This writ petition challenges a Kerala Lok Ayukta order (Ext. P1) in Complaint No. 1610/2014A directing removal of a telecom generator/tower installed at Laloor, Thrissur, and to report compliance within four weeks. The Thrissur Corporation contends that, after the constitution of the Ombudsman under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (Chapter XXV B and related sections), the Lok Ayukta has no jurisdiction to entertain complaints against a public servant of a Local Self Government Institution. The petition traces a sequence of events: a 2018 Tribunal decision (Ext. P2) allowing regularization of the tower subject to fresh application; a 2019 demolition notice; a 2019 fresh application for regularization; and Ext. P1 directing removal of the generator. The petitioner relies on Section 271O (existing cases to be transferred to the Ombudsman) and on the decision in Jose V. Jacob v. Thalayolaparambu Grama Panchayat (2016) 1 KLT 362 to urge that Lok Ayukta cannot proceed with mal-administration allegations against a public servant of a Local Self Government institution post-Ombudsman. The respondents’ position is briefly framed in opposition to the petition, but the High Court ultimately finds that Section 271O bars the Lok Ayukta from entertaining such complaints, and the Ext. P1 order is without jurisdiction. The writ petition is allowed and Ext. P1 is set aside.
This MACA arises from a Motor Accidents Claims Petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation for injuries sustained on 17.11.2005 when the claimant’s motorcycle collided with a rashly driven Omni van on the Purayar–Puthuvankunnu road. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, by its award, held the first respondent (driver) liable for rash and negligent driving, with the insurer (third respondent) jointly and severally liable; the total awarded was Rs. 62,980 with 8% interest. The petitioner challenged the quantum, arguing that the income was understated and various heads of compensation were inadequately assessed in light of the injury, Ext. A13 showing he worked in a workshop, and in view of precedents on income estimation in road-accident cases. The respondents contended that the Tribunal’s quantum was just and that there was no justification to interfere. On appeal, the High Court analyzed the evidence (notably Ext. A13) and applicable precedents, notably Ramachandrappa, Syed Sadiq, and Raj Kumar, to determine a notional income and appropriate damages. It fixed the claimant’s monthly income at Rs. 5,000 and enhanced several heads of compensation, culminating in an enhanced total of Rs. 20,950 with 7.5% interest. The insurer remains liable, with directions to pay within two months and to furnish bank details. No costs were awarded.
MACA No. 1266 of 2017; CO No. 34 of 2022 This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA No. 1266 of 2017) and Cross Objection (CO No. 34 of 2022) filed before the High Court of Kerala challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for injuries sustained in a February 5, 2013 accident. The Tribunal held the driver negligent, awarding Rs. 20,01,850 in total compensation and directing the insurer to pay. The appellant insurer contends that the Tribunal’s income fixation (Rs. 6,750 per month) was reasonable and disputes a higher notional income, while the petitioner-cum-respondent challenges the quantum on several heads, arguing for higher compensation in light of serious injuries, 210 days of inpatient treatment, and substantial future impact on career. The court examines the claimant’s income, disability, and future prospects, applying established Supreme Court principles on notional income (Ramachandrappa), future prospects (Pranay Sethi), and multiplier (Sarla Verma). The High Court enhances the overall compensation to Rs. 34,02,860, recalculating heads such as loss of earnings, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, and permanent disability, and directs deposit by the insurer with interest, to be disbursed to the claimant within two months. The decision reflects a careful re-evaluation of evidence and legally settled standards for quantum in MACT matters.
This revision pertains to eviction under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Manjeri, passed an eviction order on 29.07.2015 against the tenant in RC P No.46 of 2013, holding that the landlord bona fide needed the petition schedule shop room to start a stationery-cum-cool bar business for himself and his dependent family members. The Appellate Authority (District Judge, Manjeri) affirmed the order in RCA No.45 of 2015. The tenant’s revision under Section 20 of the Act challenges these concurrent findings, contending that the alleged need is not bona fide, the landlord has other suitable premises, and the second proviso to Section 11(3) protects him from eviction. Evidence consisted of PW1 (the landlord’s son and power of attorney) and RW1 (the tenant). The High Court, after analyzing established precedents on bona fide need, including Adil Jamshed Frenchman, Shiv Samp Gupta, Deena Nath, and Ammu v. Nafeesa, held that a bona fide need must be sincere, real, and not a mere pretext, and must be manifested in actual need. It found the evidence credible that the landlord and his son sought to start a business and that the landlord had no other suitable premises, rejecting the second proviso claim. Consequently, the revision petition was dismissed, with three months’ time to surrender, subject to conditions such as affidavit of surrender and arrears deposit.
Wilson Kallen, the sole petitioner-accused, seeks quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in respect of Crime No.1000/2020 of Chalakudy Police Station, Thrissur, now pending as CC No.3216/2020 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chalakudy. The petition is supported by a notarized settlement affidavit (Annexure-4) claimed to be genuine and voluntary, wherein the de facto complainant Priya states that the disputes have been settled amicably, has no grievance against the petitioner, and does not intend to continue the criminal proceedings. The court, after recording the complainant’s statement on 13-03-2025, notes there is no interest left in pursuing the case. Relying on established jurisprudence—Kulwinder Singh (guidelines for quashing under 482 CrPC in non-compoundable offences), and its approval in Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, and Madan Mohan Abbot—the court holds that where a settlement is voluntary and fair, and where continuing proceedings would be futile and amount to abuse of process, quashing is warranted. The offences alleged (Sections 354 and 354(A)(1)(i) IPC) are not dismissed on their own, but the quashment preserves ends of justice. Accordingly, Annexure-1 FIR, Annexure-3 Final Report (Crime No.1000/2020), and all further proceedings in CC No.3216/2020 are quashed and the Crl.M.C. is allowed.
This is a criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.M.C No. 796 of 2025) heard by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The petitioners—Aslam Shahar Khan, Muhammed and Laila—seek quashment of Crime No.340/2022 of Beypore Police Station, Kozhikode, now pending as CC No.1108/2022 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-V, Kozhikode, under sections 498A and 406 read with 34 IPC. The court records that a settlement between the petitioners and the defacto complainant (2nd respondent) has been achieved; the defacto complainant has sworn an affidavit stating there is no objection to quashing, and has even received gold ornaments from the petitioners. Relying on established precedents—B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, and State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699—the court notes that the inherent power under 482 Cr.P.C (now 528 BNSS, 2023) can be exercised to quash non-compoundable offences where a genuine settlement exists and there is little likelihood of conviction. The court holds the settlement bona fide, finds that continuing prosecution would be an abuse of process, and that quashing would secure ends of justice, particularly since 406 is compoundable. Accordingly, the petition is allowed; Annexure-A1 Final Report and all further proceedings in CC No.1108/2022 are quashed."
The petitioner, Rajakumaran, owner of 0.0570 hectares in Pirayiri, Palakkad, seeks removal of land from the Data Bank under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008, challenging Ext.P6, which rejected Form 5 based on a report by the Agricultural Officer and the Local Level Monitoring Committee (LLMC). He argues that the land is not paddy land or wet land as per the Act, and that the decision was vitiated by non‑application of mind since no independent assessment as of the date of coming into force of the Act (12.08.2008) was conducted. The court notes that Ext.P6 is based solely on the Agricultural Officer’s report and LLMC findings and stresses that the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) must independently assess the land’s status and consider whether removal would adversely affect paddy cultivation or wetlands, rather than accepting a report as determinative. The court cites Arthasasthra Ventures (India) LLP v. State of Kerala, Muraleedharan Nair v. RDO, and Aparna Sasi Menon v. RDO to emphasize the need to evaluate the land’s status on the relevant date and its suitability for paddy cultivation. It directs that Ext.P5 be reconsidered with a KSRSEC report, at the petitioner’s expense, and within a set timeframe, with the petitioner required to obtain the KSRSEC report and apply for it within two weeks. The writ petition is disposed of with these directions.
This High Court of Kerala (Ernakulam) disposed MACA No. 2417 of 2012, challenging the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Kozhikode’s award in O.P.(MV) No. 981/2009 for the death of Vishnu, a 13-year-old student. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,50,300 with 7% interest and costs. The appellants contended the tribunal miscalculated by fixing a low notional income and applying an incorrect multiplier. They urged reliance on Supreme Court precedents such as Kishan Gopal and Kuruvan Ansari to determine notional income and multiplier, arguing for a higher compensation. The insurer contested liability and quantum, though admitted the policy. The High Court re-evaluated the claim, adopting the Kuruvan Ansari approach and fixing the minor’s notional income at Rs. 25,000 per year with a 15 multiplier under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, calculating loss of dependency at Rs. 3,75,000. It also awarded Rs. 80,000 for loss of filial consortium and Rs. 15,000 for funeral expenses, resulting in total compensation of Rs. 4,70,000. The appellate court directed payment of enhanced compensation with 7% interest from the petition date to deposit, excluding a 370-day period when interest was disallowed, and ordered the insurer to pay additional court fees and deposit the balance in the proportion 50:35:15 within two months. The appeal was allowed with consequential directions.
BAIL APPL. NO. 1173 OF 2024 This is a bail application under Section 439 CrPC filed by accused 1–3 in Crime No.1488/2023 of the Adoor Police Station, Pathanamthitta, challenging their detention in connection with offences under Sections 457, 467 and 380 r/w Section 34 IPC. Accused 1–3 are Rahul Singh, Ankoor, and Omprakash, arrested on 06.11.2023. The prosecution alleges a common intent to break into the garment shop Karikkineth Silks Galleria, remove roof sheets, and steal Rs.3 lakh, gold ornaments, watches and garments between 18–19.10.2023. The case record shows recoveries and a final report has been filed. The petitioners claim innocence and say they have been falsely implicated; investigation is complete and the report laid; they seek enlargement on bail. The Public Prosecutor counters that the petitioners are history sheeters with four prior similar offences and have no roots in Kerala, creating a likelihood of flight if released. The court references established Supreme Court bail precedents (Hussainara Khatoon, Prasanta Kumar Sarkar, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar, Mahipal, Ash Mohammad) to emphasize that bail is not automatic and must be weighed against the gravity of the offence, risk of tampering, and community ties. After careful consideration, the court concludes that the petitioners are not entitled to bail and dismisses the application to safeguard justice and societal interests.
This Regular Second Appeal (RSA) under Section 100 read with Order XLII Rule 1 CPC arises from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction over plaint schedule property in Kannur. The plaintiff, Premaja A, alleges that the property originally belonged to her father, Arippa Damodaran, and, after his demise, was partitioned among legal heirs. She claims exclusive possession of the plaint schedule property and that defendants trespassed and sought to convert a portion of the land into a motorable pathway through the eastern side of her property. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of exclusive possession by the plaintiff. The first appellate court reversed, holding that the disputed area (as demarcated in Ext. C4) is part of the plaint schedule property and that the defendants did not establish any right over it; possession thus follows title. The defendants (appellants) argued that the plaint schedule property was not identifiable and that there existed a 10-foot pathway evidenced by Exts. B1 and B2, with rights claimed via partition deed no.1378/1987. The Advocate Commissioner’s reports (Exts. C1–C4) identified the disputed area as belonging to the plaintiff. Suresh Lataruji Ramteke and the principle of a step-by-step second-appeal process are cited to emphasize procedure, while the core issue remains whether the defendants have a valid right to the disputed area. The High Court ultimately dismissed the second appeal, upholding the first appellate decree and confirming that no substantial question of law warranted interference.
Amjath P. S., the petitioner, obtained a vehicle loan from IndusInd Bank and seeks a No Objection Certificate (NOC) and Form 35 under Rule 61 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, to cancel the endorsement of hypothecation on the Registration Certificate of vehicle KL-63A-4807. He contends that he has repaid the entire loan liability and there are no outstanding dues against the vehicle; thus, the endorsement of hypothecation should be cancelled and the RC updated accordingly. The respondents 1 and 2 contend they are private financiers, not State under Article 12, and therefore the writ petition is not maintainable. They further argue that there are other outstanding loans and that the Bank’s general lien extends to the hypothecated vehicle, justifying the denial of NOC. The court examines Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, including subsections (1)–(6), which mandate entries in the RC for hire purchase/hypothecation and the conditions for termination; Rule 61 of the CMVR 1989 provides the termination process and Form 35; and the court cites Shabu Sukumaran v. RTO, Thiruvananthapuram (2018 (2) KLT 219) to emphasize the registrar’s discretion to renew or permit issuance after hearing. The court holds that once the liability is discharged, the Bank’s lien cannot defeat statutory requirements, and the NOC must be issued. The petition is allowed, directing the 3rd respondent to cancel the endorsement of hypothecation and the 1st and 2nd respondents to issue NOC and sign Form 35 for vehicle KL-63A-4807.
WP(C) Nos. 10612/2024 & connected cases This judgment decides a batch of writ petitions under Article 226 filed across several cases (WP(C) 10612/2024 and connected matters) concerning freezing of bank accounts by banks upon intimation from cybercrime and police authorities, under the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal framework and related police requisitions. The petitions challenge the blanket freezing of accounts, arguing that restrictions on operation of funds must be proportionate to the dispute and should be limited to the amount specified in the police requisitions, with due notice and opportunity to transact for bona fide needs. The respondents, including Union of India (through the Home Ministry), the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre, RBI, various state administrations, and banks such as Federal Bank, ICICI Bank, Kotak, Canara Bank and others, defend the measures as necessary to preserve proceeds of crime and ensure effective investigations. On 26 March 2024, Justice T.R. Ravi issued a consolidated order disposing of the petitions with directions, notably that freezes should be confined to the amounts mentioned in the police requisitions and that police authorities should inform banks about the duration of any continued freeze (within an eight-month window for extension). The judgment cites Dr. Sajeer v RBI (2023 KHC Online 661) for the guiding directions and references other related orders (e.g., W.P.(C) 28155/2023) as background. The court also anchors its directions to preserve petitioners’ ability to operate accounts beyond the freeze limit where appropriate.
BAIL APPL. NO. 1084 OF 2024 This is a bail application (BAIL APPL. NO. 1084 OF 2024) filed by Mohammed Ijlal, accused no.8, in Crime No.149/2024 registered at the Ernakulam Central Police Station. The petitioner challenges orders in CMP 130/2024 of JFCM-II and CRMC 333/2024 of the District Court & Sessions Court. The prosecution alleges that on 17 January 2024, the accused, in furtherance of a common intention with other co-accused, formed an unlawful assembly with dangerous weapons and assaulted the defacto complainant, causing injuries including a chip fracture of the ulnar styloid; several accused allegedly beat the victim with iron rods and wooden implements. The petitioner asserts innocence, arguing that the FIR does not specify overt acts by him and that the core offenders were others; he has been in custody since 18 January 2024, and, according to the defense, investigation is practically complete with recoveries effected. The Public Prosecutor counters that the injuries were serious and many accused remain at large, indicating ongoing investigation. The court invokes principles from Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., and State of Kerala v. Raneef to stress presumption of innocence and that bail is a rule, not an exception, to be weighed against case specifics. It ultimately grants bail to the petitioner on a Rs.50,000 bond with two sureties, subject to conditions (appearance, no inducement, no new offenses, passport surrender, possible cancellation on violation) and cites Sushila Aggarwal for permissible bail-condition concerns.
This is a bail application under section 439 CrPC filed by Vishnu K. Babu, the sole accused in Crime No.315/2024 of Thalayolaparambu Police Station, Kottayam, alleging offences under sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC. The temple employee is accused of misappropriating Rs.24 lakh donated to the Thalayolaparambu temple between 2019 and 2022; the prosecution says the loss is Rs.24 Lakh, whereas temple administration notes Rs.10,24,459; the petitioner states he is one among seven temple staff, that donations were promptly entered into temple registers, and that he has already repaid a substantial amount; he is ready to repay the balance; he has been in jail since 19.3.2024, and investigation is practically complete with some recoveries; the counsel for the petitioner argued innocence and requested bail as a matter of right; the public prosecutor opposed bail claiming ongoing investigation and risk of tampering with evidence. The High Court cites bail jurisprudence—Sanjay Chandra v. CBI; Dataram Singh v. State of UP; State of Kerala v. Raneef; Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)—holding that bail is the rule and detention must be justified by circumstances. On considering lack of antecedents, completed investigation, and recoveries, the judge grants bail with conditions including Rs 50,000 bond with two sureties, weekly appearances, no tampering, surrender of passport, modification/cancellation on violation, and power to continue investigations and recoveries while on bail; order dated 23 April 2024.
This Original Petition (O.P.) under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenges Ext.P4, dated 22-06-2017, in OA 958/2015 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Ernakulam, which dismissed the applicants’ plea for retirement benefits in favour of Sreedharan’s legal heirs and left open the option to pursue civil remedies. The petitioners—P. Vasantha (wife of Sreedharan), and her two children—seek disbursement of retirement benefits due to them as heirs. The factual matrix includes Sreedharan’s permanent retirement in 1987, his disappearance in 1998, and a long line of civil proceedings over the years concerning the validity of the marriage between petitioner No.1 and Sreedharan. Family Court judgments (Anx.A3, 2004 declaring petitioner No.1 as the legally wedded wife; Anx.A4, 1992 divorce from Kamalamma) and later Family Court orders created a contested legal backdrop on the legitimacy of the marriage. The Tribunal’s order relied on civil forum remedies after decisions that the matter is essentially civil in nature. The petition cites Secs. 107-108 of the Indian Evidence Act defining presumptions of death and life, and Sec. 7 of the Family Courts Act along with Sec. 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The High Court, after analysis, declines to intervene in a civil dispute via writ, affirming the Tribunal’s approach and dismissing the petition, while granting liberty to approach the proper forum for civil relief.
This is an Execution Second Appeal under Section 100 read with Order XXI CPC, arising from a decree in a suit between a decree holder and judgment debtors. The decree holder sought to execute delivery of 20 cents of land belonging to the judgment debtors; Vijayamma, the claim petitioner, contends that 15 cents thereof belonged to her, allegedly put in possession by her mother, and seeks to establish her title to that portion. The trial court dismissed the claim petition as meritless. The first appellate court reportedly addressed only the issue of compensatory costs and did not clearly resolve the merits of the possession claim; reasons for rejection of the possession plea were not explicitly articulated. The respondents argued the petition is a gimmick to defeat delivery and that the judgment debtors are in possession of the property. The appellant argued that merits must be considered on appeal, not merely the question of costs, and that the trial court and appellate court misapprehended possession facts. The High Court, per a single judge, emphasized that, for admission of a second appeal, there must be a substantial question of law, citing Nazir Mohamed, Kondiba Kadam, Santosh Hazari, and Government of Kerala v. Joseph. It held that no substantial question of law arises in this matter, and accordingly dismissed the execution second appeal with all interlocutory orders and applications disposed of.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.M.C. No. 2580 of 2022) heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. Tess Thomas, the petitioner-accused, challenges the order of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pala, which took cognizance under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act based on ST 5291/2020. The petitioner contends that the complaint should be quashed as there is no prima facie case; she points to annexures suggesting payment of amounts via a different arrangement (through her brother-in-law Dany Antony) and a purported reliance on Annexure-5, a police complaint to the District Police Superintendent. The respondent State opposes the quashing, arguing that the cheque for Rs. 9 lakh allegedly issued by the petitioner and dishonoured on presentation constitutes a prima facie offence under NI Act, and that the jurisdiction to quash must be exercised sparingly. The court surveys canonical principles from Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and subsequent Supreme Court decisions to outline when quashing is permissible: lack of essential ingredients of an offence; absurd or improbable allegations; capricious or arbitrary exercise of power; and fundamental legal defects such as lack of sanction. The Kerala High Court ultimately refuses to quash the proceedings, noting that the alleged cheque dishonor and the formalities suggest a prima facie offence and directing the trial court to proceed expeditiously, with disposal within three months of receiving a copy of the judgment. The petition is dismissed, with liberty to raise contentions at trial, and trial is to be expedited within six months as per statutory mandate.
Baby M.K., a 50-year-old workman employed as a Team Leader in the canteen run by the first respondent, challenged an award of the Labour Court, Ernakulam, which dismissed his challenge to his dismissal for misconduct. The dispute arose after Ext.P1 show cause notice (07-07-2007) for willful insubordination and riotous behaviour, followed by Ext.P3 charge sheet (09-07-2007). A domestic enquiry, conducted by an enquiry officer, found him guilty, and he was dismissed with effect from 24.09.2007. The Labour Court held that the punishment was not disproportionate to the proved charges. The petitioner contends that the absence of standing orders vitiates the disciplinary action ab initio and that the enquiry violated natural justice, with biased conduct by the enquiry officer. He also points to lack of evidence on some charges, no police complaint, and hardship due to suspension without subsistence allowance. The respondents submit that the Labour Court’s scope of interference is limited and that the charges were proved by witnesses who were cross-examined; that the enquiry officer properly followed procedure and rendered a reasoned report; and that the petitioner left the country after dismissal. The High Court, applying the settled principles on the limited scope of judicial review in departmental inquiries and relying on cited authorities, finds no error in the Labour Court’s award and dismisses the writ petition.
This is a single-judge Kerala High Court bail order (B.A. No. 9574 of 2022) dated 22-03-2023, arising from Crime No. 23/2022 of Pappinesseri Excise Range, Kannur, registered under NDPS Act section 22(c). Petitioners/accused Nos. 1 and 2—brothers Muḥammad Asarudheeni and Muḥammad Askar—seek bail under Section 439 CrPC, claiming they are pillars of their families and that the investigating officer failed to comply with Section 50 NDPS while body-searching. The prosecution contends that even after considering 100 gms recovered from the car (and other quantities allegedly belonging to the accused), the quantity constitutes a commercial one, triggering strict bail controls under Section 37 of the NDPS Act; hence bail should be denied. The court notes red-handed recovery statements and discusses compliance with Section 42(1) and the purported non-compliance with Section 50, concluding that Section 50 non-compliance cannot automatically derail the case at the crime stage, as decisions like Union of India v. Md. Navaz Khan indicate the issue is to be decided at trial. The court emphasizes that Section 37 bail requires two conjunctive conditions: (i) reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty, and (ii) likelihood of not committing an offence while on bail. On evaluating the materials, the court finds no basis to grant bail, holding that the petition is not prima facie defensible for release. Consequently, the bail application is dismissed. The decision relies on jurisprudence surrounding reasonable grounds, the conjunctive test for Section 37, and the trial-stage treatment of Section 50/42 issues.
K.T. Hassankoya, owner of 0.90 acre in R.S. 21-9-182 in Panniyankara, Kozhikode, filed a writ petition challenging the acquisition and use of 18 cents of his land for road widening. Based on an oral assurance in Ext.P2 (dated 15-11-2003) by the then MLA (5th respondent) that acquisition would be initiated and compensation paid, Hassankoya had provided consent for 15 cents; later the road was widened using 18 cents without any compensation. He made representations (Exts. P3, P5, P10) and served a legal notice (Ext. P11) but received no substantive response. He sought (i) a declaration that the acquisition violated the Land Acquisition Act, and (ii) either return of 18 cents or payment of compensation at Rs 10 lakhs per cent, with other appropriate reliefs. Respondents contended that the land was used for a corporation road and that compensation is the corporation’s responsibility; the surrender was voluntary and the petition was time-barred. The petitioner relied on Article 21 and Article 300A and cited Vidya Devi and Kalyani to argue that delay cannot defeat a continuing wrong. The High Court ultimately held the acquisition illegal for lack of due process and directed steps to quantify market value and disburse compensation within specific timeframes, retaining the road for public use.