CRL.REV.PET NO. 844 OF 2022 This is a criminal revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. filed by the accused, Mujeeb P.T, challenging judgments arising from S.T. No. 684/2014 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Perinthalmanna, and Criminal Appeal No. 207/2017 of the Sessions Court, Manjeri, in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant lent money to the accused for his tyre business; the accused issued cheques and later demanded further sums, including a partner stake, leading to further cheques and a dispute over gold ornaments pledged as security. After mediation, the accused issued cheques totaling Rs. 2 lakh and Rs. 1 lakh in 2014; some cheques bounced and gold was eventually returned. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 138 NI Act and imposed six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 with default imprisonment. The Sessions Court affirmed conviction and modified the sentence to simple imprisonment till rising of court and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 with possible compensation under Cr.P.C. Section 357(1)(b). The High Court, while noting the limited scope of revision under Cr.P.C. and the well-settled presumptions under NI Act Sections 118 and 139, dismissed the revision petition, although granted three months to pay the fine and to undergo the modified sentence, with execution deferred until 17-04-2023 and the petitioner to appear by 18-04-2023.
The petitioner, A.M. Abdulla, is a trader in arecanut and an assessee under the Central Sales Tax Act who challenges Ext.P4, an assessment order issued for the year 2011-12. After an original CST assessment was finalised under Rule 6(5) of the CST Rules, 1957, the department issued Ext.P2 proposing a fresh assessment under Rule 6(5) read with Rule 6(7). The petitioner filed Ext.P3 objection, but Ext.P4 demanded Rs. 1,65,622. The petitioner argues that reassessment can be initiated only within four years from the end of the year under Rule 6(7) and that the period had expired on 31-03-2016; thus Ext.P4 is time-barred. The respondents contend Ext.P4 is valid as a Rule 6(5) order, and invoke Section 42(3) of the KVAT Act (regarding pending assessments under Section 25) and the Finance Act 2016 to argue that the time limits do not apply where revised returns or annexures were not filed, making the reassessment permissible. The court analyzes the provisions, cites State of Kerala v Parisons Agrotech Pvt. Ltd. for the four-year outer limit, and holds that misquoting a provision to extend time is impermissible. Ext.P2 notice and Ext.P4 order are quashed as barred by limitation; the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.
This intra-court appeal challenges a single-judge order in WP(C) No.19991/2023, wherein contract library assistants engaged by the University of Kerala were denied regularization after more than a decade of service. The appellants, numbering around 13, had been recruited through walk-in interviews on contractual terms, with annual renewals and no entitlement to post-regularization benefits. They contended that long service, comparable duties to regular non-teaching posts, and a lack of due process in recruitment warranted regularization; they also pointed to notifications and parity with others who were regularized. The University and State authorities argued that these were temporary, contract appointments made without sanctioned posts, direct recruitment via direct selection boards or KPSC, and not supported by a constitutional or statutory framework for automatic regularization. The learned Single Judge held that the appointments were contractual and that regularization could not be guided by faulty or non-competitive recruitment, citing Umadevi (3) and related doctrine. On appeal, the Division Bench affirmed, clarifying that while contract staffing is permissible to meet administrative exigencies, any regular vacancies must be filled through a regular process. The court emphasized that Article 14 read with Article 16 requires due process, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot override this framework. The appeal is dismissed, upholding the original dismissal of the writ petition.
OP(C) Nos. 2072/2021 and 2075/2021 These OP(C) petitions arise from orders of the Additional District Judge II, Kalpetta, dismissing or not pressing original petitions seeking enhanced compensation for trees felled for a 400 kV transmission line. The petitioners, a religious charity registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary Scientific Societies Registration Act, 1955, claim ownership of Survey No.353 in Thirunelli Village, Mananthavady Taluk, Wayanad. Power Grid Corporation of India laid the line and paid nominal compensation, prompting petitions under the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 (Sec. 51) read with the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (Secs. 10 and 16) and the Indian Electricity Supply Act (Ss. 42, 60) for enhanced compensation. The District Court had earlier held no jurisdiction to determine compensation under Act 36 of 2003, and dismissed the petitions as not pressed, prompting the petitioners to invoke Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court, citing Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. v. Power Grid and related Kerala authorities, exercised jurisdiction to set aside the Ext.P8 orders, restore the petitions, and direct the Kalpetta court to decide on merits, expeditiously. It also notes that if compensation is enhanced, no interest shall accrue from 13.01.2015 to 03.08.2022 and points to Central Government guidelines (2015) in this regard. The judgment underscores the remedy of filing a suit before the District Judge for compensation and the need to adjudicate merits under law.
The petition under OP (RC) No. 110 of 2022, filed by the tenant Manikkoth Shaniba against Kunnoth Ayisha, challenges Ext. P3, a Rent Control Court order (12(1), read with 12(2)) directing the tenant to deposit admitted arrears of rent and continue paying rent for subsequent periods, in a pending eviction proceeding under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Control Court had ordered Rs. 11,500 per month in arrears from August 2019 in a lump sum within four weeks, and to pay subsequent rent within 15 days. The tenant contends that the security deposit of Rs. 4,00,000 paid by him should be adjustable against the admitted arrears ( Rs. 3,79,500 ), which would negate the need for such deposits as contemplated by Section 12. The Appellate Authority held that RCA No. 7 of 2022 was not maintainable since the order under challenge is under Section 12(1) and not appealable. The High Court, while examining supervisory relief under Article 227, examined whether Ext. P3 could be interfered with and whether Ext. P5 could be directed to be decided in accordance with law. Ultimately, it held that there is no legal basis to adjust the security amount against admitted arrears, and that Ext. P3 cannot be interfered with. The petition was dismissed, leaving Ext. P3 intact and refusing to direct disposal of Ext. P5.
Mamachan, the defendant in O.S.33 of 2011 before the Principal Sub Court, Kollam, challenges ex parte decree in favour of Nazar (plaintiff) and two interlocutory orders: I.A.391/2017 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of a 1275-day delay, and I.A.392/2017 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree dated 19.06.2013. The Sub Court rejected both applications on 18.01.2020. The High Court, in FAO No.71 of 2020, admitted the appeal and, after hearing, found the orders cryptic and not properly reasoned, observed that the defendant, aged over 60, had substantial reasons (back pain in 2019 and piles surgery) with supporting treatment narratives, and that no opportunity was afforded to substantiate the same. Relying on Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee, and other authorities, the bench held that while liberal in condoning delay, courts must exercise discretion to avoid injustice. The Division Bench set aside the impugned orders, remanding the matter to reconsider with proper evidence and reasoned orders, and directed both sides to appear on 10.03.2022, with a two-month time frame to dispose. An undertaking not to enforce coercive steps in E.P.37/2016 remained in force until then. The judgment underscores the essential role of reasoned decisions and a balanced, justice-oriented approach to delay and ex parte set-aside applications, within the framework of the law of limitation.
CRL.REV.PET NO.727 OF 2022 Makkar C.M., the revision petitioner, challenges a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) arising from two cheques issued in 2011 for Rs.1,00,000 and Rs.50,000, dishonoured on presentation for funds. The trial court, after re-numbering as S.T.1724/2019 due to long pendency, convicted the accused and sentenced him to three months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,50,000, with default imprisonment in case of non-payment. The Additional District and Sessions Judge, Muvattupuzha, confirmed the conviction in Crl.A. No.225/2019. The High Court, in revision, examined the narrow scope of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., emphasizing that revisional courts are not appellate tribunals and should not re-appreciate evidence absent a manifest miscarriage of justice, citing State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Phalke, and other precedents. The Court reiterates that once the complainant proves the basics and the cheque is linked to a debt, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act operate and the onus shifts to the accused to rebut by a preponderance of probabilities, as clarified in Rangappa v. Mohan, Krishna Janardhan Bhat, Bir Singh, Kalamani Tex and Kishan Rao. The High Court allowed the revision in part: the conviction stands, but the sentence is modified to one day of simple imprisonment for the offence under Section 138 NI Act, with a fine of Rs.1,50,000, payment of compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C., and deferment of execution until 20.12.2022 with one month to pay the amount.
This writ appeal challenges Exhibit-P1, a Kannur University notification dated 11.08.2021, reconstituting 71 Boards of Studies and forming a new Board of Studies in Biochemistry and Bioinformatics (UG) under Section 25(xvi) of the Kannur University Act, 1996. The appellants, two senior faculty members and university insiders, sought to quash the notification and contend that Board of Studies must be constituted under Statute 4, Chapter XIII of the Kannur University First Statutes, 1998, with nomination by the Chancellor; Section 30 and 30(2) require the constitution to be prescribed by statutes. They allege illegality in including in the reconstituted boards persons ineligible for teaching posts (retired bank employees, private/unaided college faculty) and claim that the Chancellor’s involvement is essential to ensure proper nominating and appointing processes. The writ court rejected the challenge, holding that the Board of Studies may be constituted despite the statute interplay. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, allows the writ appeal to the extent that Ext-P1’s appointment of Chairmen and Members of the Board of Studies in Commerce and Management Studies is illegal for want of Chancellor’s recommendation and in contravention of Statute 4, Chapter XIII, First Statutes, 1998. It clarifies that the Syndicate cannot override the Chancellor’s statutory role and directs that future appointments follow law, though other faculties not before the court remain undisturbed. The decision emphasizes statutory hierarchy and the mandatory character of nomination by the Chancellor for Board formations.
This is a criminal miscellaneous petition (CRL.M.C. No. 182 of 2016) filed by Muhammed Sameer M, then Circle Inspector of Police, Kavaratti, challenging CC 25/2015 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Andrott, for offences under Section 324 IPC. The events trace to two house trespass cases (Crime Nos. 7/2015 and 8/2015) reported on 24-04-2015, wherein entries reveal similar modus operandi of breaking windows and intrusions; the 2nd respondent (Muhammed Shafeeque) was arrested and a statement was recorded by the 3rd respondent accusing the petitioner of assault while in custody, prompting a suo motu inquiry (Crl.M.P No. 205/2015) by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amini, which led to cognizance of offence under Section 324 IPC in CC No. 25/2015. The petitioner contends that cognizance was taken without required sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C, making the entire proceedings vitiated and justifiably challengeable under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The respondents maintain that sanction was not necessary or has not been obtained. The Kerala High Court, citing S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar and Moosa Vallikkadan v. State of Kerala, interprets Section 197(1) to require prior sanction when acts are directly connected with official duty. It concludes that no sanction was obtained, therefore the proceedings are vitiated and quashed, thereby allowing the Crl.M.C.”
WP(C) Nos.23186 of 2022 & connected cases This batch of writ petitions, filed by managers of Private Aided Higher Secondary Schools, challenges Government Order GO(M.S.) No.121/2022 dated 07.07.2022 and the Plus One admission prospectus for 2022-23. The core issue is the Government’s decision to cap management quota at 20% in Private Aided Higher Secondary Schools and to require schools to declare the community of the management with a 10% community quota for that community on merit. The court traces the history of admissions in Kerala, including GO 206/2005, and the earlier practice of converting community quotas into management seats, noting an earlier Division Bench decision quashing the community quota clause as unconstitutional. The judge sustains the 20% management quota as a valid policy decision but holds that the 10% community quota is unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The 10% seats, having been struck down, are to be treated as open merit seats and filled through the Centralized Allotment Process (CAP). Admissions already made under declarations by managements are not to be disturbed. The ruling underscores that policy matters lie within the government’s domain, that judicial review cannot compel a reallocation of seats beyond the policy, and that the CAP aims to ensure merit-based admissions while addressing previous irregularities in management quotas.
Original Petition (O.P.(C) No. 1679 of 2022) challenges two interim orders (Ext. P7 and Ext. P8) passed on 1 August 2022 in O.S. No. 157 of 2009 of the Sub Court, Perumbavoor, which dismissed the petitioners’ requests to remit the Advocate Commissioner’s report and to remove the suit from the list. The petitioners, who are plaintiffs 4–6 in the suit, sought relief in order to ensure compliance with the principles laid down by this Court in Sabu v. Sasi (2022) and with the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961. The essence of their argument was that the Commissioner’s and Surveyor’s reports must be consolidated to include essential survey details such as ladder, line, checkline, and offset measurements, forming a coherent survey map and plan. The court, after considering the pleadings and the legal position in Sabu, held that there is no illegality or perversity in Exts. P7 and P8 and that the decision elaborates the manner in which commission and survey reports should be filed under the governing statutes. Consequently, the original petition was dismissed, and no fresh relief to remit the report or re-open the suit was warranted.
The petitioner, an 85-year-old housewife, is the widow of late P.K. Jacob, who ran a small proprietary plastics unit, M/s Palm Groove Plastics, Kattoor. The business incurred sales tax liabilities for the years 1994-95 and 1995-96, against the deceased. The petitioner, who had no involvement in the business and did not inherit assets from her husband, was nonetheless impleaded in proceedings under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968, with a sale notice Ext.P3 issued under Section 49(2) directing the sale of her self-acquired property to satisfy the tax dues. The petitioner challenged Ext.P3 on the ground that she cannot be held liable for the debts of the deceased, particularly as she did not acquire any assets of the deceased nor participate in the day-to-day affairs of the business. The court examines the liability of legal heirs under the KGST Act, notably Section 20, which deems the legal representative as a dealer but restricts liability to the assets of the deceased in his hands. Relying on prior decisions (Hameed v. Addl. Sales Tax Officer; Sreejith v. Intelligence Officer), the court holds that legal heirs’ liability is confined to assets devolving on them. Since the property under sale is self-acquired by the petitioner, Ext.P3 cannot stand. Ext.P3 sale notice is quashed; the respondents may proceed against the petitioner or other legal heirs only to the extent of the assets of the deceased in their hands, as per law.
WP(C) Nos.21618 & 23237 of 2021 The petitions arise from a dispute over the promotion of Headmistress at S.N.M. Higher Secondary School, Purakkad. Sreerekha R., a long-serving teacher with test qualifications, contends that, on retirement vacancy arising on 1.6.2021, she was the senior-most eligible candidate under Rule 44A(1) of Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules (KER) and that the Manager’s appointment of Ushas S. as Headmistress (who lacked the requisite test qualifications) violated statutory provisions. The DEO’s order declining the Manager’s proposal and recognizing the petitioner’s entitlement was challenged. The Manager defended the appointment as a senior ordering under evolving rules and amendments; the Goverment Orders cited (including G.O.(Ms) 157/2015 and the 2017 amendment introducing the third proviso to Rule 44A(1)) are central, though their application is contested by respondents. W.P.(C) 23237/2021, filed by Chandrika K.C., Ashadutt A.N., and Ravilal T.R., seeks provisional consideration for promotion under the third proviso to Rule 44A(1), arguing delays due to COVID-19 testing prevented test qualifications. The Court disposed of the petitions by directing the Director of General Education to consider the revision petition filed by the Manager (R5(f)) and to hear all parties, while dismissing 23237/2021 as a separate, non-provisional relief. Overall, the judgment emphasizes adherence to statutory prescriptions, pending statutory remedies, and a cautious approach to provisional relief in light of evolving rules.
W.P.(C) Nos. 37630 of 2010 & 14320 of 2011 The petitions challenge Ext. P3, a communication by the Drugs Controller extending exemption from taking out a drug license under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 to clinics/hospitals owned and maintained by a single registered medical practitioner or by a husband-and-wife couple as a single entity. Ext. P4 demands that the second petitioner obtain the requisite license. The counsel for the petitioners argues that the exemption is irrational, restricting it to single practitioners or couple-run hospitals, with no nexus to the object, and that it violates Section 18 and Rules 61 and 62; they urge broadening the exemption to all private hospitals, contending that Government hospitals are treated differently. They rely on Sanjose Parish Hospital for the proposition that dispensing medicines in a hospital may not equal a sale, and on Rule 123 and Schedule K to argue exemption scope. The Government pleader counters that classification is supported by the decision in Qualified Private Medical Practitioners’ Association v. State of Kerala, that Government and private hospitals form distinct classes, and that the legal regime under the Act is regulatory, not fiscal, differentiating from KVAT. The court upholds the earlier ruling, rejects extending exemption to all private hospitals, and clarifies that the exemption is anchored in intelligible differential and constitutional principles, dismissing the petitions.
Vipin S.S., the kuthaka holder for stall LFS-7 on the Marakkoottam-Saramkuthi trekking path to Sabarimala Sannidhanam, filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking a mandamus to relocate his stall or to open it facing the alternative route to the queue complex so that he can continue operating in accordance with Ext.P3 Kuthaka certificate. The petition relies on Ext.P1, the list of kuthaka items, Ext.P3, the license certificate dated 08.12.2022 issued by the 6th respondent Executive Officer, Sabarimala, and Ext.P2, a sketch showing the exact location of shops along the trekking path, including LFS-7. It also references Ext.P4, photographs showing diversion of pilgrims through the alternate route. The grievance is that, at times, pilgrims are diverted, affecting the stall’s operation, and the petitioner seeks permission to open or relocate to face the alternative route so as to continue the business as per the license. On admission, the matter was heard with parties’ submissions. The Travancore Devaswom Board explains that Sabarimala, located in a forest terrain under Periyar Tiger Reserve, requires crowd management by Kerala Police; past orders in Suo Motu v. TD Board emphasize police-led crowd control and the Virtual-Q system with IT security norms. The court found that such crowd management restrictions are within safety considerations and disallowed the relief, dismissing the petition without costs.
The petitioners, Abdul Jabbar and K.G. ASHA, filed CRL.MC No. 408 of 2020 before the Kerala High Court challenging the order/judgment in L.P. No.7 of 2008 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kozhikode. The accusation concerns offences under Sections 406, 420, and 201 read with Section 34 IPC, connected to a share trading business conducted under the name Prime Scrips, where funds were allegedly collected for purchasing shares but not transferred to the respective accounts, ultimately resulting in financial loss to the respondents. The petition contends that the disputes have been settled amicably; several respondents filed affidavits stating they have no further grievances; a legal heir of a former party CW26 was impleaded as the 36th respondent. Counsel for the petitioners argued that amicable settlement and recorded statements eliminate lingering disputes, and continuing the prosecution would be wasteful and contrary to the ends of justice. The respondents’ counsel and the Public Prosecutor acknowledged the settlement and emphasized the need to examine the disturbance to society, given that some offences are non-compoundable. The court relied on State of MP v Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh, and Narinder Singh to articulate the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash private disputes where settlement exists, while excluding heinous or offences under special statutes. The Court ultimately allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings in L.P. No.7/2008.
BAIL APPL. NO. 724 OF 2024 Prakash Kumar, the sole accused in Crime No. 36/2024 of the Sooranadu Police Station, Kollam, seeks anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC in connection with allegations that he stored 141 LPG cylinders without license for public distribution and, during transfer, a cylinder exploded, damaging houses in the locality. The offences invoked are Section 3 read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and Section 3(a) of the Explosive Substances Act. He contends innocence and alleges false implication; custodial interrogation is unnecessary, and he is willing to comply with conditions. The State opposes bail, arguing that the incident was grave and could threaten public safety; investigation is at a preliminary stage and requires his custodial interrogation for recovery. The court anchors its decision in Supreme Court jurisprudence on anticipatory bail, citing Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre and Sibbia, emphasizing that no rigid guidelines govern grant or refusal and that a wise, case-specific exercise of discretion under Section 438 CrPC is essential. It also cites Jai Prakash Singh to stress that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary privilege to be granted only in exceptional circumstances. After balancing the nature and gravity of the offences, the stage of investigation, and the risk of interference, the court concludes the petitioner is not entitled to anticipatory bail. The application is dismissed, with a conditional direction for surrender and possible merits-based reconsideration on subsequent bail proceedings.
This is a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court arising from WA No. 1676 of 2021, challenging the orders in RP 61/2021 and W.P.(C) No.33800/2019. The respondent purchased 11.60 acres of land described as nilam (paddy land) in Karinkunnam (Block 14, Re-survey 340/2) in 2015 and sought permission under Rule 5 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Rules, 2008 to convert 10 cents of land for constructing a residence. The Local Level Monitoring Committee (LLMC) rejected the request, noting that the land was acquired after the Act’s commencement and that Section 3 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008 prohibits non-cultivation uses on such land. Thepetitioner relied on earlier decisions (Thankachan K.S. v. District Collector, Alappuzha; Yousuf Chalil v. State of Kerala; and Sudheesh R., supra) that had taken differing views on post‑Act reclamation. A Full Bench in 2022 examined the objects and reasons of the Act, particularly the definitions of “owner” and the relationship between Sections 3, 5(3) and 9, and whether purcha sers after 12.08.2008 could seek reclamation. The court clarified that the Act aims to protect existing paddy fields and that the term “owner” must be interpreted strictly; it held that post‑Act purchasers are generally not entitled to Section 5(3) r/w Section 9 relief. Ultimately, the WA was allowed, following the Full Bench presumptions, with directions that the earlier precedents be applied in light of the law laid down in the 23.03.2022 judgment. The matter thus turns on statutory interpretation and the State’s objective of preserving paddy land.
Murukan, owner of 15 Ares 35 sq.m. of land in Re-survey Nos. 31/14 and 31/15-1, sought removal of his property from the Data Bank under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008. The Regional Government authorities had included the land in the Data Bank and, on Form 5 (Rule 4(d)) grounds, the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) refused removal citing the Agricultural Officer’s report and the Local Level Monitoring Committee (LLMC) recommendation that water chalis around the property and potential construction would obstruct water flow and cause water-logging; the site visit showed the land had not been converted before 2008. The petitioner contends Ext.P3 is vitiated by non-application of mind, inconsistent with the Act and binding precedents, particularly Aparna Sasi Menon v. RDO. The High Court relied on earlier decisions that the RDO must independently assess the land’s status on the date of coming into force of the Act and its suitability for paddy cultivation, rather than merely endorsing LLMC/AO reports. The court found Ext.P3 unsustainable and set it aside, directing the RDO to reconsider Form 5 after obtaining a KSRSEC report (at the petitioner’s expense) within two months and for the petitioner to obtain a KSRSEC report within two weeks. The petition is disposed of with these directions.
This Regular First Appeal arising from a partition suit challenges the Sub Court Palakkad decree in O.S.244/2000. The plaint schedule property is the self‑acquired estate of late V.V.P. Iyer, now represented by his heirs and trust executors. The Will of V.V.P. Iyer appoints executors and provides trust management, with Clause 9 allowing wind‑up and sale of the trust's properties if the schools are not self‑sustaining for three consecutive years, the proceeds to be distributed among the sharers. The first defendant, as trustee, managed the properties but faced allegations of mismanagement and attempts to dispose of assets for private gain. The trial court held the plaint schedule property not to be partitionable, declaring the shares of the sharers, and dismissed the suit on the ground of res judicata in light of earlier proceedings (O.S.255/1988) and a 1994 WA on closure of schools. The 12th defendant filed O.S.120/2009 under Section 61 of the Trusts Act, seeking a sale in the beneficiaries’ best interest. The High Court, while examining Will Clause 9, prior judgments, and Section 90 presumptions under the Evidence Act, held that the plaint schedule property remains a trust asset not ordinarily partitionable and upheld the trial court’s findings, dismissing the appeal. The court directed the Munsiff Palakkad to dispose of the related suit expeditiously and awarded costs to the parties.
