This is a Kerala High Court MACTA appeal (MACA No. 245 of 2014) challenging an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Attingal, dated 27 August 2013 in OP(MV) No. 698 of 2004. The claimant, K. Sanil, sustained severe injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 16 March 2004 while riding a motorcycle; an autorickshaw collided with his vehicle. The Tribunal found the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by both the claimant and the autorickshaw driver, assessed compensation at Rs. 1,67,500, and held 50% contributory negligence by the claimant, directing the insurer (3rd respondent) to deposit half of the award with interest. The petitioner argued that the Tribunal erred in not adopting a higher notional monthly income (RAM follow-up: Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd.) and for inadequate compensation under heads including pain and suffering, loss of amenities, and permanent disability, though evidence of permanent disability was disputed. The insurer contested the degree of negligence and argued lack of material for liability or disability. On 28 February 2023 the Kerala High Court allowed the appeal, reversed the 50:50 contributory negligence finding, fixed the claimant’s notional monthly income at Rs. 4,500, re-assessed losses for eight months’ earning, enhanced several heads of compensation, and ordered the insurer to pay the entire amount with interest at 7.5% per annum, while deleting the Tribunal’s 12% default interest provision and directing payment within two months of copy receipt of the judgment.
This writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks mandamus and police protection to enable the petitioner and his workers to repair and heighten an existing granite boundary wall and to act on representations filed before the police. The petitioner asserts that the 3rd respondent and his henchmen threaten the life of the petitioner and his workers, and that previous police inaction endangers their safety and rights. The factual matrix traces a civil lineage of land and wall rights dating to a decree in OS 370/2000 (Ext.P1) declaring exclusive right over the rubble wall, and subsequent litigation including O.S. 233/2021 and CMA 35/2022 (pending before the District Court). The petitioner argues that despite Ext.P1 and Ext.P9 (2004) judgments, the right to maintain and heighten the boundary wall should be recognized and protected, as the civil disputes have not resolved the ownership of the wall or the corresponding pathway. The counter-affidavit contends that the petitioner seeks to encroach on the adjoining pathway, would impede air passage, and that the key issue is still a civil dispute pending in court. The learned judge ultimately declines relief, noting that the civil dispute remains undecided and directing any relief to be sought within the ongoing civil proceedings; relying on a Division Bench decision that police protection should not be ordered in civil disputes over title and possession.
This writ petition concerns Exts. P2 and P6 orders under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby gratuity was awarded to S. Kumaraswamy despite the bank’s challenge that his termination for misconduct should bar gratuity under the Act. The third respondent ( Kumaraswamy) faced a departmental inquiry resulting in a penalty of compulsory retirement on 20.03.2006 for alleged misconduct including the fraudulent creation of a demand draft. The Gratuity Authority allowed a gratuity of Rs. 4,13,515 with interest. The Syndicate Bank challenged the orders, arguing in particular that under Regulation No. 46 of the Syndicate Bank Officers’ Service Regulations, 1979 and Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, gratuity would be forfeited where employment ends due to an act constituting moral turpitude; the bank also argued that the employee’s misconduct warranted denial of gratuity. The appellate authority dismissed the petition for condonation of delay under Section 7(7) of the Act, holding a delay of 188 days with no permissible condonation. The High Court ultimately held that special limitation provisions apply and decline to interfere with the authorities’ orders; the writ petition was dismissed. The decision effectively upholds the gratuity award as not barred by the statutory provisions, and confirms the delay ruling.
Johnson Stephen, the owner of 33.91 acres in Re-Survey No.36 of Block No.145 in Kottayam, filed WP(C) No.32823 of 2022 challenging the omission of the 4th respondent Tahsildar in entertaining his application for reassessment of Basic Tax and for entries in the Basic Tax Register. The predecessor invoked the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 seeking permission to convert the land to non‑agricultural use, resulting in Ext.P1 dated 1993 under Clause 6 of the Order. Despite the enabling order, revenue records describe the land as Nilam/Paddy land, prompting Ext.P2—under Section 6(3) of the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961—to seek reassessment and updates in the Basic Tax Register. The Tahsildar did not decide Ext.P2. The respondents claim Ext.P1’s genuineness must be verified and the current land status ascertained before any reassessment. The court cites Mary Abraham v. State of Kerala and others (2020 (4) KLT 448) and District Collector, Ernakulam v. Fr. Jose Uppani and others (2020 (4) KLT 612) to hold that once a statutory order under the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 permits conversion, earlier BTR entries become superfluous, and Revenue officials are obliged to re‑assess under Section 6A after verifying the permission. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed; the Tahsildar is directed to consider Ext.P7 Form‑A and pass orders within one month after verification of the permission.
FAO No. 76 of 2021 arises from an order dated 18.10.2021 in I.A.1/2021 in O.S.No.21 of 2019 (Sub Court, Punalur), challenging an ex parte decree dated 02.02.2021. The suit seeks specific performance of an agreement for sale of plaint schedule property, or in the alternative, return of Rs.10,00,000 out of the total consideration of Rs.27,50,000. The defendants appeared late, were not present on 01.02.2021 and were subsequently ex-parte; an ex-parte decree was passed on 02.02.2021. On 17.02.2021, within the statutory period, the defendants moved I.A.No.1 of 2021 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC seeking to set aside the decree, supported by a medical certificate claiming illness on 01.02.2021 with accompanying treatment. The plaintiffs opposed, contending the 2nd defendant was a bystander and the 1st defendant’s illness did not justify non-appearance, noting also absence of examination of the doctor. The trial court dismissed the application, and the Sub Court’s reasoning was upheld by the drawn-out order. The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the word “sufficient cause” is to be liberally construed to advance justice, relying on G.P. Srivastava and Peeves Enterprises. The ex parte decree is set aside on payment of Rs.2,500 as costs, and the case is to proceed expeditiously with a fresh schedule, with both parties to appear on 21.02.2022.
CRL.M.C. No. 5569 of 2021 Petitioner Santiago Martin, the first accused in Special Case No. 533/2018 before the Special Court under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, seeks renewal of his passport before its expiry in November 2021. The court record shows that Annexure A1 granted a three-year renewal in 2018; later, under Annexure A2, he sought a further five-year renewal, while the CJM allowed two years, and Annexure A9 (the Special Judge’s order) dismissed the request with a rider to appear before the Directorate of Enforcement in ongoing investigations. The Enforcement Directorate is probing large-money laundering allegations (approx. Rs. 910 crores), with further investigation proceeding, and summons under Section 50 of PMLA issued on several dates. The petitioner has not consistently attended personal interviews, arguing difficulties including medical issues and travel obligations; he says he has substantial business abroad, permanent residence in Coimbatore, and that renewed travel is essential for his interests. The respondents contend that personal appearance is essential for investigation, and that Section 23 presumption against renewal applies. After analysis, the High Court declines to interfere, holding that the ongoing investigation and failure to cooperate justify denial of renewal; it leaves open the possibility of a fresh petition once the petitioner cooperates with investigators and appears personally.
BA No. 8132/2022; BA No. 7837/2022 These bail applications arise from Crime No. 849/2022 of Kattakkada Police Station, where three KSRTC employees — a station master, a clerk, and a conductor — are charged along with others with forming an unlawful assembly on 20.09.2022, verbally abusing and assaulting the defacto complainant and his daughter when they sought renewal of a concession certificate. The offences include sections 294(b), 341, 342, 323, 324 and 354 read with 34 IPC. The petitioners seek pre-arrest bail under Section 438 CrPC in BA 8132/22 for accused Nos. 1 and 3, and in BA 7837/22 for accused No. 2. Petitioners’ counsel argued innocence, contending no overt acts fall within Section 354 and that the inclusion of that offence appears motivated by public outrage, a distorted video, and media publicity. The State opposed bail, noting the seriousness of the allegations, the alleged assault on both the complainant and his daughter, and the leaked video which provoked public outcry. The court, after considering the statements of the complainant and his daughter and reviewing the video, held that while the act was serious, the evidence did not establish the essential elements of Section 354 against the petitioners. Custodial interrogation was deemed non-essential, and bail was granted subject to various conditions to ensure cooperation, non-interference with witnesses, and compliance with investigation.
This is an Income Tax Appeal (ITA No.168/2019) before the Kerala High Court, challenged by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam, against an ITAT Cochin Bench order dated 04.01.2018 for AY 2012-13. The tax effect is below the ceiling limit, and the Revenue contends that exceptions to Circular No.3/2018 apply in this case. The counsel for the Revenue relies on apex court decisions: CIT v Surya Herbal Ltd (2011) 15 SCC 482; Tarun R. Tahiliani v. Board of Direct Taxes (Civil Appeal No.7526/2011); and S.C. Naregal v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2021) 431 ITR 1, to argue that the circular should not be applied ipso facto to pending matters or to cases with cascading effects, and that liberty to seek review should remain open where warranted. The respondent bank argues that the matter cannot escape the effect of the circular once the tax effect falls within the specified limit, especially given the Supreme Court's caveats in Surya Herbal and the subsequent guidance in Naregal. However, after considering the authorities and the order dated 04.10.2018 in Civil Appeal No.7526/2011, the Court held that the appeal is to be dismissed under the monetary limit prescribed by Circular No.3/2018, subject to the observations in the Supreme Court order.
This writ petition (WP(C) No. 25867 of 2021) challenges the denial of approval of the petitioners’ appointments in Kuthuparamba High School on the ground that the Manager did not execute a bond as required by G.O.(P) No. 10/10/G.Edn. dated 12 January 2010. The 1st petitioner, Sheeba Kumar B, had been appointed as UPSA in an LWA vacancy in 2001 and subsequently promoted to HSA (Natural Science) with effect from 1 June 2009; her approval was withheld due to the economic ban, though earlier posts were approved up to 2009. The 2nd petitioner, Bini M., was appointed during the ban and has faced rejection of approval and revision petitions. After lifting the ban, the government required execution of a bond by managers, and petitioners contend that the bond need not be re-executed for each vacancy and that, following various judicial pronouncements, bonds may be deemed executed if not properly executed. The respondents argued that appointments in additional division vacancies require 1:1 apportionment and that some managers challenged G.O. 10/10 in the Apex Court. The court cites State of Kerala and Ors. v. V.S. Suma Devi (2017) for the principle that bonds may be deemed executed and that approved appointments during the ban period must be matched, subject to pending Apex Court orders. Ext. P8 is quashed, and Exts. P6 and P12 are to be reconsidered with a four-month deadline, noting that final orders may depend on the Apex Court’s decision.
WP(C) NO. 23971 OF 2010; WP(C) NO. 24300 OF 2010; WP(C) NO. 24568 OF 2010 These writ petitions, filed by managers of distance education off-campus centres at Kalamassery (St. Paul’s), Ernakulam (St. Albert’s) and Changanacherry (Assumption Off Campus Centre), seek declarations that the petitioner institutions are entitled to continue the various Distance Education Courses sanctioned by Mahatma Gandhi University and to operate off-campus centres. The University, through its Standing Counsel, contends that authoritative authority from a Division Bench in Unine Trust (M/s.), Cherthala v. M.G.University and Ors. (2017) (2) KLT 1031), following a Supreme Court judgment, holds that no off-campus centres can be started outside the State or beyond the territorial limits of the University unless there is an enabling provision in the statute. It is reinforced by this Court’s own decision in Vismaya Max Animation Academy v. M.G.University and Ors. (2015) (5) KHC 33). Consequently, the University asserts that it is not venturing to establish off-campus centres in Kerala. The petitions are ultimately closed with the court observing that, in view of the authorities cited, there is no enabling provision in the statute to permit such off-campus centres. The operative note states that the writ petitions are closed, with no declarations or reliefs granted to the petitioners.
The appellant Navas filed MACA challenging the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Attingal’s award in O.P.(M.V) No.190/2007 for injuries sustained in a motor accident dated 18.09.2006. The motorcycle ridden by Navas was hit by a jeep KL-01/5967 owned by the 1st respondent and insured by the 2nd respondent. The Tribunal held negligence by the 1st respondent and held the insurer liable to pay, while noting the 1st respondent had no valid license and permitting recovery of the award from him by the insurer. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,20,446 but deducted amounts under policy conditions and license issues. Navas contends the compensation is inadequately computed, particularly for disability. Ext.A7 shows 40% disability, but the Tribunal rejected it since the examining doctor was not called; Navas relies on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar to accept the disability percentage. The court agrees to treat the 40% disability as certified and, applying Ramachandrappa and Minu Rout, increases the monthly income to Rs.5,500 and recomputes the compensation. Additional amounts are granted for pain and suffering and loss of amenities. After recalculating earnings with the revised income, and deducting earlier amounts, an additional Rs.3,87,200 is awarded. The insurer is directed to deposit this amount with interest within three months, and may recover it from the 1st respondent after depositing the enhanced sum. The appeal is allowed and the award modified accordingly.
MACA No. 1941 of 2014; Co. No. 163 of 2021 This is a consolidated Motor Accidents Claims Appeal (MACA 1941/2014) and Cross-Objection (CO 163/2021) arising from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award at North Paravur. The insurer, National Insurance Company Ltd., challenges the Tribunal’s award under several heads, arguing that compensation for permanent disability and loss of income was already provided and that a separate head for loss of earning power should not exist. The claimant-cross objector (Pavanan) contends that the injuries were severe (brain injury with epilepsy) and seeks higher compensation: a higher notional income than Rs. 5,000, a larger future prospects component, enhanced pain and suffering, and additional future medical expenses. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 10,05,900 overall, with a Rs. 15,00,000 cap, and included Rs. 2,00,000 under loss of earning power. The High Court, after hearing the parties, deletes the loss of earning power head, but substantially enhances the claimant’s relief: permanent disability is raised to Rs. 3,52,350 with a 35% future prospects addition based on a 5,000 notional income; pain and suffering increased to Rs. 3,00,000; future medical expenses increased by Rs. 44,108 (plus Rs. 75,000 already awarded); total compensation becomes Rs. 12,91,358 with interest and deductions for delay. The Court clarifies the rate and the start of interest, and overall upholds the enhanced sums while maintaining other heads.
This appeal arises from MACA No.1639 of 2014 challenging the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kottayam’s award in OP(MV) No.156 of 2011 for injuries sustained by the claimant on 09.11.2010 when he was standing on the eastern footpath of MC Road near NSS College, Changanassery. The motorcycle rider (1st respondent) negligently caused the accident; the owner (2nd respondent) and insurer (3rd respondent) were impleaded. The Tribunal held the insurer liable to indemnify, and awarded Rs.3,22,288, limited to Rs.3,00,000 for court fee purposes, with 8.5% interest from the petition date and costs. The appellant claimed enhanced compensation under multiple heads, arguing that the quantum did not reflect the true loss and that notional income and multiplier should be recalibrated. The High Court, invoking State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, Pranay Sethi, and other precedents on ‘just compensation,’ revalues notional income to Rs.7,500/month (from Rs.5,000), applies a multiplier of 14 (age 42) and recalculates gains for loss of earnings, medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, and permanent disability (21.82%). The total enhanced compensation is Rs.1,49,932 beyond the Tribunal’s award, with 8% interest, to be paid within three months by the insurer. The appeal is disposed of with no costs.
W.P.(C) Nos. 14402/2022, 17689/2022 and 20803/2022 These connected writ petitions (W.P.(C) Nos. 14402/2022, 17689/2022 and 20803/2022) are heard together before the Kerala High Court. The petitions challenge surcharge orders under Section 68(2) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and related administrator-appointment decisions in the Arayoor Service Co-operative Bank. The petitioners, elected to the bank’s Managing Committee in 2018, faced a 2021 surcharge and subsequent administration from 18 June 2021. The High Court had previously quashed a similar surcharge order in 2022 (W.P.(C).No.12783/2021) and directed fresh orders after affording due process. In 2022-23 the Joint Registrar issued two separate orders (Exts. P9 and P10) directing recovery from the petitioners, and remonstrances were filed arguing that surcharge proceedings were confined to particular petitioners or that deceased members’ legal heirs were not afforded hearing. Grounds asserted included lack of specific findings in the Section 66 enquiry (Ext. P1), absence of conduct-based findings under Section 68(1) (Ext. P2), and four heads of loss in Ext. P10 not traceable to Ext. P1. The Court examined statutory provisions (Sections 66-68 and related Rules) and jurisprudence (Cheranellur Co-op., Ellakkal, AK Francis, Musthafa TH, Shabin Antony, etc.), concluding that Exts. P9/P10 were not sustained and must be redrafted in light of Ext. P7’s directions. The judgment also addresses minutes-book custody, interim orders, and the need for timely elections, disposing of the petitions accordingly.
This motor accident claims appeal arises from an order in OP(MV) No. 1309/2010 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kollam, awarding compensation for the death of Arun Thampu following a 18.04.2010 accident involving a KSRTC bus. The Tribunal held the bus driver negligent and the insurer liable, and quantified compensation at Rs. 9,48,000 with distribution among wife, daughter, mother, and father in the ratio 40:40:10:10. The appellate claimants (3–5) challenge the apportionment and seek enhancement, while the insurer disputed negligence and quantum. The High Court re-examines the assessment, particularly the deceased’s income, dependency, and the heads of compensation, applying precedents such as Ramachandrappa, Syed Sadiq, Pranay Sethi, and Satinder Kaur. It fixes the monthly income at Rs. 7,500 (based on a 2010 accident), adds 40% for future prospects, and recalculates the loss of dependency to Rs. 16,06,500. It also revises the loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses, adjusting certain amounts (including to remove double compensation for minor care and guidance). The result is an enhanced liability of Rs. 8,51,500 to be deposited by the insurer within three months, with distribution among the dependents as originally awarded.
MFA (EFL) No. 124 of 2013 This appeal under the Kerala Forests (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act, 2003 (EFL Act) challenges a Tribunal order under Section 10 vesting ecologically fragile lands in the State. The respondents (applicants in the OA) claim absolute ownership, possession and enjoyment of approximately 3.50 acres of land in Mananthavady taluk, including land described in Sy. No. 89/18A1A1B3E, which the Tribunal had classified as not ecologically fragile, thereby allowing invocation of Section 10 to seek exclusion from vesting. Proceedings reveal the land was to be examined against the appointed day (2.6.2000) and that the 4th petitioner’s purchase certificate under the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Ext. A1) shows a 3-acre entitlement; the 4th vendor allegedly transferred 2.90 acres to the other applicants, who have been cultivating crops such as coconut, arecanut, tapioca, plantains, ginger and paddy. The State contends the land is ecologically fragile and within forest lands with natural vegetation; Ext. C3/C6 reports and the expert assessments are relied upon. The Tribunal held the land not within the ecologically fragile land definition, and that the transfer would be insignificant while permitting Section 10 claims—an analysis the High Court scrutinizes, noting S.4(3) applicability and the vesting under S.3. Relying on Parameswara Sastrigal v. State of Kerala, the court upholds the Tribunal’s conclusions but clarifies that the declaration under Section 10 must cover only Ext. A1 land, and disallows broader relief. The MFA is dismissed with these directions.
This petition arises from a dispute concerning internal governance of a registered public trust, Sree Narayana Dharma Samrakshana Yogam, and challenges the legality of a 2022 election to the Board of Trustees. The Munsiff’s Court Cherthala had held that the matter potentially falls under Section 92 CPC (succession of internal affairs of trusts), prompting a CMA before the Sub Court, Cherthala. The Sub Court reversed that position, holding that Section 92 CPC did not apply, and thereby restored the suit to the trial court. The petitioners approached this Court under Article 227 and contend that internal matters relating to removal or appointment of trustees fall within the supervisory jurisdiction of Section 92 CPC; they argue the relief sought — invalidating the trustees’ election and restraining them from assuming office — is a quintessential internal matter of a trust. The Respondents, including the trust and its office-bearers, rely on a Supreme Court decision (Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala v. Baba Gopal Dass Chela Surti Dass) to contend that a suit brought by the trust against a third party need not fall under Section 92 CPC. The High Court ultimately sets aside the first appellate order and allows the original petition, noting that internal trust matters may be governed by Section 92 CPC and leaving questions open for a properly instituted suit, with directions to proceed under lex fori/lex loci.
K.B. Sundaresan, who sustained catastrophic injuries in a motor-vehicle accident on 15.07.2005, pursued compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, culminating in a modest award of Rs. 10,22,550 against an claimed Rs. 43,09,706. Sundaresan died in 2016; his legal heirs carried the appeal MACA 1984/2011 against the Tribunal’s quantum and its reasoning. The central dispute concerns the income to be adopted for the deceased, at the time of the accident; the Tribunal accepted Rs. 17,711 as October 2005 pay, later treating Rs. 18,691 as income but deducting Rs. 2,000 for income tax. Counsel for the appellants pressed for computation using the notional income with multiplier under Sarla Verma and future prospects, and challenged the deduction of a Voluntary Retirement Pension (Rs. 6,994) as having no rational basis, arguing that a portion of such pension may be mischaracterised as family pension in some precedents. They also urged enhancement under heads of Pain and Suffering, Loss of Amenities, and Extra Nourishment, and sought attendant care in line with Kajal and Jithendran. The Insurance Company contended the Tribunal’s approach was correct, based on actual income less the pension. The High Court, after detailed scrutiny, partly allowed the appeal, rectifying several heads of compensation and reconfiguring the notional income, disability assessment, attendant expenses, and interest, while directing deposit of enhanced amounts within two months.
The Kerala High Court hears a Criminal Revision Petition filed by Nishad Mathew challenging an order of the Additional Sessions Judge-VI, Ernakulam, which directed that the NI Act case, eventually numbered CC No. 154/2015 and tried in the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (N.I. Act cases), Ernakulam, be heard and decided by a different court. The petitioner contends that the NI Court Ernakulam had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because the instrument was presented for collection through an account at Kalamassery, which would ordinarily confer jurisdiction on the Kalamassery JFMC under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The trial before the NI Court Ernakulam had proceeded with the petitioner’s appearance and the evidence, and the case was transferred to Kalamassery on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The complainant and the State oppose the transfer, arguing the petitioner seeks to delay judgment; they rely on Section 462 Cr.P.C., and invite scrutiny of the earlier order. The High Court analyzes the jurisdictional questions, emphasizes that a party must raise jurisdictional objections early, and holds that, in the absence of inherent lack of jurisdiction and prejudice to justice, trial in the original court may proceed. Ultimately, the court sets aside the transfer not as a new remedy but by restoring Ernakulam’s jurisdiction, and dismisses the revision petition, directing the NI Court Ernakulam to hear and decide CC 154/2015 and deliver judgment within the specified period.
WA 48/2020 (and connected batch cases) This batch judgment of the Kerala High Court concerns writ appeals challenging the validity and retrospective/prospective effect of amendments to the Kerala Value Added Tax Act (KVAT) and the transition to the Kerala Goods and Services Tax Act (KGST) in the wake of the Constitution 101st Amendment. The core issue is whether amendments to Section 25(1) KVAT (substituting ‘five years’ with ‘six years’) made via Kerala Finance Act 2017 (Act 11/2017) and the third proviso thereto, and further amendments via Kerala Finance Act 2018 (Act 5/2018), can operate retrospectively to reopen or extend the period of reassessment for years where the period had already expired or was close to expiry, especially after the KVAT Act was repealed by KGST enactment in 2017. The Court considers the interplay of legislative powers under Article 246A, the sunset provisions/preservation under savings clauses, and the impact of consequential constitutional changes. The bench analyzes the Vindication of the State’s power to amend, the commencement vs operation dates, and the presumption against retrospective laws. The decision heavily discusses Baiju A.A., Jyoti Traders, Hajee Abdul Shakoor, S.C. Prashar, Calcutta Discount, Mohit Minerals, Reliance Industries, and other cited authorities. Ultimately, the appellate position is that the challenged amendments could not revive time-barred reassessments and that the 2017 amendment is to be read as prospective; the court upholds the batch as a whole and dismisses the appeals as lacking merit.
