The Kerala High Court, in Crl.M.C. Nos. 443–447 of 2016, heard by Justice Sunil Thomas, deals with petitions filed by accused 1 and 2 (Mathews Jose and Sherin Joseph), directors of M/s Blue Labs Technology Solutions (P) Ltd., challenging criminal proceedings for alleged default in EPF contributions under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and related schemes. The petitioners argue that payment of the entire sum due, including penalties, to the PF authorities extinguishes liability and that there was no break in PF coverage, rendering the ongoing prosecution unsustainable. They rely on Adoni Cotton Mills Ltd. and Ors v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner & Ors, Provident Fund Inspector, Faridabad v. Jaipur Textile, and Jasoda Glass and Silicate and others v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to contend that payment can quash criminal proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. However, the respondents assert that these decisions were decided on peculiar facts and cannot be treated as general law; they cite Pranati Textiles, Anjuman Tea Company, and Hotel Dock Palace to support that non-payment within prescribed time constitutes an offence under Section 14 of the EPF Act, with later payment potentially as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The court ultimately reaffirms Pranati Textiles as the binding standard: an offence can be committed for non-payment; payment may mitigate but cannot automatically bar prosecution. Consequently, the Cr.M.Cs are dismissed, though warrants may be recalled within 15 days to permit remedy. The matter underscores the limited role of payment in quashing EPF prosecutions and upholds continued proceedings.
RCRev..No. 150 of 2015 (E) This High Court of Kerala (Ernakulam) heard RCRev. No. 150 of 2015 (E), challenging the judgments in RCA.49/2009 (District Court, Ernakulam) dated 08-04-2015 and RCP.138/2007 (Rent Control Court, Ernakulam) dated 30-07-2009. The revision petitioners/tenants sought eviction protection and a fixation of fair rent, under Sections 5 and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, alleging bona fide need for their landlord’s ancestral house for his sons’ residence and improvement of living conditions. The Rent Control Court and the District Court concurrently concluded that the landlord’s need was bona fide and denied protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3). The petitioners contended that the first proviso to Section 11(3) should apply since the landlord owns another building with ten rooms; they also claimed that the Typewriting Institute income is the family’s main livelihood and that the evidence did not establish exclusive reliance on that income. The High Court reaffirmed the concurrent findings, holding that mere possession of another building is not automatically fatal to bona fides under the first proviso unless those rooms are vacant and suitable for the need. It also noted lack of adequate evidence proving the landlord’s sole reliance on the Typewriting Institute income and the absence of evidence of feasible alternatives. Venugopalan Nair v. Mohamedkunhi was cited to illustrate the landlord’s right to select among multiple tenanted spaces (the pick-and-choose principle) absent mala fides. The revision was dismissed, but the court granted six months to surrender with conditions including an affidavit. The order directs compliance within specified terms.
This is a motor accident claims appeal arising from an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha, in a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, concerning injuries sustained in an accident on 13 December 2006. The petitioner (Thankamma) claimed compensation from the owner (2nd respondent) and insurer (3rd respondent), with the petition originally filed against the driver (1st respondent), who could not be served and was deleted from the party array; the owner was later shown as being liable through vicarious responsibility, and the insurer contested liability arguing breach of policy conditions and lack of fitness/licence. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 5,87,511 with 7.5% interest and costs. On appeal, the insurer contended (i) the petition could not proceed after relinquishment of the 1st respondent; (ii) the petitioner’s disability was assessed as 100% functional despite a 40% permanent disability; (iii) the insurer should be entitled to pay and recover under Section 149 of the Act for a vehicle without fitness. The Kerala High Court held that deletion of the driver is not fatal, read Exts. A15 and C1 together to affirm 100% functional disability, and apply Pareed Pillai to permit pay-and-recover from the owner. The appeal was disposed of by confirming the Tribunal’s award but directing payment to respondents 4–6 with recovery from the 2nd respondent, as per law.
OP (FC).No. 99 of 2016 (R) The original petition challenges Ext.P7 and seeks a declaration that the Family Court, Nedumangad, had no jurisdiction to execute the decree in OP No.1005/2003 against the petitioner, who is the 4th judgment debtor. The respondent obtained a decree in OP No.1005/2003; EP 52/2007 was filed for its execution before the Family Court. The petitioner appeared and filed EA 124/2008, contending that the decree had no against him and that he was merely a surety by having executed a bond for Rs 1 lakh with two sureties for releasing the respondent's husband when arrested. He contends he did not furnish any security, and the bond was for appearance, not to secure the decree debt; no order of forfeiture existed during the pendency. The Family Court relied on Section 145 CPC to enforce liability against the petitioner as a surety, even though the petitioner was not a party to OP 1005/2003. The court referred to Varghese v. Bhanuvikraman Unnithan and other decisions. The High Court held that Section 145 contemplates a liability for performance of a decree or for payment of money, or for the property; a bond for appearance does not create such liability; since there was no decree against the petitioner and no forfeiture orders, he cannot be treated as a surety. Consequently Ext.P7 is set aside and the petition is allowed; the petitioner is not liable for the decree amount.
This is a Motor Accidents Claims Appeal (MACA No. 368 of 2011) from the Kerala High Court arising out of an MACT award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The appellant, K. P. Sadasivan, sustained injuries in a scooter–car collision on 11.07.2005 at Pulluvazhy Junction on the Muvattupuzha–Perumbavoor road. The car, owned by respondent 1 and insured by respondent 3, collided with him, leaving him hospitalized for 20 days. The MACT Tribunal partly allowed the petition, directing the third respondent insurer to pay Rs. 72,648 with interest and costs, while the other respondents stayed ex parte. The appellant challenged the quantum in the High Court, contending that the assessment of income (monthly earnings fixed at Rs. 15,631 after standard deductions), loss of earnings, medical treatment, and heads of compensation (bystander expenses, extra nourishment, pain and sufferings, loss of amenities) were inadequate. The respondents, including insurers, contested the quantum, with insurers emphasizing inconsistent proof and disputing the need for higher compensation, though the car’s driver was found negligent via Ext. A6. The High Court, while upholding negligence and denying permanent disability, enhanced the award by Rs. 20,000 across several heads and directed deposit with 8% interest, to be disbursed after deposit. The judgment ultimately provides partial relief to the appellant within the statutory framework of the Motor Vehicles Act.
This is MACA.No.100 of 2013 before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, challenging an award in OPMV 924/2008 (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Vadakara) under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellant, Ranjith K.K., sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 25.08.2008 while riding a motorcycle; the opposing driver (2nd respondent) allegedly drove rashly, causing a collision with the petitioner’s vehicle. The Tribunal awarded Rs.1,30,652 with interest at 7.5% per annum. The appellant contends the compensation is inadequate, particularly regarding income, permanent disability, and heads of damages. The appellant asserts the monthly income should be Rs.6,000 (not Rs.4,000) based on his pre-accident earning, citing Ramachandrappa to challenge the Tribunal’s assessment. Disability Ext. C1 shows 26.25% permanent disability, but the Tribunal assessed only 5% permanent disability. The court re-evaluates disability using Ext. C1, adopts a 26% disability and applies a multiplier of 16 (as reflected in Sarla Verma), leading to a recalculated compensation. It also re-assesses loss of earnings (Rs.18,000 for three months) and increases damages for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities. The court ultimately allows the appeal in part, awarding enhanced compensation of Rs.2,84,720 with interest at 7.5% from the petition date, directing payment within two months.
The four appellants—SOSAMMA ABRAHAM, KURUVILA ABRAHAM, BIJU KURUVILA, and GEORGE KURUVILA—who are the legal heirs of Abraham Kuruvila, challenge the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Pathanamthitta’s award of Rs.56,020 for a fatal/multifaceted injury claim arising from a 29.11.2003 accident. The Tribunal held the third respondent insurer not liable on the ground that the accident occurred in a place not defined as a public place under Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and thus not within liability under Section 147. The appellants contend that private premises where vehicles have access should be treated as a “public place” for the purposes of the Act, invoking Rajan v. John and later decisions (Parukutty, Hasna S.K.), urging purposive interpretation of the term “public place.” They also seek enhanced compensation based on the injured worker’s earnings and disability. The insurer resists, relying on policy conditions and contends the accident did not occur in a public place. The High Court accepts the purposive interpretation, finds that access to vehicles on private premises suffices to qualify as a public place, and thus insurer liability applies. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part, the award is enhanced to Rs.95,120, and the insurer is directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months, with appropriate court-fee adjustments. The decision also aligns with existing case-law on calculating loss of earnings and disability, applying Ramachandrappa for the mitigation of compensation.
This Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA No. 216 of 2013) arises from an enhanced compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, decided by the Kerala High Court. The original claimant, who sustained severe head injuries in a motorcycle accident on 06.01.2009, was treated in hospital and assessed with an 84% disability by a Medical Board, though the Tribunal had fixed 60%. The claimant died on 03.06.2014 while the appeal was pending, with his mother and others impleaded as next friends. The Tribunal had adopted a monthly income of Rs. 4,500 and, applying the accident-year approach, awarded limited compensation for permanent disability, loss of amenities and other heads. The appellants contended that the Tribunal erred by underestimating income (should be Rs. 6,000), failing to apply 25% future prospects, and not using a proper multiplier, which should be 18, given the injury-like nature of the loss and the claimant’s life expectancy. They also challenged the calculation of future bystander expenses (arguing for a multiplier-based compensation). The respondents argued the death occurred five years after the accident with no proven link to the accident, and that the disability head should be restricted by time and multiplier. The High Court, allowing the appeal, enhanced compensation by recalculating with Rs. 6,000 monthly income, 25% future prospects, 18 as multiplier, and 84% disability, and by adjusting bystander expenses per Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, while awarding 9% interest and directing deposit by the insurer. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned with a condition regarding interest.
Mahesh @ Appi, the third accused in SC 163/2010, challenges his conviction for offences under sections 302, 307 and 324 r/w 34 IPC along with two co-accused. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, hears the criminal appeal filed by the appellant challenging the validity of the proceedings and the conviction on the ground that he was a juvenile at the time of the offence (13 January 2008). The trial court had convicted all accused; Mahesh argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to try a juvenile, a point raised but not initially considered by the Sessions Court. In response to the admission, the court directed an age inquiry by the Dy. SP, DCRB, Thiruvananthapuram Rural, leading to records showing birth years of 1990–1991 from various sources (admission registers, birth certificates, hospital records). The majority discusses the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 ( JJ Act ) and its evolution, noting the replacement by the JJ Act, 2015 and the pertinent provisions, including Section 7A (inquiry when juvenility is raised) and the rules concerning age determination, documents that may be relied upon, and the transfer of juvenile offences to Juvenile Justice Boards. The Court ultimately holds the appellant to be a juvenile in conflict with law on the date of the crime, and finds the conviction and sentence void ab initio, directing release and appearance before the Juvenile Justice Board on 04 August 2021.
This High Court of Kerala appeal arises from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Kollam award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in OP(MV) No.211/2009. The appellants, Rajan and his parents Chandrika and Lekha (the latter recorded as the deceased’s sister; the parents have since died), sought enhanced compensation for the death of Raju in a motor-vehicle collision involving a tourist bus. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 3,24,000, and the insurer contested liability while the deceased’s parents pursued higher damages via MACA 893/2013. The learned Judge scrutinizes income, multiplier, and heads of compensation, relying on established precedents to grant a more favorable award to the appellants. The Court rejects an inflated income claim based on Ext.A7 as unreliable, but accepts the need to adjust for future prospects and increases the multiplier to 16 (per Sarla Verma) and aligns with Pranay Sethi principles for heads like loss of dependency, loss of consortium, loss of estate and funeral expenses. The final enhancement amounts to Rs. 6,54,600 with 7.5% interest, excluding prior amounts. The insurer is directed to deposit Rs. 3,786 as court fee and the balance amount in the third appellant’s name within two months. The appeal is partly allowed and remits the enhanced compensation accordingly.
WP(C).No.22573 of 2015(V) Air India Limited, a Government of India enterprise, operates passenger and freight air services. The first respondent, Ajith P. Balan, employed abroad, suffered a loss of employment allegedly due to flight cancellations and rebooking failures in May 2012 after Flight IX 481 was cancelled and AI 915 was rebooked to AI 929, which also did not reach on time. The Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Service) awarded Rs. 5,00,000 as compensation for the respondent’s claimed loss of employment, directing payment within two months with interest if unpaid. The petitioner challenged the award on grounds that there was no clear proof of the respondent’s permanent overseas employment or of loss of employment caused by the airline’s alleged negligence. The petitioner contended that alternative arrangements were made—30 passengers took AI-929 from Kochi to Riyadh and were transported onward—thereby negating liability, and that the decision was based on misappreciation of evidence since the respondent failed to prove salary or details of employment abroad. The High Court upheld the Lok Adalat award, holding that the Lok Adalat acted within its statutory remit under Chapter VI-A of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, and that the evidence supported the findings. The writ petition was dismissed, with Ext.P10 award preserved.
RFA Nos.101/2007 and 173/2007 These appeals arise from a partition suit (O.S. 598/2002) in the I Addl. Sub Court, Thrissur, involving nine siblings of late Luwis. Six sisters (Elsy, ThressiaKutty, Mary, Febiyola, Brijeetha and Jessy) claim their rightful shares in the plaint schedule property, while two brothers (Francis and Jose) seek to retain front portions under a will allegedly created by the father; Alphonsa and Jaseentha are other sisters involved with the defendants. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that disposition under Ext. B1 (the will) governed the property and left no scope for partition. The High Court reversed, holding Ext. B1 is not proven to be the last will and that the burden of proving execution and the absence of suspicious circumstances rests on the propounder, especially where there are genuine doubts about signing, attestation, and related documents. The judgment relies on established principles from H. Venkatachala Iyengar and subsequent Supreme Court authorities (Smt. Jaswant Kaur; Kalyan Singh; Ashutosh Seal) to emphasize that suspicious circumstances require cogent explanations. Consequently, the court holds the partition feasible and directs a nine-way division, assigning six shares to the plaintiffs and three to the defendants, with preliminary decree and final decree to follow. RFA 101/2007 is allowed; RFA 173/2007 is partly allowed in view of the reversed finding on Ext. B1.
RCRev. No. 146 of 2017 (D) This Kerala High Court Rent Control Revision judgment concerns two connected revisions challenging concurrent orders of the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Sections 12(1), 12(2) and 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The revision petitioner, Sadique, a tenant, challenges a detailed order (issued during the pendency of eviction proceedings) directing him to deposit arrears of rent at Rs. 5,000 per month from April 2014 and to continue depositing monthly rent, along with a separate order under Section 12(3) directing eviction upon non-deposit. The landlords' claim is that arrears pre-dated the petition and that deposit of admitted arrears is mandatory to maintain the case, with non-compliance leading to eviction. The tenant contends there is no admitted pre-litigation arrears, and that rent paid after the petition relates to post-petition liability not susceptible to an “admitted arrears” inquiry; he also disputes the landlord’s title and permanent tenancy status. The court discusses a two-limb construction of Section 12, the need to consider denial of title/permanent tenancy as a preliminary issue, and safeguards ensuring the tenant’s opportunity to show cause. Ultimately, the High Court sets aside the lower orders, remanding the matter to the Rent Control Court with a three-month timeline for expeditious disposal and a further instruction to consider the Section 12 petition within two weeks of receipt of the order.
This Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 1066 of 2017) before the Kerala High Court arises from a suit for permanent injunction filed by plaintiffs who claim title and possession over plaint schedule properties. The plaintiffs allege cultivation and enjoyment of lands by themselves and their predecessors, asserting they are not part of a vested private forest and that the defendants—the Forest Range Officer, Meppady, and the State of Kerala—have no rights over the land. The State's defense invokes the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (the Vesting Act), asserting the land is or may become private forest vested in the Government; it is argued that civil courts lack jurisdiction to decide such questions and that disputes must be settled by the Forest Tribunal under the Vesting Act. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, holding there was no sufficient proof of vested forest. On admission of substantial questions of law, the High Court analyzed the Vesting Act provisions (Sections 2(f), 3, 8(1), 13), jurisdictional barriers (Section 13), and the Tribunal’s exclusive competence under Section 8(1). The judgment ultimately holds that civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide whether land is a private forest or whether it has vested, and that the suit should be dismissed with liberty to approach the Forest Tribunal for redress. The High Court thus allows the appeal and sets aside the lower judgments, directing referral to the Tribunal.
This is a Kerala High Court Rent Control Revision (RCR 275 of 2017) arising from eviction proceedings under Sec. 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The tenant Moosa Vannathamkandiyil challenged an eviction order passed by the Rent Control Court, which was upheld in appeal by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (RCA 123/2015). The landlady, Remla Kakkamvelli Peedikayil, sought eviction on the ground of bona fide need to start a hotel in the petition schedule shop room. The Rent Control Court found the need bona fide and not hit by the first proviso to Sec. 11(3); it also held the second proviso inapplicable. The revision petition contended that the courts below failed to properly evaluate evidence under the first proviso, notably the landlady’s admission of another vacant room and her wealth/assets, which purportedly negate bona fide need. It was argued that the landlady’s husband runs a hotel in Bangalore, and she possesses other income sources, undermining the asserted need. The High Court, applying settled doctrine (Shamsudheen v. Balan Nair; Abdul Rub v. Jobby Tharian), held that other income sources do not necessarily negate bona fide need and that clerical explanations (Ext. B1/Ext.A4) were credible. The revision petition was dismissed, but the tenant was granted eight months to vacate upon conditions, including an affidavit and arrears deposit.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.MC No.534 of 2017) before Justice Alexander Thomas, challenging the cognizance in CC No.2831/2015 for an offence under Sec.138 NI Act. Accused No.3, the petitioner, contends that the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kozhikode, took cognizance without conducting the mandatory inquiry under Sec.202 Cr.P.C., and that the Anx.A complaint is not maintainable since the cheque was drawn on the company’s account with the first and second accused as directors, and the signature of accused No.3 is not present on the cheque. He argues that the amendment to Sec.202 Cr.P.C. (Central Act 25 of 2005) makes such inquiry obligatory when the accused resides outside the court’s jurisdiction, intended to prevent harassment from false complaints. The respondents advocate a pragmatic approach: in NI Act cases, Sec.202 inquiry is not strictly mandatory; the 200/204 Cr.P.C. framework can still permit proceeding after a prima facie case is found, emphasizing expeditious disposal of NI Act matters. The judgment surveys numerous authorities—Modern Denim, ASR Systems, Vijay Dhanuka, Udai Shankar Awasthi, Usha Sanghi, HDFC, and Calcutta/Punjab & Haryana line—distinguishing or endorsing various positions. Ultimately, the court dismisses the Crl.MC, holding that non‑compliance with Sec.202 does not ipso facto vitiate cognizance and that quashing is unwarranted at this stage.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.MC No.1612 of 2009) arising from a private complaint filed in CC 124/2008 in the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Changanacherry, alleging offences under IPC sections 323, 324, 326, 346, 454, 308, 294(b) and 506(ii). The petitioner, a former Circle Inspector of Police, challenges the cognizance taken by the Magistrate on the private complaint on grounds of (i) lack of any offence disclosed in the complaint, (ii) absence of sanction under Section 197 CrPC, and (iii) a plea of limitation under Kerala Police Act, 1960 Section 64(3). The Gist of the allegations is that in August 2004 police officers abused, assaulted, and detained the complainant at a police station, ultimately producing him before a Magistrate. The petitioner’s counsel relied on established precedents (Pukhraj, Sankaran Moitra, Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava) and on the test for Section 197 protection (three questions: what duty; what acts to perform; whether there is a reasonable connection to the duty). The court examined these authorities, concluding that the alleged act was in the discharge of official duty, cognizance without sanction was improper, and the private complaint and cognizance order were liable to be set aside. The petition was allowed, with Annexures A3 and A4 quashed and interlocutory applications closed.
OP (CAT).No. 4043 of 2013 (Z) This original petition challenges an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Ernakulam Bench) dated 25 February 2013 in OA 584 of 2011. The respondent/applicant, a Gramin Dak Sevak Mail Deliverer (GDSMD) from Parathode, Idukki, was upgraded to a Departmental Sub Office and posted as GDSBPM, Kozhimala, with a reduced TRCA (from 4820) to 2745. He sought protection of the TRCA (Time Related Continuity Allowance) at the higher rate. The Administrative Tribunal, relying on its Full Bench decision in OA 270 of 2006, allowed OA 584/2011, directing fixation of the TRCA at the maximum of the posted TRCA (4245) and allowing potential future enhancement, subject to workload. The petitioners challenged this order, arguing that the transfer and fixation were correctly determined and that the tribunal’s reliance on the Full Bench decision required scrutiny. The court, after noting the Writ petitions challenging the Full Bench decision and the Division Bench’s concurrence in upholding it, held that the impugned order did not warrant interference. It dismissed the original petition (OP CAT 4043/2013) and affirmed the Tribunal’s order as correct in law.
This Rent Control Revision arises from landlords Abdul Khader (also styled Abdul Rahman Kutty Puthuvatharathundiyil) and Nabeeza Beevi challenging an eviction order under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The Rent Control Court, Thiruvalla, had dismissed the petition, finding bona fide need but granting tenants protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3). The Rent Control Appellate Authority allowed eviction. The High Court, in a prior remand, directed a fresh consideration of the first and second provisos, and an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to determine the availability and suitability of other premises in the locality. The Commission reported additional buildings in the landlords’ possession: one about 2 km away in waterlogged condition and another about 250 meters away with six rooms, which the court found not suitable or not sufficiently explained for non-use. The appellate authority’s conclusion that the landlords failed to show special reasons under the first proviso and that tenants were not protected under the second proviso was affirmed. The petitioners challenged the decision, arguing non-disclosure should not negate bona fide need, while the respondent tenant relied on two precedents to justify denial of eviction under the first proviso and limitation of second proviso protection. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, preserving eviction and the appellate order.
Seven petitioners, former Vehicle Mechanics in the Border Roads Organisation's General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) at Pune, challenged their termination order issued in late 2011 under CCS (Temporary Service) Rules. After selection and four months of Pune-based training as part of induction to GREF, they were posted to various units. An enquiry into irregularities in recruitment for MT Drivers, Electricians and Vehicle Mechanics led to Ext.P2 termination orders, with one month pay in lieu, and subsequent movement orders sending petitioners home. They were terminated after about six months of service. The respondents opposed the petition on jurisdictional grounds under Article 226, arguing that the cause of action arose outside Kerala, where the orders were issued and where postings and terminations occurred, and that a similar view had been taken by Delhi and Madras High Courts in related matters. The petition relied on the option of Kerala High Court jurisdiction; however, the court relied on a Full Bench decision in Indian Maritime University v. Viswanathan to hold that no part of the cause of action arose within Kerala, so Article 226 relief is not maintainable here. The court noted a contrary view in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, but distinguished it as not applicable. The petition was dismissed without prejudice to pursuing remedies in the appropriate jurisdiction.
