This criminal appeal challenges a judgment convicting the appellant, Kannan, s/o Ganapathi, under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The Additional Sessions Court-I, Kalpetta, on 13 October 2015 in SC No. 24/2014, convicted the accused and sentenced him to seven years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 50,000, with 18 months’ imprisonment in default. The prosecution case, supported by 11 witnesses and documentary Exts P1–P11, is that on the night of 9 March 2012 at about 11 p.m., the accused, who was intoxicated, forcibly entered the residence seeking his wife and children, assaulted the deceased with a bamboo pole MO1, and caused fatal head injuries. The victim died on 16 March 2012 after treatment at Medical College Hospital, Kozhikkode. The defense raised several contentions: delay in lodging FIR (the inquiry began with Ext P1 on 11 March 2012), non-production of a wound certificate, PW2’s purported lack of direct sight of the assault, questioned propriety of MO1’s recovery, alleged insufficient lighting, and a purported mismatch between ocular and medical evidence about injuries. The High Court, while considering these points, found PW1’s testimony to be clinching and relied on Ext P6 (postmortem findings), noting that minor discrepancies between medical and ocular evidence do not negate eyewitness testimony (citing Kamaljit Singh v. State of Punjab). The court upheld the conviction and the sentence, rejected the appellants’ contentions, and dismissed the appeal. The appellant, having been released on remission, did not affect the merit of the conviction.
Swaroop V., the manager of PAMM Upper Primary School, Palakkad, challenges Ext.P6, a notice of sale of immovable properties issued by the 6th respondent, on the ground that the school’s properties cannot be mortgaged without prior permission under the Kerala Education Act, 1958. The school is an aided institution with a history of management transfers (Ext.P1 and Ext.P2) and the petitioner’s appointment as manager (Ext.P3). The five properties cited (documentNos. 3723/1988, 3724/1988, 3616/1988, 222/1992, 4046/2001) are tied to the 5th respondent’s Educational Agency and were at issue in Ext.P6, with items 2 and 3 appearing as properties in the name of the 5th respondent and described as residential in Ext.P6. The petitioner contends that, without the mandated permission from the District Educational Officer, mortgage of assets of an aided school is impermissible, in terms of Section 6 and Rule 2 of Chapter X of the Kerala Education Act, 1958 and the Kerala Education Rules, 1959; Rule 9 of Chapter III imposes managerial duties. The petitioner seeks quashing Ext.P6 to the extent of items 2 and 3 and a declaration that the 5th respondent had no right to mortgage without proper permission. The court cites Purushothama Panikker v. Mohan to underscore the Act’s overriding aim to protect aided schools. Respondents did not appear. The petition succeeds.
CRL.M.C. No. 1360 of 2024 This Criminal Miscellaneous Case under section 482 CrPC seeks to quash all further proceedings in CC No.1120/2023 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Koyilandy, against four accused for offences under section 498-A and 406 read with section 34 IPC. The prosecution alleges mental and physical harassment of the defacto complainant by the accused. The petitioners contend that the parties have settled their dispute and do not wish to pursue the prosecution; the affidavit of the victim supports the settlement. The Public Prosecutor, while acknowledging the settlement, expresses reservations about quashing solely on this basis. The court has considered the submissions and perused the records, including the victim’s affidavit. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) (5) SCC 688 and the linked doctrines in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the court lays down that the power under Sec. 482 CrPC to quash non‑compoundable offences can be exercised when the dispute is private and settled, provided the offences are not heinous or under special statutes, and after considering the accused’s antecedents and the circumstances. Since the dispute is private and there is a genuine settlement, the court allows the Crl.M.C and quashes all further proceedings in CC No.1120/2023 against the petitioners.
Ex.FA Nos. 9/2021, 11/2021, 12/2021, 13/2021, 14/2021, 15/2021 These six execution-first appeals arise from a common order of the Thrissur District Court that lifted attachments under Order 21 Rule 58 CPC from properties in EP 139/2012, OS 1233/1980. The original decree, passed by the Bombay High Court and subsequently transferred to Kerala for execution, involved CCIL as the decree holder and six claimants who asserted ownership rights to properties linked to a 2012 transfer. The attachments were made in 2019, roughly seven years after the alleged transfers, prompting CCIL to rely on Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to defeat the belated attachments. The Kerala High Court, however, held that Section 53 cannot be invoked due to the elapsed period and lack of timely application or suit within three years; it rejected the argument that attachment can be treated as a substantive defense under limitation law. The court distinguished the cited precedent (Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi) and treated attachments as protective measures to secure execution, not defenses. Consequently, the six appeals were dismissed without costs. The judgment clarifies the protective nature of attachment in execution proceedings and emphasizes timely invocation of rights under the Transfer of Property Act rather than extending limitation doctrines.
CRL. M.C. NO. 8207 OF 2023 This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.M.C. 8207 of 2023) challenges the order in CC 1427/2021, Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thalassery, arising from Chokli Police Station Crime No. 555/2021. Muhammad Rishan is charged under IPC sections 341, 325 and 294B. The petitioner submits that the entire dispute has been settled and the victim has sworn an affidavit in support of quashing; the victim has no objection. The Public Prosecutor expresses reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement but concedes the matter is settled. The court relies on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) 5 SCC 688, along with Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, to set out the governing principles: Section 482 CrPC can quash non-compoundable offences where the dispute is civil in character and entirely settled; such power is not applicable to heinous offences (murder, rape, dacoity), public interest offences, or offences under special statutes; offences like Section 307 IPC or Arms Act are not to be quashed. The court notes that the present case involves a private dispute, the settlement is genuine, and the absence of public interest. After examining the facts, the court allows the quashing; proceedings in CC 1427/2021 are quashed. The court also emphasizes consideration of antecedents and the stage of investigation in such exercises, concluding the private nature of the dispute justifies quashing. The order ends with the quashing of the proceedings.” ,
Geetha, owner of 0.202 hectares in Re.Sy.No.24/4/1 in Elavancherry, Palakkad, challenges Ext.P2, an order of the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) denying her Form-5 application under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 for removal of her land from the Data Bank. She asserts the land does not qualify as paddy land or wetland as on 12 August 2008 when the Act came into force, and that inclusion in the Data Bank is erroneous. The RDO’s Ext.P2 relies solely on the Agricultural Officer’s report and the LLMC’s recommendation, without independent assessment of the land’s status as of 2008, contrary to this Court’s precedents. The petitioner emphasizes the need for KSRSEC data to ascertain the status on the Act’s date and argues the act requires evaluating whether removal would affect paddy cultivation nearby or preserve wetlands. The court reiterates that the decisive date is 12.08.2008 and that the RDO must independently assess land status rather than rely only on LLMC or AO reports, citing Arthasasthra Ventures (India) LLP v. State of Kerala, Muraleedharan Nair v. RDO, and Aparna Sasi Menon v. RDO to underscore this principle. The writ petition is allowed in part: Ext.P2 is set aside and the RDO is directed to reconsider Form-5 with a KSRSEC report at petitioner’s cost within two months of receiving the report, after the petitioner files for KSRSEC within two weeks of this judgment, and the petition is disposed accordingly.
CRL.M.C. No. 1875 of 2022 Vishnu, the sole accused in Crime No. 636/2019 of Nemom Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, now pending as S.C. No.350/2020 of the Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Neyyattinkara, seeks quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on grounds of settlement. The offences alleged include IPC Sections 354D (sexual harassment-like acts following a woman), 451 (trespass), 506(1) (criminal intimidation), and POCSO provisions under Section 11(i) read with Section 12 (with the court noting a misstatement of the section). The prosecution claims that the 15-year-old victim was followed, a mobile phone was hidden in a dictionary, and the petitioner trespassed into her house around 3 a.m. and threatened to accompany him after she turns 18. The defence contends that the matter has been amicably settled as evidenced by affidavits from the victim and her mother (Annexures 4 and 5), and that quashing would not undermine the ends of justice. The Public Prosecutor opposes, arguing that a minor victim’s harassment under POCSO and the other offences are serious and not fit for quashing. The court, after examining the facts, clarifies that the POCSO charge is under Section 11(iv) (repeated/following a child) rather than 11(i), and that the gravity of offences is not grievous. It further notes that the settlement reduces the prospect of conviction and continuing prosecution would amount to abuse of process. Relying on Narinder Singh, Madan Mohan Abbot, Gian Singh, the court holds that the circumstances justify quashing; the petition is allowed, and all further proceedings in S.C.No.350/2020 are quashed.
CRL.RP Nos. 508 and 512 of 2010 Two criminal revision petitions (CRL.RP Nos. 508 and 512 of 2010) filed by N. Radhakrishnan challenge concurrent convictions under Section 138 NI Act, recorded by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Kochi and affirmed by the Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc-II), Ernakulam. The prosecutions, in CC Nos. 269/06 and 270/06, were instituted by Sri Rubber Industries (the complainant) against the accused for cheque bounce. The trial court sentenced the accused to imprisonment till rising of the court and imposed fines of Rs 17,00,000 and Rs 9,00,000, directing these to be paid as compensation under Cr.P.C. Section 357(1)(b) and to further imprisonment on default. The prosecution was carried out through the firm’s Power of Attorney holder, PW1, who testified about the transaction records. The revisions attack the maintainability of a complaint by a firm via its Power of Attorney holder and challenge the sufficiency of evidence, including ledger extracts Ext.D1, to rebut the statutory presumptions under Section 139 NI Act. The petitioner cites Nazar v. State of Kerala and Anirudhan v. Philip Jacob to argue that the Power of Attorney holder cannot substitute the firm and that the presumption may not have been properly rebutted. The respondents rely on the trial and appellate findings, Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, and established NI Act principles, contending no jurisdictional error or illegality exists. The Kerala High Court ultimately dismisses the revisions, upholding the lower courts’ judgments and directing surrender and payment of fines, with compensation to the complainant.
This Rent Control Revision concerns a landlord’s eviction petition under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, which the Rent Control Court (Munsiff, Kalpetta) allowed, directing eviction to enable the landlord to start a furniture business in the petition shop and two adjacent shop rooms. The Appellate Authority (Rent Control Appellate Authority) confirmed that eviction. The tenant challenged this in a revision under Section 20, arguing inter alia that additional documents filed under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC were overlooked and that the first proviso to Section 11(3) ought to apply given the landlord’s possession of another building. The High Court (Anil K. Narendran, J. and G. Girish, J.) analysed whether the need was bona fide and whether the first proviso to Section 11(3) applied, noting that the need was supported by the landlord’s testimony and that the tenant did not contest the projected need. The Court relied on established jurisprudence that bona fide need must be sincere, real, and present (not mere whim), and that the availability of other premises bears upon, but does not automatically defeat, such need. The revision was dismissed, upholding the concurrent eviction orders, while granting five months’ time to vacate with conditions.
This is a criminal revision petition under section 401 CrPC filed by M/s Seven Ocean Maritime Agencies (the revision petitioner) challenging conviction under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the concurrent orders in CC Nos. 45/2013 and 46/2013 from the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kochi, and the subsequent appeal in CRL.A. No. 105/2016 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam. The facts revolve around two cheques, ₹1,48,30,000 dated 20.09.2004 and ₹15,00,000 dated 29.09.2011, issued in discharge of a liability arising from a property transaction. Both cheques were dishonoured for insufficient funds. The complainant contends that the real sale consideration was far higher than the registered deeds (₹20,50,000 total) and relies on Ext. P8 (Letter of Acknowledgment) to claim a balance debt of ₹1,63,30,000. The petitioner argues that Ext. P8 is a device to undervalue property to evade stamp duty and that, under the Explanation to Section 138, the debt must be legally enforceable. The petitioner cites Krishna Janardhan Bhat to contend that a debt must be legally recoverable and not presumed, and cites other authorities on contract legality and stamp duty. The court, however, holds that notwithstanding undervaluation, the debt evidenced by the Ext. P8 and the associated agreement is legally enforceable, and the respondent’s complaint under Section 138 is maintainable. The revision petition is ultimately dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.
This Kerala High Court writ petition concerns the administration of Sree Vaikkathoor Mahadeva Temple, a List-B religious institution under the HR&CE Act, 1951. The 1st petitioner, Vaikkathur Kshetra Samrakshana Samithi, represented by its president, asserts that the Temple’s administration right was transferred to it by hereditary Ooralans in 1976 (Ext.P1) and that Ext.P2’s bye-law memorializes this transfer, with the Samithi acting as trustee. Following allegations of misappropriation, the 4th respondent Malabar Devaswom Board issued Ext.P3 (2019) inviting applications for appointment of non-hereditary trustees under Section 39(2) HR&CE Act. Ext.P4 (2021) appointed non-hereditary trustees, which petitioners challenge as ineligible and contrary to Ext.P1. After a prior judgment Ext.P5 directed the Commissioner to consider a revision (Ext.P4), Ext.P6 (17.02.2021) purportedly assumed temple administration under HR&CE Act. The petitioners maintain that the temple’s assets and administration are vested in the deity and hereditary trustees; transfers require sanction (Section 29) and are inalienable (res extra commercium). The respondents argue Ext.P4 and Ext.P6 were valid under HR&CE Act, and that the Samithi has no right to challenge via Article 226, as a statutory remedy exists. The Court ultimately finds no maintainable case for writ relief, emphasizes exhaustion of statutory remedies, and dismisses the petition. The decision cautions that rights to challenge non-hereditary trustees lie under HR&CE Act sections 39(4) or 99, not in a writ petition.
WP(C) Nos.11578/22 & 13522/23 These two writ petitions challenge the permission granted by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited to establish a petroleum retail outlet at East Kallada, Kollam. BPCL issued a letter of intent to the licensee and obtained a consent to establish from the Kerala State Pollution Control Board, as well as a No Objection Certificate from the District Administration under the Petroleum Rules. The petitioners allege non‑compliance with siting norms under CPCB guidelines, contending that the proposed outlet violates the minimum distance of 30 metres from residential areas because several residences lie within that radius. They also challenge the sanctioned plan, site approval, and building permit on grounds of non‑compliance with siting criteria and setback provisions. The respondents counter that the CPCB siting criterion refers to residential areas designated as per local laws, and that the petitioners’ properties are not within legally designated residential zones; they further contend that the NOC was issued in accordance with the Petroleum Rules, 2002 (Rule 144) and that the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. V.B. Menon (2023) 7 SCC 368 held that petroleum retail outlets fall in the ‘green category’ and do not require consent to establish/operate, while directing CPCB to ensure adherence to guidelines issued on 07.01.2020. The Kerala High Court, applying this doctrine and noting the distinction between designated residential areas and individual houses, found no legal violation and dismissed the petitions, though it emphasized compliance with CPCB directives.
This is an original petition (OP) under section 25 of the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 filed in the Kerala High Court, challenging an order dated 04.03.2023 in I.A.29/2023 in OP(Society) No.122 of 2021 (Addl. District Court‑IV, Kollam). The petitioners (a group of 12 members) sought to amend the plaint (Ext.P7) to assert that new ordinary members inducted pendente lite have no vested rights and that the 2020 elections held for the society were not lawful; they also sought a declaration on the validity of the elections and the status of inductees. The respondents include Sree Narayana Health Care Society and a large roster of society members and office bearers. The core legal issue was whether reliefs not expressly enumerated in Section 25(1) (clauses a–c) can be granted by the District Court, and whether amendments incorporating subsequent events can be allowed. The court held that reliefs, though not expressly enumerated, can be permitted if not independent but inseparably interwoven with main reliefs, invoking incidental/ancillary powers. It allowed Ext.P7 amendment and directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously, disposing the petition with the amended reliefs after proper adjudication.
This is a Kerala High Court revision petition (R.C.Rev.No.51 of 2022) by seven petitioners-tenants challenging eviction orders passed under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, from a petition schedule shop at Punalur. The Rent Control Court (Munsiff) had ordered eviction for arrears of rent from 01.01.2008 and for bona fide need of the landlady to occupy the premises for her own business after retirement. The Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-VI, Kollam) confirmed the eviction. The revision petition contends that the landlady’s need is not genuine, that the petition schedule shop is suitable for the petitioners’ livelihood and that there are no reliable grounds showing absence of other suitable premises. The Court reiterates the settled legal principles: bona fide need must be honest, sincere, and not a mere pretext; the need must be a praesenti and actual need, not whimsical; the revisional court is limited to legality, regularity and propriety and should not re‑appreciate evidence. The Bench holds that the landlady’s need is genuine and corroborated by the evidence, and that the second proviso to Section 11(3) was not established by the petitioners. Consequently, the revision is dismissed, but seven months’ time is granted to surrender possession on conditions including arrears deposit and compliance with licensing/authorities, with the option to vacate earlier if conditions fail.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 892 OF 2018 This Criminal Revision Petition (CRL.REV.PET NO. 892 OF 2018) is filed by accused No.7 in CC No.59 of 2017 before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Thripunithura, challenging an order dated 09.05.2018 by discharging CMP No.1000 of 2017. The prosecution arises from Crime No.1493/2015 of Hill Palace Police Station, alleging a conspiracy to cheat the de facto complainant Ajay Gosh and trap him in a fake narcotics case. The sequence described in the allegations includes bringing the complainant to Bangalore, impersonating Narcotics Bureau officers, presenting forged evidence of narcotics worth Rs.3.5 crores, and coercing the victim to pay Rs.2 crores with threats of severe consequences. Accused Nos.1 to 7 allegedly conspired and executed the plot, with accused Nos.3 and 4 accompanying the complainant to Bangalore and others performing the arrest facade. The petitioner’s counsel argued that, except for an additional statement alleging only that the petitioner introduced accused Nos.8 and 9 to the 1st accused, there was no direct involvement attributable to him; such evidence could not establish conspiracy or role in the alleged offences, thus discharge should be granted. The Public Prosecutor contended that statements of witnesses Nos.14 and 15, and other materials, indicated the petitioner’s involvement. The High Court, however, applied the discharge standard, citing Supreme Court authorities on framing charges and discharge at the pre-trial stage, and concluded that the material did not establish grave suspicion by the petitioner. Accordingly, the court allowed the revision, set aside the impugned discharge order, and discharged the petitioner.
National Insurance Company Limited challenges the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal’s award in OP(MV) 610/2003, arising from a motor accident involving a goods vehicle. The insurer contends that the policy issued was an Act-only policy, with premium collected to cover risk to employees rather than a gratuitous passenger, and that no goods were loaded at the relevant time. The respondent/claimant Siddique testified that he was travelling in the vehicle from Guruvayoor to collect timber for construction, and that the accident occurred en route. The insurer relies on Ramakrishnan v. K.T. Baiju and Others to insist that mere travel in the vehicle requires proof of goods in order to be covered under the policy, and on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh (SC) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Jameela and Others to interpret the scope of “carried” under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal had found the insurer liable; the insurer appealed arguing the contrary. The High Court analyzes these precedents and factual nuances, clarifying that under an Act-only policy the owner or authorized representative may be covered for transporting goods, even if goods’ presence is not strictly proven at the moment of the accident. It concludes the petitioner was the owner of the goods and that the risk was covered by the policy. The appeal is dismissed and the Tribunal’s award upheld.
This writ petition concerns 75 retired employees of The Arya Vaidya Pharmacy (Coimbatore) Ltd. who are subscribers to the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) seeking higher pension under the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 (EPS 1995). The petitioners contend that their pension should be calculated in proportion to their last drawn actual salary, and not capped by the maximum pensionable salary prescribed in paragraph 11(3) of EPS 1995. They rely on joint option forms (Exhibits P1–P75) to establish their entitlement and demand mandamus to require respondents to process these forms and compute pension accordingly, as laid down in P. Sasikumar v. UOI (ILR 2019 Ker. 614) and RC Gupta v. EPFO (2018) SCC 809. The respondents, including the EPFO and Union of India, submit that the matter is settled by the Supreme Court in EPFO Organisation v. Sunil Kumar B. (2022) SCC online SC 1521, and that the petition should be considered in light of that decision. The High Court disposes of the petition by directing the competent among the respondents to re-consider the petitioners’ claims within three months from receipt of a copy of the judgment, in accordance with the Sunil Kumar B directions. The Appendix lists multiple petitioners with their formal joint option exhibits, illustrating the procedural basis for their claims.
This is a Civil Revision Petition filed by Sangha Erectors Pvt Ltd challenging an order of the III Additional Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, in O.S. No. 1358 of 2017, for recovery of hire charges amounting to Rs. 8,69,836 with interest. The dispute arises from a 2016 hire arrangement for a 165 MT crawler-mounted crane for a project in Chhattisgarh. After negotiations, the plaintiff/hirer issued a purchase order on 11.03.2016; the plaintiff accepted with modifications, and the crane was delivered. The defendant paid nothing and contested the court’s jurisdiction. The defendant contends that Clause 17 of the purchase order confers exclusive jurisdiction on courts at Secunderabad; the plaintiff contends the bottom-of-letterhead clause ‘subject to Cochin jurisdiction’ indicates Cochin jurisdiction, while the rest of communications were from Ernakulam. The trial court dismissed the application seeking to return the plaint, on the ground that no exclusive jurisdiction existed. The revision petition argues that silence on exclusivity should be deemed consent to Cochin. The High Court discusses Section 20(c) CPC and the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, drawing on Hakam Singh, A.B.C. Laminart, Unneerikutty, Rickmers, Noorbhai, Bhagwati Prasad, and other authorities. The court notes that the clause lacks words like ‘alone’ or ‘exclusive’ and that the printed statement alone cannot confer exclusive jurisdiction. It concludes there is no consensus ad idem for exclusive Cochin jurisdiction and dismisses the revision petition.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CRL.A No. 1452 of 2008) arising from a conviction under Sections 55(g) and 8(2) of the Abkari Act for illicit liquor manufacture. The appellant was found in his Mulavana residence with 20 litres of wash and 5 litres of arrack, along with utensils. The trial court convicted him, but the High Court re-examines essential due process and evidentiary requirements governing arrest, seizure and laboratory analysis. Central issues include whether the arrest was properly memorialised as required by D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (arrest memo and intimation), whether the contraband underwent chemical analysis and whether the sample tested in the laboratory corresponds to the sample seized from the scene. The Bench scrutinises the prosecution’s failure to produce the arrest memo and arrest intimation, the unexplained delay in producing property, the absence of a specimen seal description, and the lack of examination of those who handled the sample. Relying on Sasidharan, Sathi, Ravi, Rajamma, Daulat Ram, and Vijay Pandey, the court holds that the chain of custody and linkage between seizure and analysis are not established, invalidating the prosecution’s case. Consequently, the appellant is acquitted and the appeal is allowed.
WPC Nos. 14546 of 2022; 13093 of 2022; 14923 of 2022 The present writ petitions challenge an assessment order under the Income Tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 2013-14, issued through the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC). The petitioners — Simix Francis, Abdul Anvar, and La’ Casigne Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. — contend that the prosecution of the case under the faceless regime violated the principles of natural justice by denying a reasonable opportunity to respond to the Show Cause Notice (SCN). The petitioners point to the SOP governing Faceless Assessments under Section 144B, specifically Clause 13.1, which requires a minimum seven-day window to file a reply to the SCN. They also rely on the decision in Aneesh v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No.31553 of 2022), cited by the court, asserting a seven-day requirement to reply. The Kerala High Court, agreeing that the petitioners were not afforded a seven-day opportunity, allows the petitions on this sole ground. The impugned assessment order and subsequent proceedings are set aside and remanded to NFAC Delhi to provide a seven-day window for the petitioner to file a reply to the SCN dated 26.03.2022 (Ext.P-10) via a link, with the seven-day period to run after activation. No further extension shall be granted; NFAC must finalize the assessment under Section 147 read with Section 144. The decision underscores natural justice in faceless assessment and cites Aneesh as supportive precedent.
