The petitioners, retired employees of the Kerala State Beverages Corporation (KSBC) and its units, approach the Kerala High Court seeking higher pension under the Employees' Provident Scheme as amended in 2014. The writ petition centers on whether the amended scheme can be applied to enhance pension benefits for retired KSBC employees who were under the EPFO framework. The court notes that the validity of the 2014 amendment to the Employees’ Provident Scheme was upheld by the Supreme Court in a 2022 decision (Sunil Kumar B.). In light of that ruling, the learned standing counsel for the respondents submits that petitioners may submit fresh applications under the amended scheme, which should be considered in accordance with the amended regime and the Supreme Court's directions. The tribunal below does not adjudicate the merits of enhanced pension in this proceeding; instead, it disposes of the petition by permitting the petitioners to file appropriate applications for enhanced pension under the amended scheme and to be processed without delay by the relevant authorities. The order thus preserves the petitioners’ right to seek enhancement through a procedural route, ensuring expeditious consideration. The judgment reinforces deference to the Supreme Court’s ruling and provides a pathway for pension enhancement via a fresh, timely application under the amended scheme.
WP(C) Nos.3801/2014 & 36086/15 These two writ petitions, heard together, challenge orders of the Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum (District Forums) under the Consumer Protection Act. The petitioner-bank in WP(C) No.3801/2014 disputes a stay order restraining recovery proceedings against default on an educational loan. The Hedge Commodities petition (WP(C) No.36086/2015) challenges Ext.P9, a District Forum order in a consumer dispute initiated by Hedge Commodities; the petition contends lack of jurisdiction and maintainability of the District Forum’s order and seeks quashing or remand. A central legal issue is whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be entertained where an adequate statutory remedy exists, particularly in a complete-code regime like the Consumer Protection Act, given the pending status of petitions admitted years earlier. The court anchors its analysis on controlling authorities, notably Genpact India Pvt. Ltd. v. D.C.I.T., which clarified that admission of a writ petition does not bar examination of maintainability and the availability of alternate remedies. The judge ultimately allows WP( C) 3801/2014, quashing Exts.P1 and P2, and partially allows WP( C) 36086/2015, quashing Ext.P9 and remanding for reconsideration by the District Forum with opportunity of hearing. The decision emphasizes discretionary, fact-specific evaluation in light of the Consumer Protection Act’s hierarchical appellate structure.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a dispute over a road, C schedule, and a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction. Plaintiff P.A. Johny Kutty @ Yohannan sought to restrain the defendants from closing or reducing the width of C schedule road, alleging it is a public road of 12 feet width vested in the Panchayat, with vehicular ingress and egress to his A schedule property. The trial court granted a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants, their men and agents from obstructing the road, limiting width to 2.75 metres as per Ext. C1. On appeal, the first Appellate Court modified the decree, maintaining the injunction but adjusting the width to reflect varying dimensions (starting at 3.95 metres and tapering to 2.75 metres) as reported in Ext. C1, and directed removal of a fence within two months, failing which the plaintiff may remove it by due process. The defendants contended that substantial questions of law arise, noting the court exceeded pleadings by granting mandatory relief and that Ext. C1 support does not establish a public road; the plaintiff contended no such questions arose and that the road is public as per Panchayat records. The High Court ultimately upheld the appellate order, holding that the Panchayat record indicates a maximum public-road width around 2.50 metres, and that the appellate court’s exercise of discretion to mould reliefs and grant status-quo ante was justified. The appeal is dismissed with costs to both sides.
The petitioner, Seahorse Ship Agencies Pvt. Ltd., a shipping agent, approached the Kerala High Court seeking a refund of a duplicate payment of Light Dues amounting to ₹6,33,144/-, paid on 9 May 2016 in respect of the vessel MV Cape Chronos. The payment was made online through the DGLL portal, but no receipt was generated, leading the petitioner to make a manual payment at the Cochin Customs office in belief the online payment had not gone through. Subsequently, the online receipt appeared, revealing that two payments had been made for the same dues. The petitioner asserted that the excess payment arose due to technical failure and sought refund of the duplicate payment. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs rejected the refund claim as time-barred under Section 19 of the Lighthouse Act, 1927, and the Customs Appeals and CESTAT were similarly adverse. The petitioner contended that Section 19 is not applicable to a duplicate/dual payment, as it is not an “excess payment” envisaged by the Act, and that liability lies not with the Customs but with the DGLL/portal system. The High Court held that the duplicate payment does not fall within Section 19’s scope and allowed the writ petition, directing the refund within one month. The judgment surveys constitutional and common-law principles related to refunds for payments made by mistake and unjust enrichment, citing multiple precedents.
WP(C) Nos. 28461/2018 & con.cases The judgment consolidates a batch of writ petitions by KSRTC employees challenging terminations/regularisation decisions following a bipartite pay revision and subsequent Government directives. The Court traces the history: a bipartite settlement (2008) and subsequent Government orders (notably 22.12.2011 GO 78/2011, 21.11.2013 GO 105/2013, and 26/03/2018 GO 129/2018) introduced conditions for regularisation, including a minimum ten years of service and, later, a demand for 120 days of duty per year. Petitioners argue that many were regularised through this Court’s earlier decisions (e.g., Suresh Kumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 258) and that KSRTC’s 2018 termination orders undermined vested rights obtained via judicial pronouncements. The Court notes the Supreme Court’s Civil Appeals No.4435–4438/2017 holding that Government-imposed conditions could be applied to regularisation, and that the power to issue general instructions under Section 34 of the Road Transport Corporation Act can guide future but cannot jeopardise settled rights. Ultimately, the Court holds that the impugned termination orders must be set aside, directs KSRTC to give hearings with access to documents, and, if petitioners prove ten years of service and 120 days of duty up to 21.12.2011, orders regularisation with pensionary implications; otherwise, appropriate termination can be issued. The decision binds all petitioners by the Supreme Court’s precedents under Article 141.
This Criminal Misc. Case (Crl.MC.No. 3502 of 2018) concerns a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash proceedings in Crime No.156 of 2015 at Malappuram Police Station. The second respondent, a de facto complainant from a Scheduled Caste community, alleged a prolonged relationship with the first petitioner, Ansar, including sexual activity in 2014–2015, accompanied by a promise of marriage. The allegations also name the petitioners 2 and 3 as friends who allegedly dissuaded the complainant from insisting on marriage. The trial court had registered the case under IPC sections 376(2)(n) and 506(1) read with 34, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST POA Act. The petition argues that the relationship was consensual between adults and not a rape; reliance is placed on the Supreme Court decision Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar and the complaint is an abuse of process. The High Court considered the statements, the de facto complainant’s affidavit and the ongoing life of the victim; it held that continuing the prosecution would cause grave hardship, dignity concerns and remote chances of conviction. Consequently, it allowed the petition and quashed the Final Report and proceedings, exercising extraordinary powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed by Mathew Varghese @ Sharon, the fifth accused in SC No. 324/2019 arising from Crime No. 307/2013 of Konni Police Station, Kerela. The SC No. 324/2019 matter concerns offences under Section 395 IPC (dacoity). The petitioner seeks quashing of proceedings on the basis that the parties have settled their dispute and do not wish to prosecute. The victim supports the settlement; the Public Prosecutor acknowledges the absence of criminal antecedents against the petitioner but expresses reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement, noting the need to consider public interest. The court cites Sajeev and anr. v. State of Kerala (2022 (2) KLT 861) to illustrate that final reports can be quashed on a settlement against one or more accused, and relies on the broader principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019 (5) SCC 688), which summarise when the power under s.482 CrPC may be exercised in non-compoundable offences where the dispute is private and resolved. Laxmi Narayan references Gian Singh and Narinder Singh. After examining the facts and documents, the court finds the dispute private, with no serious overtacts, and accepts the settlement. The Criminal Misc. Case is allowed and all further proceedings against the petitioner in SC No. 324/2019 are quashed.
Praveen A R filed GOP No.1792 of 2017 in the Family Court, Thrissur, seeking permanent custody of Nishan Krishna and, in IA No.26/2022, an order directing the mother to give written consent for renewal of the minor’s passport so that he could take the child abroad. The opposing IA, IA No.27/2022, filed by the mother, sought the return of the minor’s passport. The Family Court, by Ext.P6 dated 04.08.2022, dismissed IA 26/2022 and allowed IA 27/2022, directing the father to hand the passport to the mother. The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging Ext.P6. The High Court outlined the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, citing precedents such as Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, and Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair, to emphasize that Article 227 supervision is not appellate, and interference is warranted only for grave dereliction of duty, gross violation of natural justice, or manifest errors. After examining submissions, the Court held that the Family Court’s reasoning was not perverse and that there was no justification to interfere. Consequently, the original petition was dismissed, and Ext.P6 stood. The matter thus ends with no relief to the petitioner.
This is a criminal revision petition under sections 397 and 401 CrPC filed by E.K. Hariharan challenging the concurrent convictions under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) and the sentences imposed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The complainant alleged that Hariharan issued a cheque for Rs. 15,00,000 on 17.10.2015 towards repayment of a loan allegedly borrowed in January 2014; the cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds. The Trial Court convicted Hariharan and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment with a fine of Rs.15 lakh, directing the fine to be paid as compensation under CrPC 357(1)(b). The Additional Sessions Court, on appeal, confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence to imprisonment till the rising of the court under section 138 NI Act and maintained the Rs.15 lakh compensation, with optional further six months’ imprisonment if the fine was not paid. Hariharan contends that the evidence does not establish the loan transaction, that he partially admitted the loan (Rs.12 lakh) and that the complainant is a moneylender with signed blank cheques; he also argues that presumptions under sections 118 and 139 NI Act were wrongly applied. The High Court, reiterating that revision powers are limited and cannot re-appreciate evidence to reach a contra finding, dismisses the petition. It grants three months to pay compensation and defers execution until 25.04.2023 with appearance on 26.04.2023.
This Kerala High Court Motor Accidents Claims Appeal (MACA No. 906 of 2013) arises from an OP(MV) petition (No. 1198/2009) filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kollam, seeking compensation for injuries sustained in a road accident on 26.04.2009. The Tribunal awarded Rs.1,04,000 on an claimed Rs.2,00,000. The appellant, Bhaskaran Achary, contends that the Tribunal erred in adopting a meagre notional income of Rs.4,000 per month, despite the appellant having claimed Rs.5,000 monthly; the medical evidence shows severe injuries and substantial aftercare. Ext.A11 records 12% permanent disability but was rejected by the Tribunal as not issued by a Medical Board; the appellant argues that the certificate, corroborated by Exts A5–A6 (wound certificate and discharge summary), indicates extended disability and long treatment, warranting a longer loss-of-income period (at least 24 weeks rather than four months). The appellant also asserts the pension of 12% disability and the injury severity justify higher compensation (loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and transport expenses). Respondents contend that Tribunal's computations were correct. The High Court, relying on Ramachandrappa, holds that the notional income should be higher and that Ext.A11, though not from a Medical Board, can be given substantial weight. The court partially allows the appeal, enhancing disability compensation, loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and transport expenses, with interest at 7.5% and costs on enhanced amounts.
This appeal arises from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award in OP(MV)252/2011 (Pala). On 10.10.2010, the appellant, Gajapathi, while riding a motorcycle KL37/7661 from Puliyanmala to Vandanmedu, was struck by a car KL-41/A 2731 driven by the first respondent in a rash and negligent manner. He sustained injuries, and his avocation as a JCB operator living off a salary claimed at Rs.18,000 per month was contested. The vehicle was insured with the second respondent. The Tribunal awarded Rs.58,750 as compensation with 7.5% interest from the petition date, ultimately limiting the claim to Rs.1.70 lakh against a claim of Rs.2,91,000. The appellant contends that he was a skilled worker earning more and that he possessed a valid driving license to operate heavy equipment, rendering the Tribunal’s income fixation of Rs.5,000 per month wrong. The insurer defends that the accident occurred due to the petitioner’s negligence and that compensation heads were excessive. While the Tribunal applied a disability of 2%, the Medical Board later assessed 10% disability. The High Court, relying on Pranay Sethi and related decisions, re-fixes notional income at Rs.10,000 per month and revises several heads, ultimately increasing total compensation and directing deposit within two months, with disbursal as per law.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging Annexures G and H orders of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court – I, Ottapalam, and the Additional Sessions Judge – IV, Palakkad. The petitioners are accused in CC 1027/2016 arising from the final report in Crime No. 443/2014 of Sreekrishnapuram police station, alleging offences under Sections 3 read with 17 and 18A(6A) of the Kerala Money Lenders Act (KML Act), and under Sections 3 read with 9(a) of the Kerala Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act (Prohibition Act). The allegation is that around 2011 the second respondent borrowed Rs. 30,000 from the petitioners, who secured the loan with signed blank cheques and papers; subsequent loans totaling Rs. 65,000 were taken with Rs. 6,500 collected as interest. Even after repayment, security papers were not returned. The Magistrate discharged the petitioners only in part under the KML Act, while directing trial under the Prohibition Act, a decision upheld by the revision court. The petition contends misapplication of Section 239 Cr.P.C., non-consideration of documents produced by the petitioners, and the view that the Prohibition Act cannot operate independently of the KML Act. The High Court rejects these contentions, noting that discharge under Section 239 is based on whether a charge is groundless, and preserves independent penal provisions of the Prohibition Act. The petition is dismissed as lacking merit, with the court underscoring that the matter should proceed to trial where evidence will be weighed."
The Kerala High Court deals with an original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging Exts. P3 to P5 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (RCAA) Thrissur in RCA No.154 of 2011, which arose from eviction proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Control Court had granted eviction under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(8) on a bona fide need; 11(4)(i) eviction was rejected. The tenant—Lawrence (died) and his legal heirs—challenged the appellate orders in a petition for supervisory jurisdiction, contending that impleadment of the landlord’s legal representatives and subsequent review proceedings were mishandled and that the abatement of RCA No.154 of 2011 was improper. As part of the Article 227 analysis, the court cites Shalini Shyam Shetty, Jai Singh, and other Supreme Court authorities to explain the limited, supervisory character of Article 227, emphasizing that interference is warranted only for grave dereliction of duty, gross injustice, or manifest errors, not as an appeal. The High Court also discusses Rule 10 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules regarding impleadment and condonation of delay. Ultimately, it holds that there is no demonstration of patent perversity or miscarriage of justice, and declines to interfere, dismissing the original petition and upholding the Appellate Authority’s orders and the abatement."
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a suit seeking a declaration that the marriage agreement Ext.A3 dated 14.12.1989 is void and that there is no valid husband-wife relationship between the parties. The plaintiff, a Hindu Ezhava, runs a studio and was a student; the defendant, a member of the Hindu Ullada community, allegedly cohabited with the plaintiff and a marriage was later registered. The trial court held that mere execution of a marriage agreement under the Hindu Marriage Act is not enough to constitute a valid marriage and that, to be valid, the marriage must be in accordance with customary rites and ceremonies under Section 7, including saptapadi. It further held that since Ext.A3 did not prove the customary rites, the declaratory relief was not granted; a related injunction in a separate suit was dismissed. The first appellate court affirmed. On admission, the High Court addressed whether, in the absence of proven customary marriage, the courts could deny a declaration that there is no matrimonial relationship. The appellant argued coercion, lack of free consent, and that the marriage was primarily a sham to fortify Ext.A3; the respondent contended there was a valid customary marriage supported by Ext.A3. The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal in part, holding Ext.A3 not a valid marriage agreement and annulling the lower decrees to the extent of declaring the agreement void, while denying the injunctions and costs.
Petitioner Bindhu K, appearing in person, challenges Ext.P7, a termination notice issued by the Centre for Professional & Advanced Studies (CPAS) under a contract dated 01.01.2022, alleging misconduct and insubordination. The core dispute is Ext.P4, directing her to enter her designation in the KUHS portal as Associate Professor in Pharmacognosy, a post for which KUHS later declared her ineligible in Ext.P8. She had been engaged for Pharmaceutics, not Pharmacognosy, so the directive was effectively impossible. In Ext.P5 she objected, but CPAS proceeded to terminate. The petitioner contends there was no act of misconduct or dereliction; the instruction to register in Pharmacognosy was impossible and illegal; terminating on such grounds stigmatizes her. CPAS argued that Clause 5 obliges her to assist and obey directives, and Clause 9 permits termination with one month's notice in cases of misconduct or breach. The High Court observed that Ext.P7 brands the petitioner with serious misconduct without a proper enquiry, while the underlying instruction was impossible to implement. Relying on Vijayakumaran C.P.V., Pavanendra Narayan Verma, and ECIL v Karunakar, the Court held that stigmatic termination cannot be sustained and quashed Ext.P7, allowing the petition with liberty to CPAS to take action under the agreement following due procedure.
The appellant, Sulochana (appellant), was convicted under Section 58 of the Kerala Abkari Act by the Additional Sessions Judge, Neyyattinkara, in Sessions Case No. 193/2001. The prosecution case rested on possession of a 5-litre jerrycan containing arrack seized on 15 December 1997. The trial court sentenced the appellant to 37 months of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, with an additional six months’ imprisonment in case of default. On appeal, the High Court examined serious deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, notably the absence of a forwarding note and absence of an arrest memo marked in evidence, both of which link seizure to laboratory analysis and establish tamper-proof custody. Exhibits P1–P5 and the material objects MO1–MO2 were relied upon, but their weight was undercut by missing chain-of-custody documents and unexplained delay in production of the contraband (four days) before the court. The court underscored that, in Abkari cases, forwarding notes are essential to prove the path from seizure to the analyst, containing seal impressions and other critical data. Relying on decisions such as Gireesh @ Manoj, Ramankutty, Prakasan, Vijayan Pattalam Vijayan, and Gopalan, and while acknowledging related authorities like Sukumaran, Ravi, Meppadi, and Vikraman, the court held that the defects cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s case and ultimately allowed the appeal. The conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was ordered liberty with bail, if any, canceled.
On 10.12.2003, Lijo Jose, riding as a pillion on a motorcycle, was struck when an autorickshaw driven by the 2nd respondent overtook a car from the wrong side near Kunnathangadi. The rider of the motorcycle died on the same day; the appellant sustained serious injuries, including fractures of C1 and C2 and dental injuries, resulting in a permanent disability of 16%. The appellant, employed as a salesman, sought compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, allowed the petition against the insurer, awarding Rs.1,37,830 with interest and costs. The Tribunal fixed the notional income at Rs.2000 per month, while the appellant claimed Rs.3500. The respondents did not contest liability, and the insurer defended the quantum, arguing the accident resulted from the rider’s negligence. The appellant’s disability certificate (Exhibit A11) showed 16% permanent disability. The High Court referred to Ramachandrappa (2011) and Sarla Verma (2010) to re-evaluate the award, holding the notional income should be Rs.3500 and applying a multiplier of 18 (instead of 17) and the 16% disability as per Exhibit A11. It recalculated heads of damage: loss of earnings Rs.10,500; loss of amenities Rs.15,000; total Rs.2,07,010. The appeal was allowed in part, increasing the compensation by Rs.69,180, with 7% interest and Rs.3,000 costs; the enhanced amount to be deposited within 60 days before the Tribunal for disbursement.
This is a bail application (BA 471 of 2023) filed by the second accused, Vimal, in Crime No.1278/2022 of East Kallada Police Station, Kollam, under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The prosecution’s case is that on 01.11.2022, the first accused was caught red-handed with 43.8049 gms of MDMA. During the investigation, the second accused’s ATM card was seized from the first accused and linked to withdrawals for purchasing MDMA. Bank transactions and call records allegedly show repeated contact between the two accused during the relevant period, leading to the charge that the second accused facilitated the purchase of contraband. The prosecution invoked Sections 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act, with Section 37 as the governing bail provision in cases involving commercial quantity. The petitioner argues innocence, highlighting that nothing was recovered from him and that he handed over the ATM card not for purchasing contraband but for other purposes; he also cites the custody timeline (since 28.11.2022) and the progress of the investigation. The Public Prosecutor contends that the second accused aided in supplying MDMA in Kollam and that the card, call data, and transaction records establish prima facie involvement, justifying denial of bail under Section 37. After evaluating materials and relying on established NDPS bail jurisprudence, the court holds there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and that he will refrain from offences on bail. Consequently, the bail petition is dismissed. The matter is decided by a Single Judge, Justice A. Badharudeen, and the final disposition is dismissal of the petition.
The Royal Sundaram General Insurance Company Ltd appeals MACA 338/2019 against the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pala’s award of Rs 16,09,270 out of Rs 30,00,000 in OP(MV) 699/2015, arising from the death of Lishin Shabu in a road accident on 16.03.2012. The Tribunal held the deceased was employed by the vehicle-owning business and fixed a notional income of Rs 10,000 per month with 40% future prospects and applied a multiplier to arrive at compensation under losses of earnings and pain and suffering. The insurer contends that the deceased, aged 17, was a gratuitous passenger, and that Rs 8,500 should be the appropriate notional income for unascertained earnings (per Ramachandrappa); it also submits that no loss of earnings or pain and suffering should be awarded at all. The claimants contend the deceased worked for the owner of the vehicle, supported by depositions and evidence, and argue for the Tribunal’s computation with a higher notional income. The High Court rejects the gratuitous passenger claim, noting that age alone does not preclude work and applying Sarala Verma’s guidance on future prospects. It upholds the Rs 10,000 notional income for a skilled fish cutter, following Rajani and Ramachandrappa, but agrees with Satinder Kaur that death negates certain heads of compensation. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part: the Tribunal’s losses under Loss of Earnings and Pain and Suffering are deleted, while other items stand. The notional income remains Rs 10,000.
The High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam heard MACA No. 43 of 2015, an appeal by the legal heirs of Jain alias Thomas challenging an award under the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Vatakara. The accident occurred on 06.12.2008 when a KL-7/S-2680 auto rickshaw, driven by the 2nd respondent in a rash and negligent manner, knocked down the deceased and left him on the roadside; he died the following morning. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,59,900 in compensation, which the appellants sought to enhance. The 2nd respondent allegedly had no valid driving licence, and the 3rd respondent insurer admitted the policy but contended the driver lacked license and that the insured’s negligence could not be established beyond the driver’s acquittal under Section 304 IPC. The High Court scrutinized Exts. A5–A6, noting insufficient proof of the deceased’s exact age and subsequently adopted an age of 31 years for the deceased; relying on Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, it fixed the notional income at Rs. 7,000 per month with 40% future prospects. After 50% personal deduction and a multiplier of 16, the Court computed Rs. 9,60,000 for dependency; it also adjusted heads for funeral, loss of estate, and love/affection, culminating in a total enhanced compensation of Rs. 6,15,100. The insurer is directed to deposit this amount, with Rs. 25,000 to appellants 3–5 and the balance to appellants 1–2, at 7.5% interest, within two months; there is no order as to costs.
