WP(C).No.26675 of 2011 (H) This writ petition challenges Exhibit P4, a gratuity payment order which recovers Rs. 1,23,479 from the petitioner's DCRG as unsettled portion of a medical advance. The petitioner had been sanctioned Rs 1,30,000 on 25 February 2006 for a coronary bypass operation for her husband. The surgery occurred on 24 February 2006, and Rs 1,30,000 was disbursed on 6 March 2006. The unspent Rs 6,521 was refunded on 27 June 2006. The petitioner submitted bills for Rs 1,23,479 and sought reimbursement; no final orders were passed on the reimbursement claim. Upon retirement on 31 March 2011, the 2nd respondent issued Exhibit P4 to recover Rs 1,23,479 from the petitioner’s DCRG as an unsettled medical-advance liability. The petitioner contends that recovery of the entire amount after more than five years, without quantification, is illegal and unwarranted. The respondents argue that the medical advance was an interest-free loan subject to conditions: utilization within three months, adjustment against the final claim within six months, with any balance recovered from salary and any unadjusted balance recovered from the DCRG. The court finds that the final medical claim had not been settled and liabilities had not been quantified; thus the entire amount cannot be recovered from the DCRG. It directs expeditious final determination within two months, hearing on the petition, and release of any amounts due, with further proceedings contingent on the final order.
WP(C).No. 21117 of 2016 (L) The petitioner, a 100% visually impaired candidate with LLB and NET qualifications, challenged denial of her appointment as Lecturer/Assistant Professor in Law at Kannur University. Ext.P-3 (29.01.2008) invited candidates for a disability-reserved post; she contends she was eligible for age relaxation under G.O.(P) 158/73/PD (29.05.1973) and for the physically disabled quota, in line with the Central Act on Disabilities (Sec. 32, 33) and Article 12 of the Constitution. The university ultimately appointed an open candidate, and rejected the petitioner on age grounds while she was the sole reserved-category applicant. The learned Single Judge (Ext.P-7, 2015) held that G.O. 158/73/PD applies to age relaxation for university service; the Division Bench (Ext.P-8, 2015) affirmed. The matter was remitted for fresh consideration; Ext.P-10, however, rejected the petitioner as unsuitable due to disability. The petitioner argues that the post has been identified as suitable for physically disabled candidates and that selection must be fair, transparent, and guided by objective merit, not disability-based bias. The court ultimately quashes Ext.P-10, remits the matter to the selection committee for fresh consideration, directs a six-week timeline to complete the process, and calls for framing objective norms for future selections, while maintaining interim relief as needed.
Crl.A.Nos.114 & 135 of 2004 This is a criminal appeal arising out of S.C.No.314/2003, Thrissur, involving four accused charged under sections 489(B) and 489(C) read with 34 IPC for possessing counterfeit currency notes near the Vadakkumnatha temple, Thrissur. Accused 1 and 2 were convicted by the Third Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc) for 489(B) and 489(C) with different sentences; accused 3 and 4 were acquitted. On appeal, the Kerala High Court, in a common judgment, partly allowed the appeals. The court held that mere possession of counterfeit notes is not automatically punishable under 489(B); knowledge or reasons to believe the notes are forged and an intention to use or distribute them as genuine must be proved (citing Gafoor; Vijayan; Hashim). The court found the prosecution’s evidence sufficient to uphold the 489(C) conviction but concluded that the conviction under 489(B) could not be sustained and set it aside, acquitting the appellants of that charge. The court modified the sentence for 489(C) to two years’ rigorous imprisonment with fines (Rs. 10,000 each) and provided for set-off for detention. It also discussed admissibility of Ext.P9 (expert report) under sections 292/293 IPC and various precedents on mens rea, possession, and the inference of knowledge from circumstances. The overall result is that the appeals are allowed in part, with the 489(B) conviction set aside and 489(C) conviction affirmed but with modified sentencing.
WP(C).No. 20537 of 2015 (N) The petitioner, a member of the respondent Bank, challenges the admission of the second respondent as a member in 1986 on the ground that he was a minor. Exhibits P2 (School Leaving Certificate) and P3 (Aadhaar) are relied upon to show his birth date, making him under 18 at admission. The petitioner contends that Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act prohibits membership before eighteen, and Rules 16(3) and 16(4) provide a remedial mechanism. He argues that if the disqualification is ab initio, all acts of the second respondent as President could be nullified and the matter must be adjudicated by the managing committee, not the Joint Registrar. The second respondent, now long-serving President, is said to have attained majority soon after admission and continued as a member for about thirty years; the petitioner claims lack of bona fides and seeks to set aside the Joint Registrar’s order (Exhibit P8). The Government pleader and counsel for the second respondent assert age is not in dispute and that the remedy lies under Rule 16. The court finds that Exhibit P8 is ultra vires and that the managing committee is the competent forum to adjudicate ab initio ineligibility. It directs the petitioner to approach the managing committee, excluding the second respondent, for an independent decision, and disposes of the petition.
WP(C).No. 17594 of 2015 (Y) Arunkumar P.S. and Dimple K. @ Dimple Baby (petitioners) approached the Kerala High Court seeking a mandamus to absorb and regularize them in permanent posts in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) at the Kolenchery branch. They allege engagement since 23 October 2008 as daily-wage workers, with initial postings as a junior assistant and a sweeper, and claim ongoing, regularized service supported by documents and certificates. Their prayer for absorption rests on the premise that they are qualified and have served continuously, contending that disengagement after filing the writ petition amounts to unfair labour practice under Section 25T, punishable under Section 25U of the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act). They rely on Supreme Court judgments, including Civil Appeals No. 6915 of 2009 and connected cases (decided 18 March 2015), to support regularization claims. The respondents counter that LIC’s temporary staff are selected under LIC’s Employment of Temporary Staff Instructions, 1993, and that casual daily-wage workers have no right to regularization; remedies lie under the ID Act and not in Article 226. They also cite the Umadevi decision to discourage blanket regularization. The Court disposed of the petition, directing that the ID Act procedures be pursued, and that petitioners may continue in their present roles pending disengagement, with preference to experienced temporary staff where applicable.
WP(C).No. 21314 of 2016 (L); WP(C).No. 24609 of 2016 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited challenged a reassessment notice under Section 25(1) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for the assessment year 2005-06, arguing it was issued beyond the five-year limitation and that the extension provisions under Section 25B could not revive a time-barred initiation. The court first clarifies the statutory framework: Section 25(1) obliges the Assessing Authority to determine escaped turnover within five years from the last date of the year to which the return relates, but does not prescribe a fixed period for completing the assessment itself. Relying on Cholayil Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) (FB), the Full Bench explained that the mandate is to proceed to determine by issuing notice within the period, not necessarily to complete the assessment within that period. The court discusses Tirur Medical Stores (Division Bench) and ultimately rules that Section 25B extends only the period for completion, not the initiation. It cites State of Punjab v. Shreyans Indus Ltd. to illustrate that extending time for assessment enlarges the period of limitation but cannot revive actions beyond expiry. The outcome: WP(C) No.21314/2016 is allowed (Ext.P8 set aside for being beyond the limitation), and WP(C) No.24609/2016 is disposed of with observations; no costs.
WP(C).No. 25413 of 2013 (B) This writ petition (WP(C).No.25413 of 2013) concerns a dispute within St. Peter's and St. Pauls Orthodox Syrian Church, Kolencherry, where parishioners (petitioners) seek police protection to enable the 4th respondent, the Vicar, to conduct religious services despite factional opposition from respondents 5–9. The petition relies on the civil suit O.S.43/2007, which was dismissed but later affirmed on appeal by the High Court in R.F.A.655/2011 (and related proceedings), and on what petitioners describe as the 1934 church constitution (validity and applicability) and the udampadi No.13/12/1088 M.E. The petition contends that the two rival factions have already had their rights settled by the apex court’s decisions in PMA Metropolitan’s case (AIR 1995 SC 2001) and Moran Mar Baselious Marthoma Mathews II v. State of Kerala (2003 (1) KLT 780). Respondents 5–7 acknowledge the Supreme Court matter but claim ongoing challenges and that both factions are already conducting services separately. The State and police are urged to provide protection to allow peaceful worship. The court, after hearing arguments, holds that once a Civil Court has decided the 4th respondent’s right to conduct services, all parties are bound by it, and directs police to ensure peaceful conduct and to remove obstruction on demand, while noting the pending Supreme Court proceedings.
WP(C) Nos. 37436 of 2003; 25318 & 26373 of 2015; 11438 of 2016 This batch of writ petitions before the Kerala High Court concerns Muslim personal law, particularly the practice of talaq (including triple talaq) and its consequences under Muslim divorce law, as well as its impact on related civil matters such as maintenance and passport changes. Justice A. Muhammed Mustaque undertakes a comprehensive examination of whether unilateral triple talaq accords with Qur’anic injunctions, classical Islamic jurisprudence, and the Indian Constitution. The court surveys Qur’anic verses, Hadith, and later scholarly works to contend that triple talaq in one utterance is not supported by the Qur’an and has been discouraged by both historic and modern jurists; it underscores the need for reform within Islamic law and for state-level codification to protect women’s rights. While recognizing religious freedom, the judgment argues that personal law can and must evolve in harmony with constitutional guarantees, maslahah (public welfare), and ijtihad (independent reasoning). The court does not strike down religious practice outright but suggests that the State pursue reform through legislation and codified rules, addressing disparities revealed by empirical studies. The Reliefs reflect a measured approach: one petition is dismissed for lack of a direct challenge to the law, while the others are disposed with a roadmap for reform and interim administrative directions, including passport updates and registration considerations.
WP(C).No. 20029 of 2016 (C) The petitioner, Bibin K. Ramakrishnan, proprietor of Kunnathukudy Cement Products, approached the Kerala High Court seeking police protection to enable him to continue loading and unloading activities at his small-scale unit with registered headload workers. The workers were issued identity cards under Rule 26A of the Kerala Headload Workers Rules (Exts. P2(a)-(c)). Respondents, including three unions (R3–R5) and police authorities, contended that the identity cards pertained to Nellikkuzhy Panchayath and not to Kottappady; an appeal filed by the unions before the District Labour Officer was pending. The court examined the statutory framework for headload workers and relied on the Division Bench decision in Jnana Prakasam v. Natarajan (2002 (1) KLT 39), which clarifies the attached/unattached worker distinction: Column (6) refers to attached workers, while Column (7) relates to unattached workers, with the establishment name being decisive for attached workers. The court found that Exts. P2(a)-(c) establish that the workers are employed by the petitioner and are entitled to work at his establishment. Accordingly, it granted police protection to enable the petitioner to employ the workers without obstruction, while noting that the respondents’ appeal could proceed on merits. The judgment thus directs protective action and preserves the right to pursue the pending appeal.
This writ petition (WP(C) No. 26701 of 2008) challenges Ext. P9, a State Information Commission order directing the petitioner, K.P. Jayarajan (Controller of Examinations, Kannur University), to personally appear and show cause for possible punishment under section 20 RTI Act, 2005. The 3rd respondent, as President of Kannur University Staff Organisation, filed Ext. P1 under RTI seeking information about alleged loss/destruction of degree certificates, including U.O. notes, despatch files, and related records (EG I/II sections, note files, and enquiry reports). The petitioner argued there was no information to furnish since the university had no such records; he asserted that the 3rd respondent filed the RTI application in a personal capacity, while RTI sec. 3(2) requires information to be sought by a citizen. He relied on Louis Mathew v. State Information Commissioner to contend that information available on record only should be furnished, and nonfurnishing based on non-existent files should not trigger penal action under sec. 20. The court noted the absence of prior notice and that Ext. P9 directed personal appearance without sufficient basis. It held that no information existed to be furnished, quashed Ext. P9, and disposed of the writ petition. The matter highlights issues of information availability, citizen entitlement, and the proper exercise of RTI enforcement powers by the Commission.
Arb.A. Nos.65/2012, 66/2012, 1/2013 and 4/2013 These four Arbitration Appeals arise from four references to arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1940, concerning the extension of a BG railway line project and related work carried out by Southern Railway contractors. The Arbitrator, Chief Engineer/Workshop Head, Southern Railway, awarded certain sums in awards dated 10.02.2011, which were filed in court on 29.03.2011. The Railways filed four applications under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to set aside these awards on 06.07.2011. The Sub Court, Alappuzha, dealt with petitions under Section 17 (for passing decrees in terms of the awards) and Section 30, and separately addressed the Railways’ challenge to the awards. The main disputed issue was whether the Railways’ challenge was time-barred under Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, considering whether notice of filing of the award had been served. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court concluded that the petitions by the Union of India and others were time-barred, holding that limitation commenced from the date of filing of the award in court as communicated to the parties (notice). On merits, the Court did not find the arbitrator to have acted with misconduct or to have exceeded jurisdiction, and it upheld the awards. The Appeals are dismissed. The decision emphasizes the primacy of timely challenge to arbitral awards under the 1940 Act and clarifies notice as a triggering event for limitation."
This Kerala High Court judgment relates to four ITA appeals (ITA Nos. 2, 6, 30 and 31 of 2017) arising from orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal concerning the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for AY 2010-11 and 2011-12. The primary issue is whether the respondent bank qualifies as a ‘co-operative bank’ eligible for the 80P deduction. The Tribunal had denied the deduction and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for reconsideration in light of the bank’s alleged status as a State Land Development Bank under NABARD Act, 1981, rather than a cooperative bank. The appellant Revenue contends that the assessee does not meet the statutory definition of a cooperative bank, and that 80P(4) excludes banks that function as ordinary banks under banking regulation. The respondent bank asserts it is a cooperative entity providing credit to its members and cites precedents such as Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Citizen Co-operative Society Ltd. to advocate a liberal interpretation of 80P, along with the Madras High Court dictum affirmed by the Supreme Court. The High Court acknowledges these precedents, notes the conflicting findings in the assessee’s own case (ITA 103/2011) and relevant Kerala judgments, and ultimately remands all four appeals to the Tribunal for decision afresh in light of law and the cited authorities.
W.P.(C) Nos.17165, 17610 & 18020 of 2016 These writ petitions challenge Circular No.3/2009 issued by the Transport Commissioner, Kerala, which directed that Trade Certificates for motor vehicles could be issued or renewed only to dealers authorized directly by the manufacturer, and that sub-dealers could operate only under Form 21 through the authorized dealer. The petitioners, Yamaha Sub Dealers Association of Kerala and K. Mohanan Nair, contended that the circular encroaches upon the statutory framework of the Motor Vehicles Act, Central Motor Vehicles Rules and Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules by dictating quasi-judicial decisions normally entrusted to Registering Authorities under Rule 35 CMVR. They argued that the primary and appellate authorities—Registering Authorities and the Transport Commissioner—exercise quasi-judicial powers and must act independently; circulars from a superior authority that alter or pre-empt such adjudication undermine the statutory hierarchy and violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The Transport Commissioner contends Rule 405 of the KMV Rules empowers him to issue circulars to guide the department, and that the circular provides a proper meaning to 'bonafide dealer' and prevents misuse by sub-dealers. After hearing, the judge holds that the power under Rule 35 is quasi-judicial and must be exercised free from interdicting directives. Circular 03/2009 is thus arbitrary and illegal. The petitions are allowed to the extent of quashing the circular, with a caveat that authorities may continue to function under the Act and Rules. The judgment reaffirms the independence of quasi-judicial bodies and the supremacy of statutory rules.
WP(C).No.19854 of 2016 (F) This writ petition, filed by twenty registered auto-rickshaw owners in Kasaragod district, challenges the restrictive conditions imposed in their contract carriage permits (Exts. P21 to P40), which allegedly limit plying within the town area. The petitioners contend the restrictions are illegal fetters on their livelihood and the right to operate their vehicles in the town. They list the vehicles by registration numbers to emphasize the breadth of impact. The petition relies on a line of decisions including Rajesh v. Secretary, RTA (2014 (3) KLT 341), arguing that the Motor Vehicles Act does not authorize statutory authorities to impose such area-based restrictions; under Section 74(3)(a) only the State Government can issue area-limiting notifications. The respondents’ counsel (Government Pleader) counters the need for regulatory controls to ensure orderly traffic, public safety, and to align with urban planning considerations. The judge carefully examines whether authorities possess power to incorporate permit stipulations restricting operations in city limits, citing prior jurisprudence. Ultimately, the court accepts the petitioners’ premise and, relying on Rajesh and related precedents, directs that petitioners’ applications for variation of permits concerning halting stations, parking and passenger pickup be considered within three weeks, with a decision within one month after hearing. The writ is allowed, subject to compliant variation procedures.
WP(C).No. 16913 of 2016 (L) This writ petition (WP(C).No. 16913 of 2016) before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam concerns 16 petitioners who operate autorickshaws in Kasaragod district. Each petitioner holds a certificate of registration (Exts.P1–P16) and several contract carriage permits (Exts.P17–P32), all subject to the condition that the vehicles shall not park or pick up passengers within the City. The petitioners seek a variation of these permit conditions to enable pickup and parking within the city limits. They rely on a precedent set by Rajesh v. Secretary, RTA (2014 (3) KLT 341). The petition is argued with the Government Pleader representing the respondents. The Court records that, for any variation in Exts.P17–P32, the petitioners must file appropriate applications before the 3rd respondent (Regional Transport Authority). The Court directs that if such applications are filed within two weeks of receiving a certified copy of the judgment, the 3rd respondent shall consider them strictly in accordance with law, with notice to the petitioners, and dispose of the matter expeditiously, within two months from receipt of the applications. The petitioners are allowed to raise all legal contentions before the 3rd respondent. The judgment is delivered by Hon’ble Justice Anil K. Narendran on 6 May 2016.
WP(C).No. 36525 of 2009 (I) Fr. Justin Ollattupuram, caretaker of St. Vincent’s Industrials Charitable Institutions, Calicut, challenged revenue recovery actions taken for KGST tax default for 1997-98. The Society’s land was attached and later bought in as ‘bought in land’ after sale notices in 2003, despite an appellate order reducing the tax liability from ₹6,50,833 to ₹2,27,518 in December 2004 (Ext.P8). The Amnesty Scheme was denied since the property had already been acquired by the State. The petitioner contended that the appellate reduction should cancel the original assessment and the recovery actions were therefore invalid, seeking reconveyance upon remittance of the revised tax and interest. The respondents argued that recovery proceedings were based on the original assessment order and that the appellate reduction did not automatically nullify the prior demand. The court examined the principle from Income Tax Officer v. Seghu Buchiah Setty (AIR 1964 SC 1473) and noted that an appellate order reducing an assessment requires the original order to be superseded, with the notice of demand falling accordingly, a doctrine the Kerala High Court had followed in WP(C) 10214/06. Ultimately, the court directed payment of the revised tax due under Ext.P8 with interest by 15 March 2013; upon remittance, reconveyance of the 6 cents of land was ordered, with incidental expenses borne by the Society and reconveyance to be completed within four weeks of payment. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The Kerala High Court, in a batch of writ petitions, challenges the selection and appointment process for unskilled workers (Grade IV) in the Kerala Small Scale Industrial Development Corporation (SIDCO). The lead petitioner Sukesh C.K. and dozens of other applicants allege that a transparent, rules-based selection was bypassed. Ext. P1 (notification of 10.10.2013) invited 40 vacancies with SSLC qualification and one year experience; a written test conducted by KITCO (Ext. P2) was followed by group discussions (Ext. P3) and interviews (Ext. P4). However, no formal shortlisting or rank list was published, despite the process spanning 2014, and 157 appointments were made without a published rank list. Petitioners rely on guidelines (Ext. P9) and various Supreme Court precedents to argue that marks distribution between written tests, GD, and interview must be transparent, with fixed norms announced at the outset (not altered mid-process). They challenge the 50-50 split (written vs GD/interview) and reliance on high interview marks as an instrument of inappropriate selection, invoking Ashok Kumar Yadav, Mohanan Pillai, Inder Prakash Gupta, and other decisions supporting fixed, transparent norms and publication of rank lists. The respondents contend the process followed Ext. P1 and related procedures, with marks awarded by a committee and RTI-disclosed lists showing fairness. The court scrutinizes the procedures, notes the lack of a published rank list and the excessive weight given to interviews, and ultimately sets aside the challenged appointments, directing re-selection based on written test performance with no mandatory GD, and publication of a rank list with a three-month deadline for completion.
WP(C).No. 19327 of 2015 (M) The petitioner, K.R. Radha, a part-time sweeper who was later confirmed as a full-time employee, challenged the proposed retirement date of 30.06.2015. She had declared her date of birth as 01.07.1959 and, following an Ext.P3 order dated 27.04.2015, sought correction of her date of birth from the SSLC to 01.07.1962. She contended that this corrected date should be reflected in her service records to enable continuation in service beyond superannuation and even contend for salary after 30.06.2015, as interim orders suggested. The government argued that corrections of date of birth in government service records ordinarily should not be entertained near retirement; corrections must be sought within five years of entry into service and after correction of the SSLC. The court cited Achumma TV v. State of Kerala and other precedents (State of U.P. v. Gulaichi; State of Punjab v. Chadha; State of Maharashtra v. Kamble; State of Gujarat v. Sindhi; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shrivas; Bharat Coking Coal Limited v. Uranw) to emphasize that there is a general principle against late corrections but with exceptions when there is clear, unimpeachable evidence. In this case, the petitioner did not pursue correction within the prescribed time-frame with the employer, and the SSLC correction alone could not alter service records. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the salary claim was denied in light of the interim order. The court held that the correction sought did not meet the exceptions and the writ petition lacked merit.
WA.No. 1543 of 2014 arises from a challenge to Ext.P2 circular issued by the Deputy Director, Department of Dairy Development, Palakkad, dated 30 August 2014, and Exts.P3 and P3(a) memos by Walayar Kherolpadaka Sahakarana Sanghom Ltd. The appellants, Kandha Samy K and Subramonia P, two small-scale dairy farmers living in the border area of Tamil Nadu, contend that the total prohibition on collecting milk from outside Kerala contravenes the freedom of trade guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution and infringes their right to carry on business. The 3rd respondent, a Kerala APCOS dairy co-operative society with operation confined to Ward Nos. 11 and 12 of Puthussery Panchayat, Palakkad, has treated non-residents as non-members under Sections 16(1)(a)(iii) and 7(1)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. The Deputy Director's Ext.P2 circumscribes imports from other States; Ext.P3/ P3(a) reflect the society’s inability to purchase from the appellants. The petition was dismissed in limine by the single judge; the appellants challenged that order in this writ appeal. The court upheld the view that the border-area prohibition does not violate Article 301 since the restriction aims to regulate trade within the operating area, and the need to protect public health, citing the Supreme Court’s Centre for Public Interest Litigation decision. The appeal is dismissed.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CRL.A. No. 1728 of 2005) by the second accused in a case under the Abkari Act. The trial court convicted the first accused under Section 55(a) and the appellant under Section 55(i), after evidence indicating possession and sale of arrack mixed with toddy at Toddy Shop No. 90, Pallimon Cheri. The prosecution relied on the APPELLANT’s alleged status as licensee and on Ext. P1 mahazar, Ext. P6 (chemical analysis showing 26.02% ethyl alcohol), and Exts. P2–P8. The appellant contends that there was no independent corroboration, that no proven master–employee relationship existed, and that extant evidence fails to prove the appellant’s link to sale of contraband. He also challenges alleged non-compliance with Section 36 Abkari Act and Excise Manual, the late production of samples (14 days), and Ext. P8’s disclosure timing under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The Public Prosecutor maintains the trial court’s reasoning. The High Court ultimately finds no proven employment relationship and notes the delay and improper disclosure undermine the prosecution's case. Consequently, the court sets aside the conviction and sentence against the appellant and acquits him, allowing the CRL.A. to prevail.
