench upheld these concurrent findings, rejecting the Challenge to Ext.P8. The Division Bench ultimately dismissed the writ appeal, holding that the petitioner failed to establish non-resignation and that Rule 51A benefits could not accrue where the vacancy persisted beyond 1991. The court emphasized that the vacancy continued and that appointments were made to it, undermining the appellant’s claim.
This is a criminal revision petition under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act), filed by the revision petitioner Sona C. Soman challenging an order that vacated a residence order granted under Section 23 of the DV Act and directed the petitioner to vacate the shared household within a month, with the respondents (2nd respondent being the husband and 3–5 his father, mother and brother) directed to provide alternate accommodation or pay rent. The MC 22/2020 case before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, IV (Mobile), Thiruvananthapuram, and the subsequent confirmation by the Additional District and Sessions Court, VI, Thiruvananthapuram, had held that the residence order could be lifted under Section 25(2) in light of alleged concerns about false allegations and the respondents’ move to a separate rented dwelling. The revision argues that Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021 SCC and 2020 KHC reports) should not control the present facts, where the in-laws vacating the shared home does not constitute a ground to modify the order, and that Section 25(2) requires a genuine change in circumstances. The Kerala High Court rejects the broad application of Satish Chander Ahuja to this matter, clarifies the scope of Sections 17, 2(s), 19, and the right to residence in a shared household, and ultimately allows the revision, setting aside the impugned order and restoring the interim residence order in favour of the petitioner.
The writ petition concerns Muhammed Kunhi C, a Lower Division Clerk employed in Sir Syed Higher Secondary School (a government-aided institution under the fifth respondent). Beginning with his appointment in 2005 and continuing through a series of orders, petitions, and revision filings, the petitioner challenges rejection of his post-approval and related bond-related impediments for a post created during a ban on new appointments. Ext.P1 granted the appointment; Ext.P2 rejected on the ground that the post should be filled from protected hands due to the school’s newly opened status; Ext.P3 upheld the rejection; Ext.P4 later granted approval; Ext.P5 promoted him as LDC from 2006; Ext.P5 was rejected again for the same protected-hands reason. Amid ongoing approvals, GO (P) 10/10/G.Edn. (12-01-2010) prompted revised staff-fixation (Ext.P12) and Ext.P13 denying the petitioner’s claim, based on bond insufficiency. The petitioner argued, invoking the court’s own Suma Devi doctrine (State of Kerala and Ors. v. V.S. Suma Devi and Ors.), that bonds by managers are deemed executed and that appointments from protected hands must be made equal to the number approved during the ban period. The court agrees Ext.P13 cannot stand and issues directions to reconsider Ext.P10 with notice, instructs the government to treat managers as having executed bonds, and to dispose within three months, preserving pending Supreme Court matters. Writ petition disposed of with these directions and related caveats.
WA No.1599/2019; WA No.1873/2019 This is a consolidated writ appeal challenging the judgment dated 21 May 2019 in WP(C) 35765/2018(U) of the High Court of Kerala. The writ petition, filed by Dr. Sreedevi K. Nair (the senior tutor), claimed that she was the senior-most among NSS-managed colleges and that the Corporate Management’s Ext. P13 ranked list promoted juniors in four Principal posts, disregarding seniority and thus violated the Calicut University Act’s seniority-cum-fitness principle and UGC rules. The Single Judge set aside Ext. P13, directed recasting of the rank list based on seniority, and ordered that petitioner be promoted as Principal with effect from 17 May 2018, with consequential benefits other than monetary up to retirement. The appellants, including Dr. Balachandran S. (WA1599) and Dr. Azad R.P. (WA1873), challenged this order, arguing that the ranking was merit-based and that relaxation under UGC Regulations (3.0, 3.2, 4.2) with clause 3.5.0 should not be construed to override established seniority norms. The Court, after hearing counsels, held that the relaxation under Clause 3.5.0 applies to Principal eligibility where Master’s degree was earned prior to 19 September 1991, thereby supporting eligibility of the writ petitioner, and upheld the Single Judge’s order. It also held that the process was clearly a promotion (not direct recruitment) since willingness was solicited from candidates for a Principal post. The appeals were dismissed.”
Jacob Philip, an ambulance driver, was initially appointed by the Vadasserikkara Grama Panchayat on 9 February 2010 on a contract after a due selection process and served until December 2018. He was re-engaged in August 2018 following the termination for misconduct of the preceding driver. By Ext.P2 minutes dated 8 May 2020, the Panchayat allocated supervision of the Covid-19 centres to the petitioner and authorized the ambulance under the Palliative Care project to be used for Covid-related duties. The Palliative Care Policy for Kerala, 2008, establishes a policy framework under which a Palliative Care Policy Project Management Committee (4th respondent) is to function, with the committee making recommendations to the Panchayat for policy implementation. By Ext.P5, the 4th respondent recommended continuing the petitioner (and a nurse) in service; however, in Ext.R2(a) dated 16 August 2021, the committee resolved to terminate the petitioner, permitting him to continue only till 31 August 2021 and directing the medical officer to invite applications for filling the vacancy. The petitioner sought protection under Ext.P4 Government Order (1 June 2021), arguing that contract employees engaged in Covid-related activities cannot be terminated and that the 4th respondent cannot terminate him unilaterally. The respondents asserted that the petitioner’s appointment was not supported by a valid contract or proper process, and that a fair selection process was being undertaken to fill the vacancy, with 43 applicants. The court observed the lack of a formal contract and limited powers of the 4th respondent, ultimately dismissing the writ petition.
Anilkum ar G S/o GOPALAKRISHNA PILLAI, the petitioner, filed WP(C) No. 2341 of 2011 challenging the proceedings of the Kerala Financial Corporation and revenue authorities in enforcing an outstanding loan by sale of a 17-cent land with a building, on the ground that the sale and subsequent sale confirmation were illegal and arbitrary and violated natural justice. The loan, secured by the bus and land, went into default in 2001, with attachment in 2005 and an auction held on 30 June 2007. The petitioner claims that Ext.P6, an application dated 27 July 2007 to set aside the sale, remained undecided within the 30-day window required by prudent practice and by the cited precedent P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala (2006 KHC 366). The wife of the petitioner also filed Ext.P10 within the period, but she was not a party to the writ petition. The 2nd respondent later issued an order on 18 July 2007; in 2008 the sale was confirmed and a sale certificate issued. The petitioner sought quashing Ext.P2 and a fresh hearing with an opportunity to adduce evidence. The court, however, held that Ext.P6 was not a Sec. 53 RR Act petition and distinguished the Gopalakrishnan line of authority; it found no occasion to interfere with a sale completed over a decade earlier, especially since there were post-sale approvals and third-party compliance, and dismissed the petition, underscoring the strong policy favoring finality in revenue-recovery actions.
Mat.Appeal No. 523 of 2019 This Kerala High Court matrimonial appeal arises from a Family Court Thrissur order dismissing a petition by the husband for divorce on the ground of cruelty. The couple married on 27 December 2009 at Guruvayoor and their daughter was born in 2011. The husband alleged a sustained pattern of cruelty: the wife’s volatile temper, filthy language, neglect of household duties, and alienation from his parents; he also stated that she prevented him from seeing the child and that multiple complaints leading to criminal cases were filed. A mediation at the Family Court produced a compromise whereby the parties would resume conjugal life and withdraw pending criminal cases; however, they later lived separately. The husband argued the wife continued cruelty and alienated the child, while the wife claimed the husband’s conduct caused the discord (including alleged pledge of ornaments) and that the compromise had been breached. The Family Court held that pre‑compromise cruelty had been condoned and that there was no resumption of conjugal life, dismissing the petition. The High Court re‑examined the matter, holding condonation is conditional forgiveness and can be revived by later cruelty, including parental alienation. It found cruelty proved and granted a decree of dissolution, setting aside the Family Court’s order. The appeal was allowed; the marriage stands dissolved with no costs order.
WP(C).No.18434 OF 2020(D) This writ petition challenges a disciplinary action against T.G. David, a retired Executive Engineer of the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB), arising from an incident in 1993. The enquiry report of 1997 found him guilty, but no action was taken for over three years until his retirement on 31.08.2000. After retirement, Ext.P8 (16-07-2003) imposed a punishment reducing pension by 20% under Rule 59B of Part I KSR, which was quashed by this Court in Ext.P9 (2016) and Ext.P11 (Division Bench). The petitioner contends that the period of suspension (01.11.1995 to 18.08.1996) should be treated as duty under Rule 56B, and Ext.P13 (22.06.2020) denying this treatment was illegal and contrary to law. The Respondents argue Ext.P13 follows the principle from Mesaya Das v. State of Kerala and that the suspension decision was not wholly unjustified. The Court notes the protracted delay in taking action by KSEB and the lack of reasons in Ext.P13, and emphasizes that Rule 56B(iii) requires a reasoned assessment of whether suspension was wholly unjustified. Relying on Mesaya Das (1978 KLT 160), the Court holds the authority should have considered the suspension as duty if warranted and quashes Ext.P13, directing reconsideration expeditiously with payment of all due benefits.
This writ appeal (WA No.1513 of 2020) arises from a review of a writ petition decision in W.P.(C) No.32652/2014. The appellant Ramakrishnan claimed to hold 13.51 acres in Sy. No.1 at Irumbiliyam, Tirur Taluk, Malappuram, based on a partition deed. The original writ petition sought acceptance of land tax from him; the single judge, by a 12.10.2018 judgment, directed the Tahsildar to accept tax from Ramakrishnan subject to civil proceedings, clarifying that tax acceptance would not confer title. The review petition filed by Ramakrishnan was later recalled by the same court, holding that the writ judgment could be recalled under Article 226 in view of the court of record status under Article 215, and that suppression of material facts by Ramakrishnan warranted recall. The respondents contended that CPC1908 procedures cannot govern writ proceedings and that review is statutory, citing Balan v. Shyamala, Ram Kinkar Das and George v. State of Kerala among others. The Division Bench (CJ S. Manikumar and J. Shaji P. Chaly) held that High Courts have inherent power to recall their orders in writ matters and dismissed the WA, upholding the order recalling the judgment.”
This Original Petition (Civil) arises from an application under Order 33 Rule 1 CPC by two petitioners, Vyshakh Unnikrishnan and Vaishna Unnikrishnan, who sought permission to sue as indigent persons in OS No.178 of 2016 filed in the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, by respondents 1–6 for recovery of money. The Sub Court had granted the permission (Ext. P7) after the plaintiffs sought extended time for court-fee remission. The petition contends Ext. P7 is vitiated for non-compliance with Order 33 Rule 2 CPC, which requires a schedule of movable and immovable property with estimated values, signed and verified as pleadings. It argued Rule 5 mandates rejection for failure to comply. The petition cites Mathew v. State of Kerala (1996) 2 KLT 363, where the court emphasized strict compliance with Rs. 2 and 3 of Order 33 and held that non-disclosure may lead to rejection. Respondents contend the immovable-property value omission was inadvertent, asserting bona fide indigency and requesting opportunity to rectify. The High Court held that compliance with Order 33 Rule 2 is mandatory and Ext. P7 cannot stand. It set aside Ext. P7 and permitted respondents 1–6 to file proper applications under Order 33 Rule 1; a reasoned order will follow after considering objections. The court stressed the need to come to court with “clean hands” and to disclose all assets to enjoy indigent relief under the Code.
This writ petition challenges the legality of an inquiry under Section 65 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 into the constitution, working and financial condition of the Vellamunda Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. The Registrar, on the basis of an audit, issued Ext.P5 (06.01.2021) appointing a Unit Inspector to conduct the enquiry with an initial six-month period, extendable up to one year in aggregate under Section 65(5). The enquiry could not be completed in time; a first extension was granted, and a final enquiry report Ext.P7 was submitted (30.04.2021). A second extension (Ext.P6, 25.06.2021) purportedly extended the period beyond expiry to 30.04.2021, triggering the central dispute: whether the Registrar could extend after expiry and whether Ext.P7 is legally valid. The court analyzes Section 65(5), noting the six-month deadline is procedural and aggregate extension may reach one year, with Section 101 enabling exemption from 65(5). Riji G. Nair (Dr.) v. State of Kerala (Full Bench, 2020) is cited to justify retrospective extension in appropriate cases. The judge concludes that the Registrar has authority to extend beyond expiry, rendering Ext.P7 valid, and that challenges to merits under Section 65 are to be entertained under Section 68(2). The petition is dismissed, with guidance on the proper stage for challenge to the report.
WP(C) No. 10075 of 2021; WP(C) No. 11561 of 2021 This is a consolidated Kerala High Court writ petition involving seniority and by-transfer appointments for the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior English) at SSV Higher Secondary School, Chirayinkeezhu. Chitra A.P. (the petitioner in WP(C) No.10075/2021) challenged government directions to reconsider the appointment of Smt. Mahima S. as HSST (Jr.) English and sought a direction to conduct selection post-haste, asserting her own seniority and regularized service since 2011. The companion petition WP(C) No.11561/2021, filed by the SSV Higher Secondary School and Smt. Mahima S., sought validation of Mahima’s appointment from 28.01.2019 and challenged the government’s approach to reassign the by-transfer post. The Government had ordered to place service particulars before a Selection Committee under Kerala Education Rules and to reconsider the issue, after which Ext.P9 directed reconsideration. The court, noting substantial disputes on seniority, service records, and the role of the selection committee, allowed WP(C) No.10075/2021 and dismissed WP(C) No.11561/2021, directing compliance with Ext.P9 within three months and ensuring the 4th respondent (Manager) furnishes the requisite records for a fair decision. The judgment emphasizes adherence to statutory rules, seniority-based considerations, and proper hearing before any by-transfer appointment.”
