The judgment consolidates several writ appeals challenging a common judgment in separate writ petitions (WP(C) Nos. 19808/2021, 17632/2021 and 11673/2022) that directed implementation of disability-reservation provisions in aided schools, extending the 1995 Act/2016 Act to institutions that receive government aid. The court reiterates that aided schools too fall within the scope of the Persons with Disabilities statutes and that the State had a constitutional and statutory obligation to ensure 3%/4% reservations across cadres identified for persons with disabilities, with backlog back to 7.2.1996 and 19.4.2017 as per Ext.P1. The State’s delay in implementing Ext.P1 and Ext.P5 and the related GO orders led to litigation; the learned Single Judge’s directions to implement the statutes from 18.11.2018 and to fill backlog vacancies are upheld, albeit with modifications. The judgment emphasizes that equity cannot override express statutory provisions, and that managers of aided schools are bound to comply with government orders extending disability reservations to their establishments. It also clarifies that appointments made post-18.11.2018 without compliance are illegal and may require retrospective approval subject to statutory processes. The court ultimately disposes of the appeals, affirming the lower court’s conclusions and issuing additional directions to ensure timely absorption of persons with disabilities in aided schools, while allowing provisional approvals to run until backlogs are cleared.
This is a criminal revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. challenging a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) and the accompanying sentence of three months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,46,000, as affirmed in appeal with a modified sentence. The petitioner was convicted in CC No. 8/2016 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate-II, Muvattupuzha, and the Sessions Court, in Crl.Appeal No. 166/2019, upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to imprisonment till rising of the court and a Rs. 7,46,000 fine. The revision places emphasis on the manner and validity of the statutory notice under Section 138(b) NI Act and whether proper notice was issued to the correct address; it also critiques the sufficiency of the evidence linking the accused to the debt and the dishonour of the cheque. The High Court anchors its analysis in established jurisprudence, notably regarding service of notice via registered post (Section 27 NI Act), the legal presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act, and the limited scope of revisional review. Citing several Supreme Court decisions (Alavi Haji, Rangappa, Bir Singh, Kalamani Tex, Kishan Rao, Sanjay Chavan, etc.), the court reaffirms the presumption in favour of the complainant but ultimately modifies the sentence to payment of a fine only, with the excess relief deemed executed after receipt of part payment by the defacto complainant.
This writ petition challenges Exts.P5 and P6 under the Kerala Land Utilization Order, 1967, and the action of the land authorities in Naduvattom, Tirur Taluk. The petitioner, P. Velayudhan, is the absolute owner of about 10 1/2 cents of land in RS Nos. 54/10 and 55/4. He contends the land is not suitable for paddy cultivation and has not been used to cultivate a food crop for years. A complaint by the 4th respondent led to Ext.P1 and the 2nd respondent issued Ext.P5 (Form No. E). The petitioner filed Ext.P2 objection and Ext.P4 detailed objections; the 3rd respondent submitted Ext.P3 report. The petitioner appeals under Clause 11 of the Kerala Land Utilization Order; Ext.P6 is the 1st respondent’s order dismissing the appeal. The petition argues there is no evidence that the land was cultivated with a food crop for three consecutive years immediately before the commencement of the Order, and that Ext.P5 cannot stand. The Government Pleader defends the order, asserting detailed consideration by the authority. The Court, relying on Ext.P3 and subsequent inspection reports (11.11.2022), finds no evidence of three-year pre-Order cultivation and holds Ext.P5 unsustainable. The petition is allowed, and Exts.P3, P5, and P6 are quashed, preventing further action under the LOU in this case.
This writ petition challenges Exts.P4 and P6 issued by the Kasaragod Municipality concerning correction of the date of birth of the petitioner’s son Sudheesh Kumar B.K. The petitioner seeks quashing of those notices and a mandamus directing the Municipality to consider the correction urgently, including correcting the date of birth from 4 November 1985 to 3 November 1985 and updating initials of the child’s name and parents’ names. The hospital certificate (Ext.P2) shows the hospital records are unavailable due to old age, and Ext.P6 refused to entertain the correction for lack of documents. The petitioner argues that Ext.P7 (a Division Bench judgment) lays down a procedure that does not require a hospital report and directs corrective action by declaration under Rule 11 and Section 15 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act; the rule cannot be overridden by executive orders. The learned Judge notes the Division Bench reasoning in Ext.P7, finds Ext.P6 illegal, and sets aside Ext.P6. He directs the 5th respondent to reconsider the application in light of Ext.P2 and the Ext.P7 judgment within one month. The court ultimately allows the writ petition and remands for reconsideration in conformity with the cited judgment and statutory provisions to secure the petitioner’s statutory right to correction.
The petitioner, Fasalul Haque, an Upper Primary School Teacher in Malappuram, asserts a vested right to an anticipated post under Rule 51B, Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules following the death of his wife who served as a UPSA at Vidyaposhini Aided Upper Primary School. He alleges that although the post was created in anticipation, the government ban prevented its sanction, forcing him to continue work without formal approval since 01.11.2006. After being shifted to a Junior Arabic Teacher post in 2010 (with Ext.P1), the AEO denied approval on the ground that the Manager had not executed a bond as required by GO(P) No.10/10/G.Edn dated 12.01.2010, rendering the appointment illegal. The Manager challenged this, and the DEO rejected the appeal, with the Government Revision under Rule 92 also upholding the denial in Ext.P4. Meanwhile, the 2011 Teachers’ Package purportedly approved the petitioner from 01.06.2011, prompting the petitioner to seek approval back to 01.11.2006 and to quash Ext.P4. The petitioner invokes Nadheera v State and Moosakutty v. DEO to argue that no legal obligation attaches to appoint a protected teacher absent a forwarded list. The court ultimately finds that Nadheera and Moosakutty principles apply and that absence of a bond can be treated as presumed, directing reconsideration with due process and a timely hearing.
CRL.M.C No. 7656/2022; CRL.M.C No. 7973/2022 These Crl.M.C. Nos. 7656/2022 and 7973/2022 arise from challenges to an order granting pre-arrest bail to Eldhose Kunnappilly, MLA, in Crime No. 983/2022 of Kovalam Police Station. The Additional Sessions Court-VII, Thiruvananthapuram, on 20-10-2022 granted anticipatory bail to the first accused. The State (State of Kerala) and the victim filed these petitions under section 482 Cr.P.C. to set aside that bail order. The prosecution contends the court below failed to consider crucial materials on record, including the victim’s statements under Cr.P.C. sections 161 and 164, and that the accused, as a political heavyweight, would influence witnesses and tamper with evidence, thus undermining the investigation and trial. The petitioner-victim argues that the case involves alleged rape and other offences; the court below allegedly misread the facts by assuming consent on some occasions and by importing merits into a bail inquiry. The learned judge, however, reaffirms the principle that bail is discretionary and must be grounded in relevant factors and the ends of justice. The High Court finds no perverse, illegal, or unjustified exercise of discretion in the impugned order and dismisses the petitions, thereby upholding the Sessions Court’s grant of anticipatory bail and keeping the investigative process intact. The decision underscores the narrow scope of intervention under Section 482 Cr.P.C in bail matters.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 36 OF 2007; CRL.REV.PET NO. 37 OF 2007; CRL.REV.PET NO. 38 OF 2007; CRL.REV.PET NO. 39 OF 2007 These four criminal revision petitions (CRL.R.P. Nos.36, 37, 38 and 39 of 2007) arise from the same factual matrix: four complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the second accused (S. Balakrishna Prabhu), managing partner and partner of M/s Swathi Garments, for cheques drawn on behalf of the firm that allegedly bounced. The Trial Court convicted the second accused under NI Act, §138, and the Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc-I) Ernakulam confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence and enhanced compensation with a default term. The High Court, presided by Justice Viju Abraham, heard the petitions together, addressing a core question: can a prosecution under Section 141 (offences by companies) be maintained without arraigning the partnership firm as an accused when cheques were issued by the firm? The petitioners contended that failure to array the firm as an accused taints the process, relying on Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd. The respondents relied on the vicarious liability framework under §141 and cited Parekh, Aneeta Hada, and other authorities. The court ultimately surveys multiple precedents (Aneeta Hada; Babu; Moideen Kutty; Dilip Hariramani; Sharad Kumar Sanghi; Himanshu; Hindustan Unilever) and concludes that arraigning the firm is imperative for Section 141 prosecutions. Consequently, the revision petitions are allowed; the conviction and sentence are set aside, and the accused is acquitted and discharged, with bail bonds to be cancelled.
This writ petition challenges Ext.P10, a Kerala Government order denying approval to the petitioner’s appointment as HSA (English) in HSS Panangad with effect from 01.06.2011. The petitioner asserts that four HSA (English) posts were sanctioned for 2011‑12 onward (Ext.P2) and that English classes were taught by HSA (Social Science) due to lack of a qualified English teacher until 2010‑11. The DPI introduced a new cadre for HSA (English) by reallocating periods from core English, Maths, Science and Social Studies, under GO (MS) No. 11/02/G.Edn (07/01/2002), and Rule 6.I of Chapter XXIII K.E.R. requiring sanctions to observe minimum subject requirements, with a phased implementation to avoid retrenchment of core-subject HSAs. The respondents argued that redeployment rights of a protected teacher (V. K. Dharmarajan) should fill the vacancy. However, the court relies on Minimol C. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2012 (4) KLT 719) to hold that the minimum subject requirement must be observed and that creating the HSA (English) post need not involve recalling core-subject HSA teachers. The petition is allowed, directing approval of the petitioner’s appointment as HSA (English) from 01.06.2011 and grant service benefits for the period 01.06.2011 to 02.06.2013.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 1425 OF 2011 Criminal Revision Petition No.1425 of 2011 arises from a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Trial Court sentenced Sasikumar to one year’s simple imprisonment and directed him to pay Rs.1,00,000 as compensation under Cr.P.C. Section 357(3), with a default three-month imprisonment. The Appellate Court confirmed the conviction but enhanced the fine to Rs.1,10,000, with a three-month default sentence. The complainant alleged that Sasikumar borrowed Rs.1,00,000 and, in discharge of the debt, issued Ext. P1 cheque, which bounced on presentation (Ext. P2). Although Ext. P4 (lawyer’s notice) was issued, no payment followed. The revision petitioner contends that Ext. P1 cheque was not issued for a legally enforceable debt but was given as security; that the prosecution relied on presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act; and that the defence was not properly considered. The High Court recalls the narrow, supervisory remit of its revisional power under CrPC 397-401 and surveys the leading authorities on NI Act presumption and reverse onus, including Ramrao Chavan, Rangappa, Kalamani Tex and Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel, distinguishing Krishna Janardhan Bhat as not supporting the present view. The Court ultimately finds no illegality in the concurrent findings and dismisses the revision, sustaining the conviction and sentence.
This writ petition challenges the appointment of Deepu Kumar as P.T.C.M. at Chempakassery T.T.I. and seeks a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to the post against the vacancy arising from a 2017 promotion. The petitioner, who served as a part-time contingent employee (P.T.C.M.) from 01.06.2002 to 10.12.2003, asserts that her earlier service was approved, and that subsequent actions by the 4th respondent (the Manager) and the 2nd/3rd respondents violated statutory norms. The petition traces prior enforcement: an enquiry by the Deputy Director of Education found the petitioner’s termination unjust, prompting government instructions to reinstate; Ext.P6 shows the DEO approved the petitioner, and Ext.P7 (a common judgment in related WP(C) Nos.) directed approval of the petitioner’s appointment for the 2002–2003 period and salary payment. A vacancy in 2017 led to a claim for appointment, which the DEO partially allowed (Ext.P9). The Government’s revision petitions culminated in Ext.P14 (03/2019) upholding the revision petitions, challenging the petitioner’s claim for preference. The court, after considering rival contentions, held that Ext.P7 restricted approval to salary during 2002–2003 and that the subsequent preferential claim is misconceived; the petition is dismissed. The decision hinges on the limited scope of prior approvals and the timing of the 2017 vacancy.
This High Court of Kerala original petition arises from a Family Court order dated 17 February 2023 in O.P.884/2023, where the court dismissed I.A.3/2022 seeking permission to take the child Shaisa Mariam, aged five, abroad to join the mother who is employed overseas. The petitioners, three family members of the child, challenge the Family Court order under Article 227 of the Constitution, arguing that it is in the welfare of the child to relocate abroad with the mother, who will soon join the child abroad in Oman. The respondent father, Ishak Ismail, had earlier been granted interim custody on weekends and daily telephonic contact, which was later modified by this court in O.P.(FC) No.562/2022, restricting the father's rights to alternate Saturdays and daily phone contact. The petition emphasizes the child’s need for care, affection, and education under the mother’s supervision, contending that criminal case allegations against the father and his father should not defeat the child’s welfare. The respondent resists relocation, contending it would deprive him of visitation and that there are ongoing litigations that would be adversely affected. The court, relying on welfare principles and case law, sets aside Ext.P9 and allows travel to Oman with safeguards for the father’s visitation via phone, and with annual Indian vacation custody arrangements, to advance the child’s best interests.
The High Court of Kerala heard Crl.A (V) No.18 of 2019, challenging an acquittal recorded in SC No.748/2010 dated 10 July 2014 of the Additional Sessions Court IV, Palakkad. The appellant is the legal heir of the victim who was murdered. The respondents are the two accused—Ramakrishnan and Kunjiraman—and the State represented by the Public Prosecutor. The prosecution’s case rested on circumstantial evidence, including a motive linked to a dispute over trees cut for renovation of the ancestral house, and a last-seen-together theory: witnesses placed the deceased with the accused around the time of the incident. The trial court acquitted the accused; the appellant challenges that acquittal. The court recalls the principles in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, concerning appellate review of acquittals: an appellate court may reappreciate evidence; there is no fixed bar on disturbing acquittals; yet, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. On analysis of the evidence, the High Court observes that the motive was not established; the last-seen theory is demolished; the chain of circumstances is not conclusively proven; and crucial scientific corroboration is lacking. In these circumstances, the court dismisses the appeal and upholds the trial court’s acquittal, thereby sustaining the acquittal of the accused.
MACA Nos. 1347/2016, 735/2016, 1809/2016 This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal arising from OP(MV) 501/2004 (M.A.C.A. Nos. 1347/2016, 735/2016, 1809/2016) before the Kerala High Court. The petitioner Jacob, the appellant in MACA 1347/2016, sustained injuries in a motor accident on 16.02.2002 while riding as a pillion on KL 8 T 6335. The accident involved a second motorcycle KL 8 J 3566; the claim petition proceeded against the rider (1st respondent), the registered owner (2nd respondent), insurer (3rd respondent), and later against additional respondents 4 and 5. The Tribunal initially held respondents 1, 4 and 5 liable for Rs. 88,000 with 7% interest, exonerating the Insurance Company on grounds of policy violation (no valid license to the rider). On remand, the Tribunal again exonerated the insurer, prompting this appeal. The High Court scrutinizes the insurer’s exoneration, holding that the Insurance Company shall pay first and then recover from the owner and rider, and that the registered owner remains liable so long as the vehicle is registered in his name, with the possibility of recovery from a transferee if the vehicle was transferred before the accident. The Court remands the matter to the Tribunal to reassess liability and quantum, with liberty to adduce evidence, and directs payment/deposit procedures pending final adjudication.
WP(C) Nos. 27019/2021, 27022/2021, 4732/2022 & 33757/2023 This batch of writ petitions challenges the regulation of tuition fees for private medical education in Kerala under the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017. The petitioners, the managements of Nehru College and P.K. Das Institute of Medical Sciences, contend that the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) failed to adhere to the Act and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353 in fixing fees for 2019-20 and subsequent years. They point to alleged discrepancies in the accounting basis used by the Committee, such as depreciation calculations and the inclusion of loan interest without appropriate asset valuation, and note the 2018-19 admissions status that would affect fee fixation. The respondents—FRC and the Government—argue that the Committee considered all materials submitted by the management, that the fee for 2019-20 was fixed after due process (Rs. 5,24,100), and that the process complied with the Act and applicable apex court precedents. The Court finds misalignments in the impugned order and remands the matter to the FRC for proper determination in accordance with the Act and apex court decisions, directing expedited proceedings to be completed within two months, with the Committee deciding all issues of fees for the petitions.
MACA No.970 of 2016; Cross Objection No.177 of 2019 This appeal arises from an MACT award in OPMV 818/2013 for the death of Sidhique in a motor vehicle collision on 09.02.2013. The deceased was driving a car and was struck by a lorry TN-50/J-4927. The claimants—Abdul Kareem and family (1–4)—sought compensation for loss and bereavement. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, held the lorry driver primarily responsible but assessed 10% contributory negligence on the deceased, and awarded Rs. 14,85,000 as compensation, directing the insurer to deposit 90% of the award with interest. The insurer challenged the liability and quantum, while the claimants/cross objectors urged higher compensation. The Kerala High Court, through Justice Ziyad Rahman A.A., found that the Tribunal’s 10% attribution to the deceased was unsupported by the evidence and should be set aside; the accident was due to the sole negligence of the lorry driver, making the insurer liable for the entire compensation. On quantum, the court fixed the monthly income at Rs.9,000 (citing Ramachandrappa and Syed Sadiq) and held future prospects at 40% (not 50%). It replaced Rs.3,00,000 for love and affection with Rs.80,000 for loss of consortium and reduced funeral expenses to Rs.15,000. The total compensation was recalculated to Rs.14,81,800, and the appeal and cross objections were disposed of with directions to deposit this amount within three months, after adjusting any sums already paid.
Cr.M.C. No.1557 of 2023 before the High Court of Kerala (Single Judge) arises from FIR No.548/2022 of Tirur Police Station, Malappuram, concerning offences under sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 324, 427 and 308 read with section 149 IPC. The petition seeks to quash the criminal proceedings under section 482 CrPC on the ground that the accused and the de facto complainants (respondents 2 and 3) have amicably settled their disputes and no subsisting grievance remains. The petitioners’ counsel submits affidavits from respondents 2–4 declaring no grievance and contends that quashing would promote peace and avoid oppression. The Public Prosecutor opposes quashing, citing binding Supreme Court jurisprudence (notably State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan and related decisions) and arguing that the crime involves societal interest, with several accused having significant criminal antecedents and multiple other cases. The Court reviews the chain of Supreme Court authorities on the exercise of 482 where offences are private and settled, and emphasizes that quashing is inappropriate for heinous or public-interest offences (e.g., 307 IPC, Arms Act) and where antecedents cast doubt on voluntariness of settlement. Given the petitioners’ extensive criminal history and societal impact, the court declines to terminate the prosecution and dismisses the petition. The proceedings will continue in accordance with law.
This appeal under MACA No. 1703 of 2017 challenges the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Vatakara award in O.P.(M.V) No.403 of 2014. The petitioners, Savitha, Aswathy, ASWABTGM, Mukundan and Sarada, represented by Adv. Zubair Pulikool, claimed compensation for the death of Shagesh, a skilled painter, in a road accident on a national highway when his motorcycle KL-19-AA-1151 was hit by lorry KL-57-H-1558 driven rashly. The Tribunal awarded compensation but the petitioners contend the quantum was inadequately determined: the deceased’s earnings were not credibly established, and the monthly income was fixed at Rs 5,000 on a notional basis; the Tribunal added 50% for future prospects, whereas the petitioners seek 40%. They challenge the conventional heads, contending that the award should reflect the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi (SC) for loss of estate, funeral expenses, and loss of consortium, and that the dependency calculation should reflect a larger income base given five dependants. The respondents contend that the accident resulted from the deceased’s negligence and dispute the higher income and heads claimed; they argue that the petitioners are not entitled to pain and suffering/love & affection beyond what was awarded. The High Court reevaluates evidence, enhances monthly income to Rs 11,000, reduces future prospects to 40%, and recalculates compensation, arriving at Rs 10,53,600 as total additional compensation with 7.5% interest. MACA is allowed accordingly, with payment within two months of copy of judgment under Circular No. 03/2019."
OT.Rev Nos. 84/2018; 75/2018; 78/2018; 77/2018; 79/2018; 80/2018; 81/2018; 82/2018; 86/2018; 91/2018; 92/2018; 94/2018 This batch judgment of the Kerala High Court, dated 29 July 2022, arises from a cluster of OT.Revisions challenging a common order of the Kerala VAT Appellate Tribunal dated 5 March 2018, in T.A.(VAT) Nos. 564–569 of 2014 and related cross-objections. The court, noting a split in opinion at the Division Bench level and a reference to a Full Bench, reconsiders the interpretation of Section 25 of the KVAT Act, 2003 on reassessment powers where a dealer has opted for a compounded rate under Section 8. The Full Bench had held that reassessment can be initiated by the Assessing Officer for various contingencies including misrepresentation or fraud, and that the compounded tax scheme does not immunize against reassessment for misrepresentation or erroneous facts. The Finance Department’s position, the respondents’ arguments, and the petitioners’ contentions were heard together. The Supreme Court-like question was whether reassessment under Section 25 is available in cases where compounding is accepted, and whether earlier precedents such as A. M. Muhammed Ali require overruling. The Court ultimately sets aside the Tribunal’s common order, allows the OT revisions, and remits the matters to the Tribunal for fresh disposal on merits within four months, thereby aligning with the Full Bench’s reasoning and directing expeditious resolution.
The petitioner, Mathew C. Thomas, the sole accused in the trial court case ST 3826/2019, challenged by a criminal miscellaneous petition (Crl.M.C. 3882/2020), seeks quashing of Annexure-A1 complaint under Sections 499 and 500 IPC. The complaint, filed by the de facto complainant Mathew Joseph C., alleged defamatory imputations in Annexure-A2, circulated to various officers and even to grocery shops, harming the respondent’s reputation and suggesting improper conduct. The petitioner argues that even if the imputations are taken as true, they fall within the protections of Explanation 4 to Section 499 IPC, which requires the imputation to lower the victim’s morality or intellectual character in the estimation of others; he also contends that the complaint was made in good faith for protecting life and property, and that Exceptions 8 and 9 to Section 499 IPC apply when the complaint is made to a person in authority. The respondent counters that the Magistrate properly issued process after enquiry and that the imputations were defamatory; they point to the alleged wide circulation of the complaint and the need to examine police witnesses. The Court engages on whether the petitioner can avail Exceptions 8/9 at the pre-trial stage and examines applicable precedents. It cites multiple authorities, including Maniyani, Rajendra Kumar Sitram Pande, Vedurumudi Rama Rao, Balraj Khanna, and National Insurance v. Pranay Sethi, to decide that the exceptions do not apply at this stage. Ultimately, the Crl.M.C is dismissed.
The South Indian Bank Ltd. filed WP(C) No.10822 of 2023 seeking a direction to delete entries of attachments from the encumbrance register in respect of its secured asset mortgaged by an equitable mortgage dated 19 November 2009. The borrower defaulted on installments, prompting the Bank to initiate proceedings under the SARFAESI Act; the property was subsequently sold in favor of the 6th respondent and the sale was confirmed by letter Ext.P6 dated 17 March 2023. Several attachments were obtained by the 2nd to 5th respondents from various courts—District Court, Thrissur (A.O.P. No.699/2012); Judicial Magistrate Court, Thrissur (C.C No.1141/2013); District Court, Thrissur (O.P(ARB) No.133/2013 in I.A No.810/2013); and Sub Court, Irinjalakkuda (O.S No.115/2014 in I.A No.2305/2014). All are reflected in Ext.P7 encumbrance certificate dated 28.11.2022. The petitioner contends that attachments post-dating the mortgage are not binding on the bank’s sale under the SARFAESI Act and must be effaced, since the right of redemption under Section 13(8) is extinguished by the sale. It relies on Madhan S. v. Sub Registrar, Kollam; Keechery Service Co‑operative Bank Ltd. v. Sajitha Nizar; and Ali Asharaf M.M. v. Sub Registrar to argue that post‑mortgage encumbrances do not affect the sale. The Court ultimately directs effacement of the post‑mortgage attachments from the encumbrance records and disposes of the writ petition.
