This writ petition challenges the selection process for appointing a Santhi at the Kala Bhairava temple under the Sree Manappully Bhagavathy Devaswom. The petitioners—Prakash K.M., Rajesh M., and Vinod P. Nair—contend that a 06.04.2022 notification invited applications, the interviews were conducted on 19.10.2023, but no shortlist was published, and the selection was decided by a draw of lots rather than merit, undermining transparency. The interview board consisted of four members: the Hereditary Trustee, the Tantri, the Executive Officer, and the Assistant Devaswom Commissioner; marks were awarded with 10 marks from each ordinary member and 20 marks from the Tantri, with a total of 50 marks and a cutoff of 30. The 5th respondent secured the highest marks (38) and was eventually chosen by lottery in front of the Mel Shanthi. The petition asserts the 5th respondent has a history of complaints, as shown in Exts. P5–P7, and that the entire process was a sham or 'eye wash'. A counter affidavit asserts that the process was public, transparent, and consistent with the board's procedures. The court, invoking the decision in Tata Cellular and the general scope of Article 226, finds the petitioners have failed to show mala fides, arbitrariness, or perversity in the decision-making process. Consequently, the court declines to interfere, and the writ petition is dismissed.
CRL.M.C. No. 9317 of 2023 This Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC arises from the prosecution of Mohanan V C in SC No.865/2022, connected to Crime No.551/2022 of Valapattanam Police Station, Kannur District. The petitioner stands charged under Sections 341, 323 and 506 IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The prosecution alleges wrongful confinement, assault and criminal intimidation of the victim. The petitioner contends that the parties have settled the dispute and do not wish to continue the prosecution; the victim supports this by filing an affidavit, and the victim’s stance is that there is no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while expressing reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement, concedes that the matter is settled between the parties. The Court relies on established Supreme Court jurisprudence, notably Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) 5 SCC 688, along with Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, to articulate the permissible scope of Section 482 quashing for non-compoundable offences where the dispute is private and settled. The judgment clarifies that such quashing is inappropriate for heinous/offences of public impact and for offences under special statutes, but permits it where the offence is private and the settlement is genuine. After evaluating the records and the affidavit, the court holds the dispute to be private in nature and accepts the settlement, directing quashing of all further proceedings in SC No.865/2022 arising from Crime 551/2022.
This High Court judgment confines to MACA No.940 of 2011, arising from an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode. The claimant, V.T. Gopalan, sustained serious injuries on 17-04-2008 when travelling in bus KL-11-H-8449 from Narikkuni to Kozhikode; the vehicle allegedly sped and twisted left near C.H.Palli, Nadakkavu, causing the claimant’s hand to strike an electric post. The Tribunal awarded Rs.1,20,738 but deducted 40% for contributory negligence. The appellant challenged this deduction, arguing there was no contributory negligence and relying on Meera Devi v. HRTC, Ramachandran V. Narendra Sinh, and Jumanibegam v. Ram Narayan to show lack of basis for attributing fault to the claimant. The court examined the claim petition, FI statement (Ext.A1), and the balance of evidence, observing that the petitioner’s stated cause of injury was the driver’s sudden left turn. It held that the Tribunal’s inference of the petitioner’s act (hand outside the bus) was unsupported. Consequently the court set aside the 40% contributory negligence finding, recalculated compensation on the basis of Rs.6,500 monthly income (per Ramachandrappa), enhanced various heads (loss of earnings, bystander’s expenses, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, permanent disability), totaling Rs.2,24,060, with interest at 7% p.a. The third respondent, New India Assurance Co. Ltd., is directed to pay the enhanced amount along with interest.
This petition challenges an order in O.S.1416/2018 before the II Addl. Munsiff, Ernakulam, arising from a suit for cancellation of a sale deed of a property held in trust for parishioners. The sale deed was executed for Rs. 8.55 crore. The plaint value was reduced under Section 25(d)(ii) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, reportedly following this Court’s decision in Usman Kurikkal v. Parappur Achuthan Nair (2012 (3) KLT 261). The trial court subsequently directed the plaint to be returned because the valuation exceeded Rs. 10 lakhs, thereby exceeding pecuniary jurisdiction for proper presentation. The petition contends the suit relates to trust property and should be governed by Section 28 of the Act, not by Sections 25 or 40. The High Court notes that the suit concerns property held in trust for parishioners and emphasizes that Section 28 is a special provision for trust properties, acting as an exception to Section 40. It clarifies that beneficiaries seeking to cancel the conveyance of trust property are governed by Section 28, with limited court fees (maximum Rs. 200 or Rs. 1,000 where there is no market value). For pecuniary jurisdiction, the valuation governs the forum. The court holds that the trial court’s insistence on Section 40 valuation was erroneous and that the plaint must be returned, with the original petition ultimately dismissed.
Cont.Case (C) No.1686 of 2019 This Contempt of Court case concerns alleged willful disobedience of directions contained in Annexure A1 judgment dated 12.10.2018 in W.P.(C) No.661/2015 and connected matters. The petitioners—P.K. Vijayappan, K.K. Unnikrishnan and Geetha E.—invoke Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, seeking enforcement of the writ petition order and related directives. The backdrop is the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) pension scheme, including the 2014 amendment via notification G.S.R. 609(E) and the pre-amendment para 11(3) and post-amendment para 11(4) provisions. The Supreme Court, in its 4 November 2022 judgment in Civil Appeals Nos. 8143-44 of 2022 and connected matters, and the accompanying ruling in Sunil Kumar B. (AIR 2022 SC 5634) held the notification legal and valid, issuing consequential directions for implementation and the extension of certain options. The Kerala High Court, after hearing the petitioners and the EPFO’s standing counsel, held that the petitioners’ entitlement to higher pension requires reconsideration by EPFO in light of the 2022 Supreme Court judgment. The Contempt Case is closed, without prejudice to EPFO’s right to reconsider entitlements in accordance with law and the Apex Court’s directions. The Appendix lists annexures and related communications.
This writ petition challenges Exts. P7, P12, P14 and P15, seeking a declaration that the petitioner belongs to the Paniya Scheduled Tribe and is entitled to all benefits of the Paniya caste, including a community certificate. The petitioner, a B.Com student at Vimala College, Thrissur, asserts she was born into the Paniya community and raised within its traditions; Ext.P1 shows Paniya listed in the Second Schedule of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. Documents like Exts. P2–P6 and P10–P11 establish a strong cultural link to the Paniya community through the mother and maternal grandmother, and Ext.P4–P6 indicate mixed parentage via inter-caste marriage. The mother reportedly received ST-related benefits (Exts. P8–P9), and the Govindamala Paniya Tribal Colony certificates (Exts. P10–P11) corroborate a matrilineal Paniya milieu. However, KIRTADS, in Ext. P12, concluded the petitioner does not belong to Paniya, a finding later upheld by the Scrutiny Committee and the Government (Exts. P14–P18). The petitioner contends the enquiry was flawed, not hearing her, and relied on generalizations about inter-caste marriage. The court references Indira v. State of Kerala to emphasize that caste claims require proof of social, economic, and educational disabilities and acceptance by society, and it sets aside Exts. P7, P12, P14, P15 and P17, directing a fresh, fair inquiry with opportunity for hearing. The petition is disposed with a six-month deadline for final orders after a proper enquiry.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal misc. case (Crl.M.C. No. 6205 of 2023) decided by Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan on 5 September 2023. The petition seeks to quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in CC 626/2022 arising from Tirurangadi Police Station Crime No. 5/2015. Petitioners 1 and 2 were accused in the original case; the matter involved offences under sections 143, 147, 341, 323, 427, 294(b), 427, 506(i) read with 149 IPC. During pendency, disputes between parties were settled; co-accused 3–5 were acquitted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court-I, Parappanangadi (Annexure A3). The case against petitioners was split and refiled as CC 626/2022. The petition argues that continued prosecution would be an abuse of process as the substratum of the prosecution case has been shattered by the acquittal of co-accused. The Public Prosecutor counters that the petitioners must face trial and Section 482 cannot be invoked to quash. The court relies on Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police, Abbas T.K. v. State of Kerala, and Ashraf Kancheriyil v. State of Kerala to note that if substratum is shattered, quashing can be justified. After examining the acquittal evidence, the court concludes the substratum is gone and allows the Crl.M.C, quashing CC 626/2022 and further proceedings against petitioners.
This intra-court appeal, WA No.1861 of 2023, arises from the writ petition WP(C) No.15090/2023 filed in the Kerala High Court by Bineesh M.N. and colleagues challenging the regularisation process for two driver vacancies at Udayamperoor Grama Panchayat. The single judge had allowed the petitioners and the respondents (6th and 7th in the writ petition) who were daily/contractual workers, to continue in their posts and participate in the selection for regular appointments, while directing the Panchayat to complete the selection process expeditiously and not later than three months. The appellant, Sudhir K.N., the 7th respondent in the writ petition, contended that the Panchayat had introduced a new age-guideline (30.03.2023) fixing an upper age limit, rendering him overage and unable to participate in the selection, thereby prejudicing his rights. He argued that the new guidelines should not bar his eligibility and sought to strike down or modify the lower court order. The High Court, noting that the appellant was overage at the relevant time, held that the observation of the learned Single Judge did not adversely affect the appellants’ position and disposed of the appeal by upholding the need to complete regularisation within three months, while allowing ongoing incumbents to continue until replacement. The judgment clarifies that the “last come, first go” principle would apply only when regular incumbents are appointed surplus, and that the appellant may seek regularisation if permitted by rules or guidelines.
MAT.APPEAL NO. 807 OF 2022 This matrimonial appeal challenges two Family Court orders (I.A. Nos. 2184/2021 and 2185/2021 in O.P. No. 1714/2015) in Ernakulam, arising from a long‑drawn dispute between spouses who married in 2005 and separated in 2008. The wife filed for divorce (O.P. 239/2010) and later sought recovery of a share in jointly acquired property; divorce was granted in 2015 by the Family Court, Coimbatore. In 2018, the Family Court at Ernakulam passed a decree in O.P. 1714/2015, declaring the wife entitled to Rs. 17,20,150 from the sale proceeds of property in joint names and issuing a prohibitory injunction preventing the husband from receiving sums from respondents 2–4. The husband, served but ex‑parte, contends he was unaware of proceedings while posted in Gujarat; he requested condonation of a 900‑day delay and setting aside the ex‑parte decree. The trial court dismissed the delay and set‑aside petitions. The Kerala High Court, after consideration, condones the 900‑day delay on terms: the husband must pay Rs. 25,000 as costs to the wife, deposit 50% of Rs. 17,20,150 within one month, and furnish security for the balance, with the trial court to complete trial within six months, failing which the ex‑parte decree may be revived. With these conditions, the appeal stands disposed of in the wife’s favor, preserving the wife’s rights while providing a controlled opportunity for the husband to contest.
Cont.Case (C) No.2261 of 2019 This Contempt Case (Cont.Case (C) No.2261 of 2019) arises out of W.P.(C) No.38481 of 2016. The petitioners, representing a large group of EPF beneficiaries/employees, filed contempt against the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) for alleged willful disobedience of Annexure 1 judgment dated 12.10.2018 in WP(C) 38481/2016 and connected matters. The matter traces the legal trajectory of the 2014 amendment to the scheme governing pension and contribution, notably under notification G.S.R.609(E) and the pension scheme’s paragraphs 11(3) and 11(4). The Supreme Court’s subsequent judgment dated 04.11.2022 in Sunil Kumar B. v. EPFO (AIR 2022 SC 5634) clarified the legal status of the 2014 amendment and directed certain read-downs and time extensions, including extending options and applying the amended provisions to exempted establishments. The Kerala High Court acknowledged these pronouncements and directed EPFO to reconsider higher pension entitlements in light of the 2022 apex court decision, while holding that the contempt petition can be closed. Ultimately, the court closed the contempt case, reserving EPFO’s right to reassess entitlement under the post-2014 regime consistent with the 2022 ruling.
Salimol Jacob, the first accused, challenges the conviction for cheating under section 420 read with section 34 IPC arising from CC 313/1997, and the related appellate orders. The case traces a scheme by which the accused allegedly induced PW1–PW5 to part with money on the promise of arranging visas and overseas employment, only to return them to Kerala without visas. The prosecution produced oral evidence from PW1–PW9 and documentary Exts.P1–P7, including Ext.P2, a stamped receipt/agreement wherein the accused purportedly guaranteed job opportunities abroad. The trial court convicted the first and third accused under sections 420 r/w 34 IPC, and sentenced them to two years’ rigorous imprisonment with compensation orders. The Additional Sessions Judge, on appeal, altered the sentence to six months’ simple imprisonment but affirmed the compensation, maintaining conviction. The revision petition argues lack of direct receipt of funds by the first accused, absence of documentary proof, significant delay in filing, and reliance on two apex court decisions (Sukhram v. State of MP and Vindhu Lachmandas) to claim benefit of doubt. The State contends Ext.P2 demonstrates both mens rea and a dishonest inducement and that acquittal of A2 and A3 does not erode A1’s liability. The High Court ultimately upholds the conviction, emphasizing the requisite mens rea at the time of inducement and the substantive evidence linking A1 to the transaction. The revision is dismissed; the court imposes imprisonment till rising of the Court with a fine of Rs 1,00,000, and directs disbursement of Rs 20,000 to each of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW9 upon realisation of the fine.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court of Kerala challenging the continuation of proceedings in Crime No. 883/2023 of Kadinamkulam Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram. Eight accused (1–8) are named in the petition filed by their counsel, seeking quashing of offences under IPC sections 341 ( wrongful confinement ), 294(b) (obscene language), 323 (hurt), 324 (voluntarily causing hurt with dangerous weapons), and 34 (common intention). The State/Respondents oppose only on grounds that public interest must be weighed, but the victim’s affidavit and the parties’ affidavits indicate settlement and no objection to quashing. The court, relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence led by State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) and the earlier Gian Singh and Narinder Singh decisions, sets out the framework: quashing non‑compoundable offences can be entertained when the dispute is private and resolved, except for heinous or serious offences (e.g., murder, rape, dacoity), offences under special statutes (like PCA) or acts by public servants; and the court may assess whether prosecution has a public interest to override settlement. The Kerala High Court finds the dispute private, the settlement bona fide, and that no public interest is served by continuing the prosecution; accordingly, it allows the CrL.M.C. and quashes all further proceedings and the final report in Crime No. 883/2023. The order is passed by Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan, Single Judge.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.MC No. 5860 of 2016) decided by Judge Raja Vijayaraghavan V on 12 January 2017. The petitioner, M. Sanjeevan, faced prosecution for an offence punishable under Section 419 IPC (cheating by personation) in connection with CC No. 1576/2013 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kannur. The de facto complainant, M. Praveena, a divorced typist, alleged that the petitioner responded to her marriage advertisement, discussed with her and her family, and, after interactions suggesting he was unmarried, induced her to marry him. The police charge sheet formed the basis of the final report. The petitioner invoked Section 482 CrPC, contending that the prosecution lacks essential ingredients of the offence and is an abuse of process. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that there is no proof that the petitioner impersonated another person (Section 416 IPC) and that the prosecution has failed to establish deceit, fraudulent inducement, or resulting harm necessary for 419 IPC. The Public Prosecutor argued the act could cause harm and the case should proceed, with discharge possible later. The court ultimately held that the materials do not establish a 419 offence and that continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of process, quashing the final report and proceedings in CC 1576/2013.
Mat.Appeal No.639 of 2022 This is a matrimonial appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, challenging an ex parte decree passed by the Family Court, Ernakulam on 20 February 2015 in OP 847/2013 for the return of gold ornaments and money. The appellant, Shajan V.S., contested the ex parte order, contending that there was no laches or negligence and seeking condonation of a substantial delay in filing the appeal, totaling 1827 days. The respondent, Nisha Shajan, opposed the application, detailing a sequence of interlocutory petitions and defaults by the appellant, including non-payment of costs imposed by the Family Court. The Family Court disposed of several petitions for restoration due to non-appearance or non-payment, and the appellant’s subsequent restoration petitions were dismissed for default. The appellant then filed this Mat.Appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, seeking condonation of delay. The respondent argued that the appellant’s conduct demonstrates negligence and tactical filings designed to delay execution of the decree, and thus the delay cannot be condoned. The High Court, in a Division Bench, applied the liberal but reasoned approach to condonation of delay, citing Katiji and Esha Bhattacharjee, and found the delay inordinate and the conduct lax. It held that the delay was not justified, dismissed the CM application, and, as a consequence, dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation.
Mat.Appeal Nos.746 & 774 of 2019 Two connected appeals (Mat.Appeal Nos. 746/2019 and 774/2019) were heard together by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. The first appeal challenged the Family Court, Kozhikode, judgment and decree dated 05.04.2019 in O.P.No.71/2018, which allowed the wife’s claim for past maintenance of Rs.1,44,000 (Rs.4,000 per month for 36 months from 02.01.2015 to 02.01.2018). The second appeal arose from a separate petition (O.P.No.1172/2017) for dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty and desertion, which was also dismissed by the Family Court. The appellant invoked Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, with delay condonation applications. During the pendency, the parties were referred to mediation at the Ernakulam Mediation Centre; they arrived at a comprehensive settlement dated 03.11.2022. The memorandum settled all disputes, including a monetary sum and gold, and provided for divorce by mutual consent under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, with an intent to waive the statutory six-month cooling period under Section 138(2). On 07.12.2022, the court noted the settlement and determined that continuing mediation and the parties’ separate living since 2014 justified dispensing with the six-month waiting period. The Appeals were allowed in terms of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 03.11.2022, with clause 6 to form part of the judgment, effectively granting a divorce by mutual consent and recording the settlement terms.
This is a Kerala High Court revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, challenging a Family Court Thalassery order in MC 230/2008 directing the petitioner, Sameer, to pay maintenance to his minor daughter, Fathima Sana, at Rs. 5,000 per month from the date of the petition (28.06.2018). The respondent, represented by her mother Shabeena, contends the child requires maintenance, with the applicant alleged to earn Rs. 1 lakh per month from Gulf employment and to own property; the child’s claim was for Rs. 7,000 per month. The petitioner contends that a lump-sum settlement of Rs. 4 lakh to the child’s mother plus Rs. 3 lakh for maintenance under a separate agreement has already satisfied his obligations; he argues the Family Court erred by not recognizing this and by basing maintenance on the petition. The respondent’s counsel contends the alleged agreement was not marked in evidence, and even if it exists, a minor cannot be bound by such settlements, with Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act rendering such arrangements void against public policy. The court notes the absence of production of the agreement in evidence, considers the minor’s rights under Section 125 CrPC, and ultimately holds that the lumpsum arrangement cannot defeat the statutory obligation. The petition is dismissed, upholding the maintenance order.
The petitioner, Harees A.M., an employee of the Kerala State Pollution Control Board (KSPCB), challenges Exts. P12 and P5 and seeks reinstatement in service and a regular promotion to the post of Environmental Engineer on the vacancy that arose on 31.05.2021. He had joined as Assistant Engineer in 2008, was promoted to Assistant Environmental Engineer in 2013, and during 2020-2021 was promoted on a temporary basis to Environmental Engineer against a leave vacancy. A suspension order was issued on 16.12.2021 following bribery allegations, and, after a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) convened on 28.05.2022 and 03.06.2022, the petitioner’s candidature for promotion was not considered because he was under suspension. The petitioner contends that the two substantial vacancies existed as of 31.05.2021; since there was no disciplinary action against him at that time, the DPC should have considered his eligibility against the vacancies, even if the committee convened later. He relies on Full Bench decisions (Varghese; James Thomas; Padmanabhan Nair) and Supreme Court rulings (Union of India v. Jankiraman; P.N. Premachandran) asserting that the relevant date is the vacancy occurrence and that administrative delays should not punish promotes. The Kerala High Court partially allows the petition, setting aside Ext. P10 as applied to the petitioner and directing a fresh DPC within three months to assess the petitioner’s suitability for the May 2021 vacancy, while keeping in view pending proceedings and KS&SSR rules.
This Kerala High Court writ petition (WP(C) No. 20105 of 2018) was heard and decided on 14 December 2018 by Justice Anil K. Narendran. The petitioner, Kabeer, sought a regular permit for the stage carriage KL-10/AK-6070 on the North Parur–Vytila Hub route. The prayer was to quash Ext. P7, the 17 March 2018 order of the 1st respondent RTA rejecting the permit, which had relied on Ext. P3, the State Transport Authority’s 14 June 2017 decision fixing age limits for stage carriages. The respondent State had previously relied on decisions that framed age restrictions under the Motor Vehicles Act to regulate public transport. The significance of previous writ petitions (notably W.P.(C) No. 24680/2017) is highlighted: in that batch, the court’s judgment dated 15 October 2018 set aside the 14 June 2017 fixation for age limits as violative of natural justice and directed reconsideration by the STA, with guidance on public-safety-oriented restrictions under the MV Act. The present court acknowledges these developments and disposes of the petition by setting aside Ext. P7 and directing the 1st respondent to reconsider the request, applying the law laid down in the 2018 judgment and ensuring status quo pending fresh orders, with a two-month deadline for a new decision and possible temporary permits."
Chandran, the petitioner, is the owner of a Stage Carriage bearing Reg. No. KL-46-M-8793, purchased from the 2nd respondent. Registration evidenced by Ext.P1 shows a registration date of 18-01-2016. The petitioner contends the vehicle was transferred to him on 21-12-2017 as per Ext.P2 clearance certificate, and that Ext.P4 regular permit for KL-46-M-8793 was issued effective from 21-12-2017, replacing his previous vehicle KL-08-AF-4880. He has been remitting welfare fund contributions for the older vehicle (KL-08-AF-4880) from 09/2005 to 04/2019, as shown by Ext.P5. The petitioner submitted Ext.P6 seeking permission to remit welfare fund contributions for the new vehicle KL-46-M-8793 from 21-12-2017, but the 1st respondent refused, directing proof of remittance for the period between 18-01-2016 and 21-12-2017 before accepting contributions for the new vehicle. The petitioner relies on Ummar v. Joint RTO, Thalassery and Ors. (2014) which laid down the transfer-date based liability under the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 and its amendment. The Court noted that, depending on whether transfers occur before or after the amendment, liability may rest with the erstwhile owner or transfer with the vehicle. The petition was disposed of with directions to the 1st respondent to consider Ext.P6 in light of Ummar (supra) and decide within six weeks, with interim tax payments already permitted subject to welfare fund proof.
This is a criminal revision petition (Crl.R.P No.1534 of 2003) heard by single judge Justice A. Hariprasad, arising from a conviction under the Kerala Forest Act. The accused was charged in CC 226/1999 with offences under Section 27(1)(e)(iii) and (iv). The lower courts convicted him for both sub-clauses for trespass and cutting teak in the Kuyilimala reserve forest (Vairamany Forest Station) and attempted to saw the log. The prosecution’s case rested on the detection by PW1 and verification by PW2, with Exts P1-P3 documenting the scene and forest status. The defense argued the evidence was insufficient and asserted possible framing, pointing to lack of independent witnesses and inconsistencies in PW1’s cross-examination and DWs. The revision court examined the interpretation of sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) and noted Mundamdra Kareem v. Deputy Ranger, Forest Station, Pothukal (2014 (4) KHC 529), which holds that the term “trespass” in sub-clause (iv) can extend beyond the acts in sub-clause (iii) and may include entry into a reserve forest without intent to commit an offence. Accordingly, the court set aside the conviction under clause (iv) while confirming the conviction under clause (iii) and applying the minimum sentence. Probation provisions were held inapplicable. All pending interlocutory applications were dismissed, finalizing a partly favorable outcome for the petitioner.
