The petitioner, C.K. JAYASANKAR, a patron member of Chalakudy NSS Educational, Cultural and Charitable Society, challenges Ext.P7, an order allowing IA Nos. 4927/2015, 4928/2015 and 4930/2015 in O.S. No. 395/2007 of the District Court, Thrissur, to implead four NSS Karayogams as parties to a scheme for administration of the fifth respondent society. The original suit, filed under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC in a representative capacity, seeks framing of a scheme to rectify perceived anomalies in the society’s byelaws, particularly concerning founder and patron members and the inheritance of patron rights. The Karayogams identified are Chalakudy Town NSS Karayogam, West Chalakudy NSS Karayogam, Potta NSS Karayogam, and Chenathunadu NSS Karayogam. The petition argues that these Karayogams lack legal personality as unregistered entities and that their impleadment is improper. The respondents contend that the Karayogams are beneficiaries and necessary parties for a comprehensive scheme and that representation under Order I Rule 8 permits their entry. After hearing, the High Court held that the impugned order is sustainable, rejected the petition, and dismissed it, thereby upholding the court below’s decision to implead the four Karayogams and permitting the continuation of the scheme proceedings.
This original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges Ext.P3, a court below’s order dated 17.11.2016 in I.A.734/2016 in FDIA 472/2015, which refused to remit the Advocate Commissioner’s report, plan and accounts to be considered at the enquiry in the partition suit FDIA 472/2015 in O.S. No.1/2000 before the Sub Court, Vadakara. The underlying suit is a partition suit in which a preliminary decree has attained finality; the Advocate Commissioner prepared Ext.P1 report showing total extent of 21.40 cents with Plot A (3.20 cents) and Plot B (7.20 cents) allocated; owelty Rs. 42,925.05. The petitioners argued that Plot A is too small for construction, that Plot B and other plots should be re-allotted; they claim they are entitled to nearly 5 cents and that Plot B has a common well accessible to all sharers. The court below dismissed I.A.734/2016, holding that objections require evidence at the main enquiry and that Ext.P1, Ext.P1 report, plan and accounts need not be remitted unless perverse. The High Court, while upholding supervisory limits of Article 227, cited Shalini Shyam Shetty and Sobhana Nair K.N. to support limited intervention, and dismissed the petition as lacking merit. The petition is thus dismissed; no manifest error in Ext.P3 was found.
This Kerala High Court revision petition arises from an eviction proceeding under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The landlord-petitioner seeks eviction of his tenant to enable construction of a residential building for his second daughter, Leena George, who allegedly depends on him for livelihood and education. Leena and her husband had resided abroad and presently live with the petitioner; the petition schedule building is said to be dilapidated and slated for demolition to facilitate a new residence near the landlord’s own dwelling. The tenant contested the petition, alleging malafide and that the claimed need is pretext to evict the tenant to fetch a higher rent; it was also argued that Leena does not truly depend on the landlord since she and her husband reside elsewhere, and that the building’s alleged dilapidation is not substantiated. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petition and the Appellate Authority upheld that dismissal. The High Court, in a Division Bench, found the need projected by the landlord to be bonafide, clarifying that under Section 11(3) the need is that of the landlord even if the beneficiary is a dependent daughter. It held that the burden to prove the daughter has no other dwelling lies not on the petitioner in this context. Adopting Mustafa Haji v. Umbichi, the bench held that non-examination of a dependent is not fatal if the landlord is examined. The matter is remitted to the Rent Control Court for consideration under the 2nd proviso to Section 11(3) and further orders are directed for 13.10.2017. The revision petition is disposed of in the manner stated.
This writ petition (WP(C) No. 28812/2018) filed by M/S Key Systems, represented by its managing partner, challenges the BSNL’s decision to allot the Kayamkulam franchise in the Alappuzha SSA to Choice Enterprises (4th respondent). The petitioner contends that the award violates the policy framework (Exhibit P2) which caps franchise shares at 33% in a given SSA with a possible extension to 50% by the first respondent; five territories exist in the Alleppey SSA, so awarding 3 territories by rounding off 2.5 fails to adhere to the policy. The petitioner relies on the Supreme Court of India decision in Supreme Mahavir (JV) v. MCGM to argue that treating a bid as responsive when it doesn’t meet eligibility would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14. It is argued that the rounding of 2.5 to 3 constitutes a departure from policy and is thus arbitrary. The respondents counter that the tender inviting authority must have the flexibility to interpret policy to make a viable contract, citing TP Constructions v. Chief Engineer, Kerala State Housing Board and Afcons Infrastructure v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corp, and asserting there is no mala fide or arbitrariness. After hearing, the court held that the 1st respondent’s rounding to 3 territories was not arbitrary or irrational, and the award was within the policy framework. The court emphasized judicial restraint and noted the lack of mala fides; thus the petition was dismissed, upholding the decision."
OP(KAT) No.374 of 2017 & OP(KAT) No.195 of 2018 Two Original Petitions (OP(KAT) Nos. 374/2017 and 195/2018) before the Kerala High Court challenge Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) orders in OA 826/2016 and OA (Ekm) 1564/2017 concerning appointment claims for a Lower Division Clerk post in Pathanamthitta. The petitioner-State contends that the Tribunal’s 2016 order, which held the State’s conduct illegal and arbitrary and directed appointment of the original applicant in place of R3 (Khadeeja Beevi) with notional relief under Rule 39, was erroneous and should not be allowed to stand; it relies on the absence of a direct directive to grant appointment from the date 30.12.2006 and on the principles of res judicata/constructive res judicata. The respondent-original applicant contends that his superior merit justified appointment in 2007 and seeks back-dating relief. The High Court, noting both petitions relate to the same issues and the same official, disposes of the matters by a common judgment and analyses the 2011 W.P(C) No. 28382/2007 Annexure-A1, the 2012 Annexure-A2 directions, and relevant KS&SR rules (Rules 23(a), 23(c) Part I; Rule 33; Rule 12(7) Part I; Rule 39 Part II). It ultimately holds that a notional period from 30.12.2006 to 19.03.2012 should be counted for seniority/pay fixation (not full back pay), directs promotion to Senior Clerk from 19.03.2014, re-fixation of pay, and orderly compliance for retirement benefits, while modifying Tribunal directions accordingly.
This Kerala High Court arbitration reference concerns AR Nos. 7 and 24 of 2016 filed by M/S Palannattil Construction Company, a Government contractor, seeking to compel arbitration for payment disputes arising from two road works. The petitioner contends that arbitration clauses exist within the contract, and disputes should be resolved through arbitration; one work was completed, the other terminated, with amounts allegedly due. The respondents counter that there is no arbitration clause, arguing that an amendment (Annexure R3(a)) deleted the clause in the notice inviting tenders, and that the amendment supersedes other contract provisions. The court examines the scope of its Section 11 powers, citing SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another, and reiterates that under Section 16 the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, while the Chief Justice may decide the issue under appropriate circumstances. It cites Wellington Associates Ltd. v. Kirit Mehta and Nimet Resources INC v. Essar Steels Ltd. to emphasize that if the arbitration agreement is unclear, the question should be relegated to the arbitral tribunal. Finding the documents insufficiently clear, the court allows the petitions, appointing Sri K.J. Thomas Stanely (retired District Judge) provisionally as arbitrator to decide the preliminary issue of existence of an arbitration agreement and to pass an interim award, with disclosure and return to court for confirmation of appointment.
This MACA relates to an appeal by Abdul Latheef (appellant/claimant) against an award of Rs. 8,94,000 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Manjeri, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for the death of his son Sajad in a road traffic accident on 28.08.2010 involving a mini lorry insured with Royal Sundaram Alliance. The Tribunal held the 1st respondent driver negligent and the insurer liable to indemnify, awarding compensation under various heads (including love and affection, funeral expenses, medical, transport, etc.) with the total capped at Rs.10,00,000 for court fee purposes. The appellant claimed Rs.16,69,700 with broader heads and sought enhancement. The 1st respondent driver did not contest; the 2nd respondent owner was ex parte; the 3rd respondent insurer admitted coverage but denied negligence and argued the accident stemmed from the deceased’s own rash riding. The High Court, in a single-judge decision, reconsiders quantum, noting key precedents on just compensation (Sarla Verma; Pranay Sethi) and standard principles for income, future prospects, and deductions for personal living expenses. It fixes the deceased’s notional monthly income at Rs.7,500, adds 40% future prospects (since self-employed and under 40), and applies the Sarla-Verma multiplier of 18. It revises conventional heads (funeral, love/affection, loss of estate, pain and suffering) consistent with Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance jurisprudence, granting an additional Rs.3,35,000 with 8% interest, directing payment within two months. The appeal is disposed of with no costs.
WP(C).No.10867 of 2020(S) Public interest litigation filed by two petitioners, parents of students at Sree Buddha Central School, Kollam, challenges the manner in which the CBSE-affiliated school conducted online/virtual classes and charged fees during the COVID-19 lockdown. The petition contends that the schools were closed from March 2020, and while the National Disaster Management Authority and the Government of India issued phased reopening guidelines, there were no uniform Kerala rules prescribing how private CBSE schools should levy fees during lockdown or how online teaching should be priced. The petition asserts that the 7th respondent school levied substantial sums under heads such as annual fees, special fees, textbooks, uniforms, and other charges for a period when no physical classes occurred, and that such demands threaten the right to education. It also alleges that the online classes provided were substandard, with scant guidance or transparency, and that teachers were inadequately trained. The petition cites CBSE guidelines and State orders as to how fees should be managed during lockdown and requests a writ of mandamus to ensure quality online teaching with video conferencing, a cap on fees to tuition, and protection from denial of education for non-payment. The Kerala High Court, relying on CBSE bye-laws and the Supreme Court's decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, dismisses the petition as a policy issue, but directs the Government to consider monthly payment options if such representations are made.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C.No.1257 of 2010) concerns a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash Annexure A4(a), an order of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kattappana, taking cognizance and issuing summons against the petitioners in a pending crime for offences under sections 323 and 294(b) IPC (r/w 34). The second respondent’s complaint arises in the context of a prior dispute where he alleges assault and other acts by the petitioners while the police were discharging official duties; the respondents contend the complaint is valid and the proceedings should continue. The petitioners challenge the legality of proceeding without prior sanction, asserting protection under section 197 Cr.P.C. and arguing that the offence was committed in connection with their official duties, thus constituting abuse of process if cognizance is taken without sanction. The court surveys seminal authorities on section 197, including Satwant Singh, Puk Raj, Matajog Dobey, and Shree Kantiah Ramayya Munipalli, along with Romesh Lal Jain, Ram Manohar Lohia and others, to delineate the scope of protection for public servants and the public order concept. It discusses Kerala’s notification extending protection to police engaged in public order maintenance, and the distinction between public order and ordinary offences. Ultimately, the court finds no merit in the petition and dismisses it, while noting that the trial court may consider relevant 197(3) materials during the proceedings.
The appellant, V. Suresh, secretary of Kannadi Service Co-operative Bank, faced a threatened suspension arising from a private complaint of misappropriation and an ensuing police inquiry. An F.I.R. was registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the IPC. Suspension pending enquiry is governed by Rule 198(6) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, and involves subsistence allowances under the Kerala Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1972, with prior Registrar approval for suspensions beyond one year. In July 2016, the Government through Ext. P2 directed the Registrar to request the Bank to suspend until investigation concludes; the Registrar, via Ext. P1, then directed the Bank accordingly. The appellant challenged Exts. P1 and P2 as impermissible dictation by the Government and Registrar to the Bank. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition as premature since the directives had not been executed. On appeal, the Division Bench held that a statutory authority must act independently, without external pressure or dictation. Citing Mohammedkutty v. Secretary to Government and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sanjay Nagayach, the court concluded that government-directed suspension is improper. The impugned directives were set aside; Exts. P1 and P2 were quashed, leaving the Bank free to act as warranted. The appeal was allowed with no costs.
OP(KAT) No.321/2015(Z) in WP(C). 17193/2008 Ajith Kumar, a Deputy Ranger in Paruthippally Range, Thiruvananthapuram, challenges the Kerala Administrative Tribunal’s rejection of his claim for seniority and promotion on repatriation from inter-department transfers. He began as a Forester in 1991; his probation was declared in 1993; he subsequently moved to the Archives Department as an LDC Typist on a KPSC-advised transfer, and later to the Tourism Department. In 2002 he sought repatriation to the Forest Department, and was repatriated on 17-12-2004. Within the Forest Department he sought promotion to Deputy Ranger, but the Tribunal and the Department declined retroactive promotion from the date of the promotion of his immediate junior, relying on Rule 8(c) and its provisos. He argued that the Full Bench decision in Balakrishnan Nair v. Ram Mohan Nair (1998) 1 KLT 766 (FB), later approved by the Supreme Court in Ali v State of Kerala (2003) 2 KLT 922, provides a broader entitlement to benefits on repatriation and should guide Rule 8 interpretation. The Government contends that the provisos to Rule 8(c) bar retrospective promotion when the inter-departmental movement is not on exigency of service. The High Court, while noting the Full Bench interpretation, held that the petitioner’s sequence of transfers—Forest → Archives via exigency, then to Tourism via inter-departmental transfer not on exigency—falls outside the ambit of Rule 8, and upheld the Tribunal’s order. Original Petition (KAT) dismissed with no costs.
Divina P.T., a teacher at Anjarakkandy Higher Secondary School, challenged the denial of approval of her appointment as Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior) in Commerce and sought mandamus directing respondents to approve Ext.P1 appointment and disburse consequent salary and benefits. The short facts show five vacancies arose when four new posts were created for 2019-2020 and one retirement vacancy. The manager filled four posts by transfer and one by direct recruitment. Ext.P1 appointing the petitioner was sent for approval but Ext.P2 declined on the ground that the by-transfer quota had been exceeded. The petitioner argued that HSST (Commerce) (Junior) could only be filled by direct recruitment since no qualified by-transfer candidates were available, and that the 25% by-transfer and 75% direct recruitment ratios must be calculated on total HSST posts; the 1st respondent directed reconsideration via Ext.P6, but Ext.P7 again declined approval. The court examined Rule 4(3) of Chapter XXXII of the Kerala Education Rules (KER) and Note provisions, noting that 25% by transfer and 75% direct recruitment apply to total posts, and that the petitioner’s appointment did not exceed the direct recruitment quota. It also cited VK Girija v. Reshma Parayil for quota computation. The court quashed Exts.P2, P4 and P7, and directed approval within two months, with salary and benefits payable from the appointment date.
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution concerns gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act for a long-serving employee of a cooperative bank. The petitioner, P. Sukumaran, who joined as Attender in 1982 and retired as Accountant in 2016, seeks a mandamus directing the first respondent bank to disburse the balance gratuity amount of Rs. 4,33,022 along with 10% interest from the retirement date. The bank had reportedly received Rs. 14,33,022 from the LIC under a Group Gratuity Master Policy but disbursed only Rs. 10,00,000 due to the second proviso to Rule 59(iii) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969. The petition pivots on whether employees under the cooperative sector can obtain higher gratuity terms under Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, despite the policy limits, and whether the Central Act overrides the State Rules. The Full Bench decision in Chandrasekharan Nair v. KS Co-operative Bank held that the liability to pay gratuity does not shift to the insurer; any shortfall must be borne by the employer, and Section 4(5) prevails for better terms where applicable. The case analyzes Article 254 and the supremacy of Central law over state enactments, emphasizing harmonization rather than repugnancy when both Acts touch the same subject. The court ultimately directs payment of the balance gratuity with interest, clarifying that the employee is entitled to the higher terms under the Central Act where applicable.
This appeal concerns the State of Kerala’s challenge to a 2016 order of a learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.24303 of 2013, which set aside exhibit P5 directing that the first respondent’s appointment as a Lower Primary School Assistant (LPSA) be treated as a daily-wage engagement and ordering recovery of excess pay drawn. The first respondent, E.K. Saheela, was initially appointed from 01.06.1999 to fill a vacancy created by the promotion of Smt. Sailaja as Headmistress on 22.02.2005; both appointments were approved and salaries paid. Audit objections later contended that the school’s effective strength was only 99 students, and the vacancy created by the promotion should have been filled on a daily-wage basis; also, the vacancy arose from a suspended teacher who was reinstated on 30.03.2011 and retired on 31.03.2011, making grounds for delaying appointment to be effective from 01.06.2011. Based on these objections, P5 directed the appointment from 01.06.2011 to be treated as daily wage and ordered recovery of excess pay. The single Judge’s judgment relied on a decision in Usuvathunnisa v. Asst. Educational Officer to hold that sanction to a post could not be withdrawn on audit grounds, and thus set aside P5. The Division Bench reversed, holding that the initial approval stood and the audit objection did not justify undoing it; thus the appeal is dismissed and the episode allowed to rest. The case emphasizes the primacy of prior approvals and limitations of audit objections to alter settled appointments.
The petitioner, Siju K Bhanu, son of the 3rd respondent, challenged a Maintenance Tribunal order under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The 3rd respondent filed a complaint alleging that the petitioner forcibly took her husband from the family home and kept him in his custody. The father, aged about 87 and suffering from dementia, had been taken by the petitioner to his residence in Thiruvananthapuram purportedly for his protection and care; the mother, aged about 79, and the couple’s pension arrangement featured in the dispute. The Tribunal ordered the petitioner to shift the father to the family home within one week and to arrange a full-time caretaker, with directions to the SHO to implement. The petitioner contended that the order exceeded statutory authority and relied on medical certificates (Exts. P1, P2) showing the father’s fragile health. The respondent argued that the objective of the Act is to safeguard senior citizens’ dignity and welfare. The High Court reviewed Sections 2(b), 4, and 9 of the Act, noting maintenance includes residence and medical care, but held that eviction-like custody transfer cannot be sustained. While upholding the caretaker directive, the Court quashed the custody-transfer portion and referred the matter to the District Magistrate under Rule 19(1) for fresh orders within four weeks to secure dignity and security for all parties.
The petitioner, Koothali Sree Kammoth Mahavishnu Kshethra Samithy, represented by its President, challenged the new management scheme framed for Sree Kammoth Mahavishnu Temple by the Malabar Devaswom Board (MDB). The scheme, prepared in accordance with a 2014 court direction, provides for a five-member Board of Trustees, including a representative of the Samithy among non-hereditary trustees. The Samithy nominated Sri. Sreedharan to be its representative; however, the Area Committee declined this nomination (Ext.P4), and the subsequent Ext.P5 order appointed five trustees excluding the Samithy representative. The petitioner contends that Ext.P4 and Ext.P5 violate Ext.P2’s clause (3) which envisages Samithy representation in the Board. The petitioner sought certiorari to quash Exts.P4 and P5 and mandamus to appoint Sri. Sreedharan. The respondents argued that inclusion of a Samithy representative is non-mandatory and that the remedy lies in Section 18 of the HR&CE Act before the Commissioner. The court relied on prior judgments, including A.S.No.537/1996 (Ext.P1) directing a fresh scheme, and stressed the availability of an efficacious statutory remedy. Ruling that High Court writs should not bypass statutory remedies absent exceptional circumstances, the court disposed the petition: directing the petitioner to approach the Commissioner under Section 18(1) HR&CE Act, with a one-month timelines for a decision.
The petition by Anup Kumar challenges Ext.P5, an order dated 01.03.2018 of the Excise Commissioner denying an FL-3 license for the hotel project at Edayarackal Residency, Neyyattinkara, and Ext.P14, a 16.01.2019 order of the State upholding the revision decision. The petitioner applied on 21.10.2017 for the FL-3 license, as evidenced by Ext.P1. The High Court had earlier directed in Ext.P6 (12.06.2018, W.P.(C).No.19367 of 2018) that the 1st respondent consider and pass orders on the revision petition with notice within two months. Ext.P14, however, was issued rejecting the revision without giving notice, relying on the distance criterion under Rule 13(3), Note 2 of the Foreign Liquor Rules. The petitioner argued this violated natural justice and merits. On 08.02.2019, the State indicated it would withdraw Ext.P14 and issue a fresh order after a personal hearing, and a hearing notice was scheduled for 19.02.2019. The court emphasized the necessity of reasons for administrative orders, citing Gordhandas Bhanji, Mohinder Singh Gill, Breen, Alexander Machinery, P.C. Kakkar, Krishna Swami, and Lingareddy, to avoid arbitrariness. It held Ext.P14 liable to be interfered with, directing the 1st respondent to re-consider the revision petition with notice, and to pass a reasoned order expeditiously (within three weeks of certified copy of the judgment). The petition is disposed with these directions and the earlier contentions left open for future proceedings.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed by the petitioners, Subhash Mathew and Roy, challenging the judgment/order in CC No.163/2023 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Neyyattinkara, arising from Crime No.965/2022 of Pozhiyoor Police Station. The petition contends that the parties have amicably settled their dispute, the victim has filed an affidavit supporting the settlement, and the entire criminal action should be quashed in the interests of justice. The Public Prosecutor, while expressing reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement, concedes that the matter is settled. The High Court discusses the settled-law on quashing non-compoundable offences under Section 482 CrPC, reiterating the Supreme Court’s decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019), Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another (2012), and Narinder Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another (2014). It lays down that quashing is permissible where the dispute is private, the entire dispute is resolved, and the offences are not heinous or against public interest, nor under special statutes. Applying these principles to the present facts, including the victim’s affidavit, the court holds that the dispute is private, the settlement is genuine, and the ends of justice require quashing the proceedings. Consequently, the Criminal Miscellaneous Case is allowed and all further proceedings in CC No.163/2023 are quashed.
Vishnu Gopalakrishnan, the second accused in Crime No. 1851/2019 (originally registered as Crime No. 1677/2019 at Museum Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram and later transferred to Peroorkada Police Station), moved the Kerala High Court for anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC. The first accused is Suntec Business Solutions Private Limited, with others occupying executive roles; the case arises from alleged offences under Sections 420 and 406 IPC in the context of a foreign exchange services agreement with FCM Travel Solutions (India) Pvt. Ltd. The prosecution contends the second accused, acting with others, transacted foreign currency (Rs. 3,43,54,184/-) between 06.04.2019 and 25.06.2019 and later repaid Rs. 2,54,44,914/-, leaving an outstanding balance of Rs. 89,69,270/-. Whether these acts constitute 420/406 IPC offences or mere breach of contract is a matter for investigation. The High Court relied on Kunhiraman v. State of Kerala (2005) 2 KLT 685 to hold that there is no legal bar to hearing the de facto complainant in bail applications, and that rights of victims need not always require notice to the defacto complainant in all bail matters. Citing 439(1-A) CrPC and COVID-19-related directives, the court emphasized social distancing and informed that bail is the rule and jail the exception. The application is allowed with conditions aimed at fair investigation and public health considerations.
WP(C).No. 18656 of 2018 (F) This writ petition concerns eligibility for a Ward of Insured Person Certificate under Group I under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. The petitioners are a mother-daughter pair; the second petitioner is an ESIC-insured employee. The daughter secured a NEET rank and sought admission to medical college under the ESI quota. The ESIC refused to issue the Ward of Insured Person Certificate, prompting the petitioners to challenge the decision. The employer had registered the second petitioner with ESIC before 01.01.2012 and contributed up to 30.09.2017, with several contribution periods showing zero or low presence of work, including gaps in Oct 2012–Mar 2013 and Oct 2013–Mar 2014, and a partial period in Apr 2013–Sep 2013. The key issue is whether the five-year continuous insurable service requirement for Group I can be fulfilled or relaxed where absences occurred due to illness. The court cites Remya Krishnan R. v. ESIC to emphasize that a beneficiary should not be deprived of rights merely due to illness-caused absences if the periods are otherwise regularized. It identifies a rule-driven misapplication in Ext.P3/Annexure I and emphasizes flexibility to ensure deserving beneficiaries are not barred from benefits. The court ultimately holds that the petitioners are entitled to the Ward of Insured Person Certificate under Group I since the first petitioner could complete five years of continuous insurable service, directing issuance of the certificate. The writ petition is allowed to the extent stated.
