This is a Writ Petition (Civil) filed in the Kerala High Court by Mohammed Sali Kahar, the petitioner and managing partner of M.S. Tiles and Granites, challenging forceful obstruction and police inaction impeding the petitioner’s establishment’s normal operation. The petitioner runs a tile and granite trading business from premises licensed by local authorities and registered under the GST Act, with six workers registered under Rule 26A of the Kerala Headload Workers Rules. After a dispute arose on 15.01.2019 with unions demanding exclusive loading/unloading rights for their workers, a complaint was filed with the Assistant Labour Officer and the Kerala Headload Workers Welfare Board. The ALO issued I.D. Cards (Ext.P6 series) to the petitioner’s attached workers; the Govt issued GO 511/2018 prohibiting interference related to employment and demanding higher wages. The private respondents contended that the petitioner’s operation requires attached workers and that the unions have vested rights. The High Court, while noting licences, registrations, and the need for orderly operation, held that the petitioner is entitled to protection and that any obstruction should be promptly addressed by police with adequate protection to the petitioner and his workers. The judgment relies on various precedents (Gangadharan CP, Amma Granites, TMV Oils, Safa Systems, Shereef, Theresa Jose, etc.) and directs continued operation with police intervention against unlawful obstruction.
This writ appeal arises from WP(C) 33339/2017 challenging Ext.P3 show-cause notices issued under Rule 16 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules by the Part Time Administrator of the Sultan Bathery Taluk Primary Co-operative Bank. The appellants contended that the 2nd respondent had no authority to admit new members or remove already enrolled members, and sought quashment of Ext.P3 and a declaration that the administrator lacked power to act in this manner. The learned Single Judge treated Ext.P3 as show-cause notices and declined to interfere at this stage, citing established Supreme Court judgments that admonish restraint in judicial review of such notices unless issued without jurisdiction or in abuse of process. The judgments cited include State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, Siemens Ltd v. State of Maharashtra, and Union of India v. Vicco Laboratories, all reinforcing abstention from interfering with show-cause notices at the preliminary stage. Rule 16 governs membership conditions and removal powers, including opportunity for representation. On appeal, the Division Bench upholds the view that there is no material to treat Ext.P3 as abuse of process and dismisses the appeal, while permitting the appellants to explicate their explanations within two weeks for the 2nd respondent’s consideration.
Thankappan Narayanan filed WP(C) No.1432 of 2019 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P9 and mandamus or other directions to permit sale / removal of trees on patta land in Mankulam, Idukki, with payment of seignorage as at the time of land assignment. The petitioner is in possession of 1 hectare in survey No.77/1 on the basis of Ext.P1 assignment order (24.03.1997) and Ext.P2 pattayam (21.10.1997) under the Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands) Act, 1971, and the Kannan Devan Hills (Reservation and Assignment of Vested Lands) Rule 1977. Under Rule 18, the government holds vesting rights in trees existing at assignment and the assignee may purchase disposed trees at the seignorage rate then prevailing. The petitioner had previously approached the court in WP(C).No.35327/2004 and in O.P.No.7220/2001 and O.P.No.6587/2001, with judgments directing that seignorage be determined by the rate prevailing at the time of assignment, and that decisions should follow those directions. Ext.P9 (28.03.2017) denied permission to cut two dying trees, while Ext.P3 (27.07.2009) and related orders suggested otherwise. The High Court held Ext.P9 vitiated by arbitrariness and irrelevant considerations, noting the earlier inter-partes judgments are binding. It directed that the petitioner may cut and remove the remaining tree after payment of the seignorage rate prevailing at assignment, and that permission to cut the other trees already granted should stand without delay. The petition stands disposed with directions.
The petitioner, K. Ravindranathan, challenges Ext.P5, an order of confiscation of two vehicles under Section 67B of the Abkari Act, issued by the Commissioner of Excise, Kerala. The vehicles had been seized for allegedly transporting toddy, and the abkari case registered against him ended in acquittal. The Deputy Commissioner of Excise had earlier confiscated the vehicles, and the appellate and revision remedies led to Ext.P5. The core issues are: (i) whether acquittal in the criminal abkari case nullifies the confiscation proceedings under Section 67B, and (ii) whether Ext.P5 adequately records the basis for confiscation and merits legal scrutiny. The court held that confiscation under Section 67B is an independent power, not dependent on the criminal case fate, citing a Division Bench ruling in Sub Inspector of Police v. Rajesh. While upholding the independent nature of 67B, the court found Ext.P5 defective in not detailing how the vehicles were involved in the alleged offence and ordered partial set aside. The court directed the petitioner to appear before the Commissioner of Excise for a hearing and to obtain a final order within two months, after evaluating the merits and allowing a fresh determination on whether the vehicles were actually involved in the abkari offence. This preserves the statutory mechanism while ensuring due process and correct factual finding on involvement of the vehicles."
The petitioner, D. L. Rajamma, seeks protection of life and property from alleged threats by respondents 2 and 3 regarding a 4-cent property at Poonithura. She owns the property in possession and contends that, in 2010, she and her husband attempted to repair a decayed western boundary fence but were obstructed by Lakshmi and her son Babu, who claimed no right to enter. The matter traces to OS 1476/1985 before the Munsiff’s Court, Ernakulam, filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner against Kochakkan, Lakshmi and their son, seeking a perpetual injunction against obstruction of fencing and use of a cattle shed. The suit was decreed on 24.02.1986 (Ext.P2). As a bona fide purchaser, the petitioner filed EP 365/2010 in execution of the decree (Ext.P3). The execution proceedings led to a series of orders, including an advocate commissioner’s report (Ext.P5) and remands that involved identifying the decree schedule property, with eventual orders for delivery, escapes, and evictions of obstructors. When the boundary wall was damaged by respondents 2 and 3, the petitioner approached this Court seeking police protection to complete construction. The petitioner relies on a Division Bench decision in Illyas T.A. v. State of Kerala (2014 KHC 647) to justify police involvement, but the court distinguishes that decision on facts and ultimately closes the writ petition with no relief, directing pursuit of civil remedies instead.
This appeal challenges a conviction under Section 8(2) of the Kerala Abkari Act handed down by the trial court in SC No. 125 of 2007. On 11 August 2002, a squad led by the Revenue Divisional Officer detected 3 litres of arrack in a 5-litre white jerry can, arrested the accused, and seized the contraband after sampling in two 200 ml bottles. The case proceeded through the usual investigative chain to the Magistrate and then to the Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court-III, Pathanamthitta, where the accused was convicted and sentenced to 1½ years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1 lakh. The appellant challenged the conviction on two legal grounds: (i) an inordinate delay in filing the final report, and (ii) defects in the handling of evidence, including the absence of a seal on the property/mahazar and the non-production of the specimen seal forwarding note. The prosecution’s delay was found not to per se vitiate the trial, but the court treated delay as only one circumstance among many. The crucial issue was the lack of proof that the laboratory analysis pertained to the seized quantity due to absence of the specimen seal and forwarding note. Relying on Joseph v. State of Kerala, the High Court held that such infirmities warranted acquittal, and allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence and directing the appellant’s release.
This writ petition, filed by Sivan Pillai, challenges Ext.P13 issued under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act (KRR Act) which seeks to sell the petitioner’s property for recovery of alleged misappropriation in a Sampoorna Grameena Rozgar Yojana project executed by the Sooranad South Grama Panchayat in 2002-2003. The petitioner served as convenor of a beneficiary committee for the project, which involved constructing a bund at Koyikkalazhikath-Valiyachan Nada under the food-for-work scheme, where workers were paid in food until the rice quota exhausted; once exhausted, wages were paid. The petitioner claims funds were misappropriated by some Panchayat members and beneficiary committee members, and that local residents obstructed the work, causing non-completion. He approached the District Collector but received no action; notices under Sections 7, 34 and 36 of the KRR Act were issued, and Ext.P13 was issued to recover the balance. He seeks quashing Ext.P13 and a mandamus to quantify the amount due after measuring the work already done and considering payments already made, with stay of further action. Respondents contend the action is lawful and in accordance with the Act. The court cites a Full Bench decision (Abdul Rahiman) on damages for breach of contract, and directs a measured opportunity for the petitioner to present further documents, with final adjudication by the second respondent within two months, while keeping an interim remittance condition in force.
WP(C).No. 38958 of 2015; WP(C).No. 7241 of 2018; WP(C).No. 16876 of 2018 This is a consolidated writ petition challenging actions taken under the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957 in respect of lands owned by the petitioner company, M/S Priya Rubber Estates & Plantations (P) Ltd, traced back to vendors whose title traces to Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. The petitions arise from notices, evictions, and orders directing resumption of government land, and the assessment of land tax on the property. The petitioner contends that Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. was in illegal possession and, consequently, the Special Officer appointed under the Act cannot adjudicate title, declare conveyances void, or evict occupants where title is disputed. It relies on a Division Bench decision in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2018(2) KHC 719), which held that the Act’s provisions are confined to removal of encroachments on Government land and that a finding of government land is a jurisdictional prerequisite. The government argues that possession may be taken and records altered under the Act, pending final title disputes and SLP outcomes. The Supreme Court’s dismissal of the SLP against the Division Bench has relevance. The court ultimately holds the Act proceedings to be incompetent where title is contested, sets aside the challenged orders (Exhibits P15 and P17), and directs civil proceedings to establish title, while allowing basic tax payment based on title deeds subject to adjudication. The petitions are disposed with these directions.
Hotel Mariya, a partnership firm, challenged a penalty imposed by the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) after an Anti-Power Theft Squad inspection on 23-07-2003 found unauthorised load beyond the connected 17 kW under LT VII A tariff. The Board issued Ext. P7 bill demanding Rs. 6,38,072 including penalty. The writ petition WP(C) 26537/2003 contended that the penalty was issued after the Electricity Act, 2003 came into force, so penalties could only be imposed under Section 126 of the Act; Ext. P7 was quashed by this Court in 2006 (Ext. P9) directing fresh orders after notice. On reconsideration, the respondents passed Ext. P10; the contention that Section 126 would apply was rejected in light of Ext. P11, a State government notification. The petitioner challenged Ext. P10 and Ext. P12 as well. The Single Judge had held that penal provisions under the Electricity Act, 2003 could be prospective and relied on Pareeth v. Kerala State Electricity Board (2014 (2) KLT 258). The Division Bench, while acknowledging arguments on retroactive penal provisions, held that Ext. P11 notification could not apply because the APTS inspection occurred on 23-07-2003, after the Act yet before notification; hence Section 126 would apply from the appointed date, and the penalty bill should be recalculated. The WA dismissed the appeal with no costs, upholding the impugned judgment.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a suit for injunction filed by the appellant, Kezhuvettill Gopalakrishnan Nair, claiming a right to possess land described as Kannath Paramba, now identified within Kalikavu Bhagavathi Devaswom holdings. The plaintiff traces title to Moorkot Chemmarasseri Nagan Namboodiri and his successors, and states that from his uncle Ravunni Nair he obtained possession in 1962 by oral entrustment, supported by Ext.A1 (1908 Kanam deed) and other documents indicating the property’s Kanam-right status. The Devaswam and Government respondents deny any right or possession, contending the property belongs to Kalikavu Devaswom and is part of a Thaalapoli Paramba; no Commission was conducted to identify the exact property. The trial court dismissed the suit for injunction, finding insufficient identification of the property and lack of proven possession; the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The High Court examined whether the appellant established possession and a prima facie right to injunction, noting Ext.A1, Ext.A18, and that Ext.A13 (Commissioner’s sketch) had limited bearing on identities. It held that the property was not properly identified and possession not proved, and refused remand. The court concluded no substantial question of law arises and dismissed the Regular Second Appeal, with all interlocutory applications disposed. The decision emphasizes that pending Land Tribunal proceedings did not alter the outcome. The judgment also clarifies that a later success before the Land Tribunal would not affect this ruling.
The petitioner, Manager of St. Joseph's Educational & Charitable Trust, Pavaratty, Thrissur, challenges Ext.P3 (dated 31-08-2017) issued by the 3rd respondent, which rejected the petitioner’s application for affiliation of new courses (B.Com Professional, B.Com Computer Application, B.Com Banking & Insurance, and BBA Marketing) and seeks a writ of certiorari to quash that order. The petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the 4th respondent (University of Calicut) to grant affiliation so that classes can commence in the 2018-19 academic year. The Court records that, on 6-04-2018, government counsel stated the 1st respondent proposed to recall Ext.P3 and take a merits-based decision; later, the 4th respondent asserted that the Ext.P2 application could not be considered, and communications dated 14-05-2018 reiterated this stance. The bench engages in a principled exposition on the need for reasoned, speaking orders in administrative decisions, citing landmark authorities that reasons are essential to avoid arbitrariness and ensure natural justice. The Court notes prior directions in related matters that a reasoned order must be issued, and disposes of the petition by directing the 4th respondent to pass a reasoned order on Ext.P2 within 10 days of certified copy of the judgment and to communicate the decision within 10 days thereafter, while leaving merits/contentions open.
This appeal arises from a land-dispute under the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958. The appellant-plaintiff, Thankam, alleges that the respondents forcibly encroached upon her land to construct a road and seeks both prohibitory and mandatory injunctions to restore the land to its original position. The suit, originally OS No.115/1992 before the Munsiff, Alathur, was amended to include a prayer for mandatory restoration of the property. The trial court partly decreed the relief, but the District Judge, Palakkad, allowed the appeal in AS No.159/1995, set aside the trial court’s judgment, and dismissed the suit, prompting Thankam to approach this High Court in a second appeal (SA No.284/2003). The respondents contend that Thankam relinquished 6.5 cents of her land by Ext.B1 under the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958 and Rules, for road formation, and that the road was essential for the locality, with government funds expended on construction. The core legal questions address (i) whether a relinquishment must follow the statutory modalities, and (ii) whether a registered document is required for transfer of land worth more than Rs.100. The High Court held that, where relinquishment is established, a registered instrument is not mandatory; Ext.B1 is found to evidence proper relinquishment, and the appellant’s challenge to it fails. The appeal is dismissed with all interim applications rejected.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Leave Petition (Crl.L.P. No.393 of 2017) filed by K. Vijayan (complainant) seeking leave to file an appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. against an acquittal on charges under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act rendered on 25.10.2012 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Karnappally. The accused, Sajeev Kumar and Mohanavally, allegedly borrowed Rs.1,00,000 on 12.7.2006 and issued a cheque (Exhibit P1) drawn on a joint account; the cheque bounced for insufficient funds, leading to a statutory demand (Exhibit P4) and a criminal complaint. The defence contended that there was no direct or vicarious liability, that accused No.2 was not a signatory to the cheque, and that there was a lack of credible evidence showing a loan or actual financial capacity on the complainant’s part. The trial court evaluated the evidence with an emphasis on circumstantial suspicions, questioned the complainant’s sources of funds, and doubted the genuineness of the transaction, ultimately acquitting both accused. The High Court, after hearing argument, held that the trial court’s acquittal was not perverse and that the appellant failed to establish a compelling case for interference. Relying on apex court precedents clarifying the heavy burden on the complainant to prove borrowal, and the limits on relying on presumptions in Sections 118(a)/139 NI Act, the court dismissed the petition for leave. The acquittal stands and no appeal is permitted.
These writ petitions challenge the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme (SSS Pension) eligibility with reference to certification for pension for participants in the Punnapra-Vayalar movement. The central issue is whether a certifier who is an Ex-MP but has jail imprisonment for less than one year can validly certify for pension under the scheme. The State and the Union Government rejected claims on the ground that Sri P.A. Solomon, Ex-MP, was not an eligible certifier. The petitioners contend that the scheme should not be read so rigidly and rely on earlier decisions (Subhadra K. v. Union of India; Suseela Chakrapani v. Union of India) to support pension even where the certifier’s eligibility is at issue. They also rely on the broader jurisprudence that the manner of proof must align with the scheme and that Co-Prisoner Certificates (CPCs) and Thamrapathra receipts ought to be given due weight. In response, the respondents emphasize that the pension can be sanctioned only as per the scheme’s explicit requirements and point to Supreme Court authorities (Bikash R. Bhowmick; Mukund Lal Bhandari; Mohan Singh) that reject any departure from the scheme. Ultimately, the High Court concludes that the binding Bikash decision governs and that Sri Solomon’s ineligibility defeats the petitioners’ claims; the petitions are dismissed and no SSS pension is granted.
This writ petition challenges Ext.P10, an order dated 17.03.2018 of the District Level Authorization Committee for the Human Organ Transplantation, which declined approval for a liver transplant from donor Manikandan to recipient Muhammad Basheer. Basheer, aged 52, suffers from decompensated liver cirrhosis with diabetes and related complications; he is in a life-threatening condition and urgently requires a liver transplant. Manikandan, his friend, offered to donate a portion of his liver after completing the required formalities and medical examinations. The petitioners contend that Ext.P10 disregards relevant considerations and the legal principles laid down by this Court in Latheefa E. v. State of Kerala and Others, 2013 (2) KHC 183, which directs careful consideration of donor applications that meet statutory requirements and cautions against relying on minor contradictions that do not disprove the donor–recipient relationship. The order, according to the petitioners, also ignores Ext.P9, a police report indicating the donor’s altruistic motive and absence of criminal activity, and fails to take into account urgency. The High Court found that the scrutinizing authority weighed non-essential discrepancies—such as incomplete knowledge of the donor’s acquaintances and unrelated details—without adequately considering the medical inputs and the DP’s report. It held that the Ext.P10 order violates natural justice, is arbitrary and illegal, and must be quashed with directions to reconsider within two weeks, incorporating all inputs and Latheefa E principles.
The petitioner, a registered civil engineering contractor for the Southern Railway, seeks appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for disputes arising from a contract dated 28.03.2008. The contract contains an arbitration clause, but the opposite parties contend that certain disputes are “excepted matters” under Clause 63 and thus not arbitrable. Annexure-A7 sets out two claims totaling Rs. 43,66,203 that the petitioner wants referred to arbitration; the opposite parties refused, arguing these claims fall within excepted matters. The petition was heard on 14.02.2017 and final arguments were heard; the key issue is whether the two disputed claims are arbitrable or must be decided as excepted matters by the Court. The court analyzes Clauses 63 and 64(i) of the GCC, interpreting the list of excepted matters and the procedure for arbitration, as well as leading authorities on Section 11 proceedings (SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab; Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance). The judge distinguishes contrary Kerala decisions (A.R.No.7 of 2012) and ultimately holds that arbitrability of Annexure-A7 disputes should be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal and directs reference to arbitration with interim award possible.
This writ petition challenges Ext.P1, an order rejecting the petitioner’s building permit for a shop cum residential building on 72 cents of land in Sy.No.81/11, Malappuram (Panakkad) Village. The petitioner contends Ext.P1 is illegal and arbitrary, and seeks quashing and a mandamus to consider the permit, arguing that Sections 61 and 67 of the Kerala Town and Country Planning Act, 2016, are ultra vires, or in the alternative, that those provisions do not bar permit until land acquisition proceedings under law are initiated. The respondents admit the application and contend that the Master Plan (approved 2013) includes a road widening proposal; the scheme is long-term with a horizon to 2030, and no acquisition has occurred in five years, but that is not fatal to the plan. The court found merit in the petitioner’s contentions and cited Abdul Hakeem v. Manjeri Municipality (2018 (1) KLT 1026) for the interpretation that Section 67 imposes a mandatory obligation to acquire or de-reserve, with authority to purchase after a prescribed notice. The court directed the 3rd respondent to re-consider the petitioner’s application de hors Ext.P1 and in light of Abdul Hakeem, determining the matter within one month after hearing, if required. The writ petition is disposed accordingly.
WP(C) No. 22488 of 2009 (S) This writ petition challenges the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench’s October 29, 2008 order in OA No.206/2008, which directed the Union of India and the Southern Railway to promote N. Chandralal, an Assistant Loco Pilot, to Senior Assistant Loco Pilot in the 4000-6000 pay scale on a par with his juniors, with all consequential benefits and arrears dating from 29 June 2007. Chandralal had been medically decategorised after a duty‑related injury in 2003, moving him from the A1 category to C1 and below, and he was placed in a supernumerary post in 3050-4590 from 20 August 2004. He contended that Section 47 of the PWD Act prohibits discrimination in promotion on the basis of disability and that Para 213A of the Railway Establishment Manual, coupled with Chapter XIII on absorption of medically incapacitated staff, demands he be considered for promotion on the same terms as his juniors, who were promoted on 29 June 2007. The petitioners argued that his disability and medical fitness precluded such promotion, and that the juniors were promoted only because they were medically fit. The Tribunal’s reasoning and the High Court’s affirmation relied on precedents (Kunal Singh, Union of India v. Jain, Devendra Pant) recognizing that sub‑section (2) of Section 47 bars discrimination but allows legitimate standards where safety/efficiency is at stake. The High Court refused to interfere and dismissed the petition, upholding the Tribunal’s order Ext.P3.
RCRev. Nos. 274 of 2014 and 292 of 2014 This Kerala High Court judgment, authored by Justices K. Harilal and Annie John, disposed of two parallel Rent Control Revision petitions—RCRev. Nos. 274 of 2014 (filed by the tenant, Jose) and 292 of 2014 (filed by the landlords). The core dispute concerns fixation and enhancement of fair rent for a petition schedule building in Thrissur, near the Paramekkavu temple, with contested area measurements (653 sq ft claimed by landlords versus 436.5 sq ft as per commission’s finding relied upon by the Appellate Authority). The Rent Control Court had fixed a rising rent: 9,800 per month from 01.07.2005 and 16,330 from 01.07.2010, with automatic 30% increases every five years. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, however, re-fixed the fair rent at 9,000 (2005–2010) and 13,000 (from 2010), based on a smaller area of 436.5 sq ft. The court examined evidence showing prevailing local rents ranging from 56 to 76 per sq ft and noted inflation considerations under Edger Ferus v. Abraham Ittiyera and Supreme Court guidelines in Mohammad Ahma v. Atma Ram Chauhan. It held that the 30% five-year increment was unreasonable and reduced it to 12% every three years, balancing advantages of the subject property with locality comparisons. Finally, RCRev. 274 was allowed in part and RCRev. 292 was dismissed, with six months to clear arrears in RCRev. 274 and conditions for payment outlined.
This High Court of Kerala, in a criminal miscellaneous case under section 482 Cr.P.C., examined a petition challenging an order dated 5 December 2016 in Cr.M.P.3665/2016 in SC No.769/2015, on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge (Special Court), Ernakulam. The petitioner, Gireesh, stands indicted along with another for offences under Sections 323, 324 and 427 IPC and section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, arising from an incident on 6 August 2014 in which CW1 was allegedly restrained and assaulted. The trial began with PW1–PW3 examined on 15 October 2016. The petitioner contends his earlier counsel failed to conduct an effective cross-examination, and a fresh counsel was engaged who examined additional witnesses. The defense sought recall of PW1 and PW2 under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The prosecution opposed, arguing that recalling witnesses would amount to retrial or prejudice the prosecution, and that mere dissatisfaction with prior counsel cannot justify recall. Annexures were filed in support. The court examined Section 311 Cr.P.C., noting that the power to recall must be exercised when essential to the just decision of the case, with caution and circumspection; it should not be used to fill lacunae or to grant unfair advantage. The High Court thus refused to interfere with the trial court's decision, and dismissed the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The ruling aligns with Supreme Court precedents that mere change of counsel is not a sufficient ground for recall.
