This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the Ext. P6 order which denied transitional input tax credit (ITC) under Section 140 for Rs. 59,05,352/-, being TDS remitted on outward supplies by the petitioner, a Kerala VAT-to-GST transitioning dealer. The petitioner filed TRAN-1 on 14.11.2022 claiming credit of Rs.59,05,352/- under SGST Act 2017 in table 5(c) as per Section 140(1). The Assessing Authority and the GST Department held that TDS remitted by the contractor cannot be claimed as ITC in TRAN-1; such TDS is reflected in the electronic cash ledger, not the electronic credit ledger, and thus not eligible as ITC under the transitional regime. The petitioner argues that the definitions of input tax (Sec. 2(62)) and ITC (Sec. 2(63)) and the transitional credit provisions (Sec. 140) permit credit for eligible duties carried forward from the previous regime; reliance is placed on Madras High Court's DMR Constructions and Jharkhand High Court's Subhash Singh Choudhary cases. The Court, after analyzing Sec. 2(62), Sec. 2(63), Sec. 140 and Rule 117, distinguishes the cited decisions, noting provisos and the manner of credit under TRAN-1. The bench closes that TDS cannot be treated as ITC; however, refund under law may be sought. The writ petition is dismissed with liberty for refund, if applicable, without extending ITC under TRAN-1.
This writ appeal challenges the order of the Kerala State Apex Body on medical negligence in the death of a 22-year-old medical student, Shamna Thesneem, following Ceftriaxone administration at Government Medical College, Ernakulam. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab & Another (AIR 2005 SC 3180), Kerala issued a circular establishing an Expert Panel and an Apex Body to determine whether medical proceedings warrant criminal prosecution. In this case, the Expert Panel’s majority found no negligence, but the Apex Body later concluded negligence against Dr. Jilse George, the Head of General Medicine, and Dr. Krishna Mohan. The writ petitioner, the deceased’s mother, challenged these conclusions, contending that the process was flawed: there was no General Medicine expert on the deciding body, individuals were named as negligent, and due procedure including hearing was not followed. The Single Judge directed reconsideration with inclusion of a General Medicine expert and hearing for the writ petitioner. The Division Bench held that the Apex Body erred by not adhering to due procedure and by naming individuals; it disposed of the appeal by restricting relief to affording a hearing while affirming other aspects. The judgment emphasizes that the decision to prosecute rests with the investigating authorities, and expert input should inform, not substitute, prosecution decisions.
This Public Interest Litigation challenges Government Order Exhibit-P9 (G.O.(Rt.) No.258/2020/ID) dated 20.03.2020, which temporarily vested the full authority of the Director, Mining & Geology, in the senior Deputy Director, C.K. Baiju. The petitioners allege that Baiju is a tainted officer facing multiple vigilance and departmental inquiries and that his appointment to a key post would undermine public trust and promote corrupt practices. They contend that the Government bypassed mandatory procedures, including the preparation of a select list under the Kerala Geology Service Special Rules, 2009 and the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958, and did not obtain concurrence from the Kerala Public Service Commission, thereby violating due process and statutory rules. They point to eight departmental/vigilance proceedings against Baiju, including alleged irregular quarrying, illegal mining, and a governance lapse regarding a missing official seal, which should have precluded promotion or appointment.
The respondents contend the appointment is temporary, necessitated by a dearth of IAS officers, and made after considering vigilant reports and in consultation with relevant authorities (including the Vigilance department and PSC). They argue that the order is not a permanent posting and that ongoing disciplinary proceedings and Lok AyuktA matters justify the interim arrangement. The High Court, after extensive scrutiny of records and authorities (including Mohinder Singh Gill and related jurisprudence on reasoned orders), holds Exhibit-P9 to be unsustainable under law and quashes it, directing termination of Baiju’s temporary charge as Director and leaving other issues for further adjudication.
This writ petition challenges the rejection of applications seeking registration as headload workers under Rule 26A of the Kerala Headload Workers Rules, 1981. The first petitioner is the Managing Partner of The Metro Tile Mall and Ceramic Studio, Chemmad, and petitioners 2–5 are his workers who sought registration as attached headload workers. The Registering Authority and the Appellate Authority rejected their applications because the establishment is in a scheme-covered area under Tanur Sub Office and because workers from existing pools (CA-1, CA-3 and CB) have been performing headload work for years, creating concerns about adverse impact on livelihood of current registered/unattached workers. The petitioners rely on Gangadharan C.P. v. Abdul Nasir and related precedents (including Simi Santhosh, Olga Tellis and DTC principles) that registration should be provided to attached workers to enable legitimate employment, while balancing the rights of existing workers. The respondents argue the scheme-area regulation and the potential loss of work for the existing pool workers justify denial of new registrations. The court, after reviewing statutory provisions (Rule 26A, 26C and the 1983 Welfare Scheme) and constitutional rights (Article 19(1)(g), Article 14), clarifies that attached workers must be registered where warranted, while allowing statutory authorities to regulate distribution of work. The judgment quashes Exts. P8 and P10, and directs the Board to grant registration to petitioners 2–5, disposing of the petition accordingly.
Sunny Mon, a Special Village Officer and Special Tahsildar, challenged Ext.P4, Government Order No. 3/2002 Vigilance, dated 15-01-2002, which laid down Special Rules for the Kerala State Legal Advisers (Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau) Service. The writ petition contends that the prosecution before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (Vigilance) is to be conducted only by a Public Prosecutor appointed under Cr.P.C. Sec.24, and that the Legal Adviser/Additional Legal Adviser (LA/ALA) under Ext.P4 are not prosecutors under Sec.24, nor appointed under the Government Law Officers Rules (1978) or the Government Public Service Act framework. The petitioner argues that Ext.P4 lacks consultation as required by Cr.P.C. Sec.24(4) and was not laid before the Legislature, rendering it invalid. He relies on Sec.2(u) of the Cr.P.C., Sec.24 of the Cr.P.C., and Sec.5(3) of the PC Act to emphasize that prosecution must be conducted by a Public Prosecutor, and that the Vigilance Court’s prosecutors must satisfy Cr.P.C procedures. The respondents defend Ext.P4 on the basis that LA/ALA are empowered to prosecute under the Vigilance Service 2002 and that Sec.5(3) of the PC Act deems the LA/ALA as Public Prosecutors for the Vigilance Special Judge. The High Court ultimately holds that the grounds lack merit, upholding Ext.P4 and dismissing the writ petition. The decision clarifies the legal framework for prosecutorial authority in Vigilance cases and endorses the validity of the Vigilance Service Rules and their application to prosecutions in the Vigilance Court.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed by accused Nos. 1 and 2, Jijin Frank alias Chichi and Martin Mathew, seeking to quash C.C. No. 1648/2021 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Kollam, arising from Crime No. 936/2021 of Sakthikulangara Police Station. The offences alleged against the petitioners include sections 294(b) (criminal insult), 323 (hurt), 326 (causing grievous hurt), 427 (mischief) and 506 read with 34 IPC. The petition argues that a settlement has been reached with the de facto complainant CW1, Sonu, and that there is no continuing grievance, justifying quashing under Section 482 CrPC. Annexures B–D and the SHO report corroborate the settlement. The Public Prosecutor represented the state and brought the record on record. The petition cites Madan Mohan Abott v. State of Punjab (2008 (3) KLT 19; (2008) 4 SCC 582) and P. Dharmaraj v. Shanmugam and Others (AIR 2022 SC 4195), and discusses the principles from Parbatbhai Aahir (supra) to emphasize that quashing may be appropriate in private-dispute settlements where the offence is not heinous and conviction is unlikely, though public interest must be weighed. On these facts, the High Court holds that continuing the proceedings would be futile and quashes the entire case (CC 1648/2021). The order is by a Single Judge, Justice P.G. Ajithkumar.
This writ appeal arises from a dispute over a settlement recorded by a Kerala High Court Single Judge in WP(C) No.18761 of 2022 between guarantors and a bank regarding credit facilities availed by Scot Free Steels Limited and Premier Alloys. The appellants, six third parties, challenge the judgment recording terms of settlement in favour of the bank and subrogation rights claimed by the writ petitioner, who had offered to settle liabilities on behalf of principal borrowers. The bank issued SARFAESI-based notices and the petition sought mandamus to dispose of complaints, while the bank and other respondents argued maintainability and the need to pursue remedies under SARFAESI. The court’s analysis centers on whether a settlement between a co-borrower and the bank can bind non-party guarantors and whether subrogation can be invoked against co-obligants. Relying on Krishna Pillai v. Padmanabha Pillai, the judgment holds that a mortgagor who discharges the debt acquires subrogation rights and equity-based reimbursement under S.69 of the Indian Contract Act and S.92 of the Transfer of Property Act, while recognizing caveats to protect other joint debtors. The bench directs that recovery be pursued against principal debtors first, while permitting safeguards for the guarantor’s subrogation rights, and disposes of the appeal with directions that preserve the bank’s security and the petitioner’s equitable remedies, including title-deed retention and indemnity arrangements for six months.
WP(C) Nos.12651/2020; 28508/2020 The petitions challenge the promotion of mechanics employed by universities to the post of Lower Division Clerk (L.D. Clerk). The petitioners, designated as Mechanics in their respective universities, contend that they are eligible for promotion under the feeder category for L.D. Clerks as per the First Statutes governing the universities, and that the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education erred in objecting to such promotions. The Deputy Director had taken the position that Mechanics fell outside the approved feeder categories. The court notes that the petitioners rely on declarations in two earlier judgments (Exts. P10, P11) which held that when university statutes include inclusive language such as “etc.”, other similar categories must be read into the feeder group through the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The Government Pleader initially supported the objection but ultimately acknowledged the declarations in those judgments. The court affirms that the declarations in WP(C) Nos.18647/2021 and 7665/2021 apply to all universities with similar service conditions, and that Mechanics may be promoted as L.D. Clerks if all other eligibility criteria are met. Consequently, the court sets aside the disputed orders, directs the Deputy Director to approve the promotions, and directs expeditious disbursal of benefits once the promotions are effected, within one month, subject to eligibility. The decision is intended to apply across universities with analogous statutes.
This Kerala High Court revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 challenges the Rent Control Appellate Authority’s order directing the tenant to deposit admitted rent arrears and, upon default, to surrender possession under Section 12(3). The landlord (Gireesh) filed RCP 18/2016 seeking eviction of the tenant (Antony) for arrears; the Rent Control Court granted eviction under Section 11(3) after an ex parte proceeding. The Rent Control Appellate Authority stayed execution on deposit of Rs. 87,500 as arrears. In RCA No.42/2018, the landlord sought, via IA 2/2022, to direct the tenant to deposit admitted arrears from May 2015 to May 2022, which the tenant partially complied with, depositing Rs. 87,500 prior to stay and Rs. 64,000 under the IA. When the tenant failed to deposit the balance, the appellate authority halted further proceedings and ordered eviction under Section 12(3). The core question is whether civil-decree arrears (O.S. 355/2018) can be excluded from admitted arrears under Section 12(1). The Court holds that admitted rent can be inferred from pleadings and related documents, and that the rent admitted as Rs. 2,500 per month during the period is binding; it upholds the appellate order and dismisses the revision, ordering eviction of the tenant. The decision emphasizes admission-based computation of arrears under Section 12 and rejects the tenant’s exclusionary argument based on the civil-decree.”
MACA Nos. 1239 of 2017 & 1352 of 2017 Two motor-accident appeals arise from OP(MV) 544/2015 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Muvattupuzha, relating to a road accident on 18 December 2014 in which the claimant, Yacob T.P., a scooter rider, was struck by a tipper lorry and suffered the amputation of his left arm. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 22,38,070 out of a claimed Rs. 51,12,000, with a ceiling of Rs. 30 lakh. The claimant challenged the award on grounds that the notional income used (likely Rs. 11,000) and disability percentage (80% vs 88.4%) understate his loss and future care. The insurer challenged several heads of compensation as excessive and questioned evidence for future medical expenses. The High Court examined the evidence, rejected reliance on Ext. A9 as uncorroborated, and held that the notional income for 2014 should be Rs. 11,000 in line with Ramachandrappa. The court increased the disability to 85% (from 80%), and while not disturbing loss of amenities and other heads, revised the sums: loss of earnings to Rs. 88,000; permanent disability to Rs. 10,09,800; and deleted loss of earning power. Future medical expenses of Rs. 1,00,000 were retained. The appeals were allowed in part, with interest at 7.5% and costs; the insurer was directed to pay the enhanced amounts. The judgment emphasises the claimant's diminished capacity in his occupation and rejects misapplication of guidelines.
MACA Nos.480 & 542 of 2010 These are two Motor Accident Claims Appeals (MACA Nos. 480 and 542 of 2010) arising from a common award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakuda, for injuries sustained by pillion riders in a motor vehicle collision on 1 November 2005. The petitions, originally under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act and later converted to Section 166 petitions, were filed by Jomon and Laiju against Mohanan (owner) and the rider of the motorcycle, with Oriental Insurance as insurer. The tribunal held that the accident could not be linked to negligence by the second respondent (the rider) and dismissed the petitions. The appellants contended that this was a case of composite negligence, arguing that the claimant may recover from any joint tortfeasor and that failure to implead one tortfeasor should not bar recovery from others; they relied on treatises and several precedents. The insurance company for the motorcycle disputed liability and pointed to the tempo traveller’s driver as the negligent party. The High Court, after reviewing the evidence, noted that the primary evidence consisted of the FIR and police refer report, which pointed to the tempo traveller’s driver, and that the petitioners failed to establish negligence on the part of the second respondent. It reaffirmed that the claim requires proof of negligence by a tortfeasor and dismissed the appeals, upholding the tribunal’s order.
ARB.APPEAL No. 38 of 2019 Arb.Appeal No. 38 of 2019 before the Kerala High Court arises from an arbitration award in a dispute over railway advertising contracts. The Southern Railway appellants terminated a contract dated 26.10.2011 with Vipin V.S. for placing advertisements at Kollam, Ernakulam and Thrissur stations after the license fee installments remained unpaid. An Arbitrator later held the termination illegal and awarded compensation of ₹2,11,20,000 along with interest and costs; the award deducted ₹64,00,000 from the claim, effectively leaving ₹1,47,20,000 due to the claimant. The District Court set aside the award on grounds that it violated judgments of this Court and that the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to nullify them. On remand, the District Court again dismissed the Section 34 application. On appeal, the court examined whether the award was enforceable under Section 34, considering arguments that it violated the fundamental policy of Indian law, showed patent illegality, and was perverse. It reviewed the contractual termination provisions, including clause 3 and amendments introduced when the contract was re-awarded, and discussed the limits of judicial interference with arbitral findings. The court ultimately found the compensation figure to be perverse and set aside that portion, while upholding the remainder of the award and remanding costs. The appeal was allowed in part.
This is a Division Bench appeal (W.A. No.1716 of 2021) by Renu P. Gopalan, challenging the Kerala High Court single-judge order dated 24.09.2021 in WP(C) No.15568 of 2018, which declined her prayers for quashing the State Government’s appointment of the 4th respondent as Member of the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The appellant had applied for the post after a Selection Committee panel of three candidates (including herself) was prepared; she scored the highest marks in that panel, but the Government ultimately appointed the 4th respondent, allegedly to suit its own preference. The Government re-notified the post after an earlier order quashed a prior notification, but still chose the 4th respondent. The learned Single Judge, relying on statutory provisions and case-law, held that the Government’s appointment could be made on the Selection Committee’s list and that the Selection Committee’s duty is to finalize a panel, not to prepare a rank-ordered list. On appeal, the Hon’ble Judges held that the Government has the authority to appoint any candidate from the final panel and is not bound to follow a rank-based order, provided the panel is duly finalised and the appointment is from within it. The appeal was dismissed, and the Government’s appointment was sustained. The original files are to be returned to the Advocate General.
This is a criminal revision petition (Crl.R.P. No.4054 of 2009) before the Kerala High Court by Binoy Mappalayil challenging a conviction under the Abkari Act arising from S.C.No.438/2006 before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Kattappana, and confirmed by a Sessions Court in Crl. Appeal No.47 of 2008. The prosecution contended that on 24 January 2004, around 4:00 PM, near the T.R. & T Estate, Chennapparamukal Kara, Peermadу, the accused transported about 15 litres of arrack in a 35-litre plastic can, leading to seizure of contraband and charges under Section 8(1) and (2) of the Abkari Act. The trial court convicted him to five years’ simple imprisonment with a Rs 1,00,000 fine and a default term of one year; the appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. In the revision petition, the petitioner argued systemic defects: absence of arrest intimation, missing seizure label and specimen seal on the sample, forwarding note defects, and unnamed officer in forwarding documents; unexplained delays in sample dispatch and analysis; and non-compliance with Section 50 Abkari Act. The court emphasized the harsh penalties and mandatory formalities of the Abkari Act, citing Basu and several Kerala and Supreme Court decisions requiring strict compliance, chain of custody, and corroboration of laboratory results with the seized sample. The High Court allowed the revision, acquitting the petitioner and canceling the bail bond.
This writ petition, filed by Aby Geevarghese, seeks compassionate appointment in Canara Bank following the death-in-harness of his father, T.M. Geevarghese, in 1995. The petition traces a long sequence of representations and bank responses: an initial 1995 offer of compassionate appointment (Ext.P1) followed by a 1995-2003 correspondence (Exts.P2–P3). A 2008 representation (Ext.P4) led to dismissal (Ext.P5). The High Court disposed of a prior petition in 2012 (Ext.P6) holding that compassionate appointment could not be directed since the Compassi onate Employment Scheme had ceased in 2005, but allowed ex gratia payment if applicable. The petitioner’s later pleas argued for revival under older schemes (1993 Dying in Harness Scheme) or under newer schemes (2009/2014). The Supreme Court subsequently clarified in Canara Bank v. Mahesh Kumar (2015) that the High Court’s approach to reconsideration under the old scheme should be respected. The Kerala High Court ultimately held that the 2014 scheme applies only to deaths on or after 5 August 2014, that the petitioner’s claim is time-barred (ext. 2019 representations), and that Ext.P6’s inter partes judgment bars revival. It concluded that there is no immediate need or justifiable basis to direct compassionate employment, and dismissed the petition. The judgment emphasizes strict scrutiny of eligibility and immediacy of need and relies on precedents to deny relief.
This is a Division Bench appeal under W.A. No. 1785 of 2019 filed by Vembanad Gas Agencies challenging a policy that allegedly transfers the consumer base from an existing LPG distributor to newly appointed distributors. The High Court review centers on whether the Oil Marketing Company (BPCL) can reduce or modify an already allotted distributorship area by appointing additional distributors, thereby transferring existing subscribers. The appellant argues that the distributorship agreement with the oil company creates a principal–to–principal relationship and that consumers subscribe to the company, not the distributor; any transfer of subscribers amounts to expropriation of the appellant’s customer base and breaches the agreement. The respondents contend that the agreement and statutory framework authorize area reduction and appointment of new distributors to meet rising demand, with the consumer subscribing to the company; the inter‑company portability or transfer of consumers is permissible within the framework of the LPG regime and the contract explicitly reserves such power. The court discusses the arbitral route, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and the essential public‑utility focus on consumer interests, ultimately holding that the distributor’s right to retain subscribers cannot override the public interest and contractual framework. It upholds the authority of the oil company to reallocate consumers and dismisses the appeal, emphasizing consumer primacy in public utility distribution.
MACA No.507/2018 and CO No.86/2018 This Kerala High Court judgment by Justice Devan Ramachandran concerns MACA No.507/2018 and CO No.86/2018, an appeal and cross-objections arising from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award in OP(MV) No.100/2015 (Kalpetta). The Insurance Company (appellant) challenged the Tribunal’s compensation awarded to the dependants of a deceased employee, while the claimants/cross objectors sought higher damages. The core disputes centered on: (i) whether the Tribunal correctly fixed the deceased’s notional income; (ii) whether the Tribunal properly computed funeral expenses, loss of love and affection, and loss of estate; and (iii) whether the amounts under “loss of dependency” and “loss of future economic benefit” reflected correct application of future prospects and the appropriate income. The insurer argued that Ext.A7 shows a basic salary of Rs.6,500, with incentives, thus notional income in practice could be Rs.8,000 and, under Pranay Sethi, future prospects should be 40% (not 50%). It also urged caps on funeral expenses (Rs.15,000) and loss of love and affection (Rs.40,000 per head) and that loss of estate be limited. The cross objectors contended for Rs.9,500 as notional income in line with Ramachandrappa and higher dependency/future benefit, citing disability of the father and the Hon’ble Supreme Court guidelines. The bench ultimately re-determined heads of damage, applying 40% future prospects, and substantial restrictions on certain heads, while enhancing others, disposing of the appeal and cross objections with a modified award.
Revision petitioner K. Abdul Rayees, a former Marketing Executive of Lysorm-Rushail Pharma-DIN (Pvt) Ltd, filed OS 31/2012 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kannur, seeking payment of Rs 1,68,753 with interest for unpaid service benefits, provident fund contributions, and related expenses following his resignation on 30 June 2006 amid alleged harassment by the Regional Sales Manager. The defendant-company argued lack of territorial jurisdiction since it is Mumbai-based and had no Kannur office or branch; moreover, canvassing orders by a marketing executive does not necessarily amount to carrying on business within the district. The trial court and the first appellate court held that Kannur had no jurisdiction; the revision petition to the Kerala High Court challenges this. The High Court analyzes Sections 19 and 20 CPC to determine where a wrong was done and where a defendant carries on business, and whether part of the cause of action arose in Kannur. It discusses the Dhodha House line of authority, Kunju's decision, and other historic authorities to lay down the rules governing carrying on business by agents. The Court ultimately finds that mere canvassing by a Marketing Executive in Kannur does not amount to carrying on business nor confer jurisdiction on the Kannur court, and rejects the Section 20(c) argument about a partial cause of action. The revision petition is dismissed.
Tr.P.(C) Nos. 695/2019, 693/2019, 696/2019 This High Court of Kerala, in a common order on 8 June 2022, deals with three transfer petitions filed by Mohandas P.K., the husband, under Tr.P(C) Nos. 695/2019, 693/2019 and 696/2019, seeking to transfer family-court proceedings from Kattappana to Thrissur. The petitions relate to OP 273/2019 (wife’s case for divorce, return of gold ornaments, and maintenance), OP 413/2019, and MC 116/2019, all filed before the Family Court at Kattappana. The petitioner contends that the distance to the Kattappana court is about 190 kilometers and that he must care for an elderly, bedridden sister, making travel onerous and causing harassment. The respondent opposes transfer, arguing she cannot travel to Thrissur due to family obligations and her own health concerns, and notes the petitioner’s own past travel to Mumbai. After hearing, the learned judge, Basant Balaji, observes that despite the petitioner’s age (57) and health issues, the hardship to the respondent—a lady who would have to travel long distances—cannot be ignored. Relying on Sumita Singh v. Kumar Sanjay (2001) 10 SCC 41 and Rajani Kishor Pardeshi v. Kishor Babulal Pardeshi (2005) 12 SCC 237, among other decisions, the court declines to transfer, finding no compelling reasons to move the cases away from Kattappana. The petitions are dismissed, with a direction that personal appearances be required by the Kattappana court only when strictly necessary.
This is a Kerala High Court judgment in OP (FC) No.119 of 2023, rendered by a Division Bench comprising Justices Anil K. Narendran and P.G. Ajithkumar, on 31 March 2023. The petitioner, Anjana Chandran, mother of Dev Haneesh Nanbeerakath (born 03.07.2015), had filed OP No.485 of 2023 seeking a divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and IA 5/2023 seeking a Sole Legal Responsibility Certificate to take the child abroad. The Family Court had dismissed IA 5/2023 on 17.02.2023. The High Court allowed IA 5/2023, set aside the Ext.P9 order, and held that the petitioner may take the child to the United Kingdom, subject to conditions ensuring the respondent’s ongoing interaction with the child, including bringing the child back to India during school vacations. The court noted the UK decision-making requirement that both parents apply or a Sole Legal Responsibility Certificate be submitted. It analyzed Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act (custody, maintenance, education) and affirmed that Guardian and Wards Act principles are applicable, while recognizing India’s non-participation in the 1980 Hague Convention but focusing on enforceability of orders for an Indian citizen. The judgment distinguishes Smitha Antony v. Koshy Kurian, clarifying that such orders need not foreclose the other parent’s custody rights. The petition is allowed; the petitioner must file an affidavit of compliance, enabling the Family Court to issue the Sole Legal Responsibility Certificate.
