ITA Nos. 34 & 35 of 2018 & 25 & 27 of 2019 This judgment, delivered by Justices S. V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji on 15 December 2022, consolidates ITA Nos. 34/2018, 35/2018, 25/2019, and 27/2019 arising from four similar appeals challenging denial of a deduction under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act for two cooperative banks—Kottayam and Meenachil. The core issue is whether a PCARDB, whose area of operation spans more than one taluk, can claim deduction under 80P(4) as amended w.e.f. 01-04-2007. The Explanation (b) to Section 80P(4) defines ‘primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank’ as a society whose area of operation is confined to a taluk and whose principal object is long-term credit for agricultural and rural development. The court applies the Golden Rule and literal interpretation, considering Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act to assess whether ‘a taluk’ may be read as encompassing multiple taluks. It concludes that the words ‘a taluk’ are to be read in the singular, and expanding them to “many taluks” would render other phrases otiose. Relying on precedents and the statutory framework, the court holds that the assessee banks do not qualify as PCARDB under 80P(4) and therefore are not eligible for the deduction for the years in question. The appeals are disposed of in favor of the Revenue; the deduction is denied.
This is a Kerala High Court judgment disposing CRL.A.289/2015 and connected appeals (CRL.A.607/2015 and CRL.A.303/2016) arising from S.C. No.302/2014, challenging convictions for murder, rape, and related offences recorded by the Sessions Court at Nilambur. The appellants challenged the trial court’s verdict, arguing that the investigation was politically influenced, witnesses were tutored, and recoveries were falsified. The prosecution contended that a complete chain of circumstantial evidence linked the accused to the crime, including last-seen witnesses, confessions leading to recoveries (ornaments, SIM card, torch, plaster roll, scissors, burnt remnants) and motive. The High Court exhaustively examined the circumstantial evidence framework, the reliability of identifications (noting delays in S.161 statements, absence of a proper identification parade for A2, and media publicity affecting identification), inconsistencies in times and recoveries, and the admissibility of video visuals produced from copied media without proper S.65B certification. It also scrutinized medical evidence and the alleged scene of occurrence. Ultimately, due to a demonstrable lack of an unbroken, cogent chain and pervasive inconsistencies, the court acquitted the accused and held that the State’s appeals fail on the same grounds. The State’s appeal (CRL.A.607/2015) was dismissed, and the accused were directed to be released forthwith if not needed in other cases.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act challenging the Tribunal’s award in O.P.(M.V.) No.107/2008 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakkuda. The appellants are Chandran (father), Radha (mother), and Bibitha (sister) of the deceased, seeking enhanced compensation for a fatal bus accident on 28.11.2007. The Tribunal had deducted 50% for dependency against the permissible one-third under Schedule II, did not grant certain medical and loss-of-estate claims, and held contributory negligence by the deceased, resulting in a reduced award. The insurer contests several heads of loss, including funeral expenses and transport charges, and supports the finding of negligence by the deceased. The High Court undertakes a reappraisal, holding that the permissible deduction for dependency is one-third, not one-half, and that the medical bills (Rs.7,560) and loss of estate (Rs.2,500) must be allowed. It further holds that funeral expenses should be enhanced beyond the Schedule II cap, citing Kurvan Ansari @ Kurvan Ali and Puttamma & Ors. v. K.L. Narayana Reddy to justify inflation-adjusted relief, and adopts the police charge-sheet as prima facie evidence of negligence (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal). Consequently, the Tribunal’s award is enhanced: loss of dependency up to Rs.480,000, funeral expenses to Rs.10,000, medical expenses Rs.7,560, and total compensation increased to Rs.5,00,060, with interest on enhanced sums. The insurer is directed to pay the enhanced amount via NEFT/RTGS after required bank details are furnished, with time-bound payment conditions and interest provisions.
Mat.Appeal.No.320 OF 2013 This matrimonial appeal arises from OP 755/2011 in the Family Court, Kottarakkara, wherein Sumimol challenged the marriage to the first respondent and sought recovery of gold ornaments and money allegedly entrusted at the time of marriage. The petition alleged misappropriation by the husband and his mother and sister. The Family Court partly allowed the petition, directing the return of 25½ sovereigns of gold ornaments or their value and Rs. 2,00,000, with the third respondent’s claim dismissed. The appellate court reappraised the evidence and found no cogent basis to support misappropriation of 25½ sovereigns, noting that Alphonsa v. Neetha and Royson Mathew v. Minimol require proving entrustment and misappropriation with pleadings and evidence. The court accepted that the petitioner admitted to possessing 10 sovereigns and that the husband admitted to receiving at least Rs. 1,00,000, while finding no substantiated basis for the larger misappropriation or Rs. 2,00,000 entrustment. Consequently, the High Court modified the decree: the first respondent must return 10 sovereigns (or value) and Rs. 1,00,000 within three months; the relief against the second respondent was set aside, with costs to be borne by the parties, and a direction for payment with interest if not complied within the period.
CRL. M.C. NO.9376 OF 2023 This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Sec. 482 CrPC concerns three accused, petitioners in Crime No. 487/2023 of Payyoli Police Station, Kozhikode, charged with offences under Sections 341, 323 read with 149 IPC and Section 4 of the Kerala Prohibition of Ragging Act. The petitioners, all students, contend that the parties have settled the dispute and do not wish to pursue the prosecution; the relief sought is quashing the proceedings, supported by the victim’s affidavit indicating consent to quashing. The Public Prosecutor initially expressed reservations about quashing on the basis of settlement alone but conceded that a settlement exists. The court examined submissions, the records, and anchored its reasoning in Supreme Court guidance beginning with State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others, and the decisions in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh. The court summarized the guiding principles: (i) Section 482 CrPC can quash non‑compoundable offences in largely private disputes where parties have resolved their entire dispute; (ii) this does not apply to heinous or serious offences such as murder or rape; (iii) not applicable to offences under special statutes or acts by public servants; (iv) offences like Sec. 307 IPC or Arms Act are generally not quashable; (v) the court may assess antecedents, conduct, and absconding. Finding the dispute private and settled, the court allowed the petition and quashed all further proceedings against the petitioners.
This petition, Crl.M.C No.3299 of 2018, arises from a private complaint alleging defamation under section 499 IPC, later invoked under section 500 IPC, lodged before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thrissur. The 2nd respondent-de facto complainant claimed that the petitioner and two others published an anonymous defamatory notice imputing misconduct and misappropriation in his capacity as Chairman of Divine Hospital, Wadakkancherry. The Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded the sworn statements of the complainant and two witnesses and took cognizance for an offence under section 500 IPC, issuing summons to the petitioner (C.C. No.206 of 2017). The petitioner contends that enmity exists between the complainant and the petitioner, the anonymous letter lacks the names or signatures of responsible persons, and the ingredients of section 500 IPC are not satisfied; he relies on the doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, arguing the absence of a disclosed author means no prima facie case. The respondents assert that the anonymous letter contained serious imputations against the complainant’s personal and official conduct and that the witnesses corroborate the claim. The court discusses the scope of cognizance, the prima facie standard, and cites Gulan Mohd. Kabir Mohd. Mir v. State of Maharashtra to illustrate that a magistrate must apply mind without full trial. Ultimately, the High Court holds that there is no illegality in the process and dismisses the petition, directing expeditious disposal of C.C No.206 of 2017 within four months, allowing the prosecution to proceed.
This writ petition (WP(C) No.26130 of 2021) was filed in the Kerala High Court by 46 former employees of SITILTD seeking pensionary benefits under the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995. The petition challenges pension-related orders and seeks quashing of Exhibits P5–P44, and a mandamus to grant pension on the basis of the average of the last 60 months’ salary, as provided in Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the 1995 Scheme as amended by the 2014 Amended Scheme. The petition contends that the petitioners are entitled to pension rights under the ESPS 1995 and that delay in processing joint option forms prejudices their retirement benefits. In submissions, the petitioners rely on the Supreme Court’s observations and directions in EPF Organisation and Another v. Sunil Kumar B (2022 SCC Online SC 1521), urging that their claims be considered in line with those directions. The respondents contend relief should be granted in terms of the Supreme Court directives, and that the joint option forms be processed in accordance with law; Ext.P71 and other communications were produced to show steps taken. The High Court disposed of the matter by directing both sides to act in terms of the Sunil Kumar B directions and to process the joint option forms in accordance with law, thereby allowing pension computation per the scheme and lawful payments.
WP(C) No. 41863/2022; WP(C) No. 41866/2022 Two writ petitions (WP(C) No. 41863/2022 and WP(C) No. 41866/2022) challenge final orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi in OA Nos. 372/2017 and 318/2018. Petitioner Ravindran K and petitioner Rajan M contend that the Kochi Bench ignored binding guidance issued by the Armed Forces Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi, notably in MA No. 2063/2022 in OA No. 1667/2020, which allowed condonation of deficiency of service for DSC personnel seeking a second spell of service. They invoke the Army’s institutional framework, asserting that DSC is a part of the Army as a Corps under Rule 187(1)(r) of the Army Rules, 1954 read with Section 3(vi) of the Army Act, 1950, and that pensionary provisions applicable to other Army personnel should extend to them. They rely on constitutional/tribunal precedents such as Union of India v. LNK DSC Mani Ram, Ex Sep Madan Singh, Bhani Devi, and Mohanan T, and reference Supreme Court guidance in Chatter Pal. The High Court, while acknowledging the arguments, ultimately remands the matters to the AFT Kochi for fresh decision after considering the Principal Bench verdict and other applicable authorities, directing expedited hearing and to take into account relevant Annexures and case-law while adjudicating.
ST.REV.NO.2/2016; ST.REV.NO.3/2016; ST.REV.NO.4/2016; ST.REV.NO.5/2016; ST.REV.NO.7/2016; ST.REV.NO.8/2016 This judgment consolidates six Sales Tax Revisions preferred by the State challenging a common order of the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Ernakulam) in TA Nos. 13–18 of 2014. The respondent-assessee, Sesame Software Solution (P) Ltd., developed software and, during 2002–05, faced tax assessments and penalties under the Kerala General Sales Tax (KGST) Act, with entry 56A of the First Schedule imposing 4% ad valorem on software. The core dispute was whether customised software supplied to specific clients qualifies as “goods” under KGST, making it taxable, notwithstanding prior service tax considerations and the claim that such software is not a saleable commodity. The Tribunal, after remand, held that the Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh decision (which dealt with canned software) was limited to canned software and did not extend to uncanned/customised software. It also accepted that website development charges were taxable. In revision, the High Court acknowledged the evolving jurisprudence on software as “goods” and, on a de novo basis, held that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tata Consultancy Services extends to customised software as well, treating it as goods for KGST purposes. The court ultimately disposed of the revisions by allowing ST.Rev Nos. 3, 4, and 7 of 2016 (in favour of the Revenue) and dismissing ST.Rev Nos. 2, 5, and 8 of 2016 (in favour of the assessee).
This Kerala High Court judgment deals with ITA No. 232 of 2019 filed by the assessee challenging the Tribunal’s order upholding an Income Tax Officer’s assessment under sections including 54F of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2013-14. The appellant assessee contends that capital gains arising from the sale of a long-term asset are eligible for exemption under section 54F when the new residential asset is either purchased within one year before or two years after the transfer, or constructed within three years after the transfer. The facts reveal that the original asset was transferred in March 2013, and the assessee along with her husband had initiated payments toward land purchase in 2007 and later construction through Heavenly Homes (P) Ltd, with a home loan sanctioned in 2012 to the husband. Construction was not completed by the date of the order, and the builder faced delays; construction expenditure is contested as to its eligibility under 54F since the three-year window would expire in March 2016. The Commissioner (Appeals) had partly allowed the appeal, but the Tribunal allowed the Revenue’s appeal, prompting judicial review. The High Court scrutinizes whether construction before sale can qualify, emphasizes completion within the time frame, and ultimately remits the matter to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) for fresh disposal, while observing that the Tribunal’s reliance on timing of payments and loan sanction was flawed. The court thus remands for reconsideration on the completion-based criterion under section 54F(1) and (4). The case presents a nuanced interpretation of the 54F provisions and liberal construction of exemptions when eligibility criteria are satisfied.
Meera Umma Yacoob filed OP(C) No. 2093 of 2018 challenging Ext.P11 CMA 3/2016 of the Addl. District Court, Pathanamthitta, and Exts.P7 and P8 in I.A. Nos.1365/2014 and 1366/2014 in O.S. No.5/1998 of the Sub Court/Commercial Court, Pathanamthitta. The original suit, filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property, was dismissed for default on 08.10.2003. After her husband’s death on 07.11.2002, and learning of the dismissal only in 2014, the petitioner moved in IA Nos.1365/2014 to restore the suit and IA No.1366/2014 to condone the 4060-day delay. The respondents objected to both applications, leading to dismissal of Exts.P7 and P8 by the Trial Court and Ext.P11 by the Appellate Court. Challenging these, the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court examines whether there is illegality in the orders, and surveys established condonation principles, citing Supreme Court precedents that delay must be justified by a genuine, bonafide explanation, not merely routine arguments. It notes that the delay was inordinate and that the petitioner failed to establish sufficient cause; the conduct of the petitioner and the lack of inquiry after her husband’s death weigh against condonation. Consequently, the original petition is dismissed, with the courts below not found to have exceeded their powers.
SylaJa Amma, an 83-year-old widow, challenged SARFAESI proceedings initiated by the South Indian Bank against a mortgaged property securing an education loan for her granddaughter. Notices were sent to her son-in-law’s address and never reached the petitioner, leaving her unaware of the action until a later date. Her son-in-law had previously obtained Ext.P2 judgment (2021) offering repayment in 12 monthly installments, but he defaulted. The bank later issued Ext.P3, and a Commissioner was directed to inspect the property, with an inspection date set for 24.06.2022. The petitioner declared willingness to clear the entire outstanding dues within 45 days, but the bank did not accept. In the earlier Writ Petition (WP(C) No. 20057/2022) dated 22.08.2022, the writ court declined relief, noting that the borrower had not complied with interim orders and that the prior arrangement had not been honoured. The appellant contended the non-compliance of annexures A1 and A2 was not intentional and that the granddaughter’s education circumstances warranted consideration. The bank defended its enforcement actions and highlighted that recovery under SARFAESI was already in motion since 2019, with coercive measures postponed only on previous conditions. The Division Bench upheld the writ court’s decision, relying on the settled law that writs against SARFAESI recovery are not maintainable where statutory remedies exist, citing United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Umakanta Mohapatra, and Phoenix ARC, and dismissed the appeal.
W.P.(C) No. 25927 of 2023 Manappuram Home Finance Limited, Ernakulam, a financial institution, approached the Kerala High Court seeking a direction to the Sub Registrar to register Exhibit P6, the sale certificate, in respect of property mortgaged by deposit of title deed under the SARFAESI Act. The bank had extended a housing loan on 30 May 2016 by creating an equitable mortgage over 1496 sq ft at Survey No. 211/12, Alangad. After borrowers defaulted, the property was sold at auction under SARFAESI. While seeking registration, the petitioner discovered third-party attachments on the encumbrance certificate, some of which post-dated the mortgage. It had earlier obtained a favorable order in W.P.(C) No.10219/2021 directing the Sub Registrar to efface such attachments and to register the sale. However, Ext. P3 shows an attachment dated 26.07.2018 in I.A. 4865/2018 in O.S. No. 827/2018, which the Sub Registrar treated as a bar to registration. The petitioner argues that attachments after creation of the equitable mortgage cannot affect the bank’s right to sell under SARFAESI and cites Madhan S. v. Sub Registrar, Keechery Service Co-op Bank Ltd., and Ali Asharaf M.M. to show that post-mortgage encumbrances must be effaced to permit sale. The court agrees, reiterating the Madhan doctrine, and directs the Sub Registrar to efface the post-mortgage attachment from the encumbrance register and to register Ext. P6 sale certificate when presented, if in order. The petition is disposed of with these directions.
This Regular First Appeal arises from a suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession, and injunctions concerning a plaint schedule property of about 3 acres 76 cents at Kattappana. The plaintiff Ramachandran Pillai claimed title under Ext.A1 (sale deed No.2094/1992) and contended that a Power of Attorney (POA) No.162/2002 and a corresponding Sale Deed No.2959/2002, executed in favour of the second defendant Shajan Lal, are forged and void. The first defendant, the brother of a person named Koshy, managed the property; the second defendant allegedly purchased after the POA and sale deed were executed. The trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, holding the POA and the sale deed null and void, declaring title in the plaintiff, granting possession and issuing injunctions. On appeal, the court addressed three questions: (i) whether the POA 162/2002 was forged based on evidence; (ii) whether the suit was timely filed within the statutory period; (iii) whether a decree for recovery of possession and injunctions was proper. The appellate court concluded that the POA 162/2002 and the sale deed were forged, the suit admissible, and the decree correct, and dismissed the appeal. The decision rests on evaluating documentary evidence, abroad-period proof, and burden of proof regarding execution and genuineness. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, affirming the trial court’s findings.
Mat.App Nos.577, 582, 610, 611 of 2022 These four matrimonial appeals, heard together by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, arise from family court orders in Thiruvananthapuram. In Mat.App.No.577 of 2022, the appellant-husband challenged a Family Court order dismissing an original petition seeking guardianship of his minor daughter Krishna Arun, though custody was temporarily granted on alternate Saturdays within court premises. In Mat.App.No.582 of 2022, he challenged a Family Court verdict dismissing a petition for dissolution of marriage; in Mat.App.No.610 of 2022, he challenged maintenance and counter-claims, while in Mat.App.No.611 of 2022, he challenged a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The appeals were admitted under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. On 6 October 2022, both sides agreed to mediation; by 16 December 2022 they entered into a memorandum of settlement. The court recorded that the disputes were settled in mediation; it proceeded to consider waiving the six-month cooling period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and to grant mutual consent divorce in 582, and to lift attachments and settle ancillary reliefs in 610. The common judgment disposes of all appeals in terms of the settlement, directing implementation and communication of the order to relevant authorities. The court relied on mediation and the Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur precedent to justify waiving the cooling period.
This is a revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Court Act read with Sections 397 and 401 CrPC challenging an order of the Family Court, Kozhikode in M.C. No. 52/2016. The revision petitioner Vidya Mundekkad, wife of Akhilesh Jayaram, and her minor daughter sought maintenance from the respondent. The Family Court had, in a common judgment with O.P. No. 574/2017, denied maintenance to the revision petitioner while granting Rs. 10,000 per month to the minor from 18.02.2016. The petitioner claimed she had no independent income and that the respondent, a senior consultant with Infosis, had substantial earnings (~Rs.1.5 lakh per month) and could easily maintain them. The respondent contended that the petitioner had been earning about Rs. 20,000 as a sales consultant and that the petitioner’s stay at Amruthapuri Ashram indicated she did not require separate maintenance. The Family Court considered evidence, noted the petitioner’s voluntary residence at the ashram, and still concluded she did not require maintenance, while granting maintenance to the minor. On appeal, the High Court held that reliance on the petitioner’s Ashram stay cannot bar maintenance and that the petitioner’s needs cannot be ignored where the respondent has substantial income. Therefore, the revisional petition was allowed, directing Rs.5,000 to the petitioner and Rs.10,000 to the minor, with arrears to be paid within 30 days.
This is a Kerala High Court Division Bench judgment in Crl.A. No. 480 of 2017, arising from a conviction for murder (Section 302 IPC) of Thilaka, wife of the appellant’s elder brother, by setting her on fire with kerosene at their shared residence in Athiyannoor. The prosecution alleged sustained enmity between the appellant and the deceased, rooted in a dispute over electricity charges and family tensions, culminating in a fatal sequence on 16–17 July 2014. The prosecution’s case rests primarily on multiple dying declarations made by the deceased to PW1 (son), PW2 (daughter), PW14 (doctor in attendance), and PW13 (Judicial First Class Magistrate who recorded Ext.P11), coupled with a postmortem and various independent witnesses. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine. The defense attacked the dying declarations as tutored and argued that the charge framing was defective; they also urged that the true cause might be suicide. The High Court undertook a detailed appraisal of the dying declarations, their recording, and the surrounding circumstances, applying Purushottam Chopra principles and allied Supreme Court precedents. It concluded that the four dying declarations were voluntary, credible, and corroborated by medical and witness evidence, sustaining the conviction and sentence and rejecting the suicide theory. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
BA No. 426/2023 & BA No. 499/2023 The Kerala High Court heard two linked bail petitions, B.A. Nos. 426/2023 and 499/2023, arising out of NDPS Case No. 1140/2022 (O.R. No. 2/2022 of DRI, Cochin) involving seizures of 217.525 kg of suspected heroin from two fishing boats, Little Jesus and Prince. Petitioners in 426/2023 are accused nos. 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18 and 19, mostly fishermen, who contend they were employed on the boats and had no knowledge of the contraband; they requested regular bail, arguing lack of direct involvement and the necessity to test the case under the stricter provisions of Section 37 NDPS due to the commercial quantity. Petitioners in 499/2023 are accused nos. 22 and 23, alleged owners/participants linked to the boats; their counsel emphasizes insufficient material connecting them to transport or possession of the contraband, and challenges reliance on Section 67 statements. The prosecution maintains that substantial material, including confessional statements and independent witness accounts, links the accused with the offence. The judge analyzes the interplay of NDPS Sections 19/24/27A and the “commercial quantity” rider under Section 37, the prevailing standards for “reasonable grounds” to deny bail, and precedents on admissibility of statements under Section 67, as they relate to trial prospects. Ultimately, the court finds no basis to grant regular bail to the petitioners, and dismisses the applications, holding that the required twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b) are not satisfied.
This is an original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging an order of the Family Court, Thrissur, dated 04-07-2022 in I.A.8 of 2022 in O.P.186 of 2022, which permitted the respondent mother to take the minor daughter, aged 14, to Germany. The petition was admitted and the operation of the order stayed on 26-07-2022. The High Court thereafter conducted in-camera proceedings by online appearance on 17-10-2022, including interaction with the child. The child, currently in IX standard, expressed a strong wish to remain with her mother in Germany and continue her education there. The father submitted that he should be afforded an opportunity to interact with the child, even if interim custody is denied. The mother contended that urgent travel to Germany was necessitated by visa expiry and the need to enroll the child in a German school, supported by documentary exhibits. The Court referenced well-settled law that custody decisions must prioritize the welfare of the child, citing Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan and Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka, along with Nithya Anand Raghawan v. State (NCT of Delhi) & another, to explain the parameters for interim custody in changes of residence. Ultimately, after considering the child’s mature views and other aspects, the court declined to interfere with the impugned order and dismissed the petition, while admonishing disobedience of the stay but refraining from punitive action.
This Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.M.C. No.1792 of 2015) concerns a petition under section 482 CrPC to quash Annexure A1, a private complaint in CC No.890/2013 filed by the first respondent, Manikandadas, alleging offences under sections 379 and 506(2) IPC. The petitioners—Manjula Shashidharan, Sashidharan, Amalnath, and Arunath—contend that the complaint is vexatious and civil in nature, arising from a longstanding boundary dispute over land, with civil suits and revenue proceedings already pending (e.g., OS 14/2012, CMP 486/2012, FIR 76/2012). They argue that the alleged trespass and theft of timber are civil disputes not requiring criminal action and that the case is an attempt to harass the petitioners. The respondent, supported by the State, contends that trespass, destruction of property, and intimidation occurred, and relies on judgments including Kanwar Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. to argue that a full trial is necessary to determine truth. The High Court, after examining the civil proceedings and the nature of the allegations, held that the offences were not made out, found abuse of process, and invoked its inherent power under section 482 CrPC to quash the complaint and all further proceedings. The matter culminates in quashing the entire CC 890/2013 proceedings against the petitioners.