WP(C).No. 32102 of 2016 (K) This writ petition concerns the tenure of Muslim members elected to the Kerala Wakf Board under the Wakf Act, 1995 and its amendments. The petitioner, a Member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly (MLA), was elected as a Muslim member of the Wakf Board in 2014 from the 13th Assembly and challenged Ext.P6, a Government order appointing a Returning Officer to conduct an election for Wakf Board membership, arguing that his five‑year term from 20.10.2014 should run until 19.10.2019, as per Section 15 of the Wakf Act. The Government contends that once the 13th Assembly was dissolved (20.10.2016), the petitioner ceased to be an MLA, and thus automatically ceased to be a Wakf Board member; the interregnum ends with the 14th Assembly’s formation (20.5.2016) and another election is required under the amended Section 14(1)(b), along with Explanation I & II, to continue membership. The court analyzes the statutory framework: Section 14 (composition of the Board), the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013 introducing Explanations I and II, Rule 9(1) of the Kerala Wakf Rules, 1996, and related constitutional provisions (Articles 174(2)(b), Article 188, and Section 73(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951). It concludes that dissolution ends the current legislature’s life, and the petitioner must be elected afresh from the 14th Assembly’s Muslim MLA electorate. The petition is dismissed with no costs.
WP(C).No. 35755 of 2015 (T) This writ petition by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) challenges the levy of advertising charges under Rule 191 KMV Rules for writings/markings on HPCL’s tank trucks operated under contracts for transport of petroleum products. HPCL argues that its tank-truck inscriptions function as identification and safety measures rather than advertisement; they enable differentiation of HPCL vehicles, detection of adulteration or theft, and aid in emergencies, and are compelled by regulatory safety norms rather than marketing aims. The petition traces the sequence from check reports (Exts. P2, P5–P10) to Ext. P12, where the Transport Commissioner declined permission and demanded advertising charges. The respondents contend that any writing or figure on transport vehicles is subject to Rule 191, which imposes fees, and that Rule 191 should be read alongside CMV Rules safety provisions (Rule 130(4), Rule 134 and its emergency information panel). The High Court balances these provisions, citing the safety-centric purpose of CMV Rules while acknowledging Rule 191’s revenue objective. The Court ultimately holds that the inscriptions on HPCL tanks, though resembling labeling, do not attract advertising fees under Rule 191 in this factual context, given Rule 134’s safety framework. Ext. P12 is quashed; check reports are set aside, but inscriptions inviting public attention to HPCL products could trigger Rule 191.”
WP(C).No.34992 of 2008 (S) & WP(C).No.2633 of 2009 The Kerala High Court heard two writ petitions filed by the Railways challenging a common verdict of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam, which had quashed disciplinary action against K. Reghupathy for subletting a railway quarter and ordered recovery of damaged rent. The quarter, No. 137-A at Erode Railway Colony, was allotted to the first respondent in 1987 and, over years, was allegedly occupied by other railway employees. In response to rampant subletting, the Railways issued Circulars (notably 28 August 2000) mandating a multi-step action plan, including proceedings under the Conduct Rules, cancellation of allotment, evicting unauthorised occupants, and recovery of damages, with disciplinary consequences for the employee involved. The Tribunal found that the disciplinary authority acted under Vigilance directions and interfered with the proper course of action, set aside the punishment, and ordered refund of the damage rent. The High Court, by a Division Bench, held that the Railways had established subletting and that the Tribunal’s approach misapplied Circulars and records. It substituted a lesser penalty (minor penalty under Rule 6(iv) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1968) of a 36-month reduction in the pay scale, without cumulative effect, while maintaining the liability to pay damage rent. The petitions were allowed to that extent, with no costs.
Rankaswamy N, a research scholar in Hindi at the University of Calicut, belongs to the Irula-Hindu community listed as a Scheduled Tribe in Kerala. He challenged a Cochin University of Science & Technology (CUSAT) notification (Ext.P2, later re-notified) dated 24.04.2013 (re-notified 06.02.2015) for a single post of Assistant Professor in Hindi reserved for Scheduled Tribes. The Ext.P5 rank list placed the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents at ranks 1–3; the petitioner and another candidate were not ranked due to not meeting the 35% minimum marks. Ext.P8 memo appointed the 3rd respondent. The petitioner contended that the advertisement and reservation were Kerala-specific and could not extend to ST candidates from outside Kerala (e.g., Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh). The University argued for pan-India recruitment under UGC regulations (nationwide advertisement) and treated reservation as pan-India, citing that the posts in Kerala should follow KS & SSR and related rules. The court examined the Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986 (Section 7(2)) and KS & SSR 1958 Rules 14–17A. It held that the Kerala notification-based reservation could apply only to Kerala-listed STs, found the 3rd–5th respondents not eligible, quashed Ext.P5 and Ext.P8, and directed a fresh selection confined to Kerala STs. The petition was allowed.
WP(C).No. 36260 of 2015 (F) The petitioner, M.V. Latha, was appointed as Upper Primary School Assistant (UPSA) with effect from 01.06.2009 in a vacancy arising on the promotion of a Headmistress in the Kadamboor North Aided U.P. School managed by the fourth respondent. The appointment was not approved by the educational authority on two grounds: (i) Rule 51-B claimant had to be considered before the petitioner, and (ii) the school being uneconomic, only a protected teacher could be appointed to the vacancy. Ext.P2 dated 01.10.2009 denied approval, and Ext.P3 dated 11.11.2010 upheld the denial, stating the vacancy could be filled only by a protected teacher. The revision petition Ext.P6 dated 02.04.2013 was dismissed, indicating that the petitioner could be appointed only after a Rule 51-B claimant was appointed. The Manager reportedly did not appoint the Rule 51-B claimant due to issues with qualifications. The Lok Ayukta directed a fresh order after evaluating the claimed qualifications, and Ext.P9 dated 11.07.2014 cancelled Ext.P6 and directed that appointment could be approved if otherwise in order. Ext.P9’s directive led to Ext.P14 dated 11.11.2015 approving the petitioner’s appointment on a daily-wage basis, which this petition challenges. The court notes the absence of a list of protected teachers being provided to the Manager, cites a 2013 Division Bench decision (S. Haseena) in support, and ultimately quashes Ext.P14 to the extent of daily wage approval, directing a fresh order for regular-scale pay from 01.06.2009 and payment of back salary and benefits within a specified timeframe.
WP(C).No.33625 of 2016 (C) Ext.P3 notification issued by the State Co-operative Election Commission for election to the managing committee of the fifth respondent cooperative society is challenged in this writ petition. The Kerala Co-operative Societies Act governs the Society, and the petitioner is an A-class member while B-class members include institutions such as cooperative societies. The bye-laws provide a 13-member managing committee, with 5 wards elected from Thrissur taluks, 3 women, 1 SC/ST member, 2 representatives of B-class members and 2 ex-officio members. The bye-laws also provide that the representatives of the B-class members shall be elected by the B-class members in the general body. The petitioner contends Ext.P3 is invalid because it confines B-class representation to B-class members in the general body, contrary to the statutory mandate that the general body elects the committee, and that five general seats being filled on ward basis would require SC/ST and women seats to be ward-based, violating the bye-laws. The Society counters that Ext.P3 and the bye-laws are valid, arguing that representation of B-class members protects their interests and that the general body includes both A- and B-class members. The court notes Section 28 of the Act provides that the general body shall constitute a committee in accordance with the bye-laws, and finds no illegality in the ward-based election provisions. It distinguishes the Mathai decision, and dismisses the petition without intervening in the election process. The judgment emphasizes adherence to statute and bye-laws over court intervention in the process.
WP(C).No. 32247 of 2016 (E) Vijayakumari filed WP(C) No.32247 of 2016 challenging the rejection of her application for regularisation of a residential building on a 1.72-acre property in Resurvey No.195/1 of Vadanappally, Thrissur. She constructed a house and sought regularisation through Ext.P6, which the 3rd respondent rejected by Ext.P7 on the ground that the land is described as “Nancha” in the Possession Certificate (Ext.P2). The petitioner contends that the land was reclaimed prior to the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008, as evidenced by Exts.P3 (Village Officer) and P4 (Agricultural Officer) certs, and is not included in the Data Bank; the Agricultural Officer also certifies the land is not in the Data Bank. An interim report dated 05.10.2016 confirms the land status and area. The petitioner seeks correction of the Possession Certificate and house number (Ext.P8). Relying on Supreme Court guidance in Revenue Divisional Officer v. Jalaja Dileep (2015 (1) KLT 984 SC) and Kerala cases Puthan Purakkal Joseph v. Sub Collector and Kizhakkambalam Grama Panchayat v. Mariumma, the petitioner argues that non-inclusion in the Data Bank does not automatically negate residential regularisation and that conversion under the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 (and Rule 6(2)) may permit a change in user. The Court ultimately allows the petition, sets aside Ext.P7, and directs the 3rd respondent to consider Ext.P6 within one month with written notice of objections, if any. No costs.
WPC(C). No. 30568 of 2016 This writ petition challenges notices issued by the Palakkad District Cricket Association (PDCA) preventing the petitioners from participating in its activities and notices calling upon them to show cause why they should not be removed from PDCA membership. The petitioners contend that, although the PDCA is not a State instrumentality, it discharges public functions in the realm of cricket administration and thus falls within writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. They rely on Supreme Court precedents such as Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India and Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar to argue that bodies discharging public functions but not amounting to the State can be amenable to writ relief when citizens’ rights are violated. The respondents counter that the PDCA is neither a State nor an instrumentality and that the petitioner’s challenge seeks to police private rights arising from bye-laws, which is outside writ jurisdiction. The court examines whether the right claimed by the petitioners—participation in meetings and membership under the Association’s bye-laws—constitutes a statutory right or a private right; it ultimately finds that such rights are private, arising from bye-laws, and that the remedy by writ is unavailable in this context. Consequently, the petition is dismissed in limine. The decision relies on constitutional and statutory distinctions rather than the cited private-law precedents.
WP(C).No. 31498 of 2015 (J) The petitioner, Dr. Shifa Naser, holds a medical degree from the University of Seychelles American Institute of Medicine (USAIM). She cleared the National Board of Examinations screening and eligibility tests, but registration was denied by the Travancore-Cochin Council of Modern Medicine on the direction of the Medical Council of India (MCI), based on a note verbale from the Government of Seychelles. Seychelles had granted a charter in 2000 to establish USAIM, which was terminated on 14 January 2010, though the Government of Seychelles indicates USAIM’s degree was historically recognized by Seychelles Qualifications Authority (SQA) during provisional periods (2008–2011). The Supreme Court of Seychelles’ ongoing proceedings regarding the charter termination prompted the Kerala High Court to consider whether the petitioner’s degree has validity in India. The court emphasized that, for Indian recognition, the degree must be recognized where it was issued. It noted two critical facts: termination of the charter occurred only in 2010 and there was a provisional extension of recognition to 2011. Relying on related MCI precedents and the Seychelles materials, the court found prima facie recognition in Seychelles and directed the 3rd respondent to grant permanent registration to the petitioner within two weeks of receiving a copy of the judgment, contingent on screening results.
WP(C).No. 29492 of 2016 (J) This writ petition challenges Exts.P9 and P11, communications by the Southern Railway that directed the petitioner to remit the licence fee and security deposit and, eventually, terminated the licence and barred him from bidding for a year. The facts trace to an open tender issued in 2014 for catering services on the Trivandrum Central–Shoranur Venad Express (No. 16301). Musthafa was declared the successful bidder and the tender validity was extended on several occasions (Exts. P2, P3, P5). The Letter of Award dated 22.07.2016 (Ext. P7) set a licence period of five years, with licence fee and security to be paid within 15 days of receipt. Musthafa sought additional time (26.07.2016, Ext. P8; Ext. P10) and proposed extensions to 15.10.2016 and later 25.09.2016, which the respondents refused, issuing Ext. P9 and later Ext. P11, debarring him for one year under the tender conditions. Clause 14 of Annexure A/1 to Ext. P1 obligates debarment for non-fulfillment; Clause 16 requires adherence to the draft licence agreement. The Railway contends that there was no violation of due process; rather, it enforced the terms of the bid and the LOA. The court held that the undertakings in the tender documents bound the petitioner; Exts. P9 and P11 were in accordance with the contract, and the writ petition was dismissed. It allowed the petitioner to pursue arbitration regarding the earnest-money issue under Article 20 of Ext. P1.
WP(C).No. 32992 of 2015 (Y) These writ petitions relate to the reclamation of paddy land in Resurvey No. 421/5 of Maradu Village and the consequences of the Data Bank revisions on land classification and building activity. The matter consolidates WP(C).No. 32992/2015 (vehicle-owner petitioner) challenging the seizure of his vehicle for allegedly carrying out construction on the land, with WP(C).No. 1192/2016 (landowner petitioner) challenging inclusion of the land in the Draft Data Bank. The sequence of events shows that in 2013 the Tahsildar informed the municipality that the land, while recorded as nilam, had become converted land; the municipality then issued a building permit (30/07/2013) and the landowner completed construction, obtaining an occupancy certificate. The Data Bank was revised on 10/10/2013, after the permit, recording the land as converted and reclaimed post-2008; the vehicle was seized on 27/12/2014, and a confiscation order was challenged as illegal given the revision occurred without notice and the contractor acted bona fide. The court held that the permit was issued under a now-converted-land status and that notice of revision was lacking, so the vehicle must be released. It directed that the landowner be allowed to regularise the reclaimed portion under Section 3A, 2008 Act, and pursue correction before the Local Level Monitoring Committee, while preserving the remainder from reclaim. Contempt proceedings were closed.
WP(C).No. 32925 of 2015 (M) The petitioner, Saji Mattathil, borrowed funds from the respondent bank and defaulted, prompting recovery proceedings before the Co-operative Arbitration Court. The first hearing occurred on 18 August 2015 at the Kannur branch, with a second hearing on 29 September 2015 at Kannur as well. Subsequently, the bank shifted the hearings to Thiruvananthapuram, where its Head Office is located, prompting the petitioner to challenge the venue shift on the ground of forum non conveniens and severe travel burden. His counsel contends that the first respondent is estopped from altering the venue and that the petitioner should be permitted to defend with legal representation to obviate continuous personal appearances. He relies on Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and cites Sections 69 and 70A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and Rule 67 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules, including Rule 67(11), to argue for a right to counsel. The respondent bank counters that initial sittings were in Kannur to ease hardship and that later sittings were arranged due to caseload and the bank’s location; it asserts that neither statutory provisions compel hearings at the borrower’s doorstep nor create an automatic right to counsel. The court ultimately holds that Rule 67(11) does not confer an absolute right to counsel, but permits it under appropriate circumstances, and disposes of the petition by directing the first respondent to consider such an application in light of Circular No. 33/1971, with no costs awarded.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CRL.A. No. 864 of 2005) arising from a conviction for possession of forged currency notes under Section 489C IPC. The appellant Salim, along with a co-accused who died during trial, was tried by the VI Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam for offences under Sections 489B and 489C read with Section 34 IPC. The trial court convicted Salim under Section 489C IPC and sentenced him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment; the appeal challenges the conviction and sentence. The prosecution alleged that on 25 May 1999, at Thoppumpady market, two men attempted to transact counterfeit notes; the police recovered six 100-rupee notes from Salim, and the notes were sent for expert examination (Ext. P7) which established non-genuineness. Several witnesses testified; some were hostile, yet credibility of PW7 (the investigating officer) and PW5 (a head constable) remained intact. The defence argued failure to prove possession and knowledge that the notes were forged, citing M. Mammutti v. State of Karnataka (1979) to claim no presumption of knowledge arises from mere possession. The High Court, applying the evidence, rejected that presumption, relying on Madan Lal Sarma v. State to require proof of knowledge or reason to believe. Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence to two years while upholding the conviction, and dismissed the appeal with the modified sentence.
WP(C).No. 26595 of 2015 (Y) These writ petitions by M/S Panikulam Pharma, a dealer in drugs, challenge the refusal to supply drugs by manufacturers/distributors in Kerala, arguing that para 28 of the Drugs Control Order, 2013 obligates them not to withhold sale to a dealer without good reasons. The petitioners rely on the Drugs Control Order (DCO) provisions defining ‘dealer’, ‘distributor’, and ‘manufacturer’, and contend that withholding supply harms public access to medicines at fair prices, invoking the overarching aims of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The respondent manufacturers/distributors respond that they operate through stockists and have contractual commercial arrangements; private deals cannot be overridden under para 28. The court initially flags maintainability, noting that the petitions sought relief for private commercial interests rather than public welfare and that no mandamus lies against private bodies absent a corresponding statutory duty and public interest. It extracts constitutional and statutory background, including Article 369, Entry 33 of List III, and the EC Act’s public-interest rationale. A central citation is Binny Ltd. v. V.Sadasivan, invoked to articulate the public-function doctrine. Ultimately, the High Court holds there is no demonstrated public interest to invoke para 28 against private entities; the petitions are dismissed, clarifying writs lie to enforce public-interest rights, not private commercial interests.
RP No.719 of 2023 in DBP No.5 of 2012 & DBP No.80 of 2022 This is a consolidated review petition proceeding before the Kerala High Court relating to the Travancore Devaswom Board’s failure to implement a 2012 order (DBP No.5 of 2012) directing the constitution of a Temple Advisory Committee for Thrichattukulam Sree Mahadeva Temple and a related Ombudsman report (DBP No.80 of 2022) on non-compliance. The petitioners, two officers of the Travancore Devaswom Board (Assistant Devaswom Commissioner and Sub Group Officer), seek review of the 2012 order and seek directions consistent with bye‑laws and statutory provisions under Section 31A of the Travancore Devaswom Board Act. The court surveys the statutory framework—Section 31A and the bye-law rules (Clauses 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 18, 21) framed under it—and binds the temple governance to a system whereby Temple Advisory Committees must reflect representation from three Karayogams and local Hindu denominations, with election from the registered mandalam. It cites Santharam Roy TS, Sunil Kumar C., Chandu K., Major Vellayani, and Rajalekshmi P. to interpret membership, term limits (two years with possible extension), and the duty to supervise committee activities. The Court ultimately disposes of RP 719/2023 by directing modifications to Clause 3 of the bye-laws to protect Karayogam and local-denomination rights and orders elections within tight timeframes, while DBP No.80/2022 is disposed in line with these directions.
WP(C).No. 26763 of 2015 (U) / WP(C).No. 25177 of 2015 (U) These writ petitions challenge the denial of the pay scale benefits under Ext.P7 to four employees of the Malabar Regional Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd, Palakkad, affiliated to Milma (Kerala Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd). The petitioners—Vivekandan, Jayprakash V., Kannan K., and Murukan K.—started as sweepers and were promoted through the organization’s internal hierarchy to Lab Assistants and Marketing Assistants. Their case rests on Ext.P7 (the amended promotion policy/standing orders) and Ext.P11 (pay revision order), arguing that their appointments to Lab Assistant and Marketing Assistant posts are by way of promotion under Ext.P7, and therefore they are entitled to the revised pay scales and arrears. The respondents counter that these posts were filled by internal selection, not promotion, and that Ext.P7 is non-statutory, so it cannot support a writ under Article 226; the proper remedy, they contend, lies in the Cooperative Arbitration Court under Section 70A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. The court notes that Ext.P7 is not statutory and discusses the Larger Bench ruling in Association of Milma Officers v State of Kerala, which held that non-statutory staff regulations cannot be the subject of writs. It also cites Bhaskaran, John, Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Santhosh, and addresses Part IX B of the Constitution (97th Amendment) and the jurisdictional framework under Sections 69 and 70A. Ultimately, the court disposes of the petitions by directing the petitioners to pursue the statutory remedy, while noting limitations and suitable forum for resolution of grievances.
WP(C).No. 30871 of 2009 (S) This writ petition challenges the Central Administrative Tribunal’s August 28, 2009 order (Ext. P5) dismissing the applicant’s plea for preferential recruitment under Annexure A2. The petitioner, a contingent employee since 2001 and later continuing as a Chowkidar on a stop-gap basis, sought preferential treatment in a 2008 GDS MP recruitment, arguing Annexure A2 confers such preference to part-time contingent employees. The Kerala High Court reviews whether a defect in initial entry into service should bar the applicant from preferential treatment. The court notes the petitioner has long service (since 2001) and continued under interim orders, but did not seek regularisation. A central issue is the applicability of the Umadevi ratio; the court distinguishes, finding that Umadevi dealt with backdoor entry and regularisation, not with granting preferential treatment under Annexure A2 where sponsorship by the Employment Exchange is a condition. The court acknowledges the employer’s lapse in sponsorship but holds that it would not automatically defeat a claimant’s entitlement to preferential treatment, especially where the petitioner has substantial meritorious service. Consequently, the petition is allowed to the extent of nullifying the CAT denial regarding Annexure A2, and the authorities are directed to consider the petitioner’s claim under Annexure A2 along with related judgments (Annexures A5–A7 and Exts. P6–P11) within three months.
WP(C).No. 35286 of 2007 (A) This writ petition challenges the staff fixation order (Ext. P4) which created a new Lower Grade Sanskrit Teacher post for the 2006-07 academic year in Amayannoor High School and was subsequently revised after a Government-directed revisit (3.11.2006). The petitioner, M.N. Anoop, who had been appointed as a part-time Lower Grade Sanskrit Teacher, contends that the revisitation and the subsequent order revoking the newly created post (Ext. P6) and the Manager’s appeal (Ext. P7) were unjust, particularly since the original staff strength should be retained if justified by student strength on the sixth working day. The court discusses Rule 12, Chapter XXIII of the Kerala Education Rules (KER) and GO (P) 164/91 G.E., interpreting that revisits should not negate a post found eligible in the initial verification unless the second verification shows a reduction in need, and that the object of KER is to align staff strength with student strength. Citing Shuja Baby v. State of Kerala, the court concludes that the higher-level verification cannot arbitrarily cancel a post sanctioned on the initial visit. The petition is allowed and Ext. P11 is set aside, directing fresh consideration of the petitioner’s revision petition (Ext. P9) with hearing, and issuance of fresh orders within two months.|
WP(C).No. 35416 of 2009 (V) Mampad Grama Panchayat challenged Ext.P2, a Government order of 16 November 2009 exempting the Kannankandi Trophy All India Sevens Football Tournament from entertainments tax under the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, 1961. The Petitioner contends that the exemption, granted under Section 7A, is void for lack of reasons; Ext.P2 contains no reasoning, thereby violating mandatory procedural requirements and undermining local revenue. The judgment explains the statutory scheme: entertainments tax is levied by local authorities under sections governing admission-based taxation, with exemptions permitted under Section 7 for educational or nonprofit-related entertainments, and more broadly under Section 7A for Government exemptions by order with reasons. The court underscores the requirement that orders under Section 7A must specify reasons, especially when they affect local authority revenues. Citing Taylor v. Taylor, Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, and Ajanta Industries, the court emphasizes the principle that powers must be exercised in the manner prescribed and that reasons are essential for enforceability and potential judicial review. The petitioner’s challenge succeeds: Ext.P2 is set aside. However, the judgment clarifies that it does not automatically authorize the Panchayat to demand entertainments tax retroactively absent a stay. The decision reinforces statutory safeguards and procedural correctness within the exemption regime.
This is a bail application before the High Court of Kerala by two petitioners, Naveendrakkumar (A1) and his wife Sandhya (A2), accused in Crime No. 1421/2014 of Kollam East Police Station. The FIR, initially listing offences under IPC sections 452, 383, 365, 368, 354, 420 read with 34, and offences under sections 3 and 4 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, as well as Section 16 of the Kerala Money Lenders Act and Sections 3 and 4 of the Kerala Chits and Money Circulation Banning Act, underwent amendments: deletion of 383, 365, 368 and addition of IPC sections 483, 465 and 468, along with Section 17 of the Kerala Money Lenders Act. The 2nd petitioner is alleged to be involved in non-ST atrocity allegations, while the 1st petitioner, an Assistant Sub Inspector, is accused of acts including alleged caste-based insult, trespass, and intimidation connected to a financial transaction. The Public Prosecutor argued Section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars anticipatory bail under Section 438; counsel for petitioners contended no substantive SC/ST Act offence is attributable to the 2nd petitioner, who has two young daughters and a prior private complaint under Section 138 NI Act, and that there is no risk of witness tampering. The court allowed anticipatory bail to the 2nd petitioner with conditions and, applying precedents, directed the 1st petitioner to appear before the Magistrate to seek bail, disposing of the application accordingly. The judgment discusses the court’s jurisdiction under Shanu v. State and Asok Kumar v. State for travel and bail considerations.
