This is a criminal miscellaneous petition by Jithin C.H., the 1st accused in CC No. 154/2023 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class-III, Kottayam, challenging the registration of a crime under Section 153 IPC and Section 120(o) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011 (Crime No. 495/2020, Kottayam West Police Station). The FIR arose after a WhatsApp post alleging that certain persons were concealing themselves in a mosque, which was claimed to facilitate the spread of Covid, prompting police to fumigate and inspect the area. The petitioner contends that the post was not illegal, malignantly or wantonly done, and there was no material showing provocation to riot; moreover, he was only a member of the WhatsApp group and not responsible for the content. Citing Ramesh v. Sub-Inspector of Police and Sajidh v. State of Kerala, the petitioner’s counsel argues that mere possibility of provocation does not satisfy S.153 IPC, and that S.120(o) requires a nuisance through repeated or undesirable communications. The court explains the ingredients of S.153 IPC and the definitions of “illegal”, “malignantly”, and “wantonly” from S.43 IPC. It also notes that there is no proof of actual provocation or nuisance in this case, and that posting in a WhatsApp group, without more, is insufficient. Accordingly, the court allows the Crl.M.C., quashes the final report and all further proceedings in CC No. 154/2023.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 4336 OF 2006 V.V. Eliyas, the sole accused in SC 152/2000 before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sultan Bathery, was convicted under Section 55(a) Abkari Act for possessing 4 litres of illicit arrack in a 5 litre can seized at Nambikkolli, Parivaramkunnu on 14.04.1999. The trial court punished him with two years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, with default imprisonment of six months. The convicted person’s appeal in CRA 277/2004 was dismissed, sustaining the conviction and sentence. In the pending revision petition, the petitioner challenged the conviction on several grounds: (i) Ext. P1 seizure mahazar lacked specimen seal affixed or a description of the seal; (ii) unexplained delay in filing the final report; and (iii) gaps in the chain of custody linking the seizure to the chemical analysis. The High Court invoked Baburaj v. State of Kerala and other authorities to emphasize strict compliance with statutory formalities under the Abkari Act due to its stringent provisions and harsh penalties. It considered the steps for sample collection, the role of the Thondy Clerk, and the need to prove that the sample reached the chemical examiner in tamper-proof condition. Given the lack of seal details, the proof of linkage, and the unexplained delay, the court found reasonable doubt and acquitted the petitioner. The revision petition was allowed; conviction and sentence were set aside, and bail was cancelled.”
This Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges Exts.P9 and P12 orders passed by the execution court (Sub Judge, Kasaragod) in a decree execution matter. The petitioner/decree holder complains that Ext.P9 fixed an upset price of Rs.13 lakh per cent for a property of about 1.06 acres (46.25 cents actually put up for sale) and that Ext.P9 is not a speaking order. Though EA No.4/2021 was filed for review, the court dismissed it. The decree holder contends the upset price is inflated and not grounded in market value, arguing for a lower rate (Rs.3–3.5 lakh per cent) or, at least, Rs.10 lakh per cent with a view to selling the entire extent. The respondent/judgment debtor argues that only a portion sufficient to satisfy the decree should be sold; they rely on several precedents supporting sale of a portion to avoid hardship, including KLT 315 (K.V. Thomas v. Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd.) and others. The court observes that Order 21 CPC requires the price to be based on materials, not mere ipse dixit, and that it may be improper to fix an upset price without credible valuation data. The judgment ultimately holds that Exts.P9 and P12 are erroneous for lack of supportive materials and remits the matter to the execution court to determine fair value and upset price using verified materials (including Ext.P4(2) valuation) and to sell the necessary portion to satisfy the decree, expeditiously given the ages of the parties.
Petitioner Mohammed Fazil .H., proprietor of Hyfa Catering, challenged the award of a catering licence for Mangalore Junction Station, Platform 1, after his bid was declared highest but allegedly barred due to a debarment. The tender process ran in electronic mode; Ext.P3 shows the petitioner's bid was technically acceptable and the financial bid, opened on 01.12.2022, placed him at the top with Rs.18,75,555 against the second bidder's Rs.15,43,227. The petitioner asserts that the five-year debarment for non-payment of railway dues (Ext.P5) is wrongly applicable to this zone; Exts.P6 and P7 clarify that the debarment is restricted to Southern Central Railway, not other zones. Ext.P1 shows the tender closure on 28.09.2022, while Ext.P5 was issued on 18.10.2022 after closure, depriving the petitioner of an opportunity to disclose the debarment in the tender documents. Respondents contend that the bidder was disqualified for misrepresentation and for dues, citing Clause 2.1.21 of Instructions to Bidders and Annexure-A1; the affidavit filed (Annexure-A8) asserted solvency and no pending dues. The court found material suppression of dues and reliance on tender conditions, noting that even if the debarment were accepted, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India would bar relief due to delay and expenditure incurred by the successful bidder. The writ petition was dismissed, upholding the tender process.
This writ petition under WP(C) No. 32808/2018 challenges the fixation of pension for a retired CISF head constable in light of post-retirement pay revisions under the 5th and 6th Central Pay Commissions. The petitioner retired in 1993 with a basic pension of Rs. 488 per month and a pro-rata revised pension fixed at Rs. 3500 from 1/1/2006, later corrected to Rs. 4030, despite the claim that the minimum pay for the pre-revised scale would yield Rs. 4920 under the 6th CPC framework. The petitioner contends that the correct entitlement should be Rs. 4920 (50% of minimum pay in the 6th CPC pay band plus a ₹2400 grade pay), while a clerical mistake had fixed Rs. 2400 as grade pay for computation. Respondents contend pension is fixed as 50% of the minimum pay in the pay band plus grade pay corresponding to the pre-revised scale; they rely on the 5th CPC/6th CPC concordance and argue that the 2013 OM (and later clarifications) govern pre-2006 pensioners. The court discusses Krishnaswamy and Sethumadhavan and ultimately holds that the petitioner should be governed by the 2013 OM (Ext.R3(a)). The matter is disposed with arrears to be paid within two months and Ext.R3(a) to govern the petitioner’s pension entitlements.
WP(C).No.16517 of 2010 (and connected WP(C).Nos 27006/2010, 27640/2010, 70/2011) This common judgment, delivered by a single Judge of the Kerala High Court, consolidates four connected writ petitions challenging the University’s handling of LD Driver vacancies that were notified in 1995 and subsequently re-notified in 2010. The petitioners, who claim positions on a valid rank list (dated 24.7.2010) and RTI-revealed vacancies, argue that the University has not taken steps to fill the remaining posts from the rank list and has instead resorted to daily-wage appointments, thereby depriving eligible candidates of their right to consideration. The respondents contend that the rank list’s validity was contingent on the single vacancy existing at the time of notification and that the University retains the power to restrict appointment to that vacancy; post-notification vacancies or ad hoc appointments cannot be compelled. The Court notes the settled law that contractual employees should not be replaced by other contractual staff but can be used where a regular incumbent is not available. It also acknowledges that while rank lists can have continued relevance, they cannot be harnessed to mandate filling non-notified vacancies via mandamus. Ultimately, the court dismisses the writ petitions, holding that the University’s discretion to fill only the notified vacancy and its use of daily-wage workers in the interim is permissible.
Petitioner Dr. Manzur Ali P.P. challenged the appointment of respondent No.8 as Associate Professor in Molecular Biology at Kannur University. The 3 October 2019 notification invited applications for posts including one vacancy reserved for the Muslim community, with qualifications: PhD, a master’s with at least 55%, and eight years of teaching/research with seven publications. The petitioner had 14½ years of teaching experience, while the eighth respondent had only 3 years 10 months. The online interview was held on 7 May 2020; a provisional rank list was prepared but not published; RTI disclosures (Exts. P4–P7) suggested that respondent No.8’s documented experience included postdoctoral fellowships not equivalent to Assistant Professor as per Exts. P8–P10, and that certain publications (Ext.P11) were named but the journal’s listing remained controversial. The petitioner contended that the appointment was illegal, arbitrary, and not verifiable, and relied on Exts.P8–P10 to show lack of equivalence. The respondents argued that the writ petition challenges merit and thus is not maintainable; they cited Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and D. Sarojakumari to urge that courts avoid scrutinizing academic merit. The court, applying established principles, found no illegality in the selection process and refused to interfere; the petition was dismissed.
Mat.Appeal No. 992 of 2017 Nickson, the husband, challenges the Family Court’s judgment in OP (Div) No.826/2013 dissolving his marriage to Neetha. The couple married on 29 August 2005 and lived together till 2008, after which they separated; a child was born during the wedlock. The husband contends that the wife’s conduct was cruel and indifferent, rendering cohabitation impossible, and that after years of separation the marriage had become beyond salvage. He asserts that despite mutual consent attempts—including a promise to dissolve the marriage on mutual terms with return of gold ornaments and cash—the wife reneged, compelling him to seek dissolution. The wife counters that cruelty was inflicted by the husband and his parents, highlighting dispossession of her gold, misappropriation of money, and the purchase of property in the husband’s family’s name in breach of trust. She maintains continued separation since 2008 and filed criminal complaints under Section 498A IPC in 2012. The Family Court dismissed the OP (Div) 826/2013, finding no established cruelty by the husband. On appeal, the Kerala High Court, while referencing Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli and Beena v. Shino G. Babu, held the marriage to be irretrievably broken for over a decade with no prospect of reunion, and that continuing the marital tie would be unjust. The appeal is allowed and the marriage is dissolved, with no costs awarded.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from concurrent litigation over a plaint schedule property in Erattupetta. The plaintiffs in O.S.132/2003 sought a prohibitory injunction against the defendants. The trial court dismissed both O.S.132/2003 and the counterclaim O.S.87/2002. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge remanded the matter to the trial court for disposal afresh, and the maintainability of the appellants’ cross-objection was subsequently considered by the First Appellate Court. The appellants filed A.S.132/2014 challenging the decree and sought condonation of a lengthy delay in filing the appeal. The First Appellate Court dismissed the delay application, and the appellants challenged this order in RSA 1037/2015. The High Court admitted the appeal on substantial questions of law and ultimately found that the appellants had established sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, invoking a liberal approach to limitation. Citing Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag, Sarojini Amma v. Gopalan, and Kunjamma v. Chellappan, the court held that the expression “sufficient cause” is elastic and must subserve ends of justice, and that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities. The High Court set aside the lower judgments, condoned 2546 days of delay, restored A.S.132/2014, and remitted the matter to the First Appellate Court to decide along with connected appeals, expeditiously, before summer vacation 2022. The Regular Second Appeal was allowed with costs to be borne by the parties.
This appeal arises from an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kottayam, in favor of Chandran for injuries sustained in a road accident on 23 November 2008. The Tribunal held the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the first respondent’s driver, with the second respondent as owner and the third respondent insurer liable under the policy. It awarded Rs. 2,54,847 with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition until realisation. The applicant contends for higher compensation on two fronts: (i) income estimation; the claimant claimed Rs. 7,000 per month while the Tribunal notionally fixed Rs. 4,500; (ii) disability assessment, where the Medical Board certified 26.8% disability but the Tribunal adopted 15%. The insurer argued the disability certificate did not state permanent whole-body disability and that no evidence substantiated a higher income. Relying on Ramachandrappa (2011), Syed Sadiq etc. (2014), and the multiplier principles in Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi, the Kerala High Court examines the evidence and relevant precedents. It holds the claimant’s income should be notionally fixed at Rs. 6,500 per month and assigns 26.8% permanent disability. Consequently, enhanced compensation of Rs. 1,62,850 is awarded with interest, and directions are issued to the insurer for payment within two months, with bank details to be provided by the claimant. Costs follow the result.
This writ petition by Shaji K.T., a devotee of Sree Valayanad Bhagavathi, seeks a mandamus to require the 2nd respondent, the Commissioner of the Malabar Devaswom Board, to hear the petitioner before finalising proceedings evidenced by Exts. P3 and P4, and to permit the petitioner to adduce evidence (oral and documentary). The petitioner also seeks a mandamus preventing finalisation of Exts. P3 and P4 without hearing and without perusal of the documents mentioned in Ext. P3. The Court discusses whether Ext. P23 (16.04.2022) issued by the Commissioner under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, violates natural justice and can be challenged under Article 226. It relies on a related judgment in W.P.(C) No.14154/2022 which dealt with a similar challenge to Ext. P23 and highlighted that remedies lie under sub-section (5) of Section 45 of the Act, including an appeal before the State under that sub-section. The judgment also cites Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Narichania to reiterate that writ courts should not grant interim relief where final relief should be sought in an appropriate forum. The petition is disposed of with directions: file an appeal under Section 45(5) before the 3rd respondent with an interim relief application; the 3rd respondent to dispose the interim relief application by a specified date, and service of pleadings/compliance to be completed. The order leaves the petition open to contentions at the appropriate statutory forum.
Joshy Jacob Kaippanplakal, petitioner, seeks a declaration and relief to cut and remove trees on his land at Vannappuram, Thodupuzha, Idukki, assigned under the Land Assignment (Regularization of Occupations of Forest Lands prior to 1-1-1977) Special Rules, 1993. The rubber trees on the land have died and require re-planting; the petitioner contends that to replant, other trees standing on the property must be cut along with the rubber trees. He asserts that patta No. 867/2001 (Exhibit P2) identifies the trees to be preserved and that trees not listed fall outside the protection regime; he has submitted representations (Exhibits P5 and P6) to the Village Officer and Divisional Forest Officer seeking permission to cut. The respondents, including DF0, Kothamangalam Division, and the Thodupuzha Range Officer, counter that the land is forest land under joint verification and remains with the Government; the patta assigns full rights over forest trees to the Forest Department, and any felling without permission is an offence. The court relies on multiple authorities, including State of Orissa v. Duti Sahu, One Earth One Life, Rajan Gopalan, Nature Lovers Movement, and Jalal, to hold that the 1995 Rules apply to lands covered by the Special Rules, and that trees earmarked in the patta or those that arise subsequently are to be preserved. Consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought. However, he may approach the appropriate statutory authority for permission to cut or remove the specified trees in Exhibit P2 patta in accordance with law. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
Crl.M.C. No. 3788 of 2021 The petitioner, Paul Varghese, is the accused in S.T. No. 3557 of 2016 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate – I, North Paravur, facing charges under IPC Section 279 and MV Act Section 185 for a drunken rash drive. The core issue before the Kerala High Court in Crl.M.C. No. 3788 of 2021 was whether a Magistrate, who had issued summons, can insist on filing a vakalath (pleader’s vakalat) from the accused, or whether a memo of appearance suffices to enable the accused to plead, including a possible guilty plea. The Magistrate had dismissed the accused’s application to plead guilty via a memo of appearance on the ground that no vakalath had been filed. The High Court held that the Magistrate erred in insisting on vakalath, as there is no statutory provision mandating vakalath and Rule 31 of the Criminal Rules of Practice contemplates a memo of appearance by pleaders. The Court noted that Rules 33, 35 (and Rule 36) deal with vakalat in contexts of exemptions or other formalities, but in the absence of an exemption, a vakalat is not mandated. The Court relied on previous decisions including Joseph v. State of Kerala and State of Kerala v. Vishnu, which affirm that a pleader may appear and plead by memorandum of appearance without vakalat. While refusing blanket permission to plead guilty without vakalat, and acknowledging the seriousness of the offences, the High Court set aside the order to the extent of insisting on vakalath and disposed of the petition accordingly, leaving the exercise of discretion on exemptions to the trial court.
The appellants are the parents and legal heirs of Vishnu R. Nair, who was the petitioner in OP(MV) No.1075 of 2010 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kottayam, for compensation arising from injuries sustained in a road traffic accident on 01.08.2008. The Tribunal awarded a monetary compensation of Rs. 20,09,230 with 7.5% interest, and the petitioner ultimately died on 19.09.2013, eight months after the award. The appellants (legal heirs) challenged the quantum in an appeal, seeking enhancement of compensation. The High Court, though noting that the insurer (3rd respondent) contested compensation and that the 1st and 2nd respondents were ex parte, proceeded to re-examine the award. The court concluded that the petition for compensation should be treated as an injury claim (not a death claim) and undertook recalculation of heads of damages. Notably, it fixed notional income at Rs. 9,000 per month using precedents (Ramachandrappa; Syed Sadiq; Pushkar Mehra; Radhakrishana V. Gokul), resulting in higher loss of earnings (Rs. 1,08,000). It awarded Rs. 4,57,500 as bystander expenses for one observer, and Rs. 27,21,600 for loss due to disability with future prospects under the age-22 multiplier of 18 (Pranay Sethi and related cases). The overall recalculated total reached Rs. 40,94,330, and the appeal was allowed with an additional enhancement of Rs. 20,85,100, plus interest and costs, with directions for deposit before the Tribunal within two months. The judgment clarifies that the legal heirs can pursue enhancement of compensation under Section 166(1) of the Act in such continuations of the petition.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case challenges an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Manjeri, dated September 27, 2023, granting permission under Section 302 Cr.P.C. to the defacto complainant to engage a counsel to conduct the prosecution in CC 372/2015 (and related cases) arising from Crime No. 475/2015 of Karipur Police Station. The main case involves offences under sections 341, 323, 324, 326, 506(1) read with 34 IPC, and a counter case CC 18/2016; all relate to a fallout in a matrimonial relationship between Abdul Samad and Subeela, with additional proceedings under 498A and 406 IPC. The petitioner contends that the trial court’s order permitting the defacto complainant to appoint counsel is illegal, as multiple prosecutions against the same parties are involved and the same prosecutor presiding across cases could prejudice the accused. The petitioner relies on Supreme Court judgments including Shiv Kumar v. Hukum Chand and Amir Hamza Shaikh’s case to stress that prosecution should be conducted by a public prosecutor with detachment and fairness, not outsourced to private counsel chosen by a complainant. The State counters that the magistrate examined the circumstances and that separate prosecutors are necessary to avoid pendency and ensure smooth conduct. The High Court ultimately held there was no merit in the Crl.M.C. and dismissed it, upholding the magistrate’s order.
BAIL APPL. NO. 5562 OF 2021 This is a regular bail application by two accused in Crime No. 169/2021, Nallalam Police Station, Kozhikode, registered under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act for alleged possession and intended sale of MDMA. The petitioners—Iqlas and Shahad Saman—were found in a plantain garden with 12.050 grams of MDMA (8.250 grams attributed to the first petitioner and 3.800 grams to the second) and were arrested and remanded. The prosecution contends the quantities should be reckoned together, so that Section 22(c) NDPS applies, with Section 29 NDPS Act reflecting a conspiracy to deal in narcotic drugs, and thereby invoking the embargo under Section 37 NDPS Act, making bail untenable at this pre-trial stage. The petitioners contend the quantities should be counted separately (8.250 g and 3.800 g), which would place the case under Section 22(b) for intermediary quantity and potentially allow statutory bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., arguing reliance on several precedents (Mushaque Ahammed @ Muthu v. Sub Inspector of Police, Malappuram; Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot v. State of Gujarat; Muthukumar and others v. Station House Officer; Bikramjith Singh v. State of Punjab). The court, after considering these authorities, distinguished several on facts, noting that this is a pre-trial stage and that circumstances suggest joint engagement and potential conspiracy. Ultimately, the court found the materials insufficient to take the case out of Section 22(c) NDPS and held that the Section 37 embargo applies, dismissing the bail application.
This is a Rent Control Revision petition under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, filed by tenants (Kurunthaliyimmal Narayani and others) challenging an eviction order passed by the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Thalassery, under Section 11(3) for bonafide need and the subsequent dismissal of their appeal by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-I), Thalassery. The landlords sought eviction on the ground of rent arrears and a proposed need for vacant possession to start a supermarket by their dependents. The Rent Control Court deemed eviction under Section 11(3) to be tenable, while the Appellate Authority upheld this. The petitioners argued that the landlords’ need was not genuine, that rent was paid up to January 2010, and that the alleged business motive was a ruse; they also challenged the enforceability of the second proviso to Section 11(3) and questioned the evidence about a family member’s mental health. The High Court (two-judge bench) examined whether it could reappraise facts under Section 20 of the Act. Relying on precedents limiting revisional interference with findings of fact, the Court dismissed the revision petition, noting no illegality or impropriety in the appellate judgment. It granted five months’ time for surrender with conditions and arrears deposits.
WP.(C)No.14342 of 2019 & con.cases The batch of writ petitions concerns the Thiruvabharana Patha, the ceremonial route through which the sacred Tiruvabharanam ornaments are conveyed from Pandalam Palace to Sabarimala during Makara Sankranti. The primary petitioner, Thiruvabharana Patha Samrakshana Samithi, along with other petitioners such as NSS Karayogam No.825 (Kozhencherry), Leelamony M.P., AnandhaKrishnan Potty, and several others, challenged encroachments on the Patha and sought time-bound action to remove them in accordance with Ext.P1 (2009) directions, including a survey by a dedicated team under the Advocate Commissioner’s supervision and police protection for the survey and eviction process. The petitions allege that encroachments span multiple villages in Ranni and Kozhencherry taluks and that floods (2018) altered the course, complicating patta boundaries and necessitating fresh demarcation. The respondents rely on established statutory regimes under the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and Rules, the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, and the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act (to which Travancore Devaswom Board answers) to justify eviction steps already taken or to be taken. The court, noting that individual notices lacked mahazars and that due process was not adequately afforded, disposed of the matter with directions for fresh notices with mahazar, a personal hearing, and a time-bound eviction framework, while preserving temple interests and public lands. The connected cases were heard together, and interim orders were continued where necessary.
This is a writ petition challenging KEAM-2022 admission under the Scheduled Tribe quota for a Chemical Engineering seat at Thrissur Engineering College. The petitioner, Ajeena K.G., was allotted in the ST quota but the admission was provisional, pending verification by KIRTADS. An enquiry led to Ext.P9, a report by the Vigilance Officer (KIRTADS), which found that the petitioner belonged to the Malai Arayan community, leading to her being treated as a general category candidate and required to pay the fee, causing her to lose the allotment opportunity. Subsequently, Ext.P13 (an order by the 1st respondent) rejected her claim to ST status. The petitioner seeks certiorari to quash Ext.P9 and Ext.P13 and mandamus directing the first and second respondents to confirm the ST status on the basis of Exts.P2 and P6 and to keep a seat vacant for ST in KEAM 2022, while also seeking exemption from translations. The petition contends that the petitioner’s mother belongs to the Malai Arayan community, and that the family’s social customs and the documentary evidence (Exts.P1–P6) support ST status, arguing that the Pentecostal faith is not a bar to caste. The respondents contend that Ext.P9 findings and the screening process are conclusive and that remedies lie under the Kerala (SC/ST) Act, 1996. The High Court dismisses the writ petition, upholding the screening process and advising resort to statutory remedies under the Act.
On 20.12.2001, a tanker lorry carrying ammonia collided with another lorry on the Waynad road near Eranhipalam, causing a leakage of ammonia. The appellant, a motorcyclist, inhaled the chemical and suffered a severe cardiac problem. He claimed joint and several liability against the tanker owner, the other lorry’s owner, and the insurer, seeking compensation quantified at Rs. 5,60,000 (limited to Rs. 3,00,000). The Principal Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode, dismissed the claim petition, holding that the appellant had failed to prove that the injuries were a consequence of the accident. The appellant challenged the decision in MACA No. 1328 of 2009. The appellant’s counsel argued that the Tribunal’s dismissal relied on a time discrepancy in Ext.A2 (the wound certificate) and adopted a hyper-technical stance, while the appellant had sought disability assessment by a medical board which the Tribunal did not decide. He relied on Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam (1991 ACJ 777) to contend that an accident need not arise from movement of a vehicle and that a casual nexus suffices. The insurer contended there was no proven nexus between the accident and myocardial infarction. The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s reasoning, dismissed the appeal and refused remand given the lack of cogent material and the protracted litigation of over two decades.
