This is an OP(KAT) petition filed by the State of Kerala challenging a Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) order in OA (EKM) No.1697/2016. The subject concerns promotion to the post of Superintendent of Police (Motor Transport) (Non-IPS). P. A. Anand, the applicant in the OA, had been included in a select list for promotion after a sequence of DPC reviews (Annexures A4 and A5) despite a pending Vigilance case, and an Annexure-A6 order later restricted the promotion to prospective effect. The Tribunal in Ext.P4 ordered notional promotion from 01.12.2008 with pay re-fixation, pension revision, and arrears, directing disbursement of arrears to the applicant. The State challenged Ext.P4 under Articles 226 and 227, contending that Annexures A4–A5 had become final and binding and that the executive order (Annexure A6) could not be overridden. The High Court acknowledged the procedural history: finality of the DPC decision, Gazette publication, and the legal limitations on altering the select list after a year from Gazette, as well as the tribunal’s limited relief of notional promotion with arrears. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition and upheld the tribunal’s order while directing timely compliance, noting the applicant’s retirement in 2010 and the need for expeditious implementation.”,
Archana K.R., a 41-year-old Assistant Public Prosecutor, challenged the Kerala High Court’s tie-breaking norms for direct recruitment to the post of District & Sessions Judge in the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service. The appellant and the third respondent were equally placed on the final merit list (Ext.P7) with identical total marks (written plus interview). The senior statutory norms (Annexure R2(a)/Ext.P-12) prescribe older age as the primary tie-breaker and, if age is identical, a longer period of bar practice, with all other factors to be considered last. Archana contends that such 1987 norms are irrational in the current regime (where recruitment is by 300 marks for written examination and 50 for interview) and conflicts with the Supreme Court’s direction in All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (2002) that direct recruitment should consider written and viva voce, guided by the Shetty Commission recommendations; hence the tie-break formula should emphasize the interview marks. Respondents (State, High Court and R3) defend the norms as a conscious policy choice by the competent authority, consistent with KS&SSR Part-II rules and the Kerala PSC manual, arguing that the emphasis on the written portion (around 86%) and limited interview weight (14%) fosters mature, experienced adjudicators. The learned Single Judge upheld the policy; the Division Bench dismissed the appeal, upholding the authority’s policy choice and judicial review limits in policy-based recruitment.
ARB.A No. 23 of 2020 (and connected cases: ARB.A Nos. 26, 31 of 2020; ARB.A Nos. 6, 7, 8 of 2021) This is a consolidated High Court of Kerala judgment disposing of six Arbitration Appeals filed by M/s DLF Home Developers Ltd. (the appellant) under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging various awards passed in favour of allottees of DLF Riverside Apartments and the corresponding orders under Section 34. The core dispute across the appeals concerns delays in handing over possession of the apartments and the question whether force majeure, as defined in the Apartment Buyers Agreements (notably Clause 36 and the defined term “Force Majeure”), excused the builder from liability. The builder contends that delays were caused by force majeure events (including regulatory actions, injunctions, and related approvals) and that the buyers were not entitled to damages beyond a refund, with limited interest as stipulated in the agreements. The respondents claim substantial amounts for principal sums paid, interest (18% p.a. in many claims), damages, and future interest. The arbitrator awards varied, but all included interest on principal and pre/post-award periods. The District Courts dismissed petitions under Section 34 challenging these awards. The Kerala High Court, after surveying the law on appraisal of arbitral awards (including Associate Builders, Ssangyong, Renusagar, and Ssangyong-line authorities) and amendments to Section 28(3), upheld the awards and dismissed the appeals, holding no patent illegality or public policy violation. The operative outcome: the Arbitration Appeals are dismissed and the awards confirmed, with no costs.”
Cus.Appeal Nos.9/2020, 10/2020, 2/2021, 3/2021, 2/2022 This batch of Customs Appeals, filed under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, challenges orders of the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Bangalore, allowing amendments in shipping bills to claim MEIS (Mechant Export from India Scheme) benefits. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench judgment by Justices S.V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji, examines five appeals: Cus. Appeals Nos. 9/2020, 10/2020, 2/2021, 3/2021, and 2/2022, relating to LMJ International Ltd., Universal Oleoresins, MRF Limited, Kancor Ingredients Ltd., and RBG Trading Corporation Pvt. Ltd. The respondents had claimed MEIS benefits and sought amendments to shipping bills where the MEIS declaration appeared as ‘N’ in the reward column, which the Tribunal treated as a procedural defect and allowed amendment to ‘Y’. The Revenue objected, arguing amendments could not be made where declarations were not properly formatted. The Court notes consistent authority supporting amendments (Madras High Court in Pasha International; Delhi High Court in Kedia Agencies; Kerala High Court in Mangalath Cashews; NC John & Sons; Kuruwa Enterprises) and a Supreme Court SLP (No.5334/2022) confirming the view in Customs Appeal No.5/2020. Following these authorities, the Court dismisses the batch, upholding the Tribunal’s permissive approach to amendment and MEIS eligibility. The outcome is that MEIS amendments are permissible, and the revenue appeals fail.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 3037 OF 2011 This is a criminal revision petition under Sections 397–401 Cr.P.C. challenging a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the consequent sentences. The petitioner, B. Karthikeyan Sreebhavanam, allegedly obtained a loan of Rs. 3,00,000 from Sathyan Sauparnam in January–February 2005, with part repayment by cheques and cash. The primary cheque for Rs. 3,00,000 was issued with a date later altered from 26.09.2005 to 16.08.2006, counter-signed by the drawer, and later dishonoured for funds insufficient. The complainant served a legal notice, and the petitioner replied denying the claim. The Trial Court took cognizance and convicted the petitioner under Section 138 NI Act, sentencing six months’ simple imprisonment and Rs. 3,00,000 as compensation under Cr.P.C. Section 357(3). The Sessions Court affirmed conviction but modified the sentence to one month’s simple imprisonment and increased compensation to Rs. 3,75,000 with five months’ default imprisonment. The High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Cr.P.C. Sections 397–401, held there was no illegality or material alteration proven and affirmed conviction, but held the substantive sentence excessive and modified it. It imposed a nominal imprisonment (one day) and increased the fine to Rs. 3,75,000, with two months to deposit and a deferment of execution until 13.11.2023, emphasizing that NI Act offences are primarily debt-recovery oriented and that revisional power is supervisory rather than appellate.
This Kerala High Court decision arises from an Original Petition (CAT) challenging a Central Administrative Tribunal order. The petitioner, V.K. Somarajan Pillai, a GDS Branch Post Master in Pathanamthitta, challenged the CAT’s final order dated 19 August 2020 in OA No.470/2018, which had dismissed the OA on the ground that there existed no vacancy to fill and that the petitioner’s claim for appointment as Postman was not tenable. The LDCE for 12 vacancies in 2009 (split across UR, OBC, PH, sports quotas, and seniority/merit quotas) is central to the dispute; the petitioner argued that the appointment of him to a Postman vacancy could only be treated as direct recruitment, not a matter of promotion/transfer, thus rendering OBC reservation inapplicable. The Tribunal had found that all 12 vacancies were filled, although the record showed some unfilled positions in PH and sports quotas. The High Court set aside the Tribunal’s merits adjudication at show-cause stage, and held that the matter must be reconsidered by the competent authority in light of Supreme Court precedents. It directed the Chief Post Master General, Kerala Circle, to decide the Anx. A-4 show-cause matter after allowing the petitioner to respond, within three months, with the judgment copy. The petition was disposed with directions for a fresh, law-based adjudication.
This is an appeal from an order dated 06.10.2016 in I.A.No.1787 and 1788 of 2015 in O.S.No.311 of 2010 filed before the Sub Court, Ottapalam, under Order 43, Rule 1(d) CPC. The appellant challenged condonation of delay of 949 days and the setting aside of an ex parte decree in a suit for specific performance, return of advance money, and a mandatory injunction. The suit, O.S.No.311 of 2010, was decreed on 15.12.2012. The appellant could not participate in the proceedings as summons were not properly served; he was in Bangalore and, according to him, service was effected by publication and he was undergoing heart treatment, having learned of the suit only when execution proceedings were initiated by the 3rd respondent, a cooperative bank which had obtained an arbitration award. The Sub Court dismissed the condonation petitions. The appellant argues that the delay was due to illness and lack of knowledge of pendency; the respondents contend there was knowledge and that the delay is not excusable. The High Court, applying liberal, justice-oriented principles and the elastic concept of “sufficient cause,” sets aside the ex parte decree restoration, with cost, and remands to dispose the suit within four months, emphasizing substantial justice over strict technicalities.
W.P.(C).Nos.477/23 & 1600/23 This writ petition, filed by Chandrasekharan Nair, a devotee of Thekkan Palani Sree Subrahmanya Swamy Temple at South Aryad, Alappuzha, seeks police protection for the Thaipooyam festival (27 January to 5 February 2023) and an order directing authorities to prevent Velukuth, a ritual where a steel rod punctures a devotee, from taking place around the temple premises. The petitioner contends Velukuth is barbaric and incompatible with contemporary sensibilities; he relies on a District Collector letter (24.11.2021) and a Thantri directive indicating Velukuth should not be part of the festival. The Devaswom’s General Body and Executive Committee reportedly decided not to permit Velukuth for the current year, a stance supported by notices and exhibits. Respondents 6–10, including Velukuth Samrakshana Bhakta Jana Sangham and individual devotees, challenge locus and argue Velukuth is an age-old devotional practice integral to Thaipooyam for many followers. The court, recognizing the writ petition’s narrow scope and the evolving perception of ritual practices, notes that the temple administration and Thantri endorse excluding Velukuth this year, with majority local opinion aligned. It grants protection to enforce the temple’s decision and to prevent illegal obstruction by dissenters, while leaving faith-based questions to the temple authorities.
This appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) CPC 1908 challenges a common order dated 24.03.2017 of the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, dismissing condonation of delay (IA 2627/2015) and setting aside ex parte decree (IA 2627(a)) in O.S. No.767/2009. The appellant, initially defendant No.2, entered into an agreement with the 1st respondent, Fathima, for sale of property belonging to the 2nd respondent; the appellant, who acted as power of attorney for the 2nd respondent, was ex parte in the suit, and an ex parte decree was passed on 04.10.2011. The appellant contends that summons were not served personally and that service by substituted publication was improper, arguing delay in filing IA 2627/2015 and IA 2627(a)/2015 should be condoned. The 1st respondent opposed, maintaining validity of service and urging merits not to be considered at this stage. The court found constructive notice to the appellant but also emphasized the principle that service by publication must be in a newspaper circulating in the locality where the defendant resided or conducted business. Citing Mohammed Shameer v. T.P. Abdul Majeed (2022) and Auto Cars (supra), it held that publication in a newspaper with limited local circulation may not suffice under Order V, Rule 20(1A). Ultimately, the appeal is allowed subject to a cost of Rs. 10,000, IA 2627 and 2627(a) are allowed, the suited restored on file, and the Sub Court directed to dispose of the suit within four months, expediting the proceedings.
MACA 535 of 2016; MACA 3849 of 2016 These MACAs arise from a Motor Vehicle Accidents claim proceeding in respect of the death of Krishnankutty in a road accident on 28.12.2005. The claimants are his wife (1st petitioner) and his children from a former wife (petitioners 2 and 3). The Insurance Company, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd., challenges both the quantum awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, in OP MV 936/2006 and the apportionment of compensation among legal representatives; petitioners challenge only the apportionment in MACA 3849. The High Court, in a common judgment, reworks the assessment of income by applying future prospects (15%), revisits deductions (1/3 for personal expenses under Sarla Verma), and confirms that the applicable multiplier should be based on age, not remaining service life (rejecting the split-multiplier concept). It revises the loss of dependency from Rs. 25,54,640 to Rs. 29,37,836 and, following Pranay Sethi and Satinder Kaur, adjusts funeral, love-and-affection, and loss-of-estate heads. The court also allows enhancement despite no cross- objection, citing Nagappa and APSRTC, and upholds the apportionment of compensation among the three legal representatives as 3:1:1 (wife and two major sons) rather than 1:1:1, while recognizing that legal representatives may claim compensation even if not fully dependent. The Tribunal’s enhanced total is Rs. 4,00,196, with interest and costs, and a deposit/order framework is laid out. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
This Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 818 of 2011) arises from a partition suit O.S. No. 67 of 2009 before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Koyilandy. The suit concerned the estate of the deceased husband of Respondent No. 1, with movable and immovable assets to be partitioned among legal heirs. The trial court issued a preliminary decree dividing plaint A and B schedule properties into four equal shares, with the plaintiff (mother) entitled to 1/4 and the remaining 3/4 allocated to defendants 1 to 3; similarly, plaint C schedule property was to be partitioned into four equal shares, with the plaintiff receiving 1/4 and the rest going to D1–D3, with some portions deposited until the minor heirs attained majority. The appellants contend that B schedule is a consortium payable to the 1st defendant (the wife) and should not form part of the plaintiff’s 1/4 share; they rely on Exts B1, B5, B6 and authorities including Archana T.A. and Omana to argue that the wife alone is entitled to the B schedule. The respondents assert these documents were not properly marked and, even if considered, do not establish a exclusive entitlement to the B schedule. The High Court held that the documents do not show a consortium and that the parties are governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; hence the mother and the three children are entitled to equal shares. The appeal was dismissed and the preliminary decree maintained, with no absolute right fastened on the 1st appellant to the B schedule.
W.P.(C) Nos.16624/2021 & 21512/2021 This common judgment of Justice Sunil Thomas arises from two connected writ petitions challenging the termination and regularisation prospects of temporary ambulance drivers engaged by the Kizhuvilam Grama Panchayat’s Primary Health Centre. Siyad S S, who had been employed since 2017, faced non-renewal of his contract in 2021. He had sought regularisation under Ext. P2 (dated 19 April 2021), which directed that applications for regularisation be placed before the Panchayat committee for deliberation and to report back; however, the Panchayat resolved not to extend his term and to invite fresh appointments. The other petitioner, Anshad S, was appointed to a vacancy from a published list and challenged his termination, seeking reinstatement if the earlier orders were complied with. The respondents argued that Ext. P2 merely directed deliberation and that regularisation could occur only against sanctioned posts; they contended that the Deputy Director of Panchayat had no inherent power to regularise against a non‑sanctioned post. The court found that Ext. P2 did not mandate automatic regularisation and that the authority to regularise lay with the Government for sanctioned posts. It dismissed WP( C) 16624/2021 and allowed WP( C) 21512/2021, setting aside Ext. P3 in the latter and directing reinstatement of Anshad S. The judgment underscores the limits of Ext. P2 and the need for due process in termination matters.
VREESHA v. SUJITH SURESH PANIKKER and others is an Original Petition (Family Court) under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging an interim custody order passed by the Family Court, Thrissur, on 17 December 2022. The petitioner, the mother, asserts that the children, Thanishka (9) and Anishka (4), are currently living with her at her parental home due to marital discord, while the father, who has been largely absent and works in Pune, should not be granted overnight custody. The Family Court had directed an interim custody arrangement and visitation regime after counselling and a clinical psychology report. The court found that the elder child has developed an emotional attachment with the father, but noted the father’s frequent absence from Kerala and the risk of emotional trauma if custody was abruptly transferred. Relying on the welfare principle and the catena of precedents, including Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan and Vasudha Sethi v. Kiran Bhaskar, the Kerala High Court held that custody decisions must prioritize the child’s best interests and ensure contact with both parents unless compelling reasons exist. The High Court thus modified the interim order to a more limited regime: scheduled visits by the father, daily video calls, and a plan for a future custody review by the Family Court, ensuring gradual re-integration and safeguarding the children’s welfare.
This writ petition concerns aided school teachers in Palakkad district who performed census enumerator duties for the National Population Register (NPR) in 2010 and were granted Earned Leave during vacation under Rule 81 Part I of the Kerala Service Rules. The petitioners allege that after receiving training, they conducted house listing and housing census from 12.04.2010 to 27.05.2010 and worked for 45 days, with Headmasters sanctioning Earned Leave surrender and AEOs verifying the duty certificates. Government orders Exts. P1 (2010) and P2 (2010) allegedly provided for proportionate Earned Leave for census duty, while Ext. P3 clarified policy. Ext. P5 (2013) purportedly restricted Earned Leave to eight days, and Ext. P7 (2020) demanded repayment of excess payments for 16 days of census work. Ext. P6 directed not to implement Ext. P5 until further notice. The petition cites a prior Ernakulam decision and relies on the Supreme Court’s State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih to contend that recovery of benefits improperly granted should not be pursued after many years when the employee acted under valid orders without fault. The learned judge found that the petitioners acted on valid orders, there was no fault, and recovery would be impermissible. The petition is allowed; Exts. P5 and P7 are quashed. No costs.
Jacob K. John @ Bibu filed O.P.(Criminal) No. 265 of 2023 challenging an order of the Family Court, Thiruvalla, in CMP 22/22 in MC 61/2014, which directed maintenance for his two minor children at Rs. 7,500 each per month from 06.08.2014. The Family Court’s order was sought to be enforced through execution petitions covering arrears from August 2019 to March 2022, totaling Rs. 4,80,000, with portions paid by the petitioner (notably March 2021–March 2022). The petitioner contends that, under the proviso to Section 125(3) Cr.P.C., warrants for recovery cannot be issued for arrears unless within one year from the date the amount became due; Ext.P4 directing a bailable warrant is thus unsustainable for non‑application of mind and for ignoring his contention. He cites Poongodi v. Thangavel and Praveen v. Sabitha to support the view that recovery of pre-one-year arrears cannot be pursued. The respondents submit that the right to recover the balance arrears remains. The High Court sets aside Ext.P4, agreeing that warrants cannot be issued for older arrears, and directs the Family Court to obtain the mother’s bank details so that maintenance can be remitted promptly to her account. The judgment underscores the need for reasoned orders, noting that “reasons are the soul of judicial orders.”
W.P.(C)No.42890 of 2022 & SSCR No.1 of 2023 This case concerns Vedivazhipadu rights at Sabarimala Devaswom during the Mandala–Makaravilakku festival season 1198 ME (2022-23). The petitioner Sheena M.S. sought mandamus under Article 226 to compel the Travancore Devaswom Board and others to allot Vedivazhipadu venues at Sabari Peedam, Saramkuthi, and Karimala, and to refund the bid amount. She was the Kuthaka (Vedivazhipadu) holder for 1198 ME; Ext.P7 general conditions and Ext.P8 alleged representation are central to eligibility and payments. SSCR No.1/2023, filed suo motu, addresses a fire/explosion on 02.01.2023 in the Vedivazhipadu explosive manufacturing shed, injuring workers, and investigates compliance with Explosives Rules and LE-2 licensing. The Court undertook multiple directions (security and fire safety audits; instructing the Fire & Rescue Services; seeking instructions from MoEFCC; and examining Licence LE-2 for platforms near Malikappuram). Over subsequent hearings, the Court scrutinized tender procedures, LE-2 licenses, and safety compliance, stayed certain licenses, and directed investigations. On 28.03.2023, the Court dismissed the writ petition (paragraphs 44–46); LE-2 licence granted to the petitioner was set aside (paragraph 46), and directions were issued to proceed with LE-2 licensing only under lawful/safer norms (paragraphs 47–48). The matter was disposed of with SSCR disposed of per those directions.
Common Judgment under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). The two Miscellaneous Second Appeals (MSA Nos. 2 and 3 of 2023) arise from the Kerala Real Estate Appellate Tribunal’s common order dated 28.10.2022 in REFA Nos. 20/2021 and 44/2021 and from the Kerala Real Estate Regulatory Authority’s (K-RERA) order in CCP No.01/2020 dated 01.02.2021. The appellants are Jewel Homes Pvt. Ltd. and its Managing Director; the respondents are the original complainants, Johny George Thyssery House and Beena Johny George Thyssery House. The core dispute is whether delay in construction can be excused by intervening circumstances and whether Section 18 of the Act guarantees an unconditional refund and compensation on demand, or whether compensation is restricted by circumstantial factors. The Appellate Authority had remanded for fresh evidence on compensation, while preserving the order refunding the advance amount. The appellants contend delays were caused by external interference, notably with the Municipal Corporation over road width, and urge that such events should not bar compensation. Respondents rely on Newtech Promoters and Imperia Structures to insist that refunds and compensation under Section 18 are unqualified. The High Court ultimately holds that intervening circumstances cannot negate the statutory remedy and dismisses the appeals, vacating interlocutory orders and directing proper consideration of compensation on remand.
Rajeevkumar, the accused in CC No.238 of 2020 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kolenchery, sought relief under Section 482 CrPC to quash charges for offences punishable under IPC Sections 448 (criminal trespass) and 506 (criminal intimidation). The Kerala High Court heard the criminal miscellaneous case on May 26, 2023. The prosecution alleged that on 11 March 2020 the petitioner trespassed into the de facto complainant’s premises and threatened him with a knife. The petitioner’s counsel argued that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and that continuing with prosecution would be unnecessary; Annexure A3 contains the sworn settlement affidavit from the third respondent. The court directed investigation to verify the genuineness of the settlement and whether the petitioner had any prior criminal antecedents. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing solely on the basis of a settlement, but agreed that no other transgressions stood against the petitioner. After examining the law—State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan; Gian Singh; Narinder Singh; and others—the court held that Section 482 powers can quash private, non‑compoundable offences in a settlement, with caveats for heinous or public-interest crimes. In light of the limited gravity of the offences, lack of serious injuries, absence of adverse antecedents, and the genuineness of the settlement, the court allowed the petition and quashed the final report and all further proceedings in CC 238/2020.
The petitioner, J. Ramanathan, owner of a Mahindra Xylo (2017 model, TN-37-CS-3142), whose tourist cab was seized in Crime No. 7/2022 of Chalakudy Excise Range on allegations of ganja transport, seeks release of the vehicle under NDPS Act and interim custody with security. The writ petition before the Kerala High Court challenged two actions: Ext. P4 (the third respondent’s disposal/holding letter) and Ext. P5 (the department’s circular under Section 52A of the NDPS Act) and sought mandamus to dispose of the vehicle in his favor. The single judge dismissed the petition, following the Division Bench ruling in Shajahan v. Inspector of Excise (2019) that the court cannot erode Section 451 CrPC jurisdiction for interim release, and relying on the proposition that the vehicle could be retained/brought within the NDPS regime. During the WA, counsel for the respondents cited a Supreme Court decision in Sainaba v. State of Kerala (2022) to contend that the registered owner may approach a Special Court under CrPC Section 451 for release. The court, however, relied on Sainaba to set aside the impugned judgment and to allow release of the vehicle on terms to be determined by the Special Court, noting Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai’s rationale on prompt custody with conditions. The appeal culminates in an order allowing release to the owner following the Special Court’s terms, with costs to be borne by the parties.
WP(C) 37634 of 2017; WP(C) 34674 of 2015; WP(C) 1421 of 2020 These connected writ petitions challenge orders of the Co-operative Arbitration Court and related regulatory bodies in disputes involving Tessy Joseph and the Alakkode Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. The Kerala High Court notes that declarations in Kodanchery Service Co-operative Bank v. Joshy Varghese (2020 (4) KLT 129) would impact the factual and legal matrix and were not considered by the Arbitration Court. It holds that the entire matter requires reconsideration by the Arbitration Court, adverting to Joshy Varghese (supra). The court also relies on Nanmanda Rural Co-operative Housing Society, Kozhikode and Another v. Ravi K.M. and Another (2015 KHC 868) to permit liberty, including to lead additional/fresh evidence, if entitled in law, before the Arbitration Court. While not venturing into the merits, the court instructs that the Arbitration Court will re-examine the case, consider Joshy Varghese and other precedents in accordance with law, and ensure due process for both sides. The judgment clarifies that the workmen’s contentions based on Joshy Varghese will be treated per law. The writ petitions are allowed; impugned orders are set aside; the Arbitration Court is directed to reconsider the entire matter expeditiously, with a six-month deadline from receipt of the judgment copy, and to issue an appropriate order thereafter.
