This Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 35 of 2011) arises from a suit for specific performance filed in the Sub Court, Manjeri, by the plaintiffs (defendants 1–3 in the appeal) against the first defendant (Ayisha) who allegedly entered into a sale agreement dated 14 December 2007 with the plaintiffs and defendant 2 for the schedule property for a total consideration of Rs 11,85,000, with Rs 7,40,000 paid upfront and a further Rs 80,000 paid on 14 January 2008. The first defendant denied the execution of Ext.A1 and claimed the document was a blank signed paper misused by the plaintiffs and her son. The trial court held Ext.A1 to be duly executed and set aside Ext.A5 assignment in favour of the 3rd defendant, directing specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs and defendant 2. The first defendant challenged this in appeal, arguing issues such as validity of Ext.A1, the unauthenticated Rs 80,000 endorsement, and the pendente lite transfer to the 3rd defendant without due process. The Kerala High Court, on appeal, analyzed the evidence, held Ext.A1 proved, reinforced the discretionary moulding of relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, and ultimately dismissed the appeal with costs to the plaintiffs, affirming the trial court’s decree for specific performance. The judgment emphasizes the court’s equitable power and caution in exercising discretion while upholding the rule of law and the integrity of court undertakings.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case challenges the proceedings in CC 643/2010 (Crime No. 121/2010) of the Badiadka Police Station, Kasaragod, under Sections 323, 406 and 498A read with Section 34 IPC. Accused Nos. 1–4 — Hareesh, Narayana Moolya, Kamala and Hemalatha — faced private complaint by Baby, the de facto-complainant. After investigation, a final report was filed and cognizance taken in CC 643/2010. The petition asserts that the dispute has been settled amicably between the parties through Annexure-A3, with the de facto-complainant supporting withdrawal via Annexure-A4, and that the marital relationship has been dissolved. Although some offences are non-compoundable, the petition seeks quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in light of the settlement. The first respondent/Ms. Baby states she has no grievance and does not oppose quashing, while the Public Prosecutor for the State opposed the application. The court notes that the settlement, aided by mediators and family members, and the decision in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (SC) supports quashing where a family dispute is settled and there is no likelihood of conviction. On these grounds, the High Court allows the petition, quashes further proceedings in CC 643/2010 against the petitioners, and directs communication of the order to the trial court.
OP (CAT).No. 8 of 2015 (Z) This judgment arises from an original petition under Article 227 challenging the Central Administrative Tribunal's refusal to grant interim relief in OA 181/2015, concerning the movement of personnel from Lakshadweep's India Reserve Battalion to other Union Territories. The Kerala High Court, acting under Article 227, notes the Tribunal's incapacity due to vacancy and invokes the principle from L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India to emphasize that tribunals created by statute must be adequately manned to function, warning that vacancies impede access to relief. The court then scrutinizes Annexures A11 (12.12.2014) and A20 (26.6.2014), which reveal a broader reorganization: renaming the IRB as State Armed Police in Lakshadweep and deploying a single unit to manage policing across Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, and Silvassa, along with CRPF augmentation. It finds that the movement, though presented as a temporary measure, has been ongoing and is governed by an internal decision framework, with MHA letters stating it would continue until a final policy decision, once infrastructure is in place. The court emphasizes that policing in a uniformed sector must respect administrative discipline and the underlying purpose of the IRB. Accordingly, the High Court declines to intervene, upholding the Tribunal's order, while urging prompt action to fill vacancies so the Tribunal can function effectively.
This is a Kerala High Court appeal (MFA.(WCC).No.115 of 2013) challenging the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Kottayam, in W.C.C. No.82 of 2002, dated 14 April 2012. The first respondent (Chacko) was employed by respondents 2 and 3, a metal crusher unit, and suffered crush injuries to his right little and ring fingers on 14 May 2002 in the course of employment. The appellant insurer had issued Ext. A2, a group personal accident policy to respondent 2, but contended that it did not cover Workmen’s Compensation Act liabilities or pay interest/penalty. The Commissioner found that the injuries led to a loss of earning capacity of 11%, assessed monthly income at Rs. 2,400, and calculated a compensation of Rs. 17,446, directing deposit before the Commissioner with interest at 12% per annum and penalty provisions. The insurer argued there is no statutory obligation to pay interest and that contracting out is permissible; the first respondent argued for recovery of the due compensation along with interest/penalty under the Act. The High Court, relying on New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Harshadbhai Amrutbhai Modhiya and Anr., held that contracting out is permissible and modified the order, limiting the insurer’s liability to Rs. 17,446, while allowing the first respondent to recover interest/penalty from respondents 2 and 3 (less Rs.1,000 already paid). Any excess deposited under Section 13 is to be released to the appellant.
Subith, Surjith and Sibitha, accused in Crime No. 1755/2013 of Vatanappally Police Station, Thrissur, challenged the order in CC 2769/2013 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chavakkad, seeking to quash the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a settlement achieved between the parties. The petition arises from a matrimonial dispute in which the first petitioner married the third respondent, daughter of the second respondent, and the couple faced ill-treatment and alleged misappropriation of ornaments. After investigation, a final report was filed and the matter was taken on file as CC 2769/2013. The parties reportedly settled with mediation and the defacto complainant and the third respondent (his wife) indicated they do not want to prosecute, arguing there is no possibility of conviction and that settlement should be honored to maintain family harmony. The Public Prosecutor opposed quashing, noting non-compoundable elements under IPC, and contending it is not a fit case for 482 CrPC. The High Court relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab to affirm that matrimonial disputes settled via mediation may be quashed under 482 CrPC to preserve harmony where there is no likelihood of conviction, and accordingly quashed the proceedings to promote settlement and family harmony.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 4230 of 2014) filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by three accused in the Economic Offences Court, Ernakulam, seeking to quash FIR No. 794/2011 and the final report in Crime No. 794/2011 of Ernakulam Town North Police Station, as well as CC No. 277/2012, on the ground that the matrimonial dispute has been amicably settled. The petition relates to offences under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC, arising from alleged dowry harassment in the context of marriage. The petitioners argue that the dispute has been settled out of court and continuing the proceedings would amount to abuse of process and an unnecessary waste of judicial time, especially since the de facto complainant has no grievance remaining. The respondent, however, submits that the de facto complainant does not intend to proceed and has no ongoing grievance. The court notes the settlement and, citing the Supreme Court decision in Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013 (1) KLD 817(SC)), holds that where matrimonial disputes are settled amicably, and the parties approach the court seeking quashing of proceedings despite non-compoundable offences, the ends of justice may warrant quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The court ultimately allows the petition, quashes the FIR and final report, and directs that the petitioners may seek return of their passports, with further proceedings in CC 277/12 quashed. The judgment emphasizes that the quashing is appropriate to avoid abuse of process and to promote settlement in matrimonial matters.
MACA Nos.1815 and 1818 of 2014 These MACA appeals arise from a common award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ottappalam, in OP(MV) Nos.6 of 2010 and 75 of 2010, relating to injuries to two passengers in an auto rickshaw (KL-9/G-9759) driven by the second respondent and a collision with car KL-9/V 6080. The Tribunal held the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving and drew adverse inferences against the owner and driver for non-production of the fitness certificate, holding the auto rickshaw without a valid certificate at the relevant time. The insurer was directed to indemnify and then recover the amount paid from the appellant, the driver, and the transferee. The appellant contends that non-production or expiry of a fitness certificate cannot be the basis to exonerate the insurer under section 149(2)(a)(i)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, unless the breach is fundamental and contributes to the accident. The High Court, on the strength of Augustine v. Ayyappankutty (Full Bench), agrees that merely technical violations cannot automatically negate insurer liability where there is no evidence that such breach contributed to the accident. Consequently, the appeals are allowed; the insurer is directed to pay the compensation amounts already awarded with interest, modify the award accordingly, refund deposits to the appellants, and proceed without costs.
This Motor Accidents Claims Appeal challenges an award made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, for the death of a man who was involved in a scooter- tempo van collision on 29.12.2001. The appellants, led by Saraswathy Amma, alleged that the Tribunal under-compensated the dependents by adopting a low monthly income and an inadequate multiplier, failing to properly account for other sources of the deceased’s income (army pension, postal pension, private software employment) and for the age-related diminution of earning capacity. The Tribunal found the negligence of the tempo van driver to be the proximate cause and awarded compensation across heads including treatment, funeral, loss of dependency, loss of estate, and non-pecuniary damages. The appellants invoked precedents such as Vimal Kanwar to argue that pension incomes should form part of the multiplicand and urged a higher multiplier given the deceased’s age. The High Court, while noting these submissions, reworked the compensation by adjusting monthly income, adopting a different share of dependence, applying a multiplier of 5 in light of the age, and revising losses for consortium and love/affection. The court ultimately held that enhanced compensation was warranted and directed the insurer to deposit ₹2,57,000 with 9% interest from 18.06.2002, within one month.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 4484 of 2014) before the Kerala High Court, presented by Bazil M. George, accused in Peechi Police Station Crime No. 1081/2013, presently facing offences under Section 376 IPC in Special Case No. 1091/2013 before the Principal Assistant Sessions Court, Thrissur. The core prayer is to quash Annexure B (final report) and all further proceedings on the ground that the dispute between the petitioner and the second respondent has been settled amicably out of court. The second respondent (de facto complainant) states that she now has no grievance against him, and the parties had married on 27 January 2014 under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, as evidenced by Annexure C. The State through the Public Prosecutor and the counsel for the second respondent does not oppose quashing in light of the settlement. The court notes that the alleged offence is of a personal nature with no broad public interest and emphasizes the need to promote settlements in matrimonial matters. Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, the court recalls that the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC may be used to secure ends of justice when the parties have settled, even where the offences are non‑compoundable. On these facts, the petition is allowed, quashing the final report and all further proceedings in SC No. 1091/2013.
Lohithakshan @ Gopi, the appellant, was charged in the Sessions Court with possession of 1.5 litres of arrack in a 2.5-litre can, seized near Sekharan’s shop in Kedavoor, under Section 55(a) of the Abkari Act (which the State concedes ought to be Section 8(1)). The case arose from Excise authorities’ patrol on 7.7.2000. PW1 and PW2 testified that the appellant stood with MO1 cannas containing arrack, that a 180 ml sample was taken, sealed, and Ext.P2 mahazar recorded, with Ext.P3 crime registration and Ext.P5 chemical analysis confirming the contraband. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, with a set-off for detention under Section 428 CrPC. On appeal, the appellant’s counsel argued that the specimen-seal impression was not produced, the seal’s nature was not described in Ext.P1, and no forwarding note was marked to verify the sample’s tamper-proof journey to the chemical laboratory; reliance was placed on Sasidharan v State of Kerala and Krishnan v State to stress the need for such documentary linkage. The State contended there was no delay and that the chain of custody was adequate. The High Court, however, found the lack of forwarding notes, seal-impression, and clear proof linking the sample to Ext.P5 fatal to the prosecution, holding that the conviction was unsustainable and liable to be set aside. The appellant was acquitted and the bail bond canceled, with directions to refund any remitted fine on application.
This High Court of Kerala, in a Criminal Misc. Case under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the charge sheet and all further proceedings in CC 289/2011 arising from Crime No. 1821/2010 at Chadayamangalam Police Station, Kollam. The petition was filed by three accused, Jayesh, Thankamany and Jisha, seeking to quash proceedings in the case registered for offences punishable under Section 498A r/w Section 34 IPC, on the ground that the dispute had been amicably settled out of court. The 3rd respondent Jyothi Govind, the de facto complainant, contended she has no grievance and does not wish to pursue the matter, and the Public Prosecutor did not oppose the petition in view of the settlement. The court heard arguments from the petitioners and the respondent, and observed that the offences alleged are of a personal nature and the matter relates to a matrimonial dispute that has been settled amicably between the parties. It also relied on a Supreme Court decision in Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi and other(s), which emphasizes encouraging genuine settlements in matrimonial disputes even where offences are non-compoundable. In the light of the settlement and lack of public interest, the court held that continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process and not serve ends of justice, and accordingly allowed the Criminal Misc. Case, quashing Annexure A1 charge sheet and all further proceedings in CC No.289/2011."
KMCT College of Nursing, a self-financing institution established in 2008, sought to expand its B.Sc Nursing intake from 70 to 90 for the 2023-24 academic year. After obtaining a no objection certificate from the Government and an approval from the Kerala Nurses and Midwives Council, the college applied to the Kerala University of Health Sciences (KUHS) for affiliation. KUHS rejected the application on 11 October 2023 (Ext.P15), citing KUHS amendment provisions that, in effect, treat the last- sanctioned batch as the first batch for purposes of any further enhancement when the original batch has not yet passed out. The University argued that Statutory amendments through Exts.P16 and P17 add new conditions, including that first batches must pass, and that pass-percentage norms must be satisfied, with Ext.P18 providing clarifications. The petitioner challenged Exts.P16 and P17 as improper exercises of power and contended that affiliation is an ongoing regulatory function that cannot be read as a statute modification, and that the words 'that may be specified later' should not be used to read into the statute or add conditions outside the statutory process. The High Court allowed the petition, holding Exts.P16 and P17 to be bad in law to the extent they redefine 'First Batch.' It directed KUHS to consider the enhanced intake from 70 to 90 in the current year after due process, and to pass orders by 23 November 2023.
OP (CAT) No. 291 of 2016 (Z) Quantum of Special Allowance payable to erstwhile Department of Telecommunications officers absorbed into BSNL in 2000 is at the core of this Original Petition (OP CAT) No. 291 of 2016 (Z), heard by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. The petition challenges a Central Administrative Tribunal order that granted relief to the applicants (the five absorbed officers named in OA 180/2014) and directed recalculation and disbursement of arrears to implement a policy initially set by Annexures A3 and A4, which sought to compensate the pay fixation disparity arising from migration from CDA scale to IDA scale. Annexure A4 replaced Clause 7 to provide that the 36% increase would be calculated using the 'mid-stage' of both scales, with a ceiling on the total SA. The BSNL argued that Annexures A3/A4 apply only to the CDA scale and that the Cabinet Note (Annexure A2) is not binding; The respondents argued limitation and that only Rs 226 would be payable. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the applicants; The High Court held that the phrase 'mid stage' must apply to both scales and that the Cabinet Note's intent was to guarantee 36% uniformly. The Court refused to interfere, dismissing the petition and upholding the Tribunal’s decision.
This is a motor accident claims appeal under MACA 2208/2012 from the Kerala High Court. The appellant, Joseph, sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for injuries sustained when a KSRTC bus he was travelling on collided with an electric post on 14 February 2008. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Wayanad, awarded Rs. 2,69,100 against the bus driver (Prakasan) and the KSRTC (owner) in OP(MV) 328/2008, which the appellant challenged as inadequate. The respondents contended the accident occurred due to the appellant’s own negligence, as he was travelling on the footboard, and argued that the compensation claimed was excessive. The appellant produced Exhibits A1–A11 and disability certificates C1 and C1(a). The High Court re-examined the computation, relying on established precedents. It fixed the notional monthly income at Rs 6,500 (rejecting the Tribunal’s Rs 3,000, citing Ramachandrappa) and determined a 25% functional disability (per C1/C1(a)) with a multiplier of 11 (per Sarla Verma). Loss of earnings was recalculated to Rs 39,000; bystander expenses to Rs 7,800; loss of amenities to Rs 25,000; and loss due to disability to Rs 2,14,500. The overall sum rose from Rs 2,69,100 to Rs 4,30,800. The appeal is allowed in part, with enhanced compensation of Rs 1,61,700, interest at 7.5% p.a. from petition date to realization, and costs of Rs 4,000; the KSRTC must deposit within 60 days.
Electrotec Power Systems, a partnership firm engaged in sale and installation of power inverters, filed WP(C) No. 31099/2019 challenging the Banking Ombudsman’s order and seeking refund of Rs.58,056 lost in a fraudulent NEFT transfer. The petitioner had, on 23.04.2019, received an email (Ext.P2) with an invoice and a bank account for the sixth respondent (Narayana Lokatia/ Accent Furniture House, New Delhi) to which Rs.58,056 was transferred via NEFT. It later emerged the email was hacked and the beneficiary account number was substituted with that of another person, Gono Richard Mewasel. The amount was credited to the hacked account; the petitioner demanded reversal and reimbursement. The first respondent bank claimed the instruction was valid and irrevocable and that the petitioner should have verified the beneficiary details; the second respondent bank’s role in reversal was not fulfilled; the Banking Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, prompting the petition. The court relied on NEFT Guidelines (Ext.P1) and the remitter’s duty to ensure accuracy, but also recognized the hacking as a fault not solely attributable to the petitioner. It invoked Section 24 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and RBI guidelines to urge follow-up actions by the banks in accordance with fair banking practices. The court disposed of the petition with a guiding observation, directing pursuit of remedies under Section 24 and urging corrective steps by the banks.
OP (CAT) No. 963 of 2011 (S) Syam Kumar B v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd challenges a CAT Ernakulam order dated 22.10.2010 that set aside a BSNL order refusing compassionate appointment and directed that the claim be considered under the scheme in force at the time of the employee’s death. The respondent’s father died on 17.09.2005 while employed as a Telecom Mechanic; at that time the applicant was a minor. After attaining majority in January 2009, he applied for compassionate employment; BSNL rejected on 09.10.2009 under the Weightage Point System introduced in 2007, finding him ineligible. OA 18/2010 before CAT was allowed, directing consideration under the older scheme. BSNL contends that the 2007 policy was intended to bring uniformity in assessing indigence; the relevant test is the one in force when the application is considered, and the applicant had only 48 points, below the 55-point threshold. The respondents rely on decisions that the death-date should dictate eligibility; however Rajkumar (2010) and the Full Bench Rajesh (2015) hold that compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the governing rule is the scheme at the time of consideration. The Kerala High Court agrees with Rajkumar/Rajesh and distinguishes older authorities (Jaspal Kaur, Vikas Dubey) as not controlling. It quashes the Tribunal’s order and reinstates BSNL’s rejection, observing no delay explanation and absence of eligibility under the current scheme.
OP (FC).No. 189 of 2015 (R) This original petition challenges the Family Court Thrissur’s 7.4.2015 order in EP 57/2011, which sought to execute a foreign judgment issued by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against the petitioner. The respondent sought to enforce the Ontario orders in India, claiming execution of a foreign decree. The petitioner argues that the documents produced do not constitute a foreign judgment enforceable in India; that Canada is not shown to be a reciprocating territory; and that the order was ex parte and not decided on merits, thus cannot be executed under Section 13(b) of the CPC. Additional grounds include that Section 44-A CPC requires a certified copy of the decree from a reciprocating territory together with a certificate of satisfaction or adjustment, which is not demonstrated here; the Family Court’s jurisdiction to execute foreign decrees is limited and does not extend to foreign judgments, under Section 18 of the Family Courts Act. Citing Lakshmi Priya Seshan and International Woollen Mills, the petitioner contends that an ex parte foreign judgment passed without merits cannot be executed in India. The Kerala High Court agrees, noting the absence of materials proving reciprocity and the lack of jurisdiction for the Family Court to entertain such an execution petition. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and Exts.P13 is set aside, quashing the attempted execution.
OP(C).No. 2295 of 2014 (O) This is an OP(C) (Civil) appeal from an order of the VI Additional District Court, Ernakulam, in I.A.916/2014 in O.S.5/2013, dated 11 July 2014. The petitioner-defendant Vidyaa Ayurveda and Herbals filed the petition under Article 227 challenging the District Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit for permanent injunction and damages concerning a registered design. The plaintiff Vaishali Industries had instituted the suit alleging copying and piracy of its registered design for a product. The defendant contended that the matter should be governed by Section 19 of the Designs Act, 2000 (cancellation of registration) and that Section 22/24 provisions would not confer jurisdiction on the District Court; the defence relied on Premier Elmech Systems (P) Ltd. v. V. Guard Industries (P) Ltd. The District Judge had, however, held that the District Court had jurisdiction under Section 22(2)/(4) and the II proviso to Section 24(2) because the suit seeks permanent injunction and damages. The High Court, while analyzing the provisions, observed that Section 19 requires a petition before the Controller on specific grounds and an order, and Section 22(4) transfers matters only if Section 19 grounds are actually invoked. The court declined to interfere, concluding there is no valid pleading under Section 19, and dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the District Court’s jurisdiction and order.
RCRev. No. 122 of 2011 (A) This revision petition challenges an eviction order passed under Section 11(4)(ii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord sought eviction for alleged unauthorised construction in the petition schedule building, consisting of a shed covered with asbestos sheets, a latrine, and a well in the open space of about four cents, contending that such construction reduced the value and utility of the premises materially and permanently. The tenant resisted, claiming the construction occurred with the consent of the previous landlord and, crucially, that there is no landlord-tenant relationship with the present owner after transfer by sale; he also contended that if unauthorised, the effect did not amount to a permanent material reduction. The Rent Control Court found in favor of the landlord, holding the construction unauthorised and to have diminished value and utility, and the Appellate Authority concurred. The High Court examined whether eviction under Section 11(4)(ii) can be sustained when the alleged act occurred before transfer to the current landlord. It held that once the tenant has used the building in a manner destroying or materially and permanently reducing its value or utility, the cause of action arises and survives transfer; the transferee landlord can sue. Citing Michael v. Paramara Group Devaswom and Vipin Kumar v. Roshan Lal Anand, the court affirmed the concurrent findings. The revision petition was dismissed, with eight months to vacate, subject to conditions including an unconditional affidavit to surrender and payment of arrears within specified time frames.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a partition suit challenging a registered settlement deed (Ext.B1) said to have been executed by the donor, Rarappan Nair, in favour of his granddaughters (defendants 2 and 3). The plaintiff, Chelathukandy Meenakshi Amma, one of the legal heirs, contends Ext.B1 deprived her of a rightful half-share in the plaint schedule properties and was executed when the donor suffered serious illness and lacked disposing state of mind, thereby lacking free consent. The Munsiff’s Court dismissed the suit, holding Ext.B1 to be a valid settlement; the lower appellate court affirmed this view. The High Court, on admission of substantial questions of law, scrutinizes the medical records (Ext.X1–X3, Ext.A23) and other evidence showing the donor’s incapacitation around November 2005, including CVA, bedsores, and weakness. It notes oddities in Ext.B1’s execution, such as inconsistent signatures and the absence of attestation in the donor’s presence, and critiques the testimony of the attesting witness DW2. Citing legal doctrines on free consent, fraud, and the burden of proof under the Evidence Act, the court concludes Ext.B1 is void and not binding on the plaintiff. Consequently, the appeal is allowed; the plaintiff is declared to be entitled to a 1/2 share, with mesne profits from suit filing until separate possession, and a final decree to follow.
