This is a bail application (BA No. 6913 of 2021) by the accused Satheesan Nair @ Sathi, pending in crime No. 958/2021 of Nedumangad Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, registered under Sections 498A and 302 IPC. The prosecution alleges a brutal, premeditated murder of the petitioner’s wife, including threats, coercion, and preparation (purchase of a chopper) and the involvement of two children who were sent away on the day of the incident. Postmortem evidence reportedly shows 22 ante-mortem injuries, with death attributed to head injuries, underscoring a savage assault. The defense argued that prolonged confinement since 03.05.2021, and delays in trial, render bail appropriate, citing State of Kerala v. Raneef to emphasize Article 21 and the value of liberty. They also invoked related bail jurisprudence (Aman Preet Singh in vested contexts) to stress the need to balance rights with delay concerns. The Public Prosecutor highlighted the brutality, the accused’s enmity with the wife, the presence of a plan (chopper) and the likelihood of continued danger, arguing that bail is inappropriate given the gravity and evidentiary materials. The court ultimately declined bail, finding prima facie evidence of a grave, premeditated crime and that the period of confinement does not warrant release. The bail petition is dismissed.
Sauda Beevi Shoukathali, a hatchery operator in Kerala, challenges Ext.P-1 assessment order dated 29 July 2019 under Sec. 22(3) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (KVAT Act) for the assessment year 2012-13. An inspection in February 2016 led to seizure of records, which were to be returned within 30 days under Rule 63(7) KVAT Rules, with a possible extension up to 60 days on higher authority permission. The petitioner submitted Ext.P-2 requesting return of seized documents, but Ext.P-1 was issued without granting a hearing, allegedly in contravention of Sec.22(4) KVAT Act. The petitioner also contends the order relies on a penalty order and mentions a pending W.P.(C).No. 16930/2018. The respondents concede that the petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The petitioner relies on Yeses International v. State of Kerala and U.K.Monu Timbers v. State of Kerala to argue that the assessing authority must independently apply its mind and that taxation requires statutory authorization. The High Court holds the impugned order illegal and ultra vires for denial of natural justice, quashes Ext.P-1, and remits the matter for fresh consideration with notice and opportunity of hearing, including production of attested copies of seized records, within a short timeframe.
On 8.4.2008, the appellant, while driving a tempo van KL-5/H 6867, collided with a stage carriage KL-5/U 6811, suffering injuries that required 25 days of hospitalization. Ext. A3 shows transfers fracture of the right femur, chest contusions, abrasions with puncture wounds, and multiple other injuries, with a 5% permanent disability as per Ext. X1. He filed a claim in O.P. (MV) No.1153/2008 seeking compensation of Rs.5,00,000 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam. The Tribunal awarded Rs.2,44,711 with interest at 8% per annum. The appellant challenges the award as inadequate, particularly under the head loss of earning power. He had claimed Rs.8,000 per month; the Tribunal adopted Rs.4,000 per month as notional income and treated him essentially as a driver, despite no material proving his avocation prior to the accident. Citing Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (three-step approach to determine earning capacity) and Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corp. (multiplier rule; 17 for age 30), the High Court reviews the determining process. It notes the lack of evidence of avocation but, given 5% disability and circumstances, corrects the quantum by granting an additional Rs.10,200 under the head of permanent disability after revising monthly income to Rs.5,000 and applying a 17 multiplier. The revised calculation yields enhanced compensation. The appellant is awarded Rs.10,200 more, with 8% interest from the petition date; the third respondent must deposit within one month. No costs.
WP(C).No. 13553 of 2014 (T) Chandramohan, the owner of lorry KL-09-AA-495, challenged a seizure by the 1st respondent under the MMDR Act, 1957 and KMMC Rules, contending that the authority lacked competence to seize the vehicle and that the Government Order (G.O. Ms) No. 20/14/ID dated 12 February 2014 did not authorize the officer in his area. The petition sought unconditional release of the vehicle. Interim custody had previously been granted upon payment of Rs. 25,000, with the Government Pleader later informing the Court that the G.O. relied upon was issued by mistake and a corrected version was being prepared. The Court, however, did not express an opinion on the impending corrected G.O. It relied on a prior decision, Aloshias C Antony v. Government of Kerala (2014(1) KLT 538), to observe that the course and proceedings pursued by the authorities intercepting the vehicle were in accordance with law. The Court noted that even if the seizure were not proper, the competent authority can file proceedings before the Judicial Magistrate’s Court if an offence is disclosed. It stressed that Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act recovery is only one link in a chain and does not by itself vitiate prosecutions. Directions were issued to report the seizure to the competent authority within two weeks, and to consider compounding the offence under Section 23A MMDR Act and KMMC Rules (citing Digil v. Sub Inspector of Police for guidance). The writ petition was disposed of with the option to compound and to proceed accordingly if a valid offence is established.
Crl.MC Nos.2529/2021 (E) & 2537/2021 (F) Two connected Criminal Misc. Cases, Crl.MC Nos.2529/2021 and 2537/2021, were heard by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court on 4 May 2021. The petitioners-accused in Crime Nos.206/2021 and 205/2021 of Chandera Police Station, Kasaragod, sought quashing of the offences under IPC sections 341 and 323 r/w 34 (2529) and sections 143, 147, 341, 323 r/w 149 (2537) and the corresponding proceedings under CrPC. The core contention is that the disputes between the petitioners and the defacto complainants (respondents 2 and 3 in 2529; respondents 2 and 3 in 2537) have been amicably settled, as evidenced by Annexures II and III (affidavits). The petitioners rely on Supreme Court precedents Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat to invoke the court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC in the ends-of-justice interest, seeking quashing of FIRs and ongoing proceedings. The court, considering the affidavits and the authorities cited, held that the inherent power can be invoked, and consequently allowed both petitions, quashing the FIRs and all further proceedings insofar as the petitioners are concerned, thereby disposing of the cases in the interests of justice.
The petitioner, Legal Literacy Council, a registered Legal Welfare Organization, filed this writ petition seeking directions against the State of Kerala and against office-bearers of the Kerala Union of Working Journalists (KUWJ), Delhi Unit, for alleged misutilisation of a Rs. 25 lakh grant meant to establish infrastructure for the Kerala Press Club in New Delhi. The Government of Kerala had sanctioned the amount in 2012 and handed over the funds to the KUWJ Delhi unit, which allegedly encashed the cheque and parked the money in a bank account without applying it to the stated purpose. The petitioner urged the State to recover unutilised funds with interest and even sought a legal mandate to enact specific laws to compel such action. The court examined procedural aspects, including service on several respondents and reliance on RTI replies and media reports. It held that writ petitions cannot be entertained solely on newspaper reports and that the petition lacked credible evidence of misutilisation. The judgment canvasses a broad constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, emphasising that courts cannot direct the Legislature to enact laws and that actions of the executive and legislature lie within their respective domains. Concluding, the court dismissed the petition for lack of timely, substantiated relief and for seeking a legislative mandate.
Aby George, a High School Teacher (Mathematics) employed as HSA in an additional division vacancy at St. Paul’s High School, challenged the non-approval of his appointment due to a government ban on filling additional division vacancies. He had earlier held appointments in 2006 and 2008–2010 in the same post, but governance authorities refused approval centered on an economic/budgetary prohibition. Subsequently, he held posts as UPST in 2010 and Upper Primary School Assistant in 2012, with some approvals (Ext.P8, Ext.P9). The petitioner contends that G.O (P) No.317/2005/G.Edn. imposed a ban on appointments in additional division vacancies and that the ban was lifted later by G.O.(P) No.10/10/G.Edn. (12.01.2010) subject to conditions including a consent bond by Managers. When the bond was not executed, the Manager allegedly breached the condition. The Government later issued G.O.(P) No.199/2011/G.Edn to implement a comprehensive teacher’s package for deployed/protected teachers. The petitioner cites decisions (Ext.P12–P15) of this Court directing deeming of bonds and approval from the date of appointment, and argues that non-execution of the bond should not defeat entitlement. The Respondents rely on the necessity of the 1:1 apportionment and the need for bonds, with some challenges pending before the Supreme Court. The Court ultimately relies on the deeming principle from Suma Devi to direct reconsideration of the revision petition.
WP(C).No. 154 of 2013 (T) This batch of writ petitions concerns the validity of mid‑course changes to the National Eligibility Test (NET) norms for Lectureship, introduced by the University Grants Commission (UGC) shortly before results were announced for the June 2012 examination. Petitioners contended that while they had already met the notified minimum marks for Papers I‑III, the UGC amended the qualifying criteria by introducing an aggregate minimum as well as new modes of reckoning marks just days before the declaration of results, thereby penalising candidates who were already qualified under the original notification. The court previously held in W.P.(C) No. 22187/2012 and connected cases that the procedures and rules of selection cannot be altered after the process has begun; consequently, the petitioners sought the same relief and demanded that certificates be issued to those who had met the earlier separate minima. The Learned Judge examined precedents such as K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Dr. Cyril Johnson v. State of Kerala (FB), Jayachandran v. High Court of Kerala, and Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar to confirm that mid‑process changes are impermissible, or declaratory judgments should be applied to all similarly situated. The court concluded that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the declaratory decision and directed the UGC to issue NET certificates within one month, while cautioning that a potential appeal could affect the extent of the declaratory order.
The petitioner, Alimon C.H., challenges the refusal of the Registrar of Births and Deaths to accept and consider his wife Shameena Rahim’s application for correction of her date of birth in the birth certificate and for inclusion of her name in the register. Shameena’s birth is recorded as 15.06.1989 in Ext.P9, but the petitioner argues the correct date is 15.06.1988, a position supported by multiple documents: marriage certificate (Ext.P1), Aadhaar (Ext.P2), Voter ID (Ext.P3), SSLC (Ext.P4), passport (Ext.P5) and Malta college offer letter (Ext.P6). The case situates the matter within the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, and Kerala Rules, 1999, notably sections 14 and 15 with Rules 10 and 11, and a 1997 circular; case law from Chalakudy Municipality, Thomas Jacob and Abdul Rahiman is cited to show that authorities can correct misentries upon establishing genuine error, with five-year limits requiring Chief Registrar permission. The court acknowledges the wife’s current absence in India and urgency due to visa expiry, and directs that the application be accepted and considered, subject to conditions: the original Ext.P9 be surrendered; the applicant to furnish a notarized authorisation; the wife’s affidavit via Notary or Indian Embassy; and on fulfillment, Chief Registrar concurrence is to be obtained before final orders are passed, enabling timely correction.
WP(C) 9881/2020 & connected cases This batch judgment of a single-judge bench (Justice N. Nagareesh) deals with a cluster of writ petitions challenging government orders and guidelines relating to access permission for Petroleum fuel stations along state highways and major district roads in Kerala. The petitions, including WP(C) 9881/2020 and numerous connected matters, challenge Ext.P2 (GO 16/2020) and Ext.P4 (GO 67/2020) along with related circulars that prescribe stringent norms for siting fuel stations (intersections, plot size, fees, bank guarantees, etc.) under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002. The State and associated authorities contended that these guidelines and norms are a valid exercise of executive power under Article 162 and fall within state legislative competence (List II List III), and are necessary for road safety and traffic management, notwithstanding MoRTH guidelines and central regulations. The court, however, held that Ext.P2/P4 guidelines cannot override the statutory framework governing access to highways, and that a District Authority’s NOC under Rule 144 cannot be refused merely for non-compliance with Ext.P4. The judgment quashes Ext.P2 and Ext.P4, sets aside district refusals to issue NOCs, and directs authorities to reconsider NOC applications under the Petroleum Rules in light of prevailing law (within two months). It also notes procedural lapses and lack of stakeholder consultation, and leaves other issues open. Overall, the petitions are allowed in part with directions to reprocess NOC applications independent of Ext.P2/Ext.P4.
OT.Rev.No. 145/2014, OT.Rev.No. 148/2014, OT.Rev.No. 150/2014 Revenue challenged a common order of the Kerala VAT Appellate Tribunal dated 24.03.2014 in TA VAT Nos. 714/2010, 715/2010 and 716/2010, which held Orbit White Chewing Gum to be taxable at a concessional rate under the KVAT Act. The three OT RevNos relate to assessment years 2006-07 to 2008-09 and the core issue was the applicable rate of tax for the product Orbit White Chewing Gum, classified by the Tribunal as falling under Ayurvedic medicaments at 4% on the basis of invoices and HS code 3004.90.11. The Assessing Officer had raised tax at 12.5% and claimed the difference. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) modified the order in favour of the respondent, and the Tribunal upheld the Revenue’s stand, prompting these revisions. The High Court, in a common Order, found the Tribunal’s approach too brief and relied upon invoices for classification, criticizing it as an error of jurisdiction. It relied on Himalaya Drug Company v. State of Kerala to emphasize that concessions in a fiscal statute must be strictly construed, and that regulatory definitions cannot be imported into fiscal regimes. The Court set aside the common order, restored the Tribunals’ TA Nos. 714-716/2010 to file, and remitted the matter for fresh disposal within three months, allowing both sides to place further materials. The overarching principle affirmed is strict construction of concessional tax rates with reclassification required by the Tribunal on remand.
This High Court bail petition concerns DevaDevan, arrested in Crime No. 867/2021 under the NDPS Act for possession of a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs (MDMA). On 30.06.2021, Kalamassery police intercepted a motorcycle with no rear number plate; the rider fled but was apprehended. A polythene packet containing white powder was recovered and allegedly found to be MDMA intended for sale. The petitioner claims he innocently collected a parcel entrusted by a quarantined friend, without knowing its contents, and contends that the seizure did not comply with Section 50 NDPS safeguards. He seeks bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. The Public Prosecutor counters that a commercial quantity was detected, invoking Section 37 NDPS, and argues denial of bail is warranted given the gravamen of the offence. The court discusses NDPS safeguards (Section 50) and Cr.P.C. provisions (Sections 100 and 165) in tandem with established precedents. It cites State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh and State of Punjab v. Labh Singh to underscore the protective purpose of Section 50 and the necessity of lawful search with Gazetted Officer presence, and State of Kerala v. Rajesh to emphasize the restrictive bail regime under NDPS, especially for commercial quantities. After considering the material and the stage of investigation, the court declines bail, holding that the circumstances warrant rejection at this stage and that the applicant is not entitled to relief.
This transfer appeal (Tr.Appeal(C) No.7 of 2021) arises from a dispute over two closely connected civil actions involving properties inherited from M.S. Chitra. The appellant-yadhu Mohan filed Tr.P.(C)No.183/2020 under Section 24 CPC seeking to transfer O.S.No.57/2020 pending in the Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam, to the Sub Court, Ottapalam for joint trial with O.S.No.20/2020 filed in Ottapalam for partition. The 1st respondent sought an injunction in O.S.57/2020, claiming ownership, possession and enjoyment based on an unregistered Will dated 06.10.2019 attributed to M.S. Chitra; the 2nd respondent is the plaintiff in O.S.No.20/2020 for partition. The learned Single Judge dismissed the transfer petition on 13.07.2021, holding that a plaintiff, as dominus litis, has the right to choose the forum and this right should not be easily curtailed. The Division Bench reverses, applying established transfer principles from Indian Overseas Bank v. Chemical Construction Co. and Kulwinder Kaur, as well as the equitable doctrines of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and preventing inconsistent findings. It holds that, given common issues and the risk of conflicting findings on the unregistered Will, it is expedient in the interests of justice to consolidate the suits in one court—Ottapalam—for joint trial. The appeal is allowed, the Single Judge’s order is set aside, and O.S.No.57/2020 is transferred to Ottapalam to be tried with O.S.No.20/2020. No costs.
Crl.M.C. No. 5697 of 2016 This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Misc. Case (Crl.M.C. No. 5697 of 2016) filed by Rahim, the de facto complainant in Kayamkulam Crime No. 130 of 2014. The petitioner seeks to invoke the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash two parallel sets of proceedings arising from the same incident: S.C. No. 381 of 2016 before the Additional Sessions Court-III, Mavelikkara (against respondents 2 and 3) and C.P. No. 63 of 2016 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kayamkulam (against respondent 4). The prosecution alleges offences under Sections 341, 324, 325, 427 read with Section 34 IPC; the final report allegedly omitted Section 308 IPC. The petitioner contends that the dispute is purely personal, and settlement between the parties has brought peace; continued proceedings would impede reconciliation and public peace. The Public Prosecutor opposes quashing under 482, noting that such powers should be exercised sparingly in cases of settlement and in view of the lack of other cases against the respondents. Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the High Court concludes that where there is an amicable settlement and ends of justice justify it, invocation of 482 is warranted, and grants quashing of the proceedings against all cited respondents.
Crl.Rev.Pet.No.1085 of 2002 This is a criminal revision petition filed by three accused challenging their conviction under section 307 read with section 34 IPC and the acquittal of certain charges in a sequence of trials culminating in a judgment by the Third Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc) Thrissur upholding a conviction for the 307/34 offence. The incident occurred on 8 May 1997 near the Sreekrishna temple at Karayamuttam, where PW2 alleged that accused 1–3 restrained him and attacked him with swords in furtherance of a common intent to commit murder; the 4th accused allegedly aided by bringing them to the place in an auto. The prosecution relied on PW1–PW15, with medical witnesses confirming injuries, and recovered weapons. The trial court convicted the first to third accused under 307/34 and acquitted the rest; the appellate court affirmed. The petitioners challenge on grounds of material discrepancies between Ext. P1 and the oral deposition, delay in filing and forwarding the FIR, non-examination of the ASI who transported the victim, and alleged inconsistency of medical and ocular evidence. The State contends the evidence suffices and the delay is not fatal, supported by several precedents.
MACA 2176/2014; Co.157/2021 This is a joint judgment of two connected matters arising from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award in OP(MV) No. 91/2008 at North Paravur. The National Insurance Company challenged the Tribunal’s award on the ground that the head of loss of earning power had been granted in addition to compensation already awarded for permanent disability, loss of income, pain and suffering, and future medical expenses. The claimant-cum-respondents (Prathapan, Suresh and Alex) contended that the injuries were grave, including fractures of the clavicle and zygomatic complex, facial disfigurement, recurrent epilepsy and memory loss, and that his notional income was undervalued; they urged enhancement of notional income, addition of future prospects, and higher compensation for pain and suffering. The learned Judge scrutinized the evidence and found that Rs.1,00,000 awarded for loss of earning power was untenable since other heads already accounted for disability and income loss. While upholding much of the Tribunal’s assessment, the Court increased pain and suffering to Rs.2,50,000 and held that future prospects should be added at 25% owing to substantial functional disability (noting 21% whole-body disability). The permanent disability was enhanced to Rs.2,83,500 and the total compensation was revised to Rs.7,16,600. The MACA was allowed and the cross-appeal allowed in part, with the insurer liable to pay the enhanced amount with interest and costs as directed by the Tribunal.
This is a criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.M.C No.3466/2023) heard by a single judge of the High Court of Kerala, involving four petitioners (Jidhesh @ Unni, Prasanth T.R., Rajesh T., and Arun) accused in Crime No.256/2023 of Kalikavu Police Station, under sections 341, 323, 324 IPC read with 34, and sections 31(s) and 3(2)(v a) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The petition challenged the continuation of proceedings under the SC/ST Act, arguing that the FIR does not prima facie attract the Act and that continued proceedings would amount to abuse of process. The Respondent State, through the Public Prosecutor, contended that the investigation was in its early stages and that the High Court should not quash at this stage given the factual premises yet to be established. The judge underscored the rarity and circumspection required in invoking inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings, citing established precedents (R. Kalyani; Monica Kumar; Kurukshetra University; Som Mittal; Tilly Gifford; and Prithvi Raj Chauhan). Ultimately, the court disposed of the petition, applying the principles and indicating that the prayer for quashing would be treated in a manner consistent with the cautions from Supreme Court precedents, directing the petitioners to surrender before the Special Court and addressing bail within a two-week timeframe where applicable.
This is a criminal appeal under section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, read with section 439 CrPC, preferred by accused nos. 17 and 19 (Nith @ Nijith and P.P. Rahim @ Jaga Rahim) challenging a bail denial in connection with a high-profile murder case investigated initially by the Kadirur police and subsequently by the CBI. The crime, registered as Crime No. 780/2014 under IPC offences including 143, 147, 148, 324, 307, and 302, with further charges under IPC sections 201, 212, 324 and 307, as well as sections 3 and 5 of the Explosives Substances Act, 1958, read with UA(P) Act sections 16(a) and 19, among others. The investigation culminated in a final report under CrPC 173 on 7 March 2015, listing 19 accused. The appellants were arrested on 21 November 2014 and remain in custody. The Sessions Court dismissed their bail applications, invoking the embargo under section 43D(5) of UA(P) Act (as amended by the proviso) which prohibits release if there are reasonable grounds to believe the accusations are prima facie true. The High Court (K.T. Sankaran and Raja Vijayaraghavan, JJ) examines whether the materials, assumed true, justify denial of bail under the UA(P) Act’s framework and clarifies that observations are tentative and not conclusive. Ultimately, the court upholds the Sessions Court’s order and dismisses the appeal, keeping the accused in custody pending trial. The decision underscores the stringent bail regime in terrorism-related offences and the limited scope of appellate interference at the bail stage.
This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.MC 3425/2023) under Section 482 CrPC concerns five accused in Crime No. 291/2023 of Poonthura Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, charged with offences including sections 341, 294(b), 323, 324, 506, and 308 r/w 34 IPC. The petition seeks quashing of the criminal proceedings on the basis that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, supported by an affidavit from the injured complainant (Annexure A2). The investigating officer was directed to verify genuineness of the settlement and whether the petitioners have any criminal antecedents or impediments to termination of proceedings. The Public Prosecutor opposed quashing but acknowledged lack of additional complaints against the petitioners. The Court, relying on the Supreme Court jurisprudence (Gian Singh; Narinder Singh; Laxmi Narayan; and others) summarized in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, held that quashing under 482 CrPC is permissible for non-compoundable offences with predominantly civil character when the parties have settled, except for heinous/offences having a societal impact (e.g., 307 IPC or arms offences) or offences under special statutes. The Court emphasised examining the nature of injuries, weapons, and trial readiness, and also considers antecedents and conduct. Ultimately, the Court concluded that quashing serves ends of justice and allowed the petition, quashing the FIR and all further proceedings against the petitioners.
The Kerala High Court exercises its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings arising out of criminal case No. 1532/2015 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tirur, where four accused (Sarafu Deen P., Shahul T.K., Raheem T., Sakeer K.) are charged with offences under sections 341, 324, 506(ii), 427 r/w 34 IPC in Crime No. 223/2010 of Kalpakanchery Police Station. The petition contends that the disputes between the accused and the complainants have been amicably settled, and the parties do not wish to continue the prosecution. Annexures III and IV affidavits by the complainants support the settlement, and the court directed investigation to verify the genuineness of the settlement and to check for any prior criminal antecedents. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing solely on settlement, but conceded the lack of ongoing grievances. Relying on established Supreme Court jurisprudence (Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, Laxmi Narayan and others), the court clarified the circumstances under which Section 482 quashing is permissible—primarily when the offences are non-compoundable, private in nature, and involve disputes of a civil character, with exceptions for heinous or public-interest offences (e.g., 307 IPC, Arms Act) where quashing would be inappropriate. After weighing gravity of the offences, injuries, antecedents, and the parties’ relationship, the court held that quashing would not undermine public interest and would promote ends of justice, thus allowing the petition and quashing all further proceedings.
