This writ appeal challenges Ext. P19, a termination order issued by the Kerala Agricultural University (KAU) against an Assistant Professor who had availed Leave Without Allowance (LWA) for 20 years to work abroad. The petitioner contends that an absence after expiry of LWA cannot automatically terminate service; the termination was based on Rule 24A of Chapter III, Part I of the Kerala Service Rules (KSR), Clause 6 of Appendix XII A, and the KAU Statutes, but no prima facie satisfaction or proper inquiry was demonstrated before issuing Ext. P12 memo and Ext. P19 order. The record shows the petitioner delayed reporting due to medical illness and the Covid-19 pandemic; the Enquiry Committee’s findings did not conclusively reject or accept the medical certificates, and there was no explicit finding that the absence was wilful or unauthorised. The respondents relied on KSR provisions and on judicial precedents to argue that failure to join immediately after the expiry of LWA amounts to misconduct and can lead to termination after following the prescribed procedure. The judgment cites M.M. Malhotra, Union of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu, Baldev Singh Gandhi, Krushnakant B. Parmar, M.V. Bijlani and others to delineate the concept of misconduct, the scope of judicial review, and the need for fair procedure. The Court ultimately holds that Ext. P19 cannot be sustained for lack of a finding of wilful or unauthorised absence and allows the appeal, directing that benefits be paid as if the employee had rejoined on expiry of LWA, within three months, given his age.
The petitioner, C. Vinod Kumar, acts as a surety for a loan taken by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents 3 to 5 from Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. The loan, sanctioned in 2004, led to ARC proceedings and an award dated 13 December 2013 (Ext.P1). Pursuant to an undertaking to recover the debt from his salary, the bank issued Ext.P2 notice to his employer. The petitioner challenges three points: (a) the debt is barred by limitation; (b) after an award is passed, the remedy is to execute under Section 76 of the Co-operative Societies Act; and (c) since the debt is secured by a mortgage of the principal debtor, salary proceeds should not be touched without exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. The court notes that under Section 76(b)(ii) of the Co-operative Societies Act, an award for recovery of money can be executed within twelve years from the date of the award, making the limitation claim unfounded as the period would extend to 2025. On the remedy after an award, it cites Trivandrum Cooperative Agricultural Rural Development Bank v. State of Kerala (ILR 2004 (3) Ker. 282) and Sasidharan Nair v. Trivandrum Cooperative Urban and others (2009 (2) KLT 280) to hold that securing an award does not negate Section 37 of the Co-operative Societies Act. On the mortgage contention, the court reiterates that a creditor need not be compelled to proceed against the principal debtor or mortgaged property first, referencing Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act and judgments including SBI v. Indexport Registered and Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Dr. Damodar Prasad. The court ultimately dismisses the petition, upholding the bank’s right to recover the debt and rejecting the petitioner’s challenges.
OT.Rev Nos. 29/2022 to 44/2022 This decision of the Kerala High Court (Division Bench) concerns the validity and interpretation of exemptions under the CST Act 1956 and the KVAT Act 2003 in the context of inter-State sale of natural rubber. The batch of matters—OT.Rev Nos. 29/2022 to 44/2022—arose from orders of the Additional Bench, Kottayam, in revision petitions under VAT. The core statutory framework involves the exemptions granted under Section 8 of the CST Act, as amended by successive Government notifications: first notification (G.O.159/2008/TD) exempting CST on inter-State turnover of natural rubber (HSN 4006.10.00) where tax had already been paid under KVAT; second notification (G.O.181/2011/TD) restricting the exemption to sub-section (1) of Section 8; and third notification (G.O.124/2019/Taxes) introducing an option to pay tax. The Tribunal had remanded to the Assessing Officer to decide the relief after considering the interplay of these notifications, noting the dealer’s ability to opt for exemption or pay tax. The State argued for literal application of the first notification, while respondents argued that the second notification fixes the scope of exemption and that remand was justified. The bench, following Hi-Tek Traders v. Commercial Tax Officer (Ker.), holds that the second notification supersedes the first for practical purposes and that the dealer retains a choice. The revisions are dismissed and remand orders are upheld, with no costs.
The petitioners, 103 managers of aided Lower Primary/Upper Primary Schools across Kerala, filed this writ petition under Article 226 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Union of India to require the State of Kerala to grant formal sanction to impart elementary education by permitting admission of Class V and Class VIII in the petitioners' schools and to extend all benefits available to children studying in aided schools within the State. They also challenged Exhibit P9 notification dated 19.05.2017 issued by the Director of Public Instructions and Government Order dated 09.06.2017. On 04.05.2018, this Court directed the State and educational authorities to provisionally permit admission to Class V or Class VIII and to open the Sampoorna Internet Portal to facilitate admission. The core issue is educational need in localities, determined by school mapping conducted under Kerala Rules and RTE Act, including GIS-based location data, distance to nearest school, transportation facilities, and demographics. The judgment in a previous batch (W.P.(C) 23820/2016 and connected cases) held that upgradation of schools must be grounded in demonstrated educational need found through mapping. In the instant batch, the Court finds no such need, as per the mapping and the 2017 notification/government order. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, but transfer certificates must be issued to students and these students must be admitted to other schools with Class V/VI respectively, without delay. The decision adheres to the Court’s earlier 11.06.2018 ruling in W.P.(C) 23820/2016.
W.P.(C) No.6335 OF 2021(N) Sterling Holiday Resorts Ltd. and its General Manager, Shyju T.V., filed a writ petition under Article 266 of the Constitution seeking a mandamus directing the respondents to provide adequate police protection and to ensure free ingress and egress for employees, guests, vehicles, and goods at the Sterling Munnar resort in Chinnakanal, Idukki. They also sought protection to maintain law and order inside and at the resort entrance and to prevent dharna, marches or demonstrations by the 5th respondent, the Idukki District Hotels, Resorts and Shop Workers Union, within 100 metres of the resort entrance. The petition relied on Exts.P1 and P2 and asserted the need for police protection under the Kerala Police Act, 2011 to prevent interference with the resort’s operations and to safeguard the rights of workers, guests, and management. The Court had earlier issued an interim order (12.03.2021) directing SHOs to prevent threats to law and order without obstructing access to the resort. On 25.03.2021, after hearing, the Court disposed of the petition by directing the 3rd respondent to act to prevent threats, to provide police protection on request, and to permit peaceful, non-obstructive protests. The judgment emphasizes police protection as a matter of duty and cites constitutional principles and precedents on due process, right to unionise, and the balance between public order and democratic rights.
This writ petition challenges an administrative policy denying pensionary benefits for the period of leave without allowance (LWA) taken by a private college teacher for employment abroad. The petitioner, a retired selection grade (botany) lecturer of SD College, Alappuzha, had availed LWA from 1.6.1982 to 27.12.1983 to undertake teaching assignment in Nigeria and rejoined duty on 28.12.1983. He contends that LWA periods ought to be counted as qualifying service for pension, relying on earlier orders and the direct payment scheme’s allowances, while the 14.6.1985 Government Order (Ext.P4) initially stated that LWA would not be counted, and Ext.P5 (6.5.1987) clarified counting in certain circumstances. The Government has repeatedly contended that no provision permits counting LWA as qualifying service, citing subsequent orders and letters (Exts.P8, P9, P12). The core question is whether pre-14.6.1985 LWA periods in private college employment can count toward pension. The matter has been repeatedly considered by Kerala courts; notably, the Full Bench in 2015 (1 KLT 863) held LWA cannot be reckoned. The court herein, after considering Exts.P1–P17 and prior jurisprudence, concludes that the petitioner’s claim is unwarranted and dismisses the writ petition, reinforcing that pensionary benefits cannot be extended for LWA periods absent explicit authorization.
The petitioner, Kunchan C @ Devadas, files a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a mandamus to force the Special Tahsildar (LR) to consider and pass orders in S.M. No.839/2020 on the file of the Land Tribunal, Pattambi. The suo motu proceedings were initiated under Rule 5 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Vesting and Assignment) Rules, 1970 for assignment of the landlord’s rights vested in the Government under Section 72 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 and for issuance of a certificate of purchase under Section 72K read with Rule 14. The land involved is Re.Sy. Nos.156/4, 5 in Block No.15, Kuzhalmannam-II Village, Alathur Taluk, Palakkad District. The petition argues for expeditious disposal, citing the broader judicial policy of prioritizing senior citizens and ensuring disposal on seniority, in line with the court’s prior decisions. The court recalls Narayanan Namboodiri v. The Special Tahsildar (Land Reforms) and others (W.P.(C) No. 28398 of 2017, judgment dated 14.03.2018) which directed tribunals to dispose cases by seniority and to expedite senior citizens’ matters, including use of Village Officers for reports. The court ultimately directs the Land Tribunal to dispose of the S.M.839/2020 strictly in accordance with law and Narayanan Namboodiri directions, with no order on costs.
RPFC No.261/2020 and RPFC No.160/2020 This Kerala High Court revision petition appeal challenges a Family Court order dated 07.05.2020 in MC 141/2016 relating to maintenance for Shemitha (the 1st petitioner), her minor children Shemina and Ajmal Khan, and Abdul Shukkur (the respondent). The petitioners seek maintenance from the date of petition, arguing the 1st petitioner has no independent income and relies on parental support, while the respondent is alleged to have substantial means, with claimed earnings from a grocery business abroad, a salary certificate Ext. D1, property, and a car loan EMI of Rs.41,306. The respondent contends Ext. D1 is unproved and not consular-attested, challenges the admissibility of Ext. D1, and asserts the 1st petitioner’s alleged adulterous life; the court below found the respondent had sufficient means and ordered Rs.10,000 for the 1st petitioner and Rs.8,000 for each child. On revision, the Kerala High Court recognises the evidence limitations, notes the respondent’s second marriage and child, and applies the Supreme Court’s Rajnesh directive to fix maintenance from the petition date. The court partially allows the revisions, reducing the 1st petitioner’s maintenance to Rs.8,000 and maintaining Rs.8,000 for the two minors, while reserving liberty under Sec.127 Cr.P.C for future modification. The common final order is corrected to reflect “both revisions stand allowed in part.”
Komala Bhaskaran, the appellant, challenges the conviction of accused Nos.1 and 2 under Sections 8(2) and 55(g) of the Abkari Act by the Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc)-II, Kalpetta in Sessions Case No.82/2006. The prosecution case alleges that on the night of 17.04.2005, the accused were found distilling arrack at Nathamvayal, in violation of the Abkari Act, with accused No.3 said to have abetted them. After investigation, a final report was submitted, and the matter proceeded to trial where the accused were convicted (accused No.1 and 2) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.1,00,000. On appeal, learned counsel for the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish chemical analysis of the contraband and raises serious concerns about the integrity of the evidentiary chain: delay in producing property and bottles, lack of explanation for custody, and questions about forwarding the samples to the laboratory. The court examines delays from seizure on 17.04.2005 to production on 19.04.2005, the lab report dated 29.04.2005, and gaps in witnesses who handled the samples. Relying on Ravi v. State of Kerala and other precedents, the court finds no reliable link between the seized contraband and the laboratory analysis, casting reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case. Consequently, accused No.1 is acquitted and the appeal is allowed. The judgment emphasizes the necessity of a clear chain of custody and corroborative linkage between seizure, analysis, and the accused.
This writ petition challenges two administrative actions concerning the grant of a non-objection certificate (NOC) to start a petroleum retail outlet on a property offered by the petitioner (Shajida Shajahan). The petitioner had sought NOC under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules after offering her property in Madappally, Changanassery Taluk, to Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOC) for a petrol station. The IOC applied for the NOC; various authorities were consulted (District Police Chief, Tahsildar, District Fire Officer, and the PWD Roads Division), with the PWD report indicating non-compliance with IRC norms. In 2019, this Court directed consideration of the NOC without mandatory IRC/MoRTH norms within three weeks; the 2nd respondent nevertheless rejected the NOC on grounds of neighbour objections. The Court's earlier W.P.(C) 31531/2019 judgment remanded for reconsideration and, after the latest GO 67/2020 (16.10.2020) and related circulars, the 2nd respondent again rejected on grounds that the site did not meet the norms in Exhibit P5. The petitioner contends that Exhibit P5 aligns with MoRTH guidelines and is inconsistent with the judgment in Mary Ulahannan v. Union of India, which was later reversed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 2784-2792/2013. The High Court quashes Exhibit P4 and directs reconsideration consistent with P3 and relevant government orders at the time of application, directing a decision within one month and closing interim applications.
This is a Motor Accidents Claims Appeal arising from an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kollam, in OP(MV) No.1414/2006 dated 26-03-2010, awarding Rs.1,16,800 as compensation to the claimant Sajeev for injuries suffered in a September 2005 accident. The appellant contends the Tribunal erred by taking a monthly income of Rs.2000 instead of Rs.5000 and by under-compensating in several heads. The court records the accident occurred due to negligence by the 2nd respondent and that insurance coverage is in place. The appellant was 26 years old at the time, and the medical records reflect a visual disability of 30% as per Ext.C1, though the court notes it should be treated as 20% whole-body disability given it is a visual impairment. Relying on Ramachandrappa v. Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 13 SCC 236, the court justifies adopting a higher monthly income of Rs.5000 for a coolie. The tribunal’s multiplier of 17 is reconsidered in light of the age and disability. The court reworks the heads of compensation: loss of earnings for 6 months (Rs.18,000), permanent disability (Rs.1,17,600–Rs.2,04,000 range depending on calculation), loss of amenities (Rs.20,000), by-stander’s expenses ( Rs.2,800), pain and suffering (Rs.10,000). The total enhancement amounts to Rs.1,67,000, plus interest. The appeal is allowed in part and the insurer is directed to pay within two months.
This is MFA No. 15 of 2013 filed in the Kerala High Court by National Insurance Company Ltd. against an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Ernakulam, in WCC 25/2005. The claimant, Aneesh Mohan @ Anish, a driver employed by Anuradha Enterprises (the first opposite party), sustained injuries in a motor-vehicle accident on 4 June 2004 while travelling in a goods autorickshaw bearing KL-7/AQ 9661. He claimed compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, asserting a 35% permanent disability and seeking Rs. 6 lakhs. The insurer admitted the policy but contended it covered only the driver, not any passenger, and thus declined liability. The Commission found an employer–employee relationship and awarded Rs. 1,86,791 with 12% interest, directing deposit with the insurer. On appeal, the insurer argued based on Ext.R2 (policy) showing zero carrying capacity and Ext.A11 (cover note) indicating capacity for two passengers, along with binding precedents (Suresh, Paul, and Oriental—each cited) to limit coverage to the driver. The High Court accepted Ext.R2 as controlling, held no passenger coverage, and absolved the insurer while fastening liability on the employer. It ordered the insurer to refund any deposited compensation. The decision clarifies policy construction in workmen’s compensation claims, balancing insurer obligations against employer liability where coverage is confined to the driver.
This High Court of Kerala judgment deals with the evidentiary value of sworn statements made by an assessee during survey proceedings under Section 133A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant, C.K. Abdul Azeez (MD of Parathode Granites Private Limited), was found to have paid an advance of 95 lakhs for land. During survey under 133A, he made a sworn statement claiming the funds were sourced from company resources and not his personal money; he subsequently contended that the agreement was entered into in his capacity as MD and that the funds came from the company. The assessing officer rejected this, treating the 95 lakhs as an unexplained investment under Section 69 since the company’s books did not show such investment. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the ITAT upheld the assessment. The appellant argued that a sworn statement during survey has no evidentiary value and that 133A(3)(iii) merely allows recording of statements, not oath. The department argued that the sworn statement, coupled with documentary evidence, supports an assessment. The Kerala High Court examined questions of law concerning 133A’s power to examine on oath and the evidentiary value of such statements, citing Paul Mathews, Hotel Samrat, and Travancore Diagnostics to harmonize the law. Ultimately, the court held that a sworn statement is not conclusive and can corroborate other materials, but cannot be the sole foundation for assessment. The appeal was dismissed with no costs, upholding the Tribunal’s findings that the 95 lakhs were an unexplained investment.
The petitioner, Denu P Thampi, was accused of rape under Section 376 IPC in Crime No.2211 of 2014 registered at Pathanamthitta Police Station and was pursued through C.P. No. 13 of 2017 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate-1, Pathanamthitta. The first respondent, Ms. X, alleged multiple acts of sexual intercourse over four days in Coimbatore and Ooty in December 2014, following a relationship fostered through social media, after which she returned to Kerala and reported the matter on 20 December 2014. The petitioner and the first respondent later married on 30 January 2015 under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, a fact evidenced by Annexure-2, the marriage certificate. The petitioner moved this Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings in CP No. 13 of 2017, arguing that the parties have compromised, that she is content, and that a marriage under the Special Marriage Act constitutes a legitimate basis to discontinue prosecution. The Respondents opposed, emphasising that rape is a non-compoundable offence and that compromise cannot be used to quash proceedings. The court examined whether the alleged rape could be viewed as consensual sex based on a promise to marry and whether the subsequent marriage affects the continuation of prosecution. It found no fraudulent intent to marry and noted that the couple is living as husband and wife, with continuing prosecution being an abuse of process; accordingly, the petition was allowed and the proceedings quashed, with confidentiality measures for the complainant’s identity.
This Kerala High Court judgment concerns a criminal miscellaneous case arising from a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, on 8 January 2014 allowed an amendment to the complaint (Annexure D) at the instance of the complainant (the 2nd respondent). The accused petitioned under Crl.M.C. No. 5799 of 2014 challenging this order, contending that there is no express provision in Cr.P.C. authorizing amendment of a complaint and that such an amendment would be illegal and prejudicial. The respondent-complainant contends that criminal courts possess an intrinsic power to amend pleadings to cure curable infirmities, and relies on decisions of the Supreme Court in Sukumar S.R. v. Sunaad Raghuram (2015) 9 SCC 609 and U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Modi Distillery (1987) 3 SCC 684, among others. To determine the issue this Court directed the trial court to report when cognizance was taken and when summons were issued. The trial court’s report shows the complaint was filed on 5 October 2013, amended on 8 January 2014, cognizance taken on 17 January 2014, and summons issued later in February 2014. Relying on the cited apex court dicta, Hafsa Rahman T. and related authorities, the High Court held that amendments prior to cognizance for curable infirmities are permissible if no prejudice ensues to the accused. Consequently, the court dismissed the Crl.M.C., upholding the trial court’s amendment order and the cognizance sequence.
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by P.A. Thomas Tharakan against the Taluk Land Board Cherthala, the Tahsildar Ernad Taluk, the Village Officer of Mambad Village, and the Revenue Divisional Officer Alappuzha. The petitioner seeks a mandamus to the 4th respondent RDO to pass final orders on Ext.P1 under sub-section (8) of Section 85 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and to set aside the order in TLB 30/Shy. He also seeks a mandamus directing the 3rd respondent Village Officer to accept land tax for 5.10 acres situated in land records corresponding to document nos. 1189, 1190, 1197 at Nilambur. The dispute arises from a surrender arrangement involving land in Pullipadam (Nilambur) in exchange for land in Mambad Village, with a focus on survey numbers 362/3 and 362/4. Interim orders were issued (11.08.2020) directing the 3rd respondent to accept property tax, and on 27.01.2021 the petitioner was informed he may remit tax for the Mambad land. The 4th respondent filed a statement indicating they would conduct a hearing and may require more time. The Court disposed of the petition directing the 1st respondent to consider Ext.P1 in order, with notice and video-hearing, within three months from receipt of a certified copy of the judgment, while reiterating that mandamus cannot contravene law and must conform to statutory provisions.
WP(C).No. 13606 of 2018 (A) The petitioner, Sreelakshmi M, a student of Vimala College, Thrissur, participated in the NadodNrutham (Folk Dance) – Women’s category at the Calicut University Union D Zone Arts Fest, 2018, held at Panampalli Memorial College, Chalakudy, and secured the second place, as evidenced by Ext.P3. The Arts Fest is governed by the Calicut University Arts Fest Manual. Paragraph 4 divides affiliated colleges into six zones and, per Para.4.3, only those who secure first place (and, where there is one first place and multiple second places, one second-place winner selected by lot) are eligible to participate in inter-zone competitions. In the present case, there were two first-place winners, so the petitioner, having only second place, was not permitted to participate in the Inter-Zone Event. The petitioner challenged Ext.P4, the order of the 4th respondent’s Appeal Committee, seeking certiorari to quash it and a mandamus to permit participation in Inter-Zone Arts Fest-2018. The respondents contend that Para.4.3 was strictly followed and the petitioner has no grievance. The court cites Rhomy Chandra Mohan v. Gen. Convenor, Balakalotsavam and Yuvajanotsavam and Sweety v. State of Kerala to emphasize that internal rules and merit assessments by competent judges are ordinarily not open to judicial re-evaluation, except for plain illegality or malafides. Ultimately, the court held no interference is warranted, dismissed the petition, and declined costs, upholding Ext.P4.
This appeal challenges the Railway Claims Tribunal’s dismissal of a claim under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989, for compensation on account of the death of the appellants’ son who, on 23 January 2012, fell while attempting to board a moving train. The Tribunal held that the injuries and death fell within the proviso to Section 124A as a “self-inflicted injury” and thus not payable to dependants. The appellants contended that the provision is beneficial and must be interpreted harmoniously to promote its purpose, arguing that there was no clear mens rea establishing a self-inflicted act. They asserted the incident occurred in the context of boarding a moving train, not as an intentional self-harm act, and that the evidence did not establish the requisite culpable intent. The High Court undertook a survey of interpretive canons applicable to welfare legislation—harmonious construction, beneficial interpretation, and the primacy of legislative object—while examining authorities including Alembic, Transport Corporation, and various decisions on harmonious interpretation. It concluded that the language of Section 124A is plain and unambiguous and that there is no repugnancy warranting harmonious construction. The Court held that the Tribunal erred in its factual/appreciation, set aside the adverse order, and, applying a 2016 amendment, awarded the appellants Rs. 8,00,000 with interest, thereby allowing the Misc. First Appeal. No costs.
WP(C).No.20445 of 2020 (E) The petitioners, husband and wife, own land at Perumbaikad village and planned a commercial building. A lease agreement (Ext.P1) was executed with a hotelier (4th respondent) for 6,000 sq ft on the ground floor at Rs. 3,30,000 per month for five years, to commence from 1 January 2021, with registration of document No. 2415/I/2019 and stamp payment. The COVID-19 pandemic halted construction, prompting the parties to execute Ext.P2, a deed of cancellation dated 8 November 2020. The 3rd respondent refused to register Ext.P2, claiming it fell within surrender of lease under Article 54(a) of the Stamp Act and required registration fee under Article 1(g) of the Table of Fees (Registration Act). The petitioners argued Ext.P2 is a cancellation of a lease (which is not yet in existence or possession) and not a surrender. The Registrar argued that the lease creates an interest in immovable property and requires compulsory registration and stamping under applicable acts. The court examined the Transfer of Property Act provisions (Sections 105–117, especially 105, 106, 107, 111) and the doctrine that surrender under Section 111 requires express or implied surrender with possession. It held Ext.P2 to be a cancellation, not a surrender, allowed the writ petition, quashed Ext.P4, and directed registration of Ext.P2 as a cancellation deed, to be completed within one month.
BA Nos. 7913, 7981, 8006, 8059, 8203, 8239, 8606, 8754 & 8763 of 2022 These bail petitions concern Sri Lankan refugees/foreign nationals accused of offences related to illegal immigration and human trafficking, namely offences punishable under IPC Sections 511 and 370 read with Section 34; Foreigners Act Sections 14A, 14C; Emigration Act Section 10; Passport Act Section 12(1)(a). The petitions, listed as BA Nos. 7913, 7981, 8006, 8059, 8203, 8239, 8606, 8754 and 8763 of 2022, were heard by a Single Judge (Justice Viju Abraham) on 22 November 2022 with interim bail orders previously passed on 28 October and 04 November 2022. The petitioners are largely Sri Lankan nationals and some are refugees living in camps in Tamil Nadu; they have been in custody since September 2022. The court grappled with detention and visa/travel restrictions and the viability of detention centers or transit homes to accommodate foreign nationals released on bail. Authorities indicated that a transit home at Mayyanad, Kollam District, and possible refugee-camp transfers were under consideration, while Tamil Nadu authorities were to be consulted. The court directed interim bail with conditions, including staying at specified homes or open prisons, ensuring medical and educational arrangements for children, and cooperation with investigations, while awaiting further directions from relevant authorities. The matter was disposed of with ongoing directions for implementation and future instructions.
