MFA (Forest) No.56 of 2014 This is an appeal under the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting & Assignment) Act, 1971 (the Vesting Act) by a mother and son challenging an order of the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode, which held that the scheduled lands lie within a vestable private forest and exercised vesting. The appellants claim title through Narayanan Chettiar and assert the scheduled lands are garden lands cultivated before 10 May 1971, lacking forest characteristics, with boundaries akin to garden lands. They sought exemption under S.3(2) and S.3(3) or a declaration under Section 8 of the Vesting Act, based on registered title documents and pre-1971 cultivation. The Divisional Forest Officer contended the land forms part of the Koonanmala Malavaram and vested with the Government under S.3(1) of the Vesting Act, with the property classed as a forest area under the Madras Private Private Forests Act framework, challenging cultivation and possession. The Tribunal found the application maintainable despite delay but ultimately concluded a portion under MPPF and denied exemption. On appeal, the appellants rely on Mohammed Basheer v. State of Kerala (2019) 4 SCC 260 to assert conclusive title via a purchase certificate under S.72K, while the State relies on identity and boundary evidence and on Hamsa Haji v. State of Kerala to stress that identity is crucial. The High Court remands for limited purpose to correlate survey numbers with the purchase certificates, emphasizing identity. The appeal is allowed with costs.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous petition (CRL.MC No. 4036 of 2022) filed by the accused, Prasad, seeking to quash Annexure A2 Final Report in Crime No. 319 of 2018 and all further proceedings in S.C. No. 102/2019 before the III Additional Sessions Court, Thodupuzha, on the ground of amicable settlement between the husband and wife. The alleged offence is punishable under Section 307 IPC for stabbing Lekhamol on 18 May 2018 at about 7:30 PM. The petitioner contends that the injury was minor and the parties are living together; the First Information Report was allegedly a result of a misunderstanding and an affidavit from the victim states the injury occurred accidentally and that there was no intent. The Public Prosecutor reflects that the dispute is amicably settled and the victim’s statement supports accidental injury. The judgment canvasses well‑established precedents—Gian Singh v. State of Punjab; Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan; Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi—on the High Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings in cases not falling under non‑compoundable offences, especially where private disputes have been resolved. The court ultimately allows the Crl.M.C., quashing the final report and all further proceedings, balancing ends of justice against public interest in heinous crimes.
This is a Kerala High Court revision petition under Section 125 CrPC challenging a Family Court order in MC 138/2013 (Kozhikode) that directed the revision petitioner to pay maintenance to his wife and two children. The petitioner, Moideen Koya, contends that he has no sufficient means to maintain the respondents, having been engaged in broiler poultry business and real estate, with income allegedly around Rs. 1.5 lakh monthly but claims of loss and asset mortgaging; he alleges that the first respondent is employed with Rs. 12,000 per month plus Rs. 5,000 rental income. The respondents allege that he has substantial means and that his refusal to maintain is unjustified. The Family Court partly allowed the application, ordering maintenance of Rs. 3,000 to the wife and Rs. 2,000 each to the two children from 05.06.2013. The High Court, while examining the record, relies on established Supreme Court principles that maintenance is a social-justice remedy for dependants and that courts may infer notional income to determine quantum. It notes the absence of conclusive evidence proving the wife’s higher income and finds the petitioner, aged 33 at filing, capable of earning; the order is deemed reasonable. The court declines to interfere under Section 19(4) Family Courts Act and dismisses the revision petition in limine, with a direction to adjust any deposited amounts against the due balance if applicable.
This suo motu petition (DBP No.13 of 2022) before the Kerala High Court concerns alleged encroachment on land belonging to the Sree Parthasarathy Temple at Mundakkayam, administered by the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB). Petitioners Ramachandran Nair Ambadipurayidom and C.K. Anil Kumar contend that Mundakkayam Grama Panchayat encroached temple land to lay a motorable road and that Panchayat officials threatened devotees, the Temple Advisory Committee, and Devaswom staff. The matter, arising from a petition received suo motu and linked to connected W.P.s, saw the Panchayat seek time to file counter affidavits, and later responses from the Village Officer and other parties. On 29.07.2022, the Station House Officer and the Sub-Group Officer were suo motu impleaded as respondents. The court records a police report of alleged trespass and the registration of a FIR under sections 447/427 IPC read with 34 IPC, illustrating ongoing tension around the temple property. The court anchors its analysis in the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, noting that administration and control vest in the Board (Sections 3, 4, 15, 15A, 16, 24, 27, 31) with a duty to protect temple assets, and cites A.A. Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board and Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair to stress guardian-like responsibility over Devaswom properties. It directs police to prevent encroachment and to report to the relevant respondents, and concludes by disposing of the DBP with directions for protection of temple property and prevention of encroachment.
The Kerala High Court, in a Criminal Misc. Case (CRL.MC No. 3564 of 2023) decided on 5 June 2023, entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash FIR No.114 of 2023 (Rajakkad Police Station) for offences under Sections 468, 471, 420 read with Section 34 IPC. The petitioners, accused in the FIR, allegedly executed and registered a sale based on a Power of Attorney notarized in Canada, with a foreign-based party (de facto complainant) alleging misrepresentation and manipulation by the petitioners for a property transaction. The prosecution contends that the Power of Attorney entries were corrected to facilitate a sale, and Rs. 10 lakh was paid by the complainant. The petition contends that the disputes between the parties have been amicably settled, supported by Annexure A2, and asks the Court to terminate the proceedings in the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to avoid continued litigation. The Court directed the IO to verify the settlement's genuineness and other impediments before ruling. While the Public Prosecutor expressed reservations, the court endorsed the settlement’s efficacy given lack of prior antecedents and absence of ongoing grievances. Relying on Supreme Court precedents (Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, Laxmi Narayan and related cases), the judge held that the proceedings could be quashed, emphasizing the civil character of the dispute and the private nature of the offences. The petition was allowed, and all further proceedings in FIR 114/2023 were quashed to restore peace and ends of justice.
Farhan V.S., a 22-year-old fifth accused in Crime No. 777/2022 of Kondotty Police Station (NDPS/POA Act cases), moves under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash an order dated 28.03.2023 by the Special Court for SC/ST (POA) Act & NDPS Act cases at Manjeri, granting a three-month extension of detention under Section 36A(4) NDPS. The prosecution sought time to complete the investigation beyond the 180-day period. The petition details the chronology: remand expired around 27.03.2023; an application for extension was filed on 13.03.2023; orders were passed on 28.03.2023 (181st day); a final report was filed on 25.03.2023 but later found defective and returned for curing, with resubmission on 28.04.2023. Counsel for the petitioner asserts that the extension was sought and decided in a manner that sidestepped the indefeasible right to statutory/default bail and deprived the accused of due process, relying on decisions such as Vimal K Mohanan, Rakesh Kumar Paul, Judgebir Singh, Dinesh Dalmia and Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Aditya, as well as the principle that the Public Prosecutor must independently apply mind and not merely amplify the prosecution narrative. The State counters that the NDPS extension mechanism was properly invoked, grounded in progress and necessity to ensure a foolproof investigation.”
CRL.R.P. Nos. 578, 580, 582 and 585 of 2023 This is a set of criminal revision petitions under Section 397 r/w 401 CrPC, 1973, challenging orders of the Temporary Special Court, JMFC, Thiruvananthapuram, permitting the complainants to produce photocopies of cheques as secondary evidence in trials under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The petitioner, BISMI AZHAR, contends that the orders allowing secondary evidence were incorrect at the threshold, since the cheque itself is the basis of the prosecution and no baseline to admit photocopies exists; they argue the petitions are not maintainable as the orders are interlocutory. The respondents argue that where cheques are lost, it would be improper to deny the complainant an opportunity to substantiate the grievance by adducing secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act; photocopies were produced as secondary evidence because the originals were misplaced. The High Court records that the Magistrate permitted secondary evidence, and that the question of admissibility is to be decided at trial. The court also notes that the order is interlocutory under Section 397(2) CrPC, and there is no bar to granting permission to adduce secondary evidence. Ultimately, the petitions are dismissed with observations, relying on Madhu Limaye and Chitaranjan v. Jayarajan as guiding authorities. The decision preserves trial-stage assessment of evidence.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed in the Kerala High Court, challenging the order in CC 1275/2020 from the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-IX, Ernakulam. The seven petitioners were accused in a 2020 incident involving an alleged unlawful assembly and assaults (offences under IPC sections 141, 143, 148, 341, 294(b), 323, 324, 506(i) and 452 r/w 149). The petition seeks to quash the proceedings on the ground that the parties have amicably settled the dispute and wish to move forward peacefully. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing simply on the basis of settlement, suggesting careful consideration of the gravity of offences and public interest. The Court canvassed leading Supreme Court precedents — State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab — to outline the scope of the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC and the conditions under which non-compoundable offences can be quashed when the civil/private dispute is resolved and no lasting public harm remains. The Court ultimately held that, given the circumstances, quashing would not adversely affect society and would serve ends of justice; the petitions were allowed and the proceedings quashed. The final order directs quashing of CC 1275/2020 and related proceedings, with the Final Report (Annexure-1) being annulled.
BAIL APPL. NO. 3595 OF 2023 Arshad Asharaf, accused no.5 in Crime No.283 of 2023 at Pattambi Police Station, Palakkad, moves B.A. No.3595/2023 under Section 439 CrPC for regular bail in connection with alleged drug trafficking under the NDPS Act. The prosecution asserts that on 17 April 2023, a police team recovered MDMA from the 1st accused near MES School, Pattambi, leading to registration of offences under NDPS Act sections 22(c) and 29. Investigations allegedly reveal the 5th accused, based in Bengaluru, arranged the contraband and that the 3rd accused transferred Rs.28,000 to the 5th accused via UPI, which was used to procure the drugs; the 1st accused allegedly coordinated with the 5th accused. Accused no.5 contends that no contraband was recovered from his conscious possession and that the case rests on the co-accused’s confession (inadmissible in trial) and feeble call-detail evidence. The Public Prosecutor counters that the bank details and money trail, in addition to the co-accused’s confession, prima facie establish the petitioner’s involvement. The court, applying Section 37 of the NDPS Act and following the standard from Union of India v. Shiv Shankar Kesari that “reasonable grounds” require more than prima facie grounds, finds material linking the petitioner to the offence and holds that the twin conditions of Section 37(1)(b) must be satisfied to grant bail. On these grounds, regular bail is denied and the bail application is dismissed.
This Regular First Appeal arises from a 1994 suit (O.S. No. 74/1994) filed by A.M. Abdulkhader seeking specific performance of an agreement for sale of plaint schedule properties. The agreement (Ext. A1) dated 03.06.1993 contemplated a total consideration of 1,50,000 with 50,000 paid and the balance of 1,00,000 to be paid by 10.01.1994. The plaintiff prayed for a decree directing the defendants to execute a sale deed in his favour or, in the alternative, to enable sale through the court by depositing the balance amount, and to recover costs. The first defendant denied the allegation, claiming Ext. A1 was fabricated. During proceedings, Additional Defendants 2–8 were impleaded; Additional 2nd defendant claimed bonafide purchase of B schedule property. The trial court found the plaintiff ready and willing to perform and decreed specific performance with a four-month window to execute the sale deed, failure to do so permitting court-ordered execution upon deposit of the balance. On appeal, the court held that readiness and willingness was established, rejected the bonafide purchaser defense by the 2nd defendant, and concluded that the 1st defendant’s sale to the 2nd defendant could not defeat the plaintiff’s entitlement. The appeal was dismissed; the court directed the defendants to execute the sale deed to the plaintiff on payment of 1,00,000 within four months and granted costs. The decision rests on Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as amended in 2018.
MFA (Forest) No. 284 of 2009 This is a Kerala High Court judgment in MFA (Forest) No. 284 of 2009 challenging an order of the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode, under the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting & Assignment) Act, 1971. The appellant, Rajagiri Rubber, represented by its Vice President, seeks exclusion from vesting of lands described as five blocks within its cardamom estate, originally claimed as enclaves of the estate. The dispute has traced a path from the remand in MFA No. 543/1978, which directed the Tribunal to decide whether the 62 acres of enclaves could be excluded on the ground that they were kept for ancillary purposes of the estate. The Tribunal, relying on records, found no clear ownership or stock particulars as on the appointed day (1971), and concluded the lands were not proven to be private forest, noting reliance on the State of Kerala v. Chandralekha to require a claimant to prove non-vesting. The High Court, however, re-examined the remand and the Commission report Ext.C4/C5, identifying five blocks I–V within the cardamom plantation and concluding these pockets were maintained for ancillary purposes, i.e., exempt from vesting under clause 2(f)(1)(ii) of the Vesting Act. It held that the enclaves, totaling around 71.79 acres, could be exempted, and set aside the Tribunal’s order to that extent. The second issue concerning 28 acres (claimed for exclusion for fuel/burial ground) was left to be resolved as the Government had not taken over those lands. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent, with costs.
This writ appeal arises from a challenge to a 2023 order passed by a learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 25645/2019, directing the Inspector of Police, Pothanikad Police Station, to render necessary assistance to petitioners (priests and diocesan authorities) to peacefully enter St. John’s Besphage Orthodox Church and conduct religious services in accordance with the 1934 Constitution of the Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church, without hindrance. The appellants (Fr. K.K. Mathews, Noby Scaria, and Eldhose Varghese) contend the Single Judge travelled beyond the writ petition’s scope by effectively mandating police action and invoking provisions of the Kerala Police Act, 2011, rather than restraining itself to mandamus relief under Article 226. The petition traced back to Original Suit No. 15 of 2016 before the Sub Judge of Muvattupuzha, which decreed in favour of the petitioners, recognizing the 1934 constitution as controlling and enjoining compliance by the defendant church’s authorities. The Supreme Court’s 2018 observations (Civil Appeals arising from KS Verghese) held that the 1934 Constitution holds the field, rendering further adjudication unnecessary. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, held that the learned Single Judge did not exceed the writ petition’s scope and that the direction to provide police assistance conforms with the 1934 constitution. The appeal is dismissed; the Single Judge’s judgment is upheld, and the petitioners may pursue available remedies if desired.
This is a Kerala High Court revision under Section 125 CrPC filed by Suma (the wife) and her minor son Anirudh challenging an order of the Family Court, Thrissur, in MC 127/2013. The petition arose after the 1st petitioner alleged matrimonial cruelty and abandonment, leading to the husband’s obligation to maintain the wife and child. The Family Court had directed maintenance to the minor at Rs. 2,000 per month and dismissed the wife’s claim. After the couple’s divorce by mutual consent, the petitioners pressed only the question of the adequacy of maintenance for the minor. The respondent contended that his income was modest (Rs. 3,000 per month) while the petitioners claimed a much higher earning (Rs. 35,000 per month from dairy trade plus Rs. 5,000 from property), with documentary evidence Ext. X1 supporting the milk-income figure. The High Court, considering the evidence and the divorce, held the respondent’s notional income at Rs. 25,000 per month. It held that the 2nd petitioner was entitled to Rs. 2,500 per month as maintenance from 19.03.2013 until majority, partly allowing the revision. Arrears were ordered to be paid in four installments beginning 07.02.2024. The decision underscores maintenance as social justice and cites Supreme Court precedents on the rationales for Section 125 CrPC.”
MFA (Forest) No. 18 of 2016 The Kerala High Court, in MFA (Forest) No. 18 of 2016, heard an application by Rajesh Chandrabhavanam seeking exemption under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting & Assignment) Act, 1971 (Vesting Act) for 25 acres in Padinharathara, Vythiri Taluk, Wayanad. The Forest Tribunal had declared the land not to be a private forest under the Vesting Act, but the applicant contends that the land was vested and seeks exemption under sections 3(2) and 3(3) on the ground of personal cultivation as on 10 May 1971 (appointed day). The respondents cross-claimed that the land is covered by the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (MPPF Act) and thus remains vestable; they contested identity, cultivation, and the nature of the land, arguing that the cultivation was not “principal” and that post-1949 activity cannot defeat vesting. The Tribunal found the land not to be a forest, while the High Court re-examined identity and evidence, noting that the area is covered under the MPPF Act but substantial cultivation by the applicant’s father before, during and after 1971 established an intention to cultivate. It held that Section 3(2) and (3) exemptions could apply for personal cultivation, emphasizing that the exemption does not require “principal cultivation” under Section 3(2). Consequently, the Court allowed the original application for exemption, dismissed the State’s appeal, and awarded costs to be borne by the parties.
This Kerala High Court decision in CRL.MC No. 3110 of 2021 concerns the accused, T. Reghunathan, who seeks to quash criminal proceedings under Section 406 IPC for alleged misappropriation of provident fund contributions. Annexure-1 and Annexure-2 relate to a complaint/ FIR alleging deductions from employees’ wages were not deposited into the Provident Fund account. The petitioner contends that belated payment of contributions and the mere entrustment under Para 32(3) of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme should not attract criminal liability under 406 IPC, relying on Gopalkrishna Pillai v State of Kerala as abuse of process. The Provident Fund Organisation argues that the rule is mandatory and non-compliance attracts penal consequences under 405/406 IPC, reinforced by Explanation 1 to Section 405 IPC. The court surveys the statutory framework: the EPF Scheme’s mandatory deposits, the two-stage model of criminal breach of trust (creation of obligation and misappropriation), and case law including Harihar Prasad Dubey and Onkar Nath Mishra, noting the per incuriam nature of earlier decisions like Gopalakrishna Pillai. Ultimately, the court refuses to quash the proceedings but provides relief: if the petitioner surrenders and pays the dues (which were cleared in 1999), the Magistrate may grant bail and the CPF Commissioner may consider withdrawal, expediting the matter. The petition is disposed of with these directions.
This Kerala High Court judgment arises from ITA No. 59 of 2020, challenging the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench’s 07 November 2019 order in ITA No. 191/Coch/2019 for the assessment year 2015-2016. The Revenue (Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Thrissur) contends that the ITAT erred in allowing the assessee’s claim for deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act by relying on the Supreme Court’s Vijaya Bank decision (2010) without verifying the factual basis. The assessment for AY 2015-16 had disallowed Rs. 1,80,04,849 under section 14A; the PCC later found an excess provision of Rs. 121,07,84,000 as not allowable under Explanation 1 to section 36(1)(vii) due to the bank’s NPAs. The ITAT allowed the assessee’s appeal, quashing the PCC’s revision order and granting the deduction on the basis of Vijaya Bank. The High Court, noting the ITAT’s failure to verify whether the bank actually reduced asset values in its balance sheet by the corresponding amount, examined additional documents and the audited accounts. It concluded that Vijaya Bank could not be applied mechanistically without factual support, set aside the ITAT’s Annexure C order, and restored the PCC’s Annexure B order, directing the AO to re-do the assessment. The decision emphasizes ensuring factual alignment with the statutory requirements for 36(1)(vii) deductions and reinstates the revenue’s challenge to the ITAT’s approach.
WP(C) Nos.15059/2023, 15154/2023, 15167/2023 The present writ petitions—WP(C) Nos. 15059/2023, 15154/2023 and 15167/2023—challenge notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the Assessment Year 2019-20 against three cooperative societies registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. The petitioners had not filed income tax returns on the belief that their entire income qualified for exemption under Section 80P, and therefore they were not obliged to file. The Assessing Authority, however, treated the non-filing as concealment and issued notices under Section 148A to initiate assessment proceedings, followed by orders under Section 148 for continuation of proceedings. The petitioners contended that the exemption under Section 80P precludes liability and argues that the notices and joint actions under 148A were not warranted in their cases. They prayed for liberty to file returns and to pursue their eligibility arguments under 80P. After hearing, the Court disposed of the petitions by directing the petitioners to file returns within one month from the date of the order; the Assessing Authority is to examine the returns as per law and pass final assessment orders expeditiously. The judgment underscores the tension between 148A procedures and exemptions under 80P for cooperative societies, especially within the framework of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act.
M.F.A (Forest) No. 90 of 2014 This is an appeal under the Kerala Forests (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act, 2003, challenging a Tribunal for EFL Cases order under Section 10(1) of the Act. The 5.74-acre scheduled property, part of resurvey No. 1/1 in Payyavur Village, was leased in 1963 and cultivated with cashew, ginger, tapioca and turmeric; a small house stood there, which was destroyed in a fire that killed the applicant’s daughter and a female worker. The applicant sought restoration of possession under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (Vest Act) under Section 8(3)(b) and 3(2) of the Vesting Act. The Tribunal allowed the application, recognized the applicant’s cultivation in Ext.A4, and set aside Ext.B1, the notification declaring the land ecologically fragile under the EFL Act. The respondents (State Government and its Forest Department) contended the scheduled property is forest land vested in the Government by virtue of Section 3(1) of the EFL Act, and that the non-obstante clause defeats vesting; they argued the property is ecologically fragile. On appeal, the Division Bench dismisses the Government’s challenge, relying on Kumari Varma (supra) to affirm that withholding possession and vesting do not convert the land into forest status absent proper legal basis. The appeal is dismissed, and the Tribunal’s order stands, restoring or maintaining possession consistent with Vesting Act rights and EFL law.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CRL.A. No. 906 of 2023) challenging an order denying pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 (as amended 2015) and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act. The appellant published a video through his online news channel, allegedly making false accusations against the second respondent, a public figure and MLA, on 24.05.2023. The Special Court held that publication of the video containing derisive and derogatory comments could attract the Act, and that Section 18 of the SC/ST Act would bar bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. The appellant contends that public criticism of a political figure cannot automatically amount to an SC/ST Act offence, especially since the video does not reference the second respondent’s caste and there is no evident caste-based motive. He relies on Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of U.P. to emphasize that offences require targeted, caste-based humiliation. The respondents insist the video plainly insulted a person from the SC, and that the publication of such content in a news channel fits within the offence structure, including 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(u). The High Court, after examining the materials, upholds the Special Court’s prima facie finding under Section 3(1)(r) but does not resolve 3(1)(u) at this stage, and dismisses the appeal.
RP Nos.614, 629, 633 and 639 of 2023 Four review petitions (RP Nos. 614, 629, 633 and 639 of 2023) arise from a common Judgment dated 02.03.2023 upholding District Magistrate orders under Section 54 of the Abkari Act, closing liquor outlets around several religious festivals. The petitioners (hotels and their proprietors) challenge the law laid down in Thomas George v. State of Kerala and Mary Kurian and Ors., and contend that the earlier settled position remains unsettled and that Ext.P4 (29.04.2009) circular mandating a one-week prior notice before banning liquor shops has been diluted by the impugned judgment. They rely on Vanju Kamal v. State of Kerala (Annexure-A1) to insist on at least seven days’ notice, and they cite Hotel Park Residency v. State of Kerala (Annexure-A2) to argue that mere reliance on circulars or legal standards cannot justify a blanket closure without sufficient materials. They also challenge Rule 28A of the Foreign Liquor Rules, 1953 as enabling closures only on enumerated days. The respondents defend the common judgment, asserting that review petitions are appeals in disguise and that the ban under Section 54 was justified and warranted by circumstances. The Bench concludes that the review petitions fail and are dismissed, upholding the common judgment under review.