This petition concerns a sale of property devolved to the petitioners, including two minor children, after the death of the husband. The petitioners challenged Ext. P6, a communication by the Sub Registrar directing that Ext. P5 (sale deed) could be registered only after the District Court declares the first petitioner as guardian of minors 2 and 3. The Lok Adalat had earlier passed Ext. P1 award in PLP No. 673/2020, allowing a settlement involving the minors on the basis of a joint statement; fixed deposits in the minors’ names supported their financial interests. The sale deed was executed in the first petitioner’s capacity and as guardian, but registration was refused. The court referred to Merlin and Yesudas (2007) and to the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, analyzing the conditions under which Lok Adalats may record settlements involving minors, emphasizing safeguards, leave of the Adalat, and the best interests of minors. It found that Ext. P1 did not record explicit satisfaction that the minors’ interests would be protected and that the Lok Adalat failed to ensure the necessary safeguards. The court directed the Lok Adalat to reconsider the matter, pass a fresh award in compliance with statutory requirements, and, upon such compliance, permit registration of Ext. P5 without requiring guardianship orders from a District Court. Ext. P6 was set aside and the petition disposed of accordingly.
Alex P.V., a Sunday School teacher, faced a serious charge of sexual assault on a minor student. The trial court convicted him under IPC Section 376(2)(i) and POCSO Act Sections 5(f) read with 6, sentencing him to life imprisonment and a fine. On appeal, the Kerala High Court examined the scope of the POCSO Act when the offending act occurred in a Sunday School setting, the status of the institution as educational, and the reliability of the prosecutrix’s account. A key issue was the age of the victim; the prosecution relied on Ext.P3, an extract from the school admission register, to prove age, while defense counsel questioned the sufficiency and admissibility of such evidence. The court upheld the credibility of the specific incident described by PW1 and noted the possibility of embellishments in sexual cases, but emphasized that not all positive findings of repeated rape were proved. It invoked Jarnail Singh and Mahadeo to demand rigorous age proof for minors; relying on Birad Mal Singhvi, it held Ext.P3 insufficient to prove age beyond doubt. Consequently, the court acquitted the charges under S.376(2)(i) IPC and S.5(f) POCSO, due to age not being proven, but convicted the accused under S.376(1) IPC for rape, and upheld life imprisonment; the appeal was partly allowed.
This writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 24360 of 2018) filed by Dr. Mercy Xavier seeks a mandamus-like direction to the 2nd respondent, the Sub Registrar, Pattom, to facilitate conveyance of Flat No. 3A in Samariyas Centre, Pattom, Thiruvananthapuram, to the petitioner and her beneficiaries through the power-of-attorney holder Seema Antony. The petitioner had obtained a Legal Heirship Certificate and, after her husband’s death, intended to register the sale deed involving her and her children. A central issue is the insistence by the 2nd respondent that the petitioner’s daughter affix passport-size photographs and fingerprints to the sale deed under Section 32A of the Registration Act, 1908, and related FEMA 2000 provisions. The petitioner contends this biometric requirement is illegal and ultra vires and relies on Ayisha Beebee v. State of Kerala (2010) to argue that 32A’s application does not extend to the present Indian-origin transfer scenario; the respondents, however, argue that Ayisha Beebee has no application here and rely on Sec.32A as amended and on Joseph George v. State of Kerala (2017) for the obligation to comply. The court ultimately holds that Section 32A applies, including for instruments presented through a power-of-attorney holder, and directs registration if the instrument is otherwise in order. The petition is disposed of with those directions.
This is a criminal appeal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arising from an accusation that a cheque issued by the first respondent (P.B. Ragesh) to the appellant (N.A. Sasidharan) was dishonoured for insufficient funds. The appellant had lent Rs. 1,00,000 to the first respondent on 10.04.2007; the cheque dated 01.11.2007 was presented on 02.11.2007 to a Canara Bank branch and dishonoured. After serving a lawyer’s notice (21.11.2007) and non-payment, the appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 NI Act. The Judicial First Class Magistrate acquitted the first respondent, accepting his version that the cheque was not issued in relation to any debt and that Ext.P1 was possibly fabricated during a vehicle deal with Surendran, a relative of the appellant, under a complicated sequence of events detailed in Exts.D1–D6 and DW1’s testimony.
On appeal, the High Court re-examined whether the cheque’s execution and the alleged loan were proven, noting the absence of independent corroboration of the alleged loan. The court scrutinized Ext.D2 (an alleged agreement) and Exts.D3–D4 (cheques) and observed substantial inconsistencies in the appellant’s pleadings and statements; the accused’s denial and Ext.D1 reply were given primary weight. The court held that the appellant failed to establish the offence under Section 138 NI Act and dismissed the appeal. The decision contemplates the limitations of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act in light of the accused’s denial and documentary inconsistencies, distinguishing prior cases cited by the appellant. The judgment emphasizes credibility issues, reliance on the civil suit’s outcome, and the absence of a proven debt or transaction to sustain the offence.
The petitioner, the registered owner of a Tata Motor Cab (KL-36/D-1286) covered by a hire-purchase agreement with Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Ltd., approached this Court under Article 226 to compel the 1st and 2nd respondents to entertain Ext. P7, the renewal application for his contract carriage permit (Ext. P2) without insisting on an NOC from the financier. He contends that the renewal cannot be foreclosed solely on the financier’s non-response, especially since Exts. P8 (request to the financier) and P9 (postal receipt) demonstrate he has sought the NOC and that the financier’s silence should not preempt renewal. He cites Shabu Sukumaran v. Regional Transport Officer, TVM and others, which discusses Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act and holds that the registering authority may renew a permit after affording a hearing, even where the financier objects, if warranted by law. The respondents, including the 1st and 2nd respondents, insist that NOC from the financier is a precondition and that the financier’s objections must be considered in light of the hire-purchase agreement and statutory provisions (Sections 51, 81, 41(14), 47, 49, 52, 48, 9). The Court disposes of the petition by directing the 1st respondent to consider Ext. P7 strictly in accordance with law, navigate the financier’s objections, and issue orders within four weeks, while noting the Shabu Sukumaran principle and providing for notice to the petitioner and the financier.
This Kerala High Court ITA concerns AY 2011-12 wherein the Revenue challenged the ITAT Cochin’s order that allowed the assessee’s alternative claim for deduction under section 10A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 after denying a deduction under section 10B in the return. The Assessing Officer had disallowed 10B, and the assessee, in the appeal before the CIT(A), shifted its claim to 10A, which the CIT(A) accepted and the Tribunal affirmed, noting that the assessee appeared to satisfy conditions for 10A and that prior practice permitted examining an alternative deduction when 10B was denied. The Revenue’s substantial questions of law argued that the Tribunal erred in allowing 10A without a claim in the return and in relying on authorities permitting such an alternative without a revised return, citing Regency Creations Ltd. (Delhi HC) and relevant Delhi High Court judgments. The High Court examined Goetze (India) Ltd. v. CIT, Ramakrishna Deo, Fast Booking (I) Pvt. Ltd., Cronos Consulting India Pvt. Ltd., Device Driven (India) Pvt. Ltd., and Technovate E Solution P. Ltd., among others, and concluded that a revised return is required to grant deductions under 10A and that the lower authorities erred. It ultimately held that the Revenue’s appeal is allowed, reversing the lower orders and refusing the 10A deduction.
Viswanatha Kurup R., a teacher/UPSA who later became Cluster Coordinator, filed WP(C) 13871 of 2013 seeking recognition as a protected teacher as of 14.07.1997 and to set aside Exts.P7 and P8. The petition traces his UPSA service from 1993-1998, including appointment on 12.08.1996 against a vacancy arising from the promotion of Susan Abraham, which was not approved. The DEO rejected the claim for approval on 16.04.1997; further re-appointments and approvals followed, but the petitioner’s protection claim remained unresolved. The petition also notes that, after a crackdown on irregular admissions (Super Check Cell), the petitioner’s service was dispensed with in 2007, but he was subsequently reappointed as Cluster Coordinator in 2012. Ext.P7 and Ext.P8 (recovery of excess salary and other penalties) were issued, leading to the challenge. The court referred to Rule 34(b) of Chapter XIV A KER and, crucially, to the Full Bench decision in Thresia M.L. v. Preethy M.P. and Others (2014) which held UPSAs and LPSAs are distinct categories for purposes other than promotion under Rule 34(b), with a combined seniority list limited to promoting to Primary School Headmaster. Relying on these authorities, the court set aside Exts.P7 and P8, directing the first respondent to reconsider the issue in light of Thresia M.L. and W.P.(C) No.82/2011, and to pass fresh orders within three months after allowing a fresh representation within two weeks.
The petitioner, a development company, challenged two adverse orders under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 that taxed the entire Hi-Lite Mall project in the petitioner’s name. The 338-unit commercial complex was financed partly by the petitioner and partly by buyers who entered into development agreements with the builder; some buyers executed sale deeds while others had not yet completed conveyances. The assessing authority treated the building as a single taxable unit in the petitioner’s name, rejecting the argument that units financed by different persons should be treated as independent buildings under Explanation 2 to Section 2(e). The petitioner contended that when the cost of construction is met by different persons jointly, each apartment should be deemed a separate building, so units sold to third parties could be assessed in the owners’ names. The court reminded itself of the practical realities of multi-storey development and examined statutory provisions (Sections 7, 9 and 2(e) with Explanation 2) and prior case law, notably Mohinder Singh Gill and Balu v. Kerala, to emphasize merits-based consideration and the correct interpretation of Assessment. On discussing the grounds, the court held that the challenged Ext.P10 and Ext.P16 orders were unsustainable and disposed of the petition by directing a unit-wise reassessment: 224 units with pre-2.02.2016 conveyances to be assessed in the owners’ names and the remaining units in the petitioner’s name, subject to notice and due process.”
The plaintiff, Vinaya N.A., a police constable posted at Thirunelli Police Station, filed a defamation suit for Rs. 50,000 against Rashtra Deepika Ltd. (editor, printer and publisher) for a news item published on 22 May 1995 that allegedly carried innuendo about her conduct. The trial court found the publication per se defamatory, published with malice and without justification, and directed the defendants to pay Rs. 25,000 with interest and costs. The defendants appealed (A.S. 13/2000 before the District Court, Kalpetta, then transferred to Additional District Court (Adhoc), Wayanad), challenging liability and quantum of damages. The appellate court affirmed the decree. The Regular Second Appeal before the Kerala High Court raised issues on defamation law, including whether a publication in public interest and in good faith can affect a plaintiff not named in the report, whether absolute or qualified privilege applies, and whether damages must account for mitigations. The High Court exhaustively considers the principles of defamation, innuendo, and privilege, citing a long line of precedents. It ultimately holds that the publication was per se defamatory by innuendo against the plaintiff, not protected by privilege, and confirms the lower courts’ rulings, dismissing the appeal with costs to the respondent, thereby upholding the Rs.25,000 damages and relief granted earlier.
WP(C).No. 23107 of 2016 (K) The petitioner, P. Krisnan Nair, an Advocate Clerk registered under the Kerala Advocates' Clerks Welfare Fund Scheme (Act 27 of 2003), seeks to compel the Government to give effect to his nomination as a member of the Kerala Advocates' Clerks Welfare Fund Committee in place of the deceased member, on the basis of Ext.P4 and related files. The background facts show a vacancy arising from the death of Gopalakrishnan Nair in January 2016. Nomination proposals were processed in early 2016, with Ext.P3 implying a pending action and Ext.P4 containing the government’s note recommending the petitioner’s nomination. Due to the Model Code of Conduct during the State elections, formal notification and publication were deferred. The Government contends that Ext.P4 is only a file note and not a final Government order; without cabinet approval and Governor authentication, no enforceable decision exists. The petitioner argues that the note reflects a final decision already taken by the Chief Minister/Law Minister and that the nomination should be given effect. The court analyzes constitutional and statutory requirements under the Kerala Rules of Business and constitutional articles, distinguishing between ministerial notes and a valid order. Ultimately, the court holds that the Government action is complete when signed and authenticated as per Rule 12, and directs the respondents to pass appropriate orders to give effect to the nomination within a month, despite MCC constraints. The petition is allowed accordingly.
WP(C).No. 24122 of 2015 (M) M. Manikandan, a non‑gazetted UD Clerk in E6 section of the Guruvayur Devaswom, was placed under suspension from 15 November 2008 in connection with disciplinary proceedings alleging misappropriation of Devaswom funds. A charge memo dated 2 March 2009 contained 12 charges; the petitioner replied on 20 March 2009. An Enquiry Officer was appointed and later a second Enquiry Officer was substituted; the Managing Committee ultimately resolved to dismiss the petitioner and issued a show cause notice with the enquiry report. Despite attempts to re‑open evidence in 2014, the enquiry proceeded and an enquiry report (Ext.P21) was drawn. Based on that report, the Managing Committee passed Ext.P23 (8 July 2015) imposing dismissal from service and directed recovery of a substantial amount (Ext.P24). The petitioner challenged Exts.P23–P24 under Article 226. The court emphasized its limited scope of interference in disciplinary proceedings, citing Union of India v. Gunasekaran, and held that the enquiry was conducted by a competent authority, in accordance with the rules, with due natural justice, and that the punishment of dismissal was not grossly disproportionate given the gravity of the proven charges. The court rejected several objections—such as denial of witness summons, alleged bias, and lack of reasons—finding no legal infirmity. It also clarified that recovery would be limited to outstanding sums after giving due notice. The petition was dismissed, with a note that recovery actions must follow proper notice.
WP(C).No. 20894 of 2015 (J) & WP(C).No. 24917 of 2015 (J) The petition challenges Ext. P4, a 4 July 2015 order of the Convenor, Palakkad District Single Window Clearance Board, and the General Manager, District Industries Centre, which concluded that the petitioner’s access to the property varied from 10.4 metres to 3 metres and, following amendments, that a minimum width of 7 metres would be required for the M-sand unit proposed by the petitioner. The petitioner had sought permission to establish an M-sand unit after initial inquiries and deemed clearance granted by the Board (Ext. P2, 2013). The matter is intertwined with road width, encroachments, and compliance with statutory requirements under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and Kerala Panchayat Building Rules. The court retraced the sequence of prior litigation (WP Nos. 29071/14, 11852/14) directing inspection of the access road and consideration of width, while noting amendments in 2014 reducing the width requirement from 7 metres to 3 metres for small-floor-area buildings. The judge underscored that enclosure of encroachments and accurate measurement of the road width are critical, but ultimately held that the Board’s and Panchayat’s actions fall within statutory mandates. The writ petitions are dismissed, with the Board’s order sustained and the unit allowed only after encroachment removal and satisfactory width measurement.
The petitioner, D. Lathika, a 57-year-old former Lower Division Clerk of the Kerala Coir Workers Welfare Fund Board, filed W.P(C).No.9508/2015 seeking enhancement of her retirement age from 56 to 58 years. The Board had resolved on 01.10.2012 to raise the retirement age to 58 with effect from 31.05.2012, and the Government was requested to approve the proposal. The petitioner had earlier approached the Court in W.P(C).No.13056/2013, which directed the Government to take a decision on the Board’s proposal and permitted the petitioner to continue in service until the decision or until she reached 58, with a rider that no remuneration would be payable if the decision were adverse. The Government rejected the proposal in Ext.P3, noting that other welfare boards under the Government kept 56 years due to EPF pension obligations, among other reasons. The petition relied on Kavirajan v. KSBC Ltd and Chandran TV v. State of Kerala, arguing that retirement age ought to be enhanced. The Government contended, drawing from Managing Director KSBC v. P.B. Gopi and State of Kerala v. Kerala Land Development Board, that retirement-age policy is a governmental prerogative not subject to judicial reversal. The court reviewed Sections 6, 3, 9, 21, and 23 of the Kerala Coir Workers Welfare Fund Act and Rules, and concluded that the Government’s policy not to enhance retirement age is rational and within authority. It held that the Ext.P3 order is lawful and dismissed the petition, refusing salary for the post-retirement period beyond 56 years.
This writ petition challenges the Central Administrative Tribunal’s OA 262/2006, which quashed three disciplinary orders—Annexures A1, A2 and A3—imposed in a case against C.M. Chandrasekharan, a Junior Engineer, following a derailment near Quilon in August 2003. The CAT held that Annexure A1, removing the respondent from service, was issued by the fourth petitioner, i.e., the Senior Divisional Engineer, who lacked competence to impose the punishment; accordingly, Annexures A1–A3 were set aside. The petitioners contend that A1 was issued by the competent disciplinary authority under the prescribed powers and that A2 and A3 merely modified the punishment and did not cure the root defect in A1. They rely on a decision in WPC 14966/2008 suggesting the disciplinary authority may proceed from the stage of overruling the Enquiry Officer’s findings, and they argue that the competence to initiate punishment remains with the designated authority. The respondent argues a violation of Article 311 of the Constitution and maintains that a lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by appellate/revisional actions. The Kerala High Court concurs with the CAT, noting that the root defect cannot be cured by later orders and that a fresh action could be taken; it cites Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg to emphasize this principle. The petition is dismissed, upholding the CAT’s order and letting the disciplinary process proceed under proper authority.”
WP(C).No. 31780 of 2016; WP(C).No. 4702 of 2017 These connected writ petitions challenge the provisions of Adoption Regulations, 2017 framed under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The core issue is Regulation 5 of the Adoption Regulations, 2017, specifically the maximum composite age limits for prospective adoptive parents for various child age groups. The petitioners argue discrimination against non-Hindus and challenge the ultra vires nature of the rules, contending a Hindu adopter can rely on the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 to adopt younger children, while non-Hindus confront restrictive rules. In WP(C)31780/2016, the petitioner, a non-Hindu aged 50, asserts discriminatory impact on his right to adopt; in WP(C)4702/2017, Hindu petitioners aged 58 and 63 contend the upper age cap contravenes the enabling statute and lacks rational basis. Respondents contend that the Act is child-centric, the CARA guidelines are valid under Section 68 and Regulation 5(4), and the best interests of the child justify the age criteria. The court emphasizes that adoption of abandoned or surrendered children is governed by the Act, with CARA’s guidelines taking precedence over personal laws when the child is in need of care. It ultimately dismisses the petitions, upholding the regulatory framework and reserving CARA remedies for petitioners if needed.
WP(C).No. 18842 of 2016 (E) Jayasree, the petitioner, sought admission for her five-year-old daughter Anusree to Standard I at Seetharam Upper Primary School in Palakkad district, while her elder son Arun already studied in Standard I at the same school. The headmaster denied the application (Ext.P4) on the ground that the Education Department’s permission was required and cites that girl students are not normally admitted to the lower primary section of this mixed institution. The petitioner challenged Ext.P4, contending that Rule 12 of Chapter VI of the Kerala Education Rules (KER) requires primary schools to be treated as mixed and admission be open to both boys and girls unless the Director grants an exemption for special circumstances. The respondents, including the school managers, defend the practice of excluding girls from lower primary and point to nearby alternative schools as a justification, arguing that exemption is not necessary in their case. The court examined Rule 12 and traced its interpretation in Rt. Rev. Mark Netto v. Government of Kerala (1978 KLT 798), noting that primary schools are deemed mixed and exemptions are exceptional. The court held Ext.P4 to be an arbitrary misreading of Rule 12, quashed it, and directed admission if the child is otherwise qualified, aligned with Article 21-A and the Right to Education Act, 2009. The petition was allowed with no costs.
WP(C).No. 37809 of 2008 (S) This writ petition (WP(C) No. 37809 of 2008) challenges Ext. P6, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) order in OA 284/2006 directing the grant of the second financial upgradation under the ACP scheme to the respondent, who had joined as a Bosun in 1981, was promoted to Mate in 2002, and officiated as Skipper in-charge. The CAT held that denial of the second ACP was unjustified since the respondent was discharging duties of the next higher post and was entitled to the pay and benefits, directing the second ACP with effect from 30.05.2005. The Union of India and allied petitioners contest this, arguing that ACP benefits require fulfillment of normal promotion norms and the essential qualifications for the next promotional post, citing Clause 6 of Annexure-1 of Annexure R1(c) and an R1(d) clarifications by DOPT, and highlighting amendments to recruitment rules introducing a composite method of selection. They contend the respondent did not possess the essential qualifications and that, following the revised rules, second ACP should be restricted to the post-2008 period (24.05.2008). After hearing, the High Court holds Ext. P6 does not require interference; acknowledges that the respondent functioned as Skipper and was entitled to the post pay; nonetheless the court ultimately dismisses the petition, upholding the CAT’s directive for the second ACP from 30.05.2005.
WP(C).No. 19735 of 2016 (N) This writ petition challenges Ext.P7, the order of the 3rd respondent dated 21.04.2016, which declined permission to cut and remove rubber trees on the petitioner’s land under Section 5 of the Kerala Preservation of Trees Act, 1986, and for related reliefs. The land, originally part of Sy. No.57AIA of Karimpuzha II, Ottapalam, was exempted from vesting under the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 by a 1978 Forest Tribunal order (Ext.P1). Possession was restored, and subsequent survey corrections placed the land as Sy. No.57A/1A1A; it is currently under rubber cultivation with about 320 trees, many old and not yielding, as per Ext.P3. Petitioner sought permission to cut the live trees along with dead ones (Ext.P4–P6 detail the process). The 3rd respondent refused Ext.P7 on grounds that the property is private forest and must be preserved under the Act. The court notes rubber trees’ lifespan, the concept of slaughter tapping after latex extraction, and that dead trees may be removed to replant, interpreting Sec.5(1) as enabling, not prohibiting, such removal. Citing State of Kerala v. Antony Kannattu, the court holds Ext.P7 arbitrary and illegal and allows cutting under supervision with replanting, while directing reconsideration of other trees under proper procedure. The petition is allowed accordingly.
WP(C).No. 20857 of 2016 (F) The petitioner, a subsequent purchaser of a 3.03 Are property in Survey No.244/2B-2 Mulakkulam, challenges the Panchayath’s refusal to transfer a building permit previously issued to the predecessor-in-interest. The predecessor had a valid permit (Ext. P7), and the property is included in the data bank but not as ‘Nilam’; however, Basic Tax Register records describe it as Nilam. A certificate (Ext. P4) likewise describes the land as Nilam, consistent with BT R. Yet, an Agricultural Officer’s report (Ext. P5) finds the land to be included as converted land and in physical inspection, as garden land. The court discusses the framework under the Kerala Cultivation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (Act 28/2008) and the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 (KLU Order), emphasizing that inclusion in the Data Bank or the Draft Data Bank does not automatically classify land as Paddy Land or Wetland; the relevant remedies are under the KLU Order, such as obtaining conversion of user (Rule 6(2)) and, if needed, re-assessment of land as garden land. Citing Supreme Court guidance in Revenue Divisional Officer v. Jalaja Dileep and subsequent Kerala decisions (Puthan Purakkal Joseph; Kizhakkambalam Grama Panchayat), the court allows transfer of the building permit, subject to compliance with Building Rules (2011) and after hearing, within one month of certified copy. Exts. P10 and P11 are noted as permissible. The writ petition is allowed; no costs.
WP(C).No. 32142 of 2005 (B) The petitioner, K. Cicily, a Senior Manager of Kollam District Co‑operative Bank, challenges disciplinary measures imposed after a charge of misappropriation in 1986–87. Suspension was followed by a domestic enquiry which found the charge proved; a show-cause notice was issued and penalties were imposed by the bank’s Executive Committee, including reduction in rank, two-year withholding of promotion, cumulative withholding of increments for two years, treating suspension as leave with loss of pay, and a liability to refund any loss. The petitioner appealed; meanwhile, a sub‑committee found no pecuniary loss to the bank. Despite this, Exts.P14 and P15 (Government orders upholding the penalties) were issued. The petitioner contends that penalties for clerks must be imposed only by the Secretary, not by the Executive Committee or President, and that Section 69 of the Kerala Co‑operative Societies Act vests exclusive powers in the Arbitration Court for service matters, necessitating referral there rather than government adjudication. The Respondents argue the action was lawful, with opportunity afforded and relief unavailable. The court cites Thrissur Taluk Co‑operative College Educational Society Ltd v. Joint Registrar and Cheranallur Service Co‑operative Bank Ltd v. State of Kerala to support the view that, post‑Section 69, no other authority can decide service matters. Accordingly, Exts.P14 and P15 are set aside, Ext.P13 revision is to be reconsidered under Section 69, and a decision is to be made within two months.
