M.S.A. Nos.1, 4, 6 of 2023 This batch of petitions challenges a common judgment of the Kerala Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (REFA Nos.17, 18, 27, 30 of 2022) relating to Aqua City township and registration under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The Kerala Real Estate Regulatory Authority (K-RERA) had, in an initial order (28.04.2021), held that the Aqua City project was registrable under Section 3 and that marketing activities without registration violated the Act. Subsequently, in suo moto proceedings (21.12.2021) K-RERA modified the earlier order to exclude the Palm Bay Villas from registration, a decision challenged before the Tribunal and this Court. The Tribunal held that the suo moto order was without authority and that the 23.12.2021 order dealt only with amenities and directions, not registration, suggesting the earlier registrability finding had been superseded. The High Court, however, reasons that the 28.04.2021 order was a preliminary issue on maintainability and did not preclude final registration considerations; it also holds that K-RERA has wide powers under Sections 35–38 to call for information and conduct investigations, including suo moto actions. It clarifies the treatment of interlocutory orders and res judicata across stages. As a result, the Court allows MSAs 1, 4, 6 and directs the Tribunal to decide REFA Nos.17, 18, 30 afresh after hearing both sides, while also setting aside REFA No.27/2022. Costs follow the outcome.
Mary Paul @ Mary Paily and Bini Paul, appellants, challenge an order dismissing I.A. Nos.1255 and 1256 of 2014 under O. XLIII, R.1(d), seeking to set aside an ex parte decree in O.S. No.42 of 2010 and to condone a delay of 1193 days. The suit, for realisation of Rs.8,24,811 with interest and costs, was decreed ex parte on 13.07.2011. The fifth defendant, C.K. Paily, died on 07.08.2013 and is said to have been severely ill, allegedly preventing proper instruction of counsel. The Sub Court dismissed the applications on 20.02.2016, prompting the appeal. The respondents contend the delay is protracted and an attempt to protract execution, while the appellants argue that serious illness and death of the fifth defendant hindered timely compliance, justifying liberal condonation. Citing Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora, Katiji, and Esha Bhattacharjee, the court endorses a liberal, justice-oriented approach while recognizing exceptions for inordinate delay. The Division Bench finds that the delay can be condoned on payment of costs, sets aside the Sub Court’s order, allows I.A.Nos.1255 and 1256 of 2014, and directs restoration of O.S.42/2010 with a four-month deadline for disposal.
The appellant, Dali Thankachan, suffered a road accident on 10.11.2003 while travelling in a stage carriage, resulting in fractures and disabilities. She approached the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, challenging its award in OP(MV)2896/2004, which granted Rs.78,360 against a claim of Rs.1,55,000. In MACA 1937 of 2011, the Kerala High Court considered the Tribunal’s assessment of income, disability, and damages. Counsel for the appellant urged that notional income was incorrectly fixed at Rs.2,500 and that the multiplier used (17) was improper; relying on Ramachandrappa v. Manager, RCC, (2011) 13 SCC 236, the court should apply a minimum notional income of Rs.4,000 for 2003, and that Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation warrants a multiplier of 16 rather than 17. The insurer contended the Tribunal’s award was not in error. The judge held that the Tribunal’s notional income was too low and, applying Ramachandrappa, should be Rs.4,000; adopting Sarla Verma, the multiplier should be 16. Disability, originally recorded at 20% (Ext.A9) but not sustained by a Medical Board, was revised to 14% after considering Exts. A5–A8. Disability compensation was increased to Rs.99,840 and Pain & Suffering to Rs.25,000, with all other Tribunal findings remaining intact. Interest at 8% was ordered from filing. The appeal was partly allowed with enhanced compensation and preserved liberty to pay and recover by the insurer.
C.E.Appeal Nos.1/2021, 2/2021, 3/2021, 4/2021, 5/2021 This batch of Central Excise Appeals before the Kerala High Court challenges a common Tribunal order dated 23.09.2020 of the CESTAT, South Zonal Bench, Bangalore, in a dispute over CENVAT credit on service tax paid for deposits insurance under the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DICGC). The principal issue is whether the insurance service provided by DICGC to banks constitutes an “input service” under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, enabling banks to avail credit for service tax paid on such insurance premiums while rendering output banking services. The appeals trace a line of conflicting tribunal decisions across different benches (Delhi, Mumbai, Calicut) and a larger bench decision in South Indian Bank v. Commissioner Calicut that ultimately held that the insurance service to banks is an input service eligible for credit. The Revenue contends that, under Section 66D and its negative list (especially clause n), deposits and related insurance fall outside output service credit; the respondents (banks) argue that registration with the Deposit Insurance Corporation and payment of insurance premia are statutory prerequisites for banking, making the DICGC service an essential input service. The Kerala High Court, after examining the Larger Bench’s reasoning and related case law, upholds the bank’s entitlement to credit in line with the Larger Bench decision and dismisses the Revenue’s appeals.
Jyothismon P.S., a resident of Kottayam district, challenges the seizure and consequent confiscation of his Hyundai Santro car KL-33-M/3092 seized on 23.05.2020 for allegedly transporting illicit Arishtas. The car was seized by the Excise Department and a criminal case, CR No.57/2020, was registered under Sections 58B and 67B of the Kerala Abkari Act. The petitioner contends that Ayurvedic medicines transported in the vehicle are not liquor and therefore fall outside the Act’s purview, relying on the Kerala High Court’s decision in Priyamvada P.G. v. State of Kerala and Others (2015) which held that Ayurvedic medicines not notified under the Act are not within its ambit and cannot be treated as liquor under Section 3(10) or within Sections 56(b) or 67B(a). The chemical analysis report indicates Ethyl Alcohol content averaging 9.95%, below the 12% threshold in the Rule 3(1) Note to the Kerala Spirituous Preparations (Control) Rules, 1969, so the contraband cannot be deemed a spurious preparation. The State, represented by the Public Prosecutor, argued that Section 58B can apply where the substance substitutes alcohol and that confiscation under Section 67B requires awareness that an offence has been committed with respect to the property. The court, relying on prior settled positions (Division Bench WA No.546/16 and the Supreme Court’s dismissal of SLP in Priyamvada), held that the contraband is not a drug notified under the Act, hence the vehicle is not liable for confiscation. The petition is allowed, directing release of the car to the petitioner forthwith.
Rose Mary, aged 65, sustained injuries in a July 1, 2018 road traffic accident when the scooter on which she was riding as a pillion rider skidded after being bewildered by another vehicle. She challenged the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam’s award in OP(MV) 1935/2018, contending that the compensation was inadequate and that the Tribunal erred in assessment. Her counsel urged that her notional income should be fixed at Rs 40,000 per month, reflecting her own photocopying business, and that the loss of earnings should be reckoned for six months to cover the prolonged treatment and convalescence, particularly given her age. He also argued that several medical bills, some contested, were connected to injuries from the accident and, if admitted, would augment compensation. The insurer’s counsel maintained that there was no evidence of actual income and that the Tribunal properly followed the Ramchandrappa standard, setting four months for loss of earnings, and that admitted medical bills related to diabetes and heart disease were not wholly attributable to the accident. The High Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that loss of earnings should be computed for six months, and directed an additional Rs 23,000 under that head. All other heads and the Tribunal’s conclusions otherwise stood.
This is a bail application (B.A.No.803 of 2023) under Section 438 CrPC filed by the sole accused Anu Basheer in Crime No.49 of 2023 at Kalady Police Station, Ernakulam. The prosecution alleges that the petitioner cheated by selling a Toyota Innova Crysta and receiving an advance of Rs. 5,30,000, with the sale to be completed after settling a loan, but the vehicle and its records were allegedly withheld by the accused without refunding the advance. The case forms the basis for a potential offence under Section 420 IPC. The petitioner’s counsel contends the defacto complainant is a moneylender and that the alleged transaction is not established; a civil suit (O.S.No.30 of 2023) for realisation of Rs.5,30,000 based on a cheque has been filed, suggesting a civil remedy. It is argued that the petitioner borrowed money and that custodial interrogation is unnecessary; the investigation can proceed with cooperation. The Public Prosecutor disputes bail, highlighting involvement in other crimes (Nos.29, 31, 32 of 2023) and asserting that custodial interrogation and recovery of money are essential to the investigation. After considering the materials, the court held that arrest and custody were not necessary and granted anticipatory bail with conditions for cooperation, surrender, bonds, and non-interference with witnesses.
This batch writ appeals challenge retrospective amendments to the Kerala Value Added Tax (KVAT) Act, 2003, notably Section 42(3) introduced by Kerala Finance Act 2016 (Act 18/2016). The lead matter WA 676/2020 arises against a Kerala High Court judgment that held the retrospective operation of Section 42(3) permissible but subject to limits, including a reasonable period and the statutory time-bar under Section 25 of the KVAT Act. The Kerala High Court (Division Bench) upheld the legislature’s competence to enact retrospective amendments and held that Section 42(3) operates from 1 April 2005, but that reopening of assessments under this provision must harmonize with existing timelines and safeguards in Sections 21-25 and Rule 58(20) of the KVAT Rules. It held that the fiction of “treated as pending” cannot obliterate time limits, and that certainty in taxation requires adherence to time barriers; thus, even though Section 42(3) creates a mechanism to reopen, it must be exercised within a reasonable period and consistent with other provisions. The court rejected arguments that indefinite reopenings violate vested rights and scrutiny of prior decisions, and ultimately dismissed the writ appeals as lacking merit. The decision emphasizes statutory interpretation principles: retrospection must be reasonable, provisions must be read in harmony with the KVAT Act’s architecture, and cautions against extending legislative fiction beyond its proper scope.
CRL.REV.PET NOS. 1799/2013, 1816/2013, 1962/2013 The matter comprises three connected criminal revision petitions filed by Mathew Kunju Mathew challenging a common judgment upholding his conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in three cheque-transaction cases (S.T.No.2211, 2214 and 2206 of 2006) before a Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kottayam, as affirmed by the Additional Sessions Court in three corresponding criminal appeals (Nos. 558, 559 and 557 of 2010). The Revision Petitions contend that the three cheques (Exts.P1, P4, P7) were not issued toward any legally enforceable debt since civil proceedings (O.S.174 of 2009) filed by the complainant for recovery on the same cheques were decided in the complainant’s favour in the civil court’s findings that there was no valid consideration. Relying on Sections 43 and 11 of the Indian Evidence Act and established authorities (Premshanker v I.G. of Police; Mohandas v. P. Abdul Azeez), the petitioner argues that civil judgments relating to the same subject matter can be relevant in criminal proceedings and can undermine the conviction where the civil record supports a non-enforceable debt. The court examines these precedents and the settled law on competing civil and criminal actions, concluding that the civil decree can be relevant but not determinative, ultimately acquitting the petitioner in all three cases and directing relevant records to form part of the proceedings.
BAIL APPL. NO. 5100 OF 2025 This is a bail application in the Kerala High Court filed by Sohel Rana, an accused in Crime No. 218/2025 of the Ramapuram Excise Range, under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The petitioner was found in possession of 1.050 kg of ganja and was arrested on 07.03.2025. The State reports no criminal antecedents against him. The contraband is categorized as an intermediate quantity, so the rigour under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not automatically attracted. The petitioner seeks bail, offering to furnish local sureties from Kerala, and agrees to abide by conditions imposed by the court. The Public Prosecutor opposes the application, although he notes the absence of antecedents in the officer’s report. The court engages with established bail principles, citing that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and that a grant of bail preserves the right to a fair trial. It also invokes the guidance from higher courts, including Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement, Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, and Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, as well as Anzar Azeez v. State of Kerala, to emphasize the court’s duty to consider bail when justified. Ultimately, the court grants bail with conditions, balancing liberty with public interest and the integrity of the investigation.
A Physical Education Teacher at Crescent High School, Malappuram, challenged Exts. P7 and P8, which denied him approval to his appointment dated 04.06.2007 on the ground that the vacancy could be filled only by a 'Protected Teacher'. The petitioner argued that there is no record substantiating that a list of protected teachers was forwarded to the Manager, nor evidence of direct communication to him directing the appointment; he relied on this Court's decisions in Nadeera v. State of Kerala and Moosakutty v. District Educational Officer to contend that the decision should be supported by cogent records and direct correspondence. The respondents contended that Crescent High School is newly upgraded and, under GO(P) No.46/2006/G.Edn dated 01.02.2006, the Manager was obliged to appoint a Protected Teacher to the vacancy; at the relevant time, no protected teacher was in post, justifying the denial in Exts. P7 and P8. The Court noted Ext.P8’s assertion that the DDE reported 16 protected teachers awaiting deployment and that communications were made to all Managers, but found no direct evidence that the 5th respondent Manager received such a letter. Relying on Nadeera and Moosakutty, the Court allowed the writ petition, set aside Exts. P7 and P8, and directed the DEO to grant approval to the petitioner with effect from 04.06.2007, expeditiously and with specified timelines for benefits.
The petitioner, Aadharsh R.S., is a police officer undergoing a three-year Unitary LLB (evening) degree. He was implicated in alleged malpractice in the sixth semester examination, April 2022, detected by the University Malpractice Prevention Squad. An Enquiry Committee found him guilty, and the Syndicate, in its meeting of 29.07.2022, resolved to accept the report and impose the recommended punishment of debarring him for three chances from appearing for University examinations. The petitioner challenged this order in W.P.(C) No. 29523/2022. This Court, in W.P.(C) No.2118 of 2023, by Ext.P15 judgment dated 28.10.2022, disposed of the matter with directions for disposal de novo. In compliance, the Enquiry Committee conducted a fresh enquiry (Ext.P19), again finding guilt but reducing the punishment to two years. The Syndicate, on 08.12.2022, accepted the Enquiry Committee’s recommendations (Ext.P20) and communicated via Ext.P21. The petitioner argues that the Enquiry Report was not supplied to him before the Syndicate’s consideration and that members of the Enquiry Committee participated in the Syndicate meeting, creating a bias/appearance of bias. Relying on Cantonment Executive Officer v. Vijay D. Wani, Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, and Manek Lal v. Prem Chand, the Court held that such participation vitiates the decision. Ext.P20 and Ext.P21 were quashed; the proceedings must resume from the hearing on Ext.P19, with a two-month deadline; Ext.P19’s challenge remains open.
This Criminal Misc. Case (Crl.M.C. 864/2020) is a petition under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. moved by Varghese K.P., Tony Cyriac M., Arun S., Mukundan, and Valsamma Mukundan, former and present partners of Chaitanya Enterprises (Kanjoor Kuries Private Limited) challenging the final report in CC 146/2018 arising from Crime No. 1483/2017 of Kalady Police Station. The complainant alleged that the petitioners induced her to join a chitty (No. 66/379), promising payment on subscription and then defaulted on instalments, resulting in a claimed loss to the complainant. The petition argued that even if the prosecution allegations are assumed true, they do not establish offences under sections 406 or 420 IPC (read with section 34 IPC); at best the matter is a civil dispute mischaracterized as crime, and prosecuting it would amount to abuse of process. The learned counsel contended that there was no dishonest or fraudulent intent from the outset, which is essential for establishing cheating under 420 IPC, and for 406 IPC the element of dishonest misappropriation is absent. The Public Prosecutor opposed invoking section 482, asserting civil disputes can be decided only after trial. The court, applying jurisprudence that civil disputes should not be converted into criminal proceedings, held that the case is an abuse of process and quashed all proceedings in CC 146/2018. The petition was allowed, and the process terminated in the interests of justice and to prevent misuse of the criminal system.
CRL.A Nos. 1/2014, 22/2014, 23/2014, 25/2014 and CRA(V) No. 589/2015 The Kerala High Court, Ernakulam, in February 2023, heard a cluster of criminal appeals arising from a medical-negligence case at Deen Hospital, Punalur. The six doctors and three nurses (Accused Nos. 2–6 and others) along with the State faced challenges to acquittals or convictions under sections 304A and 201 r/w 34 IPC, arising from the death of Smt. Mini Philip after laparoscopic sterilization on 25 September 2006. The trial court had found no culpable homicide under 304 but convicted for 304A r/w 34 and 201 r/w 34, leading to multiple appeals. The court examined the standards of medical negligence, invoking Bolam and Jacob Mathew and tracing the jurisprudence that criminal liability for medical negligence requires gross or culpable negligence, with the degree of negligence a critical issue. It acknowledged the expert opinions and debated issues such as the qualifications of the anesthetist, the method of anesthesia (spinal vs general), pre- and post-operative care, and ARDS/hypoxia as causes of death. Ultimately, the High Court did not find evidence establishing gross or culpable negligence; it set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted the accused. The prosecution’s appeal against acquittal in CRA(V) 589/2015 was dismissed.
WP(C) Nos.28461/2018 & con.cases This batch of writ petitions, filed by KSRTC employees (drivers, conductors and mechanics) impugns termination orders issued by KSRTC in 2018 on the ground that many petitioners had been regularised based on earlier judgments and government orders. The court traces a decades-long sequence: a bipartite pay revision (2008) followed by Government orders in 2011 and 2013, judicial decisions in this Court (notably Suresh Kumar v. State of Kerala) and a Supreme Court intervention in 2017 that upheld the possibility of imposing additional conditions for regularisation. Petitioners contend that their regularisations, obtained through individual judgements, cannot be undone by broad orders terminating employment; they seek restoration and pensionary benefits. The learned Judge examines whether the termination can be sustained given the twin criteria (ten years of service and 120 days of duty per year as on 21.12.2011) and whether due process (notably opportunity of hearing) was afforded before termination. The judgment ultimately directs that the impugned termination orders be set aside, and KSRTC must hear the petitioners with documentary evidence to determine if they meet the two criteria. If they do, regularisation must be ordered within three months; if not, termination orders may stand, with pension rights appropriately addressed. The order binds all petitioners and those similarly situated, and retroactivity issues are resolved with reference to Supreme Court directives.
Yudathadevus v. Joseph concerns a boundary dispute arising from a Will-deed (Will No. 54/1994) executed by the father of the plaintiff. Original Suit No. 118/2002 before the Munsiff Kochi sought fixation of the southern boundary of the plaint A Schedule property, and a report by an Advocate Commissioner, M.K. Murari, evidenced that the property extended 15.300 cents with 7 cents allotted to the defendant and 8.300 cents to the plaintiff, including a building. The plaintiff claims exclusive possession of 8.300 cents plus excess land, while the defendant claims share in the remaining area and a possible right of way. To resolve the boundary, the court commissioned measurements and prepared Ext.P2 sketch. The defendant moved IA 346/2015 to set aside the commission report and plan. The Munsiff, after hearing PW1 (Advocate Commissioner) and PW2 (Surveyor), set aside the report and plan, noting that the witnesses could not recall whether measurements were made and whether the north-western boundary was correctly fixed; it also found inconsistencies in the sketches, including projection on the western boundary and discrepancies in extents (A schedule 3.36 vs 3.39 acres; B schedule 2.83 vs 2.73). The petitioner challenged Ext.P5 before this Court under Article 227, urging remittance for fresh measurement rather than a broader nullification. The High Court examined Order 26 CPC 9, 10(2), 10(3) and concluded that while a report may be set aside, remand for a fresh report is necessary to resolve the dispute. The court allowed the petition in part, directing remittance to the Commissioner for fresh measurement and plan, with expedited trial.
WA Nos. 1757/2020; 15/2021; 22/2021; 24/2021; 1711/2020; 1709/2020 This batch of writ appeals challenges reassessment notices issued under the Kerala Value Added Tax (KVAT) regime, arising from decisions of the Kerala High Court in WP(C) 21510/2020, 21506/2020, 23283/2020, 20799/2020 and related matters. The core issue is the applicability of amendments extending the limitation period for reassessment under Section 25 of the KVAT Act, and whether the so-called Baiju A A line of judgments governs these proceedings. The appellants (State/Deputy Commissioner-III, SGST Department) contend that the notices were issued within the extended six-year period and thus remain within jurisdiction, emphasising the progressive increase from five to six years through the Amending Act (Finance Act 11/2017) effective 01.04.2017. The respondents/dealers argue that the amendments are prospective and cannot validate reassessments for earlier years, and that the court should follow Baiju A A and related decisions placing emphasis on accrued rights and the bar of reassessment. The bench undertakes a detailed consideration of illustrative years (2013-14 to 2014-15) and the respective notice dates, noting that the amended limit extends the window for reassessment but also that vested rights principles influence outcomes. The court ultimately overturns the intermediate judgments, holds the amendment's effect is prospective, and allows the department’s appeals, while granting respondents liberty to file appeals within four weeks. The order disposes of the batch with the consequence that reassessment notices stand and writ petitions are not allowed.
WP(C) Nos. 10753 & 11984 of 2023 These two connected writ petitions challenge the denial of regular appointments by promotion under Rule 43 of Chapter XIV A KER in CMS High School, Thalavady (Thiruvalla/Alapuzha district). Dhibu M. Varkey, promoted to Clerk from 01.07.2020, and Nisha S., promoted to Office Attendant, faced Ext.P5 orders rejecting promotion on the basis that the school was uneconomic and thus should hire or appoint by a protected hand. The petitioners contend that statutory rights under Rule 43 cannot be undermined by Government Orders and that the prior judgments cited (Exts. P6–P8 and P12) affirm that a post on a regular scale cannot be replaced by daily-wage appointments simply due to uneconomic status. They rely on the Secretary, Corporate Management of Schools case, and on a Division Bench ruling (Ext.P9) to argue that an uneconomic school’s policy cannot defeat eligibility for regular appointments. The court, after hearing, holds that Ext.P5 is unsustainable and quashes it, directing the 3rd respondent to reconsider the matter expeditiously in light of Ext.P9 and the other judgments, with consequential benefits to be disbursed within specified timeframes. The judgment is a common disposition addressing both petitions, clarifying statutory rights against administrative orders in the context of uneconomic schools.
The case concerns a suit filed for recovery of possession with an alternate prayer for damages over land on Andrott Island, Lakshadweep. The plaintiff, Sekkummada Attakoya, claimed title under Ext. A2 Partition Deed (1982). While the plaintiff was abroad (1983–1986), the Lakshadweep Administration allegedly took possession of the land for helipad construction. The plaintiff approached O.P. No. 3296/1987; Ext. B4 contained a judgment directing him to pursue appropriate legal remedies. The suit sought compensation under two heads: (i) land value and (ii) value of improvements. The trial court held that possession was taken without due process and decreed compensation for both land value and improvements. On appeal, the Division Bench scrutinized whether the plaintiff was the title holder; it was held that the land is Pandaram land with government title and that the plaintiff’s rights are only as a cowledar under a lease. Regulation No. 83 of 1965, enabling occupancy rights, was not conferred on the plaintiff. Consequently, land value compensation could not be awarded; however, compensation for improvements was allowed, given the improvements made during occupancy. The court relied on E.P. Attakoya Thangal v. UT Lakshadweep (W.P.(C) No.28018/2006) for the principle relating to occupancy rights. The final decree was restructured: land value award replaced by Ext. B3 amount (₹62,500) plus improvements (₹2,00,000). The appeal was allowed, with adjusted interest and costs.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 50 of 2023) filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam by M/S Jeevan Telecasting Corporation Ltd. challenging Annexure-A2, the complaint in C.C.No.2706/2016 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-XII, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner, accused no.1, contends that the alleged debt underlying cheque no. 286955 dated 27.12.2014 for Rs. 5,89,890 was discharged by subsequent payments—amounting to Rs. 45,00,000 via RTGS on 23.03.2016—thus the substratum of the complaint no longer exists. The argument further asserts that continued prosecution would amount to abuse of process and relief should be granted by quashing the proceedings. The second respondent did not file a counter statement. On examination, the Court notes that bank remittances appear, but cannot conclusively prove discharge of the cheque obligation without examining the bank manager. The judgment relies on the Nagawwa framework for quashing, citing a line of older precedents (Madhavrao Scindia, Bhajan Lal, Bajaj, Duncan, Rajendra Agrawalla, Rajesh Bajaj, Medchl, Verma, Krishnan) as authorities summarising the principles. Ultimately, the Court finds the petition meritless and dismisses it, allowing the criminal proceedings to continue. Annexures A1–A4 are listed in the appendix.
