This proceeding arises from Ext P2, dated 15 September 2020, in OS No.8/2015 before the Subordinate Judge, Chavakkad, challenging an order appointing a next friend for the first plaintiff and her late brother in a suit for cancellation of a document and related relief. The suit, filed by the first plaintiff and her late brother, sought to safeguard their interests; during the proceedings, they sought appointment of a next friend under Order 32 Rule 15 CPC on the ground of mental infirmity. The trial court, after enquiry, granted the appointment. This Court previously interfered via Ext P1 (dated 15 January 2020), setting aside that order and directing reconsideration in light of medical evidence. Following Ext P1, the trial court again concluded that the first respondent and her late brother were incapable of independently protecting their interests, relying on medical certificates (Ext P4) indicating chronic schizophrenia and on witness deposition. The petitioner argues that the first respondent has previously testified in CC No. 847/2004 indicating sound mind, and that Ext P2 is flawed for not properly considering medical evidence. Relying on Mary v. Leelamma (DB) for interpreting “mental infirmity” under Order 32 Rule 15 CPC, the High Court finds no illegality in Ext P2 and dismisses the original petition. The appointment of a next friend thus stands and no interference is warranted.
This is a Kerala High Court writ petition under Article 226 challenging Ext.P5, a re-tender notification issued by the Guruvayur Devaswom for the kuthaka right to sell coconuts to devotees and to collect broken coconuts from Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple and Sastha Temple for the period 01.11.2023 to 31.10.2024. Petitioner K.S. Mohanan contends Ext.P5 should be quashed and the tender finalised under Ext.P1, arguing that he should be declared the successful bidder for Rs.69,66,666, since the highest bidder Anil Kumar allegedly failed to submit Aadhaar, PAN, an affidavit and a preliminary stamp-paper agreement in time. Respondents, including the Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee, contend Ext.P5 was issued after enforcing the tender conditions in Ext.P1 (notably that bids must include a Rs.1,00,000 EMD by demand draft in favour of the Administrator, Guruvayur Devaswom, plus a preliminary stamp-paper agreement, affidavit, Aadhaar and PAN copies). The petitioner, in the tender process, submitted a fixed deposit receipt in lieu of an EMD, which the Committee accepted, whereas Anil Kumar failed to meet several prerequisites; this Court cites Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and Tata Motors Ltd. to caution against extending relief to those who do not meet criteria. The petition is dismissed with directions to the Deputy Director, Local Fund Audit (Addl.R5) to submit a detailed DBAR report within four weeks and place it before the Devaswom Bench.
CON.CASE(C) NO. 1717 OF 2019 This Contempt Case was filed by petitioners 1–82 and 84–99 (the W.P.(C) No.30601/2018 petitioners) against the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) and related authorities for alleged willful disobedience of Annexure A1, the judgment dated 26 February 2019 in W.P.(C) No.30601/2018, and related orders. The petition traces a chain from a 2015–2018 writ petition on pension schemes under the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act to the apex Court’s 2022 decision in Sunil Kumar B., which upheld the validity of the 2014 G.S.R. 609(E) amendment and laid down directions for the pension scheme, including extensions of options under paragraph 11(4) of the amended scheme and related adjustments. The contempt petition contends that EPFO failed to implement Annexure A1 and the post-2014 directions, thereby obstructing higher pension disbursement to the petitioners. After hearing, the Court closed the contempt proceeding, while noting that EPFO must reconsider petitioners’ entitlement for higher pension in light of the 2022 Supreme Court judgment. The order underscores EPFO’s obligation to act in accordance with the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation, and leaves open the possibility of further action by EPFO within the law.
This writ appeal (W.A.No.1106 of 2022) arises from a challenge to a demand notice and subsequent orders regarding tariff for Self-Financing Educational Institutions under the Kerala State Electricity Board. The appellant, a consumer under the Board, sought certiorari to quash Ext.P1 (demand notice dated 27.10.2020), Ext.P2 (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum order, 16.04.2021) and Ext.P3 (State Electricity Ombudsman order, 16.12.2021), and to declare that no arrears are payable. The High Court traced the issue to tariff classification under LT-VII(A) for Self-Financing Educational Institutions from 01.12.2007, reflecting a long line of decisions. The learning trajectory includes Sr.Annie (2009) upholding the tariff reform, Joseph Antony (2009) which was later reversed by the Supreme Court in Principal, Sir Syed Institute for Technical Studies (2021), and the MRF case (1996) confirming earlier judgments. The judgment notes that the Apex Court in Principal Sir Syed 2021 upheld the Board’s tariff and that the 2009 Division Bench decision in Joseph Antony was overruled by the Apex Court (through the Sir Syed decision). Consequently, the Single Judge’s conclusion that the demand was enforceable stands, and the writ appeal is dismissed. The court directs that the appellant may represent for installment payment, to be considered within specified timeframes, with consequences for default. Overall, the decision reinforces the Board’s authority to levy the higher tariff on Self-Financing Institutions and affirms the validity of the demand for the period 2007-2011.
The batch of writ petitions challenge amendments to the Kerala Electricity Supply Code, 2005 (as amended) and the Kerala Electricity Supply Code, 2014, which make a purchaser responsible for arrears of the previous occupier/consumer before granting a fresh electricity connection. The courts examine whether Regulation 12(2) of the 2005 Code and Regulation 40(3) of the 2014 Code are within the powers of the State Regulatory Commission and are consistent with the Electricity Act, 2003. The petitioners, who purchased premises in Ernakulam and faced denial of supply due to prior arrears, contend these provisions are ultravires and impede the right to electricity. The respondents (KSEB and KSERC) defend the deposit requirement as a safeguard to ensure recovery and to prevent sale of property without settling dues. The judgment walks through Sections 43, 50 and 181 of the Electricity Act, and Regulation 12(2) and Regulation 40(3) to determine regulatory competence and constitutional compliance. It places emphasis on the duty to supply under Section 43, and the power of the State Commission under Sections 50 and 181 to formulate regulations, including an Electricity Supply Code. After analyzing various precedents (notably Suraj v. KSEB and others) and distinguishing contrary Gujarat decisions, the High Court upholds the regulatory provisions as valid, while directing the Board to consider instalment facilities or exemptions and to grant connections within a month for petitioners, disposing of the petitions by common judgment.
WA Nos. 1436/2023, 1431/2023 & 1432/2023 The appellant, a registered charitable trust, sought to establish a Medical College with 150 MBBS seats, backed by an Essentiality Certificate issued in 2014. State policy later barred new Essentiality Certificates for self-financing medical colleges, leading to a series of writ petitions challenging the policy and subsequent orders. The National Medical Commission (NMC) conducted inspections in early 2023; the State Government reduced intake from 150 to 100 seats in its 07.07.2023 order, relying on Minimum Requirements for Annual MBBS Admissions Regulations, 2020 (Regulations 2020) and the bed-strength criteria (330 beds) in B.3.1 and Annexures I–IV, particularly Annexure II. The NMC rejected the 150-seat proposal for not timely submitting required documents, and the University of Kerala reportedly granted only 100 seats. The petitioners argued that Regulation 2020 contemplates 150 seats only where appropriate bed capacity exists, and that bed-strength considerations for recognition should occur after MBBS completion, not at admission. They relied on the Supreme Court’s AIR 2021 SC 2673, which held Essentiality Certificates are not ministerial acts. The Kerala High Court held that the 07.07.2023 reduction lacked valid, explained reasons and was contrary to Regulations 2020; it quashed the impugned orders, allowing the appellant to be considered for 150 MBBS seats per regulations, with consequences to follow.
This Kerala High Court judgment deals with a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No.6968/2023) filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the continuing prosecution in CC 53/2023 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-V, Mattanchery arising from Crime No.1090/2023. Petitioners 1 to 4 are accused in the underlying case for offences under Sections 341, 323, 325 and 506 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution contends the matter is before trial, whereas the petitioners and the victim advocate settlement reached between the parties, evidenced by the victim’s affidavit, supports quashing. The Public Prosecutor initially expresses reservations about quashing merely on the basis of settlement but concedes that a settlement exists. The Court surveys the governing law in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab to delineate the limits of reopening/terminating cases under Section 482 CrPC, emphasizing that non-compoundable offences with private disputes may be quashed if the parties have settled, while serious crimes and offences under special statutes or against public servants are generally excluded. On evaluating the facts, the court finds the dispute private, approves the settlement, and quashes all further proceedings in CC 53/2023, allowing the Crl.M.C. 6968/2023.
This High Court of Kerala heard RPFC No. 446 of 2016 as a revision against Family Court, Kannur's order MC 96/2014 under Section 125 CrPC. The petitioner NKP Faizal challenged maintenance awards to his wife Sahalath VP and their two minor children, Dhiya Faizal and Fadi Muhammed Faizal, in consolidated proceedings including divorce and restitution petitions. The Family Court found the petitioner liable to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 4,000 to the wife, Rs. 3,000 to the second respondent, and Rs. 2,500 to the third respondent from 15.02.2014. The petitioner admitted the marriage and paternity but contended the wife lived separately without sufficient cause and argued the maintenance claims were not sustainable, noting that the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed and she obtained a divorce in the same judgment. The respondents contended that the petitioner, though able-bodied, refused to maintain them, reinforcing the social justice mandate of maintenance laws. The High Court discussed constitutional and statutory principles, citing Rajnesh v. Neha and Anr. [2020 (6) KHC 1], Captain Ramesh Chander Kauushal v. Veena Kaushal and Ors. [(1978) 4 SCC 70], and Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and Ors. [(2015) 6 SCC 353], and observed that Courts may estimate income notionaly to fix quantum. It concluded there was no illegality in the impugned order, dismissed the revision petition, and allowed adjustment of any interim deposits, with liberty to approach under Section 127 CrPC if circumstances change.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by eight accused (petitioners) challenging the continuance of trial in C.C.No.1607/2017, arising from Thrikkakara Police Station Crime No.340/2006. The petitioners contend that the substratum of the prosecution has been shattered by the acquittal of co-accused in Annexure A3 (the lower court judgment), and therefore continuing the prosecution would amount to abuse of process of court. The State opposed quashing, arguing that the petitioners must face trial before the lower court and that the High Court may refrain from invoking its extraordinary power under 482 Cr.P.C. The court cites Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police (2006 (1) KLT 552), Abbas T.K. v. State of Kerala (2013 KHC 336), and Kancheriyil v. State of Kerala (2011 (2) KHC 812) to articulate the principle that if the substratum of the prosecution is shattered by acquittal of co-accused, continuing the proceedings can be an abuse of process. After examining Annexure A3’s extract, where key witnesses failed to support the prosecution and some acquitted co-accused are absolved, the court holds that continued prosecution would be an abuse of process. Accordingly, the Crl.M.C is allowed and all further proceedings in C.C.No.1607/2017 are quashed; the order ends with the petitioner’s liberty. The decision reaffirms the High Court’s power under section 482 to prevent judicial waste when substratum of the case is destroyed.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case concerns accused Vinayak and Indrajith Narair seeking to invoke the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in Crime No.632/2022 of the Puthoor Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 294(b) and 324 r/w 34 IPC. The petition asserts that the disputes between the parties have been amicably resolved, supported by Annexure B (affidavit of the 3rd respondent). The investigating officer was directed to verify the genuineness of the settlement and to ascertain whether the petitioners have any criminal antecedents or impediments to quashing. The Public Prosecutor raised concerns about quashing merely on the basis of settlement, but conceded that no other transgressions exist. The Court examined the settled law on quashing involving non-compoundable/offences with private character, following precedents including Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, and the State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, highlighting that quashing is possible where the dispute is entirely resolved and the offence is non-serious, with exceptions for heinous or public-offence categories (e.g., 307 IPC or arms offences). Ultimately, noting the gravity of the offences, the coexisting amicable settlement, and favorable chance of success, the Court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings in Crime No.632/2022, rendering the petition allowed with Annexure-A on record.
These writ petitions challenge the National Highways Act, 1956, provisions 3G(5) and 3J, which bar the application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to land acquired under the NH Act and deny solatium and interest payable under the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners, evicted landowners whose land was acquired for National Highway projects in Thrissur and Ernakulam, contend that denial of solatium and interest violates equal protection under Article 14 and produces unequal treatment for similarly situated landowners. The Government contends that a special enacted scheme for highways warrants a separate compensation regime. The judgment traces the historical development of both Acts, including amendments via the NH Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997, and surveys jurisprudence on Article 14, the intelligible differentia test, and valid classifications. It notes multiple precedents (Nagpur Improvement Trust; Om Prakash; Hari Krishan Khosla; Chajju Ram; Dhanwanti Devi; Mir Fazeelath Hussain; Chakrapani; Golden Iron and Steel Forging) and discusses solatium as an intrinsic component of compensation, not mere largesse. The court ultimately rules that challenges to Sections 3G and 3J are not sustainable in light of the discretionary power conferred on the competent authority/arbitrator, while directing that claims for solatium and interest be considered within three months after allowing the parties to submit material. The petitions are disposed of with this direction, recognizing solatium as part of compensation and permitting interest where equitable.
RCRev..296 of 2018; RCRev..389 of 2018 These are two connected rent-control revision petitions arising from eviction proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The landlady, Nishan Rahman, filed RCRev.296/2018 challenging eviction under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iii) on grounds of bona fide need to start a medical laboratory in the petition schedule shop and on account of the tenants’ possession of another building. The Rent Control Court dismissed the eviction petitions under both grounds; the Rent Control Appellate Authority, while upholding the Section 11(3) decision, remitted the Section 11(4)(iii) claim back to the Rent Control Court for fresh consideration with an opportunity to adduce further evidence. Conversely, RCRev.389/2018, filed by the tenants, challenged the same landlord’s petition, with their own pleadings that the other shop space acquired by one of the tenants was not a valid basis for Section 11(4)(iii). The Kerala High Court, hearing both revisions together, found that neither court below had a definite, on-the-merits resolution on Section 11(4)(iii) and, applying the decision in P.C. Aboobacker Haji, directed that both sections be examined afresh with a full opportunity to adduce evidence. The court remitted the matter to the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal, directing both sides to lead evidence and arguments, and scheduled appearance for 01 February 2019. The order ultimately allowed RCRev.296/2018 and dismissed RCRev.389/2018, with all pending interlocutory applications closed.
Abraham Varghese (the plaintiff) filed RSA 524/2022 challenging the concurrent decrees in OS 382/2017 and AS 76/2019, seeking recovery of possession of property leased to the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation (SupplyCo) and damages for use and occupation. The building at Kumarakom was leased in 2011 for five years, with rent of Rs 12,101 per month, expiring on 10 November 2015; the parties admitted occupation beyond the term as a tenancy by holdover, though the lease deed itself was not registered and hence inadmissible as evidence. After termination notice, the plaintiff claimed damages from 30 April 2017 at Rs 25 per sq ft, asserting the tenants continued in unlawful possession. The Trial Court granted some damages; on appeal the appellate court set aside, and the matter returned to the trial court. In addressing substantial questions of law raised by the predecessor, the court relied on statutory provisions and Apex Court authority: that tenancy terminated under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act ends the tenant's right to possession and that a holdover is a tenant at sufferance liable for damages; but the quantum of damages must reflect the rent landlord could derive upon reletting. The court ultimately held that the plaintiff's entitlement is Rs 12,101 per month from 30 May 2017 until surrender, and since surrender occurred during pendency, no further relief remained; the appeal is dismissed.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC before the Kerala High Court, filed by accused Nos.1 to 7 in Crime No.302/2022 of Vithura Police Station, challenging the proceedings in CC No.639/2022 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (Forest Offences), Nedumangad, arising from the same crime. The petition seeks quashing of the prosecution on the basis of a private settlement between the parties, supported by affidavits from the victims stating they have no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor expresses reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement but concedes that the matter is settled. The court discusses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, especially State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, to delineate the limits of the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash non-compoundable offences in private disputes where the parties have settled. It is observed that such power lies where the dispute is private, the offences are non-serious, and the settlement is genuine, while noting that heinous offences, offences under special statutes, and offences like Section 307 IPC or arms-related offences require careful scrutiny. After considering the facts and affidavits, the Court holds that the dispute is private, the settlement is acceptable, and all further proceedings in CC 639/2022 are quashed, allowing the Criminal Miscellaneous Case.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No.6833/2019) filed by Sarath S., the first accused in CC No.3/2019 before the Special Judge (CBI), Thiruvananthapuram, seeking to quash the FIR and final report arising from RC 18(A)/2015/CBI/ACB/KOCHI. The prosecution alleges a criminal conspiracy between the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and the petitioner to extort illegal gratification from high-value assessees by threatening impending searches; Rs.15 lakh was initially discussed, later reduced to Rs.10 lakh, with the money allegedly handed over to the petitioner and later recovered; the investigation also suggested that the money may have passed through a third party connected to Ramachandran Textiles. The petitioner argues that the case as framed is inherently improbable, that he was not connected to the third accused and that no offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) or IPC is made out against him; the prosecution contends that the evidence points to a scheme to extract money even if the petitioner did not fall within the jurisdiction of the third accused. The High Court, noting that the matter requires detailed assessment in evidence and that it is premature to quash, dismissed the Crl.M.C. and held that framing of charges may proceed in due course, leaving the ultimate determination to the trial court.
The Kerala High Court heard WP(C) No.30303 of 2018 filed by Larson T. George and Toubro T. George challenging the mutation and basic land tax treatment of a jointly owned property in Kainoor Village, Thrissur. The petitioners traced title through a sequence of deeds (Exts P1–P3) and a partition deed (Ext P18) dated 16.07.2016, by which the brothers divided the property they had held in joint names. Earlier mutations and land tax receipts in their joint names are evidenced by Exts P8–P15. After partition, they sought mutation of their respective shares and separate basic land tax receipts, submitting Ext P20 to the Tahsildar and relying on Ext P18. Respondents, including the State and revenue authorities, argued that mutation and tax liability depend on documentary proof, and demanded the original patta; petitioners explained the patta is missing after the pattadhar’s death, with ownership chain tracing back to predecessors. The court held that mutation of joint land holders and the acceptance of land tax are fiscal arrangements that do not by themselves create or extinguish title, citing established authority, including Surney v. Inder Kaur. It directed respondents 3 & 4 to consider Ext P-20 for mutation and acceptance of basic land tax in light of Ext P-18, and to issue separate tax receipts for the partitioned shares, while clarifying that mutation does not confer title. The petition is disposed with directions to proceed expeditiously, preferably within four weeks, after due hearing and production of a certified copy of the judgment.
This writ petition (WP(C) 1048/2019) filed before the Kerala High Court, by Shoby T.K., challenges two orders—Ext.P10 (6 May 2016) and Ext.P11 (25 May 2017)—under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act 30 of 2013). The petitioner sought quashing of the orders and a rehabilitation/settlement package under Chapter V, Section 31 of the Act, claiming entitlement as an affected family whose livelihood (a shop license in a rented premises) was impacted by the widening of Vytila-Petta road. The case centers on alleged factual misstatements: the authorities relied on findings that the petitioner remained abroad for three years preceding 2015, contrary to the claimant’s evidence that, apart from a brief gulf visit (27.4.2012–4.5.2013), he conducted business through a tenant and a nominal representative during the period. The petitioner contends that the enquiry conducted by the Revenue Inspector and the Special Tahsildar occurred without prior notice and without furnishing copies of the enquiry reports, violating procedural fairness. The court surveys whether due process—notice, copies of evidence, and opportunity to be heard—was observed, citing Union of India v. Muhammed Ramzan Khan and Karunakar to underscore natural justice principles. Ultimately, the court sets aside Exts.P10 and P11 for procedural impropriety and remits the matter for fresh consideration with directions ensuring notice, access to reports, and a meaningful hearing, while keeping the parties’ rights open on the merits.
The petition challenges a series of scheme modifications affecting private stage carriage operators and the rights saved to them under the 2009 Ext.P5 (and 2013 Ext.P7) schemes, as well as amendments to the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules (Ext.P12). The core issue is whether the State Government could alter pre-existing rights via Draft Schemes (Ext.P10) and finalised schemes (Ext.P13), and whether the modifications violated the statutory procedures under Sections 99, 100 and 102 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Kerala MV Rules, 1989. The petitioners contend that the procedures promised under MV Act and Rules were not followed, that natural justice requires a draft, objections, and consideration before finalization, and that the “saved” rights under Ext.P5/Ext.P9 cannot be defeated by introducing new conditions such as a maximum distance of 140 km for saved permits. The State argues that the changes were within the statutory modification framework and that the private operators did not hold absolute pre-existing rights to operate without distance restrictions. The Division Bench largely agrees with the petitioners on the natural justice issue affecting Ext.P13 and quashes Clause (4) of Ext.P13, while upholding Ext.P12 notifications. The appeals by KSRTC are dismissed in light of the quashing. The court preserves the valid amendments to the Rules while ensuring procedural fairness in scheme modifications.
This writ petition challenges the denial to register Ext.P-3 partition deed with the lower stamp duty prescribed by Article 42(1) of the Kerala Stamp Act. The petitioner, Pallikuthu Sathyaseelan, along with relatives, sought registration of a partition deed among co-owners who are connected by enumerated familial relationships, claiming entitlement to reduced stamp duty under the Explanation to Article 42. The Sub Registrar, Wandoor, refused registration on the ground that the transaction involved multiple co-owners and that the instrument did not fall within a statutory family for the purpose of reduction. The matter was referred to a Full Bench, which in Abdul Muneer v. Sub Registrar (FB) held that eligibility under Article 42(1) hinges on the relationship between co-owners at the time of execution; if each co-owner is related to at least one other co-owner in the enumerated categories, the partition deed is entitled to the lower duty. The Full Bench also held that the explanation to Article 42 defines ‘Family’ to include relations such as father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, brother, sister and legal heirs of deceased children. The present case shows seven executants including siblings, their mother and their descendants, all linked by these relationships, satisfying the criterion. Following Abdul Muneer, the court directs registration of Ext.P-3 with the lower stamp duty and disposes of the petition.
The petitioner, K.V. Madhavi Amma, widow of freedom fighter Pulikool Cheriya Krishnan Nair, challenges Ext.P-15 (dated 12.08.2014) of the Union Government rejecting a claim for central Swatantrata Sainik Samman (SSS) pension under the 1980 scheme. The husband participated in the Kauvumbai movement (1946) and suffered imprisonment beyond six months, with jail records Ext.P-1 (under-trial) and Ext.P-2 (convict) substantiating his imprisonment. Earlier benefits were granted: Ext.P-3 (10.03.1975) and Ext.P-5 (07.02.1977) in favour of the husband and then the petitioner, while Ext.P-6 (19.07.1979) cancelled those benefits on the ground that Kauvumbai was not recognized for central pension at that time. Kerala State authorities granted parallel pension (Ext.P-7) and later relied on Ext.P-8 (20.01.1998) recognizing Kauvumbai as part of the national freedom movement. The petitioner applied for pension (Ext.P-9, 1998) and, despite favorable internal recommendations (Ext.P-10), faced repeated rejections culminating in Ext.P-15 (2014). The High Court had previously directed recognition and restoration (Ext.P-11, Ext.P-13, Ext.P-14), holding that Exts.P-1 and P-2 are primary evidence and that the central government must act to restore pension from the date of application (April 1998). The court ultimately finds Ext.P-15 illegal, and directs sanction of pension and arrears from 15.04.1998 within two months, with possible interest if delayed, while noting absence of prior interest awards in this ruling.
