This Criminal Misc. Case arises from a petition under Section 482 CrPC challenging quashing of proceedings in C.C. No.1333/2019 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Varkala, concerning an offense under Section 420 IPC. The petitioner, Lloyd M. Thomas, contends that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and seek termination of the criminal proceedings. Annexure-4 contains the second respondent’s affidavit supporting the settlement. The court had directed the investigating officer to verify the settlement, confirm that there are no other impediments to terminating the proceedings, and to report on whether the respondent has any criminal antecedents. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing solely on settlement but acknowledged the lack of other serious crimes against the petitioner. The judge surveyed the law, citing a line of Supreme Court decisions culminating in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688, which summarise the approach to Section 482 CrPC quashing in non‑compoundable offences where the dispute is civil/private and has been resolved. The court emphasised that quashing is inappropriate for heinous offences or offences under special statutes, and for offences like Section 307 IPC/ar. The judge concluded that the circumstances here justify exercising the extraordinary power and quashing the proceedings. The petition is allowed and the final report and subsequent proceedings are quashed.
WP(C).No. 31997 of 2016 (Y) Subaida Jahafar filed a writ petition challenging denial of participation in the spot allotment for KEAM 2016 admissions after she had secured admission in a private self-financing college. The common thread in the connected petitions is whether candidates already admitted to self-financing institutions can participate in spot allotment to seek admission in Government colleges or better courses, based on higher options exercised earlier. The Commissioner for Entrance Examinations issued a sequence of notifications in September 2016, culminating in Ext. P6 on 28.09.2016, which barred such candidates from the 30.09.2016 spot allotment and stated that those who had already secured admission in self-financing colleges would be ineligible. Petitioners argued that merit, fairness and transparency—a triad repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court—require consideration of higher options and that admission to Government seats or better courses should not be denied merely due to prior self-financing admissions. The Court scrutinized Clause 11.6.9 of the Prospectus, Clause 2.1.1, the terms of the Government–Self Financing Institutions agreement, and relevant Government orders. It affirmed the primacy of merit and the need to avoid wastage of seats, ultimately declining interference and dismissing the petitions, while noting the need for future safeguards consistent with the Triple Test of admissions (merit, fairness, transparency).
Cont.Case (C) No. 2604 of 2019 This Contempt of Court case, filed under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, challenges the alleged willful disobedience of the directions in Annexure II to the Kerala High Court judgment in W.P.(C) No. 3980/2017 dated 25 February 2019, which itself followed Annexure I judgment in W.P.(C) No. 13120/2015. The petitioners, six former employees of West Coast Industrial Gases Ltd., sought enforcement of pension-related directions issued by the High Court, and relied on Supreme Court judgments (notably Sunil Kumar B. and RC Gupta) that clarified the pension scheme's amendment in 2014 (G.S.R. 609(E)) and the option rights under paragraphs 11(3)/(4) of the 1995 scheme. The Supreme Court's 2022 decision, in Civil Appeals Nos. 8143-44 of 2022 and connected matters, held the 2014 amendment legal and directed readjustments and extensions, with certain conditions. On 17 October 2023, after hearing counsel for petitioners and the EPFO, the Kerala High Court concluded that reconsideration of the petitioners' entitlement for higher pension is required by EPFO in light of the 2022 Supreme Court judgment, and accordingly closed the contempt case, reserving the petitioners' rights. The court thus preserves EPFO's continuing obligation to revisit pension disbursement in accordance with law.
WP(C).No.14015 OF 2020(B) The petitioner, K. Balakrishna Pillai, worked as a Lab Assistant in the NSS College (5th respondent). He faced disciplinary proceedings for unauthorised absence and was dismissed; the order was upheld by the Kerala University Appellate Tribunal (Ext.P2). The petitioner challenged Ext.P2 in CRP(UTY) No.37/2015. In a detailed order dated 4 April 2019, this Court (Division Bench per Ext.P3) modified the punishment from dismissal to compulsory retirement effective from 05 August 2005, thereby entitling him to retirement benefits for the period he actually served—from 11 October 1982 to 05 August 2005. The revision petition thus attained finality with Ext.P3. The petitioner produced Ext.P3 along with a No-Liability Certificate (Ext.P4). The first respondent issued Ext.P5, relying on Annexure-A circular (No.54/2013/FIN dated 19.06.2013), stating that pensionary/benefits shall be payable only from the date of the appellate order (14.06.2019) if a disciplinary decision is modified on appeal after retirement. The respondents argued Ext.P5 aligns with Ext.P3 and Rules 119-120 of Chapter IX, Part III of the KSR. The petitioner argued Ext.P5 undermines Ext.P3 and the Bolpur principle. The Court reaffirmed Ext.P3 findings, held that Annexure-A circular is not applicable where the appellate authority has modified the punishment via a Court order, and that circulars cannot override judicial determinations. It quashed Ext.P5 and directed payment of arrears from 06.08.2005 with interest if delayed, within two months.
This writ appeal, WA No.1280 of 2016, arises from a challenge to Ext.P26 disciplinary proceedings of a Sub‑Committee of a Co‑operative Society (Anapanthy Service Co‑operative Bank Ltd.). The delinquent, P.K. Thomas, contends that natural justice was violated by not furnishing a copy of the disciplinary enquiry report and by issues around earlier Ext.P22 proceedings. The first instance court held that the Bank, a cooperative society, is not a “State” under Article 12 and that the writ petition was maintainable only on narrow grounds, noting that the Act and Rules do not require furnishing the copy of the enquiry report. The Division Bench reverses, clarifying that writ relief against a cooperative society is available only on limited grounds (breach of statutory provisions or breach of public duty). It observes that Ext.P26 was issued after interim steps and that the Court shall not re‑weigh evidence in a disciplinary matter, which is for the Co‑operative Arbitration Court or Labour Court to determine. The appellate court ultimately sets aside the impugned judgment, dismisses the writ petition as not maintainable, and allows the writ appeal, while reserving the delinquent’s right to pursue other appropriate fora. No costs are awarded.
Mat.Appeal Nos. 270/2014, 573/2014, 574/2014 These three matrimonial appeals arise from the Family Court, Irinjalakuda, challenging orders passed on 10 April 2013 in Original Petition Nos. 18/2012 and 10/2012. The parties are Rangan (husband) and Mini (wife), with subsequent cross-appeals by Mini. The Family Court dissolved the marriage on the ground of cruelty and granted permanent alimony of Rs. 4,00,000 in favour of the wife. The wife contended for the return of gold ornaments and Rs. 50,000, claiming entrustment by her parents at the time of marriage; the husband and his relatives denied this. O.P. 10/2012 was dismissed by the Family Court, which prompted Mini to challenge that order in Mat.Appeal No.574/2014. The High Court, while considering the three appeals together, examined whether permanent alimony could be awarded suo motu under Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and whether the evidence on entrustment of valuables was cogent. The court accepted that the decree of dissolution and the suo motu alimony award were within its discretion, and found the Rs.4,00,000 figure reasonable, especially in view of a deformed child. It relied on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh for irretrievable breakdown of marriage and cited other decisions supporting suo motu alimony. The appeals were dismissed, upholding the Family Court’s orders.
Jalaludheen, the appellant, is a life convict convicted for offenses punishable under sections 201, 302 and 392 IPC in connection with the murder of 64-year-old Pankajakshy on the night between 4-5-6 June 2008. The prosecution case is circumstantial with no eyewitnesses. The victim was allegedly brought to the appellant’s house, assaulted, and subjected to an attempted rape, followed by murder; the body was disposed in a waterlogged property after being stabbed and manipulated. The appellant allegedly mixed furadan (carbofuran) with water and administered it to the victim, causing death. Several articles belonging to the victim—jewellery, garments, and a tiffin box—were found or recovered, and a gold ring (MO3) and a gold chain (MO2) allegedly pledged by the appellant are central to the prosecution’s case. The police recovered additional ornaments and undergarments from places connected to the appellant, relying on his disclosures. The autopsy (Ext P15) suggested poisoning but lacked chemical analysis results; Ext P27 did not address the viscera for confirming poison. The trial court found guilt on the main charges but acquitted on a minor charge. On appeal, the Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, held that two independent recoveries (MO2, MO4–MO6 and MO9, MO10, MO12, MO14), together with disclosure statements under Sec.27, are sufficient to establish guilt in a circumstantial case, even if other evidence is weak. The court noted that the poison analysis was inconclusive and that Sec.27 evidence is admissible. The appeal was dismissed and the conviction sustained, with life imprisonment and associated fines. The court relied on precedents, including Babu v. State of Kerala and Ningappa Yallappa Hosamani, to uphold the reasoning that the chain of circumstances may be complete with limited links when the overall proof is strong.
Shoby Paul, the claimant in O.P.(MV) No.411/2003 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha, seeks enhanced compensation for injuries sustained in a road accident on 24 September 2002 when his motorcycle was struck by a Tamil Nadu State Transport bus. The Tribunal found the bus driver negligent and held the vehicle uninsured, directing the Corporation to pay Rs.2,50,480 under various heads with 6% interest from 12 June 2003. Dissatisfied, the appellant challenges the quantum, arguing for higher compensation under categories including transportation and medical expenses, pain and suffering, permanent disability, loss of amenities, and loss of studies. The High Court revisits the evidence, noting the need for ‘just’ compensation rather than windfall, following State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur and the constitutional bench decisions in Pranay Sethi and Sarla Verma. It fixes the appellant’s notional monthly income at Rs.8,000 (citing Fathimath Zuhara) and recalculates the damages accordingly. The court holds that the multiplier applicable to a 22-year-old claimant is 18, not 17, and that the disability percentage should be 25% as per Ext.A9. It increases awards for pain and suffering, bystander and nourishment expenses, and loss of studies, and awards a consolidated additional compensation of Rs.4,32,770 with interest at 8% from the petition date, excluding a 222-day delay. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no costs.
This is an Arbitration Request (Arb.No.18/19) before the Kerala High Court filed by the Kerala Table Tennis Association (KTTA), an affiliate of the Kerala State Sports Council, seeking appointment of an Arbitrator under clause 48 of Annexure A of the MOA of the Table Tennis Federation of India (TTFI). The dispute traces to March 2018 when the TTFI demanded KTTA amend its constitution and withdraw voting rights; KTTA challenged its disaffiliation by the Federation (annexed by orders dated 29.9.2018) and the attempt to amend the Federation’s constitution. KTTA had previously obtained a stay of disaffiliation via W.P.(C).No.32448 of 2018, and later an AGM amended KTTA’s by-laws. KTTA contends the disputes arising under the MOA between the Federation and its constituents fall within the arbitration clause, and that an arbitrator should be appointed as per the agreed procedure, especially since the Federation appointed a sole arbitrator. The Federation and KTTA argued on jurisdiction and seat: the MOA contains clauses dictating legal jurisdiction and venue, and that the “Court” under the Arbitration Act corresponds to the jurisdiction where the Federation’s registered office is located (Delhi). The Kerala High Court ultimately held that the arbitration request fails on jurisdictional grounds, upholding Clause 47 (Legal Jurisdiction) and Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, and dismissed the petition. The issues involve whether the Kerala High Court can appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) given the MOA’s jurisdiction clause and seat, and whether Article 226 can override the arbitration clause.
This High Court of Kerala, in a motor accident appeal, examines whether a compensation claim filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal after a long delay can be entertained where the insurance coverage is undisputed. The claimant suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 02.05.2006. The MACT petition was lodged on 24.03.2015, nearly nine years post-accident, against the vehicle owner, driver, and insurer. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 11,80,800 in favour of the claimant. The insurer appealed contending that the claim was not live and surviving and thus not maintainable; no fixed limitation existed, but the claim had to be brought within a reasonable time. The claimant argued that the MV Act is social welfare legislation; in the absence of an explicit time limit, belated petitions should not be rejected, especially where insurance coverage is undisputed. The court traced the law: predecessors of MV Act imposed shorter periods, later amended provisions removed a hard deadline, but a “reasonable time” test and “live and surviving” requirement remain, as clarified by Purohit & Co. v. Khatoonbee. After analyzing the delay, lack of explanation, and the evidence regarding the claimant’s disability, the court concluded that the claim was abandoned and not live; thus the petition should not be entertained. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned award set aside, and the petition dismissed. This signals the court's emphasis on timely litigation and the caution to not entertain stale, unsubstantiated claims in the MACT framework.
This writ petition (WP(C) No. 3683 of 2019) challenges Ext. P4 Government Order (dated 20.5.1997) restricting alienation by beneficiaries under the One Lakh Housing Scheme. The petitioner, an elderly widow, holds a patta (Ext. P1) for 1.62 ares issued under the Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964. Following her husband’s death, she became the sole legal heir and executed a Will in favor of her husband’s younger brother’s son. She sought to execute a settlement/deed conveying the property to that relative. When she approached the Sub Registrar for registration, she was told that Ext. P4 bars alienation, even though Ext. P1 contains no such restriction. The petitioner contends Ext. P4 was issued after the patta and cannot bind her rights, and that denial of registration would adversely affect her rights. Respondents contend that Ext. P4 is a valid policy measure and binding, and that patta holders must comply with statutory restrictions to implement public policy. The court cites Ext. P5 (2015) holding that post-patta conditions cannot bind pre-existing pattas, and relies on Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala (2010 (2) KLT 908), Joby Mathew v. State of Kerala, and Pushapangadan (Dr.) v. State of Kerala to uphold the petitioner’s rights. Ultimately, the court holds that the SRO’s refusal is illegal and ultra vires and directs registration if otherwise in order, disposing of the petition with costs.
MACA No. 2015 of 2016; W.P.(C) No. 24123 of 2016 At the Kerala High Court, this MACA arises from awards passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pala, in two OP(MV) cases (660/2006 and 661/2006). The appellant, Jacob Sebastian, challenges the Tribunal’s order allowing the insurer to recover the compensation amount from him and the registered owner, on the ground that the vehicle’s ownership transfer occurred before the accident but without due notification to the insurer and without compliance with Section 50 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal found a violation of policy conditions; hence the insurer was entitled to reimbursement. The respondents/claimants contend that the insurer’s liability is governed by the policy issued in the name of the registered owner, and transfer without notification should not automatically void coverage for third parties. The appellant relies on a decision of this court, Sayed v. Gopalakrishnan and Others (2016(2)KHC 351), arguing that the policy terms cannot be construed to penalize third parties where ownership transfer happens prior to the policy. The High Court, after considering the documentary evidence, notes that the policy was issued in the name of the registered owner and that the liability to third parties is covered, concluding that the Tribunal’s direction to recover from the appellant and the registered owner is illegal and unsustainable. Accordingly, the appeal and writ petition are allowed, and the impugned awards are set aside to the extent of recovery.
This Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous petition concerns bail in a case arising from a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (Annexures indicate). Petitioners Biju Panicker and Vikraman Nair, partners of M/S Fasto Ceramics, faced a matter arising from C.C.No. 3826/2016 at the Addl. Civil Judge & Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Morbi, Gujarat, where cognizance was taken by a Gujarat court. The petition seeks bail if arrested, arguing that Kerala authorities can grant bail under Section 81 Cr.P.C and that non-bailable warrants issued by the Gujarat court are to be executed through Kerala authorities. The court recalls the Full Bench decision in Meenakshi Sathish v. Southern Petrochemical Industries (FB) to note that cognizance taken outside Kerala cannot be challenged under Sec.482 Cr.P.C or Article 227 of the Constitution due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. The respondents contend that no non-bailable warrant has been received in Kerala and emphasize the procedural route for relief. The petition cites precedents on exemptions from personal appearance (Reddy v. Excel Glasses Ltd.; Bhaskar Industries Ltd.; Ajith Kumar Chakravorty) to support appearance through counsel. In the end, the court disposes of the Crl.M.C with directions that the accused may seek exemption under Sec.205 Cr.P.C and that the Magistrate may permit appearance through counsel, while maintaining status quo.
This Kerala High Court writ petition (Article 226) filed by Harris H., the registered owner of contract carriage KL-02/Q-55, seeks a mandamus to renew Ext.P2 without requiring a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the financier. The vehicle is under a hire-purchase with the State Bank of India (SBI), which has not issued an NOC. The petitioner submitted Ext.P4 for renewal on 03.10.2018, along with Ext.P5, and later furnished Ext.P6, a declaration under Section 51(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, after the financier did not issue the NOC. The respondent-financier’s objections to renewal are central, but the decision in Shabu Sukumaran v. Regional Transport Officer, TVM (2018(2) KHC 470) is relied upon to argue that the registering authority may renew a permit after affording an opportunity of hearing, even where the financier objects, and that the authority must apply its mind to the objections. The Court directs the 1st respondent to decide Ext.P4 with Ext.P6 after notifying the petitioner and the financier, and to do so expeditiously, within one month from certified copy. The decision relies on Section 51(9) and the discretionary power of the registering authority to balance interests under the MV Act, Article 226, and the Court’s supervisory role.
Mat.Appeal.No. 888 of 2011 This High Court of Kerala matrimonial appeal arises under sections 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The appellant, Janardhanan, challenged OP No.37/2011 of the Family Court, Kasaragod, seeking dissolution of his marriage with A. Pushpa on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The marriage, solemnized on 18 December 1992, produced a son. The husband alleges that after initial cohabitation the couple resided in a modest home; she resented the living standards, pressured him to incur loans, and left the matrimonial home in March 1998 with the child, never returning. He argues that her conduct amounts to cruelty and that she deserted him with intent to permanently abandon the marriage. The respondent concedes the marriage and child but denies cruelty, claiming that the husband’s suspicions, ill-treatment, and lack of support forced her to leave; she asserts willingness to resume cohabitation. The Family Court dismissed the petition, finding no proved cruelty or desertion and thus no entitlement to a divorce. On appeal, the appellant urged that the evidence demonstrates cruelty and desertion, citing jurisprudence that cruelty may be inferred from conduct and that desertion requires animus deserandi. The High Court, after reviewing the evidence and the record, upheld the Family Court’s findings and dismissed the appeal.
V.K. Sasikumar, a retired Branch Manager of the Edanad Service Co-Operative Bank, challenged the gratuity payable under the bank’s master policy with LIC after serving for over 37 years. He retired on 31 May 2015 and was initially paid Rs 10,00,000 as gratuity. LIC later remitted Rs 14,78,468 under Exhibit-R2(a), but the bank, invoking Circular No. 5/2016 and a Joint Registrar order reclassifying the bank from Class II to Class III with effect from 01.04.2014, paid only Rs 10,00,000. The petitioner contends that Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, grants better gratuity terms than Section 4(2), and that the circulars and state-rule provisos cannot override this right. He relies on the Full Bench decision in Chandrasekharan Nair G. and others v. Kerala State Co‑operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. and others, which held that the Central Act’s override and the insurer’s role do not cap an employee’s entitlement to better gratuity under Section 4(5); and on Nedupuzha Service Co-operative Bank v. Rugmini, affirming that excess under the policy should inure to the employee. Respondents contend for pay revision, the 2nd proviso to Rule 59(iii), and reliance on circulars. The High Court disposed of the petition by directing payment of the balance gratuity under LIC policy, plus 6% simple interest from 01.06.2015, within two months, with no costs.
On 28 February 2018, the Kerala High Court, in Tr.P.(C) No. 370 of 2017, heard a Transfer Petition under Section 24 CPC seeking to transfer O.S. No. 135/2017 from Munsiff's Court-I, Kozhikode to the Family Court at Malappuram. The petitioners, Moideenkutty K.K., Shahida P., and Fasna K.K., are the wife and her parents; the sole respondent is Muhammed Asharaf, the husband. The matrimonial disputes between the spouses had already prompted the wife to approach the Family Court for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC and related relief. The husband had filed an OP before the Family Court, while a separate suit for compensation had been instituted in the Munsiff's court, with the petitioners as defendants. The central issue was whether the plaint in the Annexure A Original Suit discloses a cause of action arising from circumstances connected with a matrimonial relationship, and thus whether the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction. The court relied on a catena of Kerala appellate authority decisions, particularly Leby Isaac v. Leena M. Ninan, to interpret the concept of ‘circumstances arising out of a marital relationship’ in Clause (d) of the Explanation to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. It held that such circumstances can include events pre- and post-marriage and those surrounding the marriage that bear directly on it. Consequently, since the civil court lacks jurisdiction and the Family Court at Malappuram is already handling related matters, transfer under Section 24(5) CPC was warranted to ensure consistency and justice. The Annexure A Original Suit thus stands transferred to the Family Court, Malappuram, and the petition is disposed of.
This writ appeal concerns limitation for assessment under the Central Sales Tax Rules, 1957 as incorporated in Kerala’s KVAT regime. The primary issue is whether notices and assessments under CST Rules can be completed outside a fixed period, given Rule 6(5) contains no explicit limitation, while Rule 6(7) and Rule 6(8) prescribe a four-year window for assessments of escaped turnover. The Kerala High Court traces the shift from KGST Act to KVAT Act: completion of assessment under KVAT Section 21 arises on filing a return, with Section 25 prescribing five years for assessment of escaped turnover; CST Rules originally provided a four-year limit under Rule 6(7). The Single Judge held that Rule 6(5) must be implemented within a reasonable time not exceeding the four-year window of Rule 6(7). The Government Pleader urged reliance on Parisons Foods (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Abdul Majeed P.A. v. State of Kerala to argue that there is no fixed maximum for Rule 6(5). The Bench, after analyzing Bhattinda, Gurbax Singh, Indian Aluminum Cables, and Bharat Steel Tubes, held that the four-year period cannot automatically govern Rule 6(5) and that a reasonable period may extend to five years for initiation of proceedings under CST Act. In WA1333 (and connected matters), the Court found that the notices issued on 23.01.2015 for years 2006–2009 were beyond any reasonable limit; WA1333 is rejected with costs and the matter is left open to challenge quantum within 30 days of certified copy of the judgment.
MACA Nos. 651 & 652 of 2016 The insurer of a motorcycle (KL-11/P 5636) challenged a common award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal directing indemnity to two claimants injured in an accident on 31 December 2004. The pillion rider and a pedestrian sought compensation in OP(MV) Nos. 489/2007 and 562/2007. The insurer contended that it was not liable to indemnify because additional premium for pillion rider coverage had not been collected; wound certificates (Exts A2 and A7) described the injuries as arising from a “fall from motor cycle,” and no police report was initially filed; the FIR was registered only on 11 February 2005 and a criminal case followed, culminating in the rider’s acquittal. The Tribunal, in a common award dated 22 May 2010, held the rider rash and negligent and directed indemnity. On appeal, this Court remanded for fresh evidence, accepting Exts A1 (FIR) and A13 (final report) as material. After remand, the Tribunal again concluded negligence on the basis of those documents. The insurer argued that criminal acquittal negates liability and that civil standard of proof differs from criminal. Citing Rajan Raghavan and Kishan Singh, the High Court held that civil negligence must be decided on the evidence before the Tribunal and not bound by criminal judgments. The MACAs were dismissed, upholding the Tribunal’s award and directing the insurer to pay compensation to the claimants.
The petitioners, two teachers (one in Physics and the other in Natural Science) at St. George Higher Secondary School, Thankey, and St. Peter’s Higher Secondary School, Kumbalangi, approached the Kerala High Court under Article 226 challenging the denial of career regularization for the period 02.06.2008 to 31.05.2011. They contended that their appointments, commencing in 2008, were not approved and thus sought quashing of the State’s approvals granted only from 01.06.2011, as well as a declaration that the prior period should be regularized with back pay. They filed revision petitions (Exts. P5, P6) under Rule 92 of Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules (KER). The respondents argued for consideration of the revision petitions in accordance with law and reliance on KER amendments, including prospective application of changes introduced by the 2014 Amendment Rules (Rules 2(1) to 2(5)(c)) and related Chapters. The court, after hearing both sides, directed the 1st respondent to decide the revision petitions in strict accordance with law within two months, and ordered that consequential monetary benefits be disbursed by the DESO within two months thereafter, after due process and hearing. The judgment also cites prior Kerala cases to guide the application of amendments and prior rulings on teacher appointments and bond requirements.
