The High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam heard a batch of writ petitions challenging the Government schemes that reserve routes for KSRTC and affect private sector operators of stage carriages under the Kerala Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The core dispute concerns Ext.P5 (Final Scheme, 14.07.2009) and Ext.P7 (Final Scheme, 23.03.2017), under which pre-9.5.2006 private permits could be renewed only if vacancies were not filled by KSRTC, and later rights in other classes were exclusively assigned to KSRTC. Ext.P9 (20.08.2015) granted Ordinary Limited Stop Services (OLSS) to operators denied renewal under Ext.P7, notwithstanding Clause 4 of Ext.P5. Draft Ext.P10 (08.02.2016) proposed to preserve private rights under Ext.P5 while allowing Ordinary or OLSS operation on saved permits; Draft Kmv Rules provisions were extended or amended (Ext.P11). Ext.P12 (15.03.2017) and Ext.P13 (23.03.2017) finalised amendments introduced a definition of Ordinary Limited Stop Service and a maximum distance rule (Rule 2(oa)) applicable to saved permits, altering the rights saved by Ext.P5. The petitioners contended that natural justice required that the final scheme or rule reflect the draft proposal with objections considered; the court agreed, holding that finalising a scheme with the distance restriction for saved permits without notice breached natural justice, quashing the clause and upholding the validity of Ext.P12. The appeals were dismissed.
WP(C).No. 17395 of 2018; WP(C).No. 17773 of 2018 These writ petitions challenge the Government order (2018) granting notional promotion to Mini George from 27.7.2012 and promoting Geetha N.S. as head teacher of Sankaramangalam Higher Secondary School, Kottarakkara. Mini George, who began as High School Assistant in 2000, argued for the promotion of the post-holder and for recognition of the 12-year qualification under Rule 44A, while Geetha N.S. challenged the government order on grounds that her leave without allowance should be reckoned toward continuous graduate service, that Mini George relinquished her right, and that there was delay in raising the claim. The court clarifies that minimum service for appointment as headmaster under Rule 44A requires 12 years of continuous graduate service, with the inclusive definition of graduate service under Explanation I to Rule 44A. It surveys several precedents (Sreedevi Amma; Nirmaladevi; Shaji Sanjayi Nottithodi; V.B. Prasad; Rajamma) to discuss whether leave without allowance or break in service can be counted toward continuous service or seniority. The court ultimately holds that the period of leave without allowance cannot be counted as part of continuous service to qualify for headmaster. It rejects Geetha N.S.’s challenge, allows Mini George’s writ, and directs notional promotion from 27.7.2012 with service count (except salary) and no recovery of salary already paid to Geetha N.S. The order dispenses with costs.
Fr. Joy Ullatil, Manager of Don Bosco College Sultan Bathery, petitioned under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a mandamus to compel the University of Calicut to consider Ext. P7 (additional affiliation for B.Sc Psychology) and Ext. P8 (affiliation for M.Sc Psychology) and to grant provisional affiliation for the academic year 2018-19. The University declined via a communication dated 14 May 2018 (Ext. P11), stating Exts. P8 and P9 could not be considered. The petitioner contends the University’s refusal is a mechanical exercise of power and violative of natural justice, urging that the university should provide a reasoned order in accordance with law. The judgment surveys a spectrum of jurisprudence on the necessity of speaking orders and reasons in quasi-judicial decisions. It cites Santu Thomas v. Joint Regional Transport Officer (2018 (1) KHC 437) to emphasize non-application of mind in a proforma order, Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, and Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandhas Bhanji, Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, and the principles from United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar and Krishna Swami v. Union of India on the centrality of reasons. The court notes that the university’s earlier actions (Exhs. P5–P6) show a pattern of discretionary decisions, yet directs a reasoned order on Exts. P8 and P9 strictly in accordance with law, with communication to the petitioner within 10 days of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, leaving other contentions open.
O.T.Rev.No.49 of 2016 & 77 of 2016 This is a Kerala High Court tax revision petition challenging the VAT/ CST assessment for AY 2005-06 and the KVATA Tribunal’s order in TA(VAT) No. 08/2015. The assessee, ITI Ltd., contends that inter-State sales occur on provisional bills with a final bill containing the full sale consideration, and that C-Forms furnished by the purchasing dealer relate to these provisional bills. They argue the sale is a composite transaction and the deferred payment is not a separate sale; thus, the concessional rate under Section 8 of the CST Act should apply. The respondent-State maintains that the statutory mandate requires strict compliance with the C-Form mechanism: a properly filled C-Form must be produced to the prescribed authority (AO), else the tax must be levied at the higher rate under Section 8(2) read with Section 8(1)/(4) and Rule 12, with Rule 8(4)(a) specifying the form and particulars. The AO, appellate authorities, and the Tribunal upheld the higher tax; the assessee cites Prestolite and Modern Proteins to argue C-Forms can be produced at any stage, but the Court finds these not applicable here. It relies on Indian Agencies (SC) for mandatory compliance and distinguishes other cases (Kedarnath Jute, Delhi Automobiles) to emphasize strict adherence, and cites Kochi Refineries to reject belated C-Form production. The High Court ultimately dismisses the revisions, upholding the Revenue’s position and tax demand, with costs against the assessee.
WP(C) No. 31339 of 2023 (and connected cases) The judgment concerns a batch of writ petitions challenging the e-tender process for auctioning Kuthaka rights of the Sabarimala Devaswom during the Mandala-Makaravilakku season for 1199 ME (2023-24). The primary petitioner, S. Vijayakumar, objects to Ext.P2 general conditions of the e-tender notification dated 24.08.2023, which conditioned eligibility on three years of IT returns and GST returns. Clauses of Ext.P2 include a disqualification regime for defaulters and blacklisted entities. Ext.P3, dated 21.09.2023, relaxed some eligibility criteria for Kuthaka items above Rs.20 lakhs and permitted re-tendering, which the petitioner alleges was improper as certain high bidders (respondents 5-8) did not meet the stricter prerequisites yet were allowed to participate and were declared successful bidders for items listed in Ext.P3. The petitions seek mandamus to re-tender all listed Kuthaka items, declare the relaxation illegal for those items, and quash Ext.P3 to the extent it fixed awards. The matter was heard on 06.10.2023, and the court disposed of the petitions by directing joint verification of highest bids for specific Kuthaka items, in the presence of petitioners and bidders, to assess eligibility, with re-tendering for non-conforming items. It also directs a future process for reevaluation and refund mechanisms where applicable.
This writ petition was filed by Shameena, an elected member of the Mampad Grama Panchayat, challenging an order issued by the first respondent to re conduct the election for the office of President of the Panchayat. The ground for challenge stems from alleged irregularities in the nomination of the third respondent Shifna Najeeb, who was allowed to correct her name despite a discrepancy in the record showing the exact name of a member. The Returning Officer initiated the election process with 19 members present; Shameena claimed misnaming and irregularities in the vote, and Ext P4 dated 31.03.2018 ordered a fresh election to be held on 12.04.2018. The petitioner contends that the writ petition can challenge the validity of election under Article 226, while the respondents contend that the remedy lies under Section 153(14) and 14A of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and that Article 243-O bars interference by courts in electoral matters. The court notes precedents including Jaspal Singh Arora v State of M.P. and Others (1998) 9 SCC 594, and Shailamma Isaac v Returning Officer (2014) 1 KLT 410, which support not entertaining such petitions under 226 and instead prescribing remedies under the Panchayat Act. Ultimately the court dismisses the writ petition, stating it is not maintainable, though it acknowledges ongoing interim proceedings and that the 12.04.2018 election was conducted as per Ext P4.
Mary Raichel, the petitioner in W.P.(C).No.34692 of 2023, an accused in Crime No. 2199/2023 of Thoppumpady Police Station, Kochi, seeks mandamus-style relief to compel action on Exhibit P3 (her representation) and to ensure a summarized investigation report of the FIR and FIS. She also prays that the 3rd respondent appoint an officer not below Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate the case, and asks for dispensation from translating vernacular documents. After hearing both sides, the learned Judge expresses the core issue: whether the investigating agency can be changed at the instance of the accused. The court anchors its decision on established jurisprudence, citing Romila Thapar v. Union of India and Others (2018 KHC 6761) and earlier decisions that an accused has no control over which agency investigates, or on how investigations are conducted. The cited authorities emphasize that the accused cannot dictate the mode or the agency of investigation, and that High Courts should not routinely substitute or direct investigation by other agencies such as the CBI. The judgment also reiterates that the extraordinary power to direct an investigation by a different agency must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, to preserve credibility of the process and protect fundamental rights. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. Notably, while Article 226 and Article 32 allow protection of fundamental rights, they do not entitle the petitioner to rewrite the investigative framework.
This Article 226 writ petition by Rasheeda (with reference to her sister Suhara in earlier related matters) challenges the continued occupation and use of land leased under Ext. P1 to Burmah Shell/BPCL, at Kalamassery, Ernakulam. The lease, dated 13 July 1964, provided for a 20-year term with renewal options; the initial term expired by 1984, but BPCL (successor to the lessee) continued to operate a petrol station on 14.825 cents of Rasheeda’s land. Rasheeda seeks eviction and surrender of possession within a timeframe fixed by the court, and a writ of mandamus directing payment of damages for wrongful use of the land from the date of filing the petition, originally claimed as Rs. 2,00,000 per month. The petition touches long-running litigation over fixity of tenure under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Section 106), and the validity and applicability of related statutory mechanisms under the Burmah Shell/Caltex acquisition regime (Acquisition of Undertakings in India Act, 1976; Caltex Act, 1977, Sections 5 and 7). BPCL contends it is entitled to fixity of tenure and that disputed questions of fact require civil proceedings and reference to a Land Tribunal. The court, relying on Dolly Das and related precedents, held writ relief appropriate, directed eviction by 31 December 2018, and ordered payment of rent due under Ext. P1 within three months, while leaving damages claims to be determined in appropriate fora.
P. Ravindran, the petitioner, held licences to operate two catering stalls at Ernakulam Junction Railway Station (TVC/080 on Platform 2/3 and TVC/082 on Platform 4/5). Though the licences were to run for five years, extensions were granted. The petitioner sought renewal of TVC/082 and asked that it be renewed without participating in Exhibit P5/tender proceedings, while opposing the tender for the stall. After the petitioner’s death during the proceedings, his legal heirs were impleaded and relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, South Central Railways & Others v. S.C.R. Caterers, Dry Fruits, Fruit Juicestalls Welfare Association & Another (2016) 3 SCC 582, and on Railway Board Exhibit P6 (Circular) directing renewal for licencees with only one licence. Respondents contended the petitioner was not entitled to the apex court benefit since he held two licences, had misconduct findings, the renewal committee rejected renewal, and the extended licence expired on 31-12-2016; auction was conducted for TVC/082. The court relied on earlier Kerala High Court judgments (Exhibits P1, P2) and held that continuance cannot be granted to heirs where the licensee held two units. The writ petition was dismissed, with no extension or deferral of tender found warranted, upholding the auction process and financial viability considerations.
This Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA No.2429 of 2013) arises from a claim petition filed by the legal heirs of Gangadharan who died in a motor vehicle accident on 31-07-2000 when he was riding a bicycle on National Highway 47. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) Kollam awarded Rs.1,22,000 with interest at 9% per annum. The appellants contend for higher compensation, arguing that (i) the deceased’s age and date of birth were not proved but he was over 65, thus a higher multiplier should apply; (ii) the monthly income should be Rs.6,000 rather than Rs.2,000, as claimed in the petition; (iii) the deduction towards personal and living expenses should follow the Sarala Varma principle; (iv) cremation of heads of compensation like funeral expenses and loss of estate; (v) higher sums for loss of consortium per Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh. The court holds that exact age was not proven, so the general rule for age over 65 yields a multiplier of 5. It approves fixing monthly income at Rs.3,500 (noted as earning capacity). On dependency, guided by Sarala Varma, the deduction should be 50% rather than 25%, resulting in Rs.1,05,000 for loss of dependency (3500×12×5/2). The court applies Pranay Sethi’s framework for additional heads of compensation: loss of consortium, funeral expenses, and loss of estate, and, noting that Rajesh is no longer binding, fixes an additional Rs.65,000 as enhanced compensation (with 8% interest from petition date) payable by the insurer. The appeal is allowed and the insurer directed to deposit the enhanced amount within a month. No costs."
Mat.Appeal No. 415 of 2009 Govindan Embranthiri, the husband, filed Mat.Appeal No. 415 of 2009 challenging an order of the Family Court Kalpetta in OP 12/2007, which dismissed his petition under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act for annulment of the marriage on the ground that the respondent Sujatha concealed a mental illness and obtained consent by fraud. The marriage was solemnised on 21 April 2006. The petitioner alleged that after marriage the respondent displayed abnormal behavior, slept throughout the day, and that she had been under psychiatric treatment since 2001, including hospitalization at PVS Hospital, Calicut, for bipolar mood disorder, with medical records (Ext. A2, A3) showing ongoing treatment up to the marriage. The respondent denied allegations of mental illness or fraud, and contended the petition was not maintainable and that suppression of facts was not proven. The trial court found no serious mental illness warranting annulment and dismissed the petition. The High Court, on appeal, held that Section 12(1)(c) permits annulment where consent to marriage was obtained by fraud or suppression of material facts relating to the respondent’s mental condition, and that the evidence established suppression, that the petitioner did not condone the fraud, and that the marriage should be declared null and void. The appeal was allowed; the Family Court’s order was set aside; OP 12/2007 allowed; marriage declared null and void with a decree for nullity and costs.
Mary, Jogy, Joshy and Julie (appellants) challenged the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Thrissur’s award in OP(MV) No.53/2005 for the death of Joy alias Ouseph in a bus accident on 30.9.2004. The MACT awarded ₹3,36,750 with 8% interest from the petition date. The High Court, in a 6 July 2017 judgment, allowed the appeal and re‑assessed compensation. The court acknowledged the lack of proof of occupation and income but held the deceased’s monthly income could be fixed notionally in light of Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. and, considering the accident year and the deceased’s age (56), set a notional monthly income of ₹4,500. While recognizing the Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh ratio on future prospects, the court warned that such an addition cannot be claimed as a matter of right due to the absence of proof of occupation, yet proceeded to apply a 15% uplift for future prospects for calculating dependency. With these adjustments, the loss of dependency was recalculated, applying the appropriate multiplier and deducting 1/4 for personal expenses to yield ₹4,19,175, from which the tribunal’s ₹2,43,000 was subtracted, granting ₹1,76,175 as additional compensation. The Court also enhanced awards under heads like loss of love and affection, loss of consortium, pain and suffering, extra nourishment, clothing and funeral expenses (totaling ₹2,72,575 as additional compensation with 8% interest). The 3rd respondent (insurer) is to deposit this amount within two months; no costs were awarded.
This High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam, heard RCRev. No. 328 of 2015 against an order in RCA 201/2012 (Addl. District & Sessions Court, Vadakara) and RCP 20/2011 (Munsiff Court, Nadapuram). The landlord-petitioner challenged concurrent findings dismissing eviction petitions under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Control Court had rejected the landlord’s bonafide need to evict the tenant from the petition schedule shop to start hill produce business, while the Appellate Authority confirmed dismissal on 11(3) grounds but considered additional questions. The landlord argued that financial stringency, coupled with a genuine need, justified eviction and that subsequent vacancy of other rooms in the building could be relevant, citing Valsan v. Furtal and apex court precedents that the crucial date for bonafide need is the date of filing, with subsequent events potentially altering the outcome. The tenant denied sub-letting and argued that mere presence of the second respondent in the premises is not proof of sub-lease. The High Court, after hearing, held that there is no ground to interfere with concurrent findings and dismissed the revision petition, affirming the appellate order and confirming eviction denial under both sections. The order concludes with no costs.”
Mat.Appeal Nos. 832, 833, 834 of 2009 and 77 of 2010 These appellate appeals arise from a common judgment of the Family Court, Alappuzha in OP(Div) No. 5/2005 and OP Nos. 947/2005 and 523/2006. The appellants, Kochurani Chacko and her three children (Stephy Maria Jacob, Subin Muchael Jacob, and Arantax Margarita Jacob) challenged the Family Court’s dissolution of the marriage with K.M. Chackochen, the respondent-husband, as well as orders regarding title, possession of petition schedule properties, and maintenance. The respondent contested the maintenance and the custody/possession outcomes. The Family Court dissolved the marriage under grounds of cruelty and desertion, and decreed various reliefs: declaration of title to two pieces of property, recovery of possession, and maintenance for the wife and four children (₹1,000 per month for each petitioner), with arrears amounting to ₹1,44,000 for past maintenance and a right to reside in the shared household until satisfaction of decrees. It also directed the husband to pay ₹2 lakh and value of 50 sovereigns of gold ornaments. The High Court, while dismissing three of the appeals, partly allowed Mat.Appeal 832/2009 by extending maintenance: the four children (including the wife) are entitled to maintenance until marriage or self-sufficiency, with the second petitioner restricted until majority (later overridden by the broader principle). The Court affirmed divorce on cruelty and upheld the financial relief, including the jewelry and cash sums, within the constraints of the evidence. The judgment engages with evolving jurisprudence on maintenance for daughters, irretrievable breakdown notions, and Article 44 of the Constitution, but ultimately consolidates relief suitable to the parties’ circumstances.
MACA Nos. 1312 & 1314 of 2013 These are two Motor Accidents Claims Appeals challenging the MACT award dated 14.01.2013 in O.P.(M.V.) Nos. 714/2011 and 715/2011. The accident occurred on 30.08.2009 when a car (KL 36A 3420) allegedly struck the petitioners near Pottanchira Junction. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 61,945 in O.P.(M.V.) No.714 and Rs. 2,50,980 in O.P.(M.V.) No.715, with 7.5% interest from the date of petition. The appellants argued that the quantum was inadequate across several heads and that medical expenses were not properly reimbursed. The High Court, hearing the appeals jointly, upheld liability but scrutinized the quantum. It dismissed MACA 1312 (mother-petitioner) while allowing MACA 1314 (16-year-old claimant) with substantial enhancements. The court applied a notional monthly income approach for the minor, and, under Section 168 MV Act, directed a 50% addition to income for calculating permanent disability, yielding an enhanced disability compensation of Rs. 1,74,960 (replacing the Tribunal’s Rs. 1,16,640). It also increased compensation for loss of marriage prospects in light of a Supreme Court decision (Rs. 1,50,000). The final order awards an additional Rs. 2,23,920 (rounded to Rs. 2,25,000) with 8% interest, directs deposit by the insurer within two months, and awards no costs. In sum, one appeal failed, the other was substantially rewarded with enhanced damages.
O.P.(Crl.) No.463 of 2017 The petitioner, Hamsa, the defacto complainant in C.C. No.70/2012 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, approached the Kerala High Court seeking directions to the police to produce CW3 to CW5 and to expedite disposal of the case, alleging repeated delays due to non-procurement or non-service of witnesses. The trial had begun in June 2016, but from September 2016 onward it was adjourned because witnesses were not produced, with alleged dereliction of duty by the Central Police Station, Kochi. The Court noted that interim orders allowed witness examination and accepted that the grievance subsisted in part, but the broader issue is the systemic delay in criminal justice. The Judge canvassed a battery of Supreme Court authorities emphasizing the constitutional right to a speedy trial under Article 21 and the duty to avoid delays, citing Hussain, Antulay, Noor Mohammed, Imtiyaz Ahmad, Anita Kushwaha, and Ex. Captain Harish Uppal among others. In response, the Court directed the State Police Chief to issue a comprehensive circular addressing service of summons, execution of warrants, maintenance of process registers, and cross-jurisdictional service, including OSU/OSPU mechanisms and a Foreign Process Liaison Cell, while recognizing the Government circulars and past guidelines. The petition was ultimately disposed of, but with a mandate to meticulously implement the circulars; no further relief was granted to the petitioner given that witnesses had been examined during interim orders.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal arising from a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, relating to a fatal road traffic accident on 20-06-2006 involving a tempo traveller driven rashly by the first respondent, resulting in the death of Vasudevan, aged 31. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 6,04,000 as compensation but deducted 25% on account of alleged contributory negligence by the deceased. The appellants challenged this reduction, arguing that Ext. A5 charge-sheet (against the tempo driver for offences under IPC 279, 337, 304A) establishes negligence and that reliance on Ext. A2 scene mahazar to infer negligence was improper, especially since no direct evidence was adduced. The respondents contended that the deceased contributed to the accident and that the scene evidence justified 25% share of negligence. The Kerala High Court examined whether the charge-sheet can be treated as prima facie evidence and whether the scene mahazar can standalone prove negligence. It held that the charge-sheet should be given primacy and that there was no credible evidence of the deceased’s contributory negligence. The court then enhanced the compensation using Sarala Verma and Pranay Sethi principles, recalculating income, applying the multiplier, and granting additional heads (loss of consortium, funeral, loss of estate, love and affection) with interest. The appeal was disposed of in favor of the appellants, setting aside the 25% deduction and directing enhanced compensation.
This High Court of Kerala, Division Bench comprising Justices C.K. Abdul Rehim and K.P. Jyothindranath, heard MACA No. 42 of 2009 against a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award in OP(MV) 457/2004 arising from a December 18, 2003 accident that killed Luckose, aged 40, a BSNL employee. The Tribunal awarded Rs 7,44,408 in compensation to the wife Aleyamma Luckose and her two minor children, who were appellants. The appellants challenged the quantum on multiple grounds. They contended that the Tribunal incorrectly treated Ext. A7 salary as Rs 4,677 instead of the actual take‑home Rs 8,105; that it failed to include future prospects and used a reduced multiplier of 13 instead of the correct 15 for a 40-year-old deceased; and that several heads, including loss of consortium, loss of love and affection, and funeral expenses, were inadequately awarded. The respondents argued that the award was reasonable and sufficient. The High Court allowed the appeal in part. Relying on Sarla Varma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, it held that the multiplier should be based on the deceased’s age, added 30% for future prospects, and performed adjustments to heads such as loss of life and loss of estate. The overall enhancement amounted to Rs 8,84,000, with final apportionment 50:25:25 and directions for deposit within two months, and no costs award.
This is a criminal revision petition under section 397 read with section 399 of the CrPC challenging an order rejecting delay condonation under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the consequent dismissal of the complaint. The complainant initially filed a cheque-bounce complaint on 8.3.2013 before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam. After the Supreme Court’s directions in Dasarath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129, the complaint was returned on 10.12.2014 for re-presentation before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Aluva. Due to delays and transitions between courts, the delay condonation application was dismissed on 26.6.2015, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint on delay grounds. The petitioner relied on Binoy K. Mathew v. Godley Dev John & anr. (2015) 4 KHC 243 (DB) and the amended NI Act provisions (Sec. 142(2) and Sec. 142A) to argue the proper territorial jurisdiction and retroactive application of the amendments. The court also cites Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. v. Inderpal Singh (2016) 2 SCC 75 to support the interpretation of where a cheque is delivered for collection and the relevant territorial jurisdiction. The High Court ultimately allows the revision, sets aside the delay dismissal, and directs re-presentation in the original forum within a specified 30-day period, with transfer to the proper court if required by Sec.142(2).
Criminal Misc. Case No. 4118 of 2016 before the Kerala High Court concerns a private complaint filed by the 3rd respondent against three family members alleging that they formed a trust, misused papers, forged a resignation document and executed related transactions through a trust running a teacher's training college, a B.Ed. college, and an auditorium. The petitioners (1st to 3rd accused) contend that Crime No. 15/2016 of the Kanjiramkulam Police Station does not disclose any triable offence, constitutes harassment, and is time-barred under Section 468 Cr.P.C.; accordingly, they seek quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The 3rd respondent argues that the allegations amount to forgery and related offences and that, at this embryonic stage, the investigation should not be stifled. The court scrutinized the complaint and annexures (I–X), as well as authorities relied upon by both sides, including decisions on the inherent powers of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings. While acknowledging the existence of an inherent power, the court held that it would exercise restraint at this preliminary stage and that the materials do not, on their face, show there is no triable offence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, allowing the investigation to proceed and rejecting quashment at this stage.
