CRL.M.C Nos. 649, 1356 & 4182 of 2023 The Kerala High Court, in a set of connected Criminal Miscellaneous Cases (CRL.M.C. Nos. 649, 1356 and 4182 of 2023), deals with quashing an FIR registered under Section 63 of the Copyright Act (Crime No. 703/2022, Kozhikode Town Police Station). The petitions seek exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash non‑compoundable offences on the basis of settlement between the accused and the private complainant. The matter involves a private dispute arising from alleged copyright violation. The parties have reportedly settled, and both the petitioners and the de facto complainant/victim, through their counsel, have stated there is no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while conceding settlement, expressed reservations about quashing solely on that basis but did not deny the settlement. The court cites Supreme Court rulings in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) and the related decisions in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh to lay down how Section 482 CrPC should be applied to non‑compoundable offences in private disputes where settlement exists, and clarifies that such power has limits (heinous offences, public‑interest offences, or offences under special statutes). After examining the facts, the court holds the dispute to be private in nature and accepts the settlement, quashing the FIR and all further proceedings. The order underscores that quashing is permissible where the settlement reflects genuine resolution and does not involve serious social harm.
W.P.(C).No.12848/20 & 205/22 The two writ petitions challenge the Kerala State Electricity Board’s order revising the qualifications for the post of Sub Engineer (Electrical) and the notification issued for recruitment. Petitioners contend that Exhibit P5 regulations of the Central Electricity Authority prescribe that engineers and supervisors dealing with operation and maintenance of generation, transmission and distribution systems shall hold a Diploma or degree in Electrical, Electronics, or Instrumentation engineering from a recognized institute, and that excluding Diploma/Degree in Electronics Engineering is contrary to those regulations. They argue that Electronics Engineering was a recognized qualification and that the Board amended qualifications without justification, thereby depriving Electronics graduates of eligibility. The Board counters that Exhibit P5 provides broad guidelines aimed at safety and that the fixed qualification of pass in a three-year Diploma in Electrical or Electrical & Electronics Engineering, recognised by AICTE, is adequate; it notes that Electronics and Telecommunication degrees are not prescribed for the role, and that the syllabus for the Diploma in Electrical & Electronics covers significantly more electrical content than Electronics & Communication. The petitioners rely on this Court’s decision in Kerala State Electricity Board Ltd v. Santhosh (2020) and on Muhammed A.A. v. State of Kerala (2022) to argue that the regulations are mandatory. The Court ultimately found that the Board has the power to fix qualifications and that the omission of electronics engineering from the qualification is not a mistake; Exhibit P5 remains binding. The petitions were dismissed.
Criminal Appeal No. 362 of 2018 This is a Criminal Appeal filed by Jibi challenging the judgment of the Special Court, Ernakulam, in SC No.397 of 2016. The first accused, Jibi, was convicted under IPC 376(2)(i) and under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) Sections 3(a) read with 5(j)(ii) and 6. The victim, a girl aged about 14 in October 2015, allegedly faced illicit sexual activity at the hands of the first accused, who was married and had three children, and the victim’s mother (second accused) was charged with related offences but acquitted. The prosecution examined 19 witnesses and proved 16 documents. A central dispute concerns the victim’s age; the defense contended that Ext. P6, an extract from a later school admission register, cannot establish age since it is not from the first school attended, and no birth certificate from the first school was produced. The prosecution relied on Ext. P6 and, at the instance of the accused, Ext. D1(b) (birth record) to prove age. The court held that Ext. P6 can be admitted as proof of age and that the victim was a minor at the relevant time, and thus the sexual act constitutes an offence. Nevertheless, applying the totality of circumstances, including the accused’s age and responsibilities to his children, the court reduced the sentence to ten years of rigorous imprisonment while upholding the conviction.
This is a writ petition under Article 226 challenging an interim order (Ext. P5) passed by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Thrissur under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The petitioner, a Non-Banking Financial Company, had lent a vehicle to the father of the first respondent and invoked arbitration after notices to guarantors for liquidation of the balance due. The first respondent filed a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum alleging unlawful possession of the vehicle and seeking its return, prompting Ext. P5 interim relief directing return of the vehicle without notice. The petitioner contends that once arbitration is pending under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the relief should come from the Arbitrator, and that Ext. P5 contravenes Section 51(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the principles of fairness. The court examines whether the Forum had jurisdiction to pass an interim mandatory injunction and whether lack of notice undermines the remedy, applying the longstanding distinction between jurisdictional error and error within jurisdiction, as refined by later Supreme Court rulings (Embassy Property Developments) for Article 226. Ultimately, the High Court held that the Forum’s interim order was within its remit, and the writ petition is dismissed. The matter clarifies that Article 226 does not override statutory remedies where jurisdiction exists to entertain interim relief.
The petitioner, Munnass Tabasim, is the second accused in C.C.98/2016 before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thalassery. She moved an original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings arising from a charge-sheet that alleged offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (Section 13(1)(c) read with 13(2)) and several sections of the Indian Penal Code (420, 468, 471, 120B). The police investigation, initially in Crime No.24/2006 and later re-registered as VACB VC7/06/KNR, purportedly revealed a conspiracy to obtain a Rs.130 lakh cash credit loan from the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Kannur Branch with forged documents, while the company P.A.Trading (P) Ltd. was allegedly fictitious. The petitioner claimed she, as a director, did not commit forgery, did not control company affairs, and that the loan was a civil transaction; the company was a bogus entity and not charged. The Bank contended that Article 227 is not a proper vehicle to quash a charge-sheet, and that materials amount to offences including conspiracy among accused. The High Court recognizes that the company is not an accused and vicarious liability cannot be imputed absent statutory provision or evidence of active participation. It nonetheless emphasizes that the offences hinge on individual acts and intent. It ultimately allows the petition, holding that pre-trial materials do not justify proceeding against the petitioner, citing Madhavrao Scindia’s test that quashing is permissible when chances of conviction are bleak and ends of justice require it. Noting substantial repayments and that the third accused and bank official were dead or not charged, the court concludes there is insufficient direct involvement to sustain criminal liability against the petitioner, and quashes the proceedings to prevent abuse of process.
The petitioner Pattayil Kunjukunju Memorial Charitable Trust runs the Sree Narayana Institute of Technology (SNIT) at Adoor and sought NOC/Approval from AICTE to start five new diploma programs for the academic year 2021-2022. AICTE granted Extension of Approval (EOA) for the courses, and the University (APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University) approved the underlying affiliation; however, the Director of Technical Education (DTE) refused to grant NOC/approval citing a government policy that bars self-financing private institutions from starting new diploma courses in 2020-21. The petitioner challenged Exts.P5 and P7 in a writ petition, contending that central statutory schemes and AICTE approvals empower the college to commence the diploma programs and that a policy decision cannot override central law or the AICTE process. The State and University counters argued that the University Act, Statutes, and the AICTE norms require careful scrutiny to ensure no dilution of standards or interference with existing degree programs. The Court framed two issues: (i) whether State policy can bar private self-financing institutions from adding new diploma courses, and (ii) whether the DTE must obtain the University’s views before granting NOC. It cited precedents emphasizing that policy cannot override central statutes, that universities may lay down enhanced norms, and that AICTE norms cannot be diluted. Ultimately, the court set aside Exts.P5 and P7, directed the 2nd respondent to reconsider after inspecting the institution and hearing the parties, and held that if infrastructure supports both courses, NOC/approval may be granted within a four-week window from receipt of the University report, with the petitioner and University heard beforehand.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a partition suit (OS 283/2006) filed in the Principal Munsiff Court, Palakkad, by the plaintiffs (Prameela and Devu U.) who claim a partition of 6.5 cents of land with a residential building, challenging a will (Ext. B1) dated 11.11.1985 said to be bequeathing the property to the defendant, Jayaprakasan. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that Ext. B1 had come into effect as the testator’s will; the First Appellate Court affirmed. The appellants challenge the judgment under Section 100 CPC, raising questions about the proper appreciation of evidence and the inferences drawn by the courts below. The core issue is whether Ext. B1 was duly executed by late Pachan, with due attestation under Sections 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Sections 67-68 of the Indian Evidence Act. The court relies on seminal authorities, including H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur, to address the standard for proving a will, especially where execution is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The High Court ultimately holds that Ext. B1 was duly executed, finds no established suspicious circumstances, and concludes that the propounder has satisfied the testamentary proof requirements. Accordingly, the Regular Second Appeal is dismissed, and the decree favoring the defendant remains unchanged, denying partition to the appellants.
This Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed in WP(C) No. 13818 of 2021 by Dr. George Joseph Themplangad seeks to curb the influence of unregistered political fronts (like LDF, UDF, NDA) and regulate pre-poll alliances during elections conducted under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The petitioner contends that such fronts lack registration as political parties, lack constitutional status, and do not have a formal organizational structure or membership recognized by law, yet they sponsor candidates and publish posters and advertisements to sway voters. He relies on provisions of the RP Act (notably sections relating to registration of political parties, corrupt practices, and nomination procedures) and references to the X Schedule and Articles of the Constitution to argue that unregistered fronts cannot claim political rights or legitimacy in the electoral process. The petitioner also cites the Election Commission’s Exhibit-P6 letter (2016) to claim that alliances are improper if they undermine statutory requirements, and he seeks mandamus to compel action against fronts and to regulate pre-poll alliances under the RP Act. The respondents argue the opposite: alliances are legitimate political activities, unregistered fronts are not entities under the RP Act, and mandamus cannot be issued for such political questions. The Kerala High Court ultimately dismisses the petition, holding no statutory obligation mandating registration of political fronts and stressing PIL must be exercised with caution.
WP(C) 9881/2020 & connected cases This is a consolidated decision of a batch of writ petitions filed by various oil companies and their franchisees challenging Kerala Government orders Ext.P2 (G.O. No.16/2020/PWD, 10.02.2020) and Ext.P4 (G.O. No.67/2020/PWD, 16.10.2020) which laid down Guidelines for Access Permission to Fuel Stations along State Highways and Major District Roads. The petitioners contend that the Petroleum Rules, 2002 (Rule 144) already regulate No Objection Certificates for establishing fuel outlets, and that the State cannot impose distance/volume norms or general guidelines via executive orders under Article 162 of the Constitution, and that such guidelines infringe Article 14 and the central statutes. The State counters that Rule 144 permits considering traffic safety and related public interests; that IRC guidelines were withdrawn and replaced by Kerala norms; and that the Government has the power to issue executive instructions. The court, in a cohesive, single-judge decision, holds that Ext.P2 and Ext.P4 Guidelines are set aside, and the District Authorities’ refusals/rejections premised on those guidelines are to be quashed. It directs District authorities to reconsider NOC applications under Rule 144, strictly under the prevailing statutory framework as of the dates of the applications, within two months, leaving other issues open. The judgment relies on Mary Ulahannan, Reliance Industries, Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu, and G.J. Fernandez, among other authorities, to uphold the petitioners’ challenge to the guidelines and to affirm executive powers under Article 162 where applicable.
WP(C).No.14398 OF 2018(Y) The petitioner, Suresh Kumar C.M., was working as a Training School Assistant at S.N.T.T.I., Nileswaram, and was suspended by the District Educational Officer (DEO) in Crime No. 118/2017 under Section 354(d) IPC for alleged misbehavior with a lady teacher. No formal enquiry had been initiated; instead, Ext.P3 imposed a major penalty (reduction in rank and transfer) by the 1st respondent. The petitioner contends that Ext.P3 is untenable because no enquiry under Rule 75 of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules (KER) was conducted, and there was no memo of charges. The 4th respondent, the Deputy Director of Education, is alleged to have acted without jurisdiction, since management disputes meant the 4th respondent was not the competent authority to conduct such an enquiry. The petitioner relies on Narikkuni A.U.P.S. v. State of Kerala (2017) 3 KLT 397 to argue that the procedure under Rules 74 and 75 is mandatory for imposing a major penalty. The Respondents contend the gravity of the allegations warranted suspension as a preparatory measure, and that the matter warrants dismissal of the petition, though they concede lack of documented enquiry. The Court finds Ext.P3 void for non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements and quashes it, while noting that the respondents may initiate action as per law with due process under the Kerala Education Act and KER.
This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 3840/2021) challenges a Sessions Court order in SC 586/2018, Pathanamthitta, that refused to allow the prosecution to confront PW1 with prior statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and to examine contradictions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. The State contends that the respondent-accused Ramadas, not belonging to Scheduled Castes/Tribes, allegedly abused the de facto minor complainant by luring her into marriage and raping her on 19-20 March 2012, leading to a FIR under IPC Section 376 and SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 (3(1)(xi), 3(2)(v)). The Sessions Judge, during PW1’s examination on 18-03-2021, did not permit cross-examination on the basis of contradictions with the 161 statements, recording the information as hearsay and denying the Prosecutor’s request to mark contradictory portions in the 161 statement. The State relies on V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand (2015) to argue that the procedure violated well-settled law and caused miscarriage of justice. The court quotes Tahsildar Singh, Tara Singh, Bhagwan Singh, and Thankappan Mohanan to emphasize the necessity of cross-examining witnesses with attention to the relevant parts of prior statements and ensuring compliance with Section 145 and 162. The High Court ultimately allows the Crl.M.C., directing recall of PW1 and proper cross-examination in accordance with law, to safeguard fair trial principles.
WP(C) 9881/2020 & connected cases This batch of writ petitions, heard together, challenges Ext.P2 GO 46/2019 and Ext.P4 GO (Ms) No. 67/2020 along with the Guidelines for Access Permission to Fuel Stations along the State Highways and Major District Roads in Kerala. The petitioners, Oil Marketing Companies and their Franchisees, contend that the regulation of petroleum, a Central subject, has been usurped by State executive guidelines that impose strict distance norms, infrastructure requirements, fees and penalties beyond what is authorized by the Petroleum Rules, 2002. They argue that the District Authorities’ practice of refusing or conditioning NOCs under Rule 144 based on Ext.P4 guidelines violates the Petroleum Rules, Article 19(1)(g) and Article 14 of the Constitution, and contravenes central legislation. The respondents contend that the State can regulate through executive instructions under Article 162 to ensure road safety, traffic management and consistent development, aided by the Kerala Highway Protection Act, 1999 and MoRTH/IRC norms and expert recommendations. The court consolidates the petitions and ultimately holds that Ext.P2 and Ext.P4, and the guidelines annexed thereto, cannot govern NOC determinations under Rule 144; directives are issued to reconsider NOCs under Rule 144 according to prevailing rules, within two months, without regard to Ext.P2/P4, while dismissing other related challenges. The decision emphasizes separation of central petroleum regulation from State regulatory instruments that are not grounded in the statutory framework.
Premalatha Subhash, the petitioner in WP(C) No.13305 of 2018, seeks a Legal Heirship Certificate for Lakshmi Anandan, her deceased mother-in-law who lived in Thalassery Taluk, Kannur. Lakshmi Anandan died in 2007; her husband died in 2013. The petitioner and other heirs now reside in Maharashtra and wish to dispose of the property described in Ext.P1. On 05.10.2016, the petitioner applied to the Tahsildar, Thalassery, for a legal heirship certificate; Ext.P5 records the rejection, on the ground that neither the deceased nor the heirs are permanent residents of Thalassery Taluk, and that the certificate is limited to financial transactions up to Rs.1 lakh. The petitioner contends proper enquiry was not conducted and relies on Ext.P1 to show Lakshmi’s permanent residence at the Thalassery address. The respondents counter that the certificate is for movable assets, not for sale of immovable property, and that the enquiry was thorough. They rely on Vishalakshi v Bank of India and on Clause 261 of the Kerala Village Manual and GO MS 359/67/RD. The court, applying Renuka K.K. v State of Kerala, held that heirship certificates are intended for movable assets and not for immovable property. The writ petition was dismissed, without prejudice to the petitioner applying for a certificate under Clause 261 for permissible purposes; no order as to costs.
WP(C).No. 8641 of 2013 (E); D.B.A.No.7/2013 These petitions concern the auction of Vedivazhipadu at Kadackal Peedika Devaswom under the Kadackal Sub Group of the Punalur Group. In D.B.A.No.7/2013, the prayer is for sanction to confirm the auction in favour of Shri Arun Kumar, the highest bidder, whose auction notice is at Annexure‑I; the auction was conducted on 08/02/2013. In W.P.(C).No.8641/2013, one participant in the auction has alleged irregularities in the bidding and challenges the qualification of the fifth respondent, the highest bidder. The petition relies on the Explosives Rules and a Division Bench decision in Chandran v. Cochin Devaswom Board (2012 (2) KLT 675) to contend that premises used for gunpowder require LE‑2 licensing and possession/use requires LE‑3, being Class‑1. The petitioner claims to hold an LE‑2 licence (Ext.P1) while the fifth respondent holds an LE‑3 licence (Ext.P10) for nitrate mixtures, suggesting different licensing classifications and purposes. The Respondents contest these contentions, noting that a licence verification and the legality of the auction should be examined by the Devaswom Commissioner. The Court directed verification of licences, possible re‑auction with appropriate conditions, and hearing of both sides; it retained jurisdiction to resolve licensing compliance and auction propriety. The proceedings culminate in a judicial framework aimed at ensuring licensing conformity and fair process in the auction.
WP(C).No. 17973 of 2010(V) This writ petition challenges an order (Ext.P10) demanding stamp duty on a sale deed (Ext.P8) executed by a member of the petitioner co-operative society in favour of the society itself, for land to be used for banking operations. The petitioner, an urban co‑operative bank established under the Kerala Co‑operative Societies Act, sought remission of entire stamp duty under Ext.P1 notification (and its extant provisions), contending the instrument is executed for the business of the society. The Kerala government and statutory officers argued that Ext.P1 remission is limited to (i) instruments executed by or on behalf of a registered co‑operative society and relating to its business, and (ii) instruments executed by an officer or member in their personal capacity or guardian capacity, but only if the instrument relates to the society’s business. The court traced the history of the Act, including the 1969 transformation, and considered several earlier decisions. It held that Ext.P1’s paragraph 1(a) has three limbs and that remission can apply only to instruments that relate to the business of the society; since the society’s business is banking, a sale deed executed by a member in favour of the society does not relate to its banking business, and cannot be remitted. The court refused to quash Ext.P10 and dismissed the petition, though directing the Sub Registrar to register the deed on payment of duty and penalty.
This Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 942 of 2005) arises from a partition suit concerning plaint schedule property measuring about 1 acre 66 cents in Re-Sy. No.4/3, originally belonging to the Thavazhi of Thala Matha. The Trial Court decreed partition in favour of the plaintiffs, and the First Appellate Court affirmed. Defendant No.1 challenges the decision in this High Court appeal. The record shows that after the death of Thala and Matha, the property vested in the Thavazhi and then in the descendants, with the Sthala and its daughters (including Narayani and others) as co-owners. In 1994, Defendant No.1 purchased the rights of the Paithal’s children, and Plaintiffs 2–12 assigned their rights to Plaintiff No.1 in 1995, resulting in a joint possession scenario among Plaintiff No.1 and Defendants 1–6, with Defendants 7 and 8 having separated their share through assignments. The principal issue is whether Defendant No.1 acquired exclusive title and possession through Ext.B1, or whether the Paithal children were co-owners with no exclusive rights, and whether there was evidence of an oral lease from Matha to Paithal in 1940. The appellant argues Ext.B1 proves exclusive title, and relies on the alleged oral lease; the respondents contend Ext.B1 does not grant exclusive possession and that co-ownership persisted, negating ouster. The High Court ultimately holds that there is no exclusive title established by Ext.B1 and that ouster has not been proven; accordingly, the Regular Second Appeal is dismissed, upholding the lower courts’ decision on partition and possession.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal from the Kerala High Court (Ernakulam) arising out of OP(MV) No.751/2001 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tirur, Malappuram. The petitioner, a minor at filing (6 years old in 2000), sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, through her mother as next friend. The accident occurred on 23 November 2000 when a passenger tempo van (AP-26-T/9225) collided with a lorry (KA-21A/9990) on the Kuttippuram-Edappal road; police records and inquest (Exts.A1, A31, A32) establish negligence on the van driver (2nd respondent). The van’s owner (1st) and insurer (3rd) faced liability; the lorry insurer (6th) contended the van driver’s negligence. The Tribunal consolidated and heard multiple petitions and awarded Rs.1,05,900 with 6% interest and Rs.2,000 costs in favor of the appellant. On appeal, the High Court partly allows enhancement, applying Master Mallikarjun (2013 KLJ 805) to fix Rs.1,00,000 as consolidated compensation for permanent disability up to 10% in a minor, and adding Rs.58,400 medical expenses and Rs.2,000 transport to arrive at Rs.1,60,400. The appeal is allowed in part, increasing compensation by Rs.54,500 with 6% interest and Rs.3,000 costs. The 3rd respondent must deposit the enhanced amount within two months, with the Tribunal distributing it thereafter.
MACA No. 2066 of 2013; MACA No. 2064 of 2013 This is a pair of connected Motor Accident Claims Appeals (MACA Nos. 2066 and 2064 of 2013) before the Kerala High Court, arising from two Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kasaragod, O.P.(M.V) Nos. 452/2010 and 444/2010. The appellant insurer challenged the tribunals’ quantum of compensation awarded to the riders, one a rider and the other a pillion rider, who were injured in a road accident on 28.04.2010 when a car collided with their motorcycle. The tribunal awarded Rs. 4,55,410 with 8% interest to the rider and Rs. 3,13,600 with 8% interest to the pillion. The insurer contends that Exts. X1 and X2, medical certificates of permanent physical impairment, show 55% and 40% disability respectively, and the tribunal erred by adopting 45% and 40% as disability percentages; thus the compensation should be higher. The court examines the medical certificates, noting the board’s finding on limb-specific impairment but also that the tribunal did not blindly accept those certificates. It cites Apex Court precedents on permanent disability, including Pappu Deo Yadav and Ramachandrappa, to emphasize disability assessment should reflect loss of earning capacity and place victims in their pre-accident position, rather than rigid stereotypes. It confirms that the tribunal’s fixed monthly income (Rs. 4,000) aligns with the Ramachandrappa principle. Ultimately, the judge disposes of both appeals by dismissing them, upholding the awards, and declining interference in the income component since the claimants did not appeal that portion. The decision endorses a pragmatic, non-stereotypical approach to disability and compensation, in line with Supreme Court guidance.
WP(C).No. 22804 of 2010(A) The petitioner, New Vikas Residents Association, represented by its Secretary K. Nazar, challenged the delimitation of wards in Alappuzha Municipality, alleging that Civil Station ward boundaries and natural/topographical marks were violated and about 100 families from Civil Station Ward were to be annexed to Sakaria Bazar ward. Ext. P2 is a notification under Section 69 of the Kerala Municipality Act; Ext. P3 contains objections; Ext. P5 is the final delimitation order under challenge. The Association argued that the boundary changes would disrupt the area of operation (Civil Station ward) and that population balance and ward boundaries were not properly maintained, violating Section 69. The Delimitation Commission filed detailed and supplementary statements. A preliminary objection under Article 243-ZG(a) contends the writ petition is not maintainable, as Article 329 bars interference in electoral matters. The court surveyed constitutional and precedential barriers to judicial review of delimitation orders (Articles 243-ZG(a), 243-O(a), 329(a)) and decisions such as Meghraj Kothari, Sunny Joseph, Satyan V.V., and others. It ultimately held the bar to interfere applicable, noted the order’s gazette effect under Section 69(2A) and Section 70, and dismissed the petition, upholding the Commission’s delimitation order with no costs.
Mat.Appeal No.785 of 2020 This is a matrimonial appeal (Mat.Appeal No.785 of 2020) challenging a Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram decree passed on 30.11.2013 in OP 895/2011, which dissolved the marriage by mutual consent following a mediation on 20.08.2013. The appellant (husband) contends that a long delay in filing the appeal—2440 days (about 6.5 years)—should be condoned because execution proceedings were triggered by the respondent after mediation terms (Rs. 2.5 lakh payable and 28 sovereigns of gold returned) and because he only learned of the decree when a court surveyor visited the property. He asserts there was no wilful laches and that he intended to comply with the mediation agreement. The respondent contends the appeal is not maintainable due to suppression of facts (notably OP(FC) 217/2019 challenging execution; the judgment was already passed in 2013; execution has continued since 2015) and that condoning the delay would prejudice the respondent. The Kerala High Court relies on Supreme Court precedents on condonation of delay, but refuses to condone inordinate delay, finding a lack of bona fides and willful negligence. Consequently, the delay condonation is denied and the appeal is dismissed along with pending interlocutory applications.
