Cus. Appeal Nos. 11/2018, 28/2018, 30/2018, 32/2018, 33/2018, 34/2018, 41/2018 This batch judgment from the Kerala High Court (Division Bench) concerns Customs Appeals filed by the Revenue challenging an order of the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) Bangalore dated 21.08.2017, which allowed the importer’s exemption claim under the Served from India Scheme (SFIS) in relation to an MRI scanner imported from Philips Electronics Hong Kong Ltd. The core dispute centers on the applicability and calculation of exemptions under Notification No. 92/2004, the subsequent Notification No. 20/2006, and related circulars/notifications affecting Basic Customs Duty (BCD), Education Cess, and Special Additional Duty (SAD). The Revenue contends that the importer was not entitled to exemption since the SFIS credit was insufficient (Rs. 18,96,214 against a payable Rs. 33,43,605) and that excluding Education Cess and SAD from the computation was illegal. The importer (KIMS Health Care Management Ltd.) argues for entitlement to exemptions and relies on Gujarat Ambuja Exports Ltd. v. UOI and other precedents to support the Tribunal’s reasoning. The High Court, after examining the notifications and cited authorities, holds that exemptions under Notification No. 20/2006 and the related schemes can apply, and that the Tribunal’s conclusions are tenable. The Court ultimately dismisses the Revenue’s batch appeals, upholding the CESTAT ruling in favor of the importer, and finding no substantial questions of law warranting reversal.
CRL.M.C. Nos. 9433/2022, 9441/2022, 9463/2022, 9464/2022, 9466/2022, 9478/2022 & 9471/2022 These connected Criminal Miscellaneous Cases arise from the Sub Divisional Magistrate Thiruvalla's notices under Section 107 read with Section 111 Cr.P.C., issued against several petitioners based on a single crime (Crime No. 350/2022) in Perinadu Police Station. The High Court consolidated these petitions, noting that the impugned Annexure-A3 orders show the counter-petitioners were called upon to enter into bonds for good behavior, but the orders merely reproduced crime numbers and generic phrases without detailing the facts that established imminent danger to public tranquility. The court reiterates established jurisprudence: under S.107, the authority must record substantive information, not merely rest on a case number; initiation must be grounded in an imminent risk of breach of peace and public tranquility at a particular place/time; there must be application of mind by the Sub Divisional Magistrate; the purpose of 107-111 Cr.P.C. is preventive restraint. The Court cites Santhosh M.V. v. State of Kerala and others (2014 (3) KLT 2837) and Ahammad Kabeer v. State of Kerala (2014 KHC 186) and Girish’s Case to emphasize that mere registration of crimes against a person does not justify invoking 107 Cr.P.C. Without the required substance, the order cannot stand. On this basis, the petitions are allowed and Annexure-A3 orders are quashed; the communication of this order to the 2nd respondent is directed; all connected cases are disposed by this common order.
This is a Kerala High Court writ petition under Article 226 challenging the Travancore Devaswom Board’s fixation of a Rs 7,000 license fee for Balitharpanam at Varkala Papanasam Kadappuram for Karkidaka Vavu 1197ME. The petitioner, who previously paid Rs 5,000 for a similar license in 2018 (Ext.P1), contends the current fee is illegal and unjust and seeks reduction (Ext.P3) along with a mandamus to consider the representation. Ext.P2 shows the conditions applicable to purohits for 1193 ME. The Board contends the Rs 7,000 fee was decided in a 29.06.2022 meeting and communicated to relevant officers, and is not arbitrary; arrangements are already in place for Balitharpanam at Varkala and other places. The court reviews provisions of the Travancore Devaswom Act (Sections 15A, 16, 24, 27, 31) and Article 226 of the Constitution, noting the Board’s fiduciary duties as a trustee of Devaswoms and its power to manage temple ceremonies and properties. It cites judicial precedents on fiduciary duties (M.V. Ramasubbiar) and uses Rajani P. Kuttan (2021) for financial background and Suo motu v. State (2022) as guiding authority. Ultimately, the court finds no basis to interfere with the Board’s decision and dismisses the petition, while directing facilities for performers be provided as per existing orders.
BAIL APPL. NO. 334 OF 2024 On 31 January 2024, in Bail Application No. 334 of 2024, the Kerala High Court (Single Judge: C.S. Dias) considered the bail prayer of Jacob Ummen in Crime No. 1747/2023 of East Kallada Police Station, Kollam. The prosecution alleges that around 3 a.m. on 30 December 2023, the accused, driven by prior animosity toward the defacto complainant, used obscene words and stabbed him in the neck with a knife with the intention to murder, constituting offences under IPC sections 294(b), 324 and 307. The petitioner contends he is innocent and falsely implicated; he asserts a close friendship with the defacto complainant and that the two were at the scene to celebrate New Year, during which the petitioner himself sustained injuries. He submits that the offence under section 307 is not attracted; he has been in custody for about a month, the investigation is largely complete, and he is willing to abide by stringent conditions. The Public Prosecutor opposes bail, citing ongoing investigation, criminal antecedents, risk of witness intimidation and tampering, and potential recidivism. The court notes the treatment certificate showing hospital admission and discharge around the time of the incident, the petitioner’s custody period and progress of investigation, and lack of prior similar offences, and finds continued detention unnecessary. Bail is granted on Rs.50,000 bond with two sureties, subject to conditions including reporting, non-interference with witnesses, abstaining from offences, passport surrender, territorial limitations, and potential cancellation on violation, with reference to Sushila Aggarwal for investigative continuity.
Malabar Medical College Hospital and Research Centre, Kozhikode, a charitable educational trust, challenged a National Medical Commission directive requiring submission of a consent of affiliation (COA) from the Kerala University of Health and Allied Sciences for starting/expansion of postgraduate medical courses for 2021-22. The appellant contends that the pandemic prevented the University from conducting inspections, and that the University had indicated it could inspect only five courses and had already granted COA for those, with seat enhancements later effected under the Court’s Ext. P1 direction (as in W.P.(C) No. 14835 of 2019). The college had paid the prescribed application fee of Rs. 4.72 lakh per course and submitted the required documents; Ext. P11 communication, it asserts, cannot operate as a time extension. The writ petition sought mandamus directing the 4th respondent University to grant COA with or without inspection or, in the alternative, to permit processing of nine PG courses without COA. The learned single Judge dismissed the reliefs, emphasizing statutory cut-off dates and the structured regulatory framework under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the National Medical Commission Act, 2019. On appeal, the Division Bench held there is no jurisdictional error and that the statutory scheme cannot be overridden by mandamus. The appeal is dismissed, upholding the regulatory regime and public interest in timely admissions.
WP(C) Nos. 4846 of 2021 and 11863 of 2021 Geogy George K. challenges the repeated refusal by the Vadakkencherry Grama Panchayat to renew his D&O licence for a hot mix plant, despite earlier directions from this Court directing the Panchayat to consider the renewal on merits. The petitioner’s history spans multiple writ petitions (notably W.P.(C) Nos. 5507/2017, 9245/2017, 5460/2018 and 5662/2018), culminating in orders that renewal be considered in light of Ext.P8 and in accordance with Section 233A of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. The respondent Panchayat’s committee had maintained that pollution concerns and health hazards justified non-renewal, relying on public complaints. However, the Pollution Control Board had previously granted a Consent to Establish and later a Renewal of Consent to Operate after inspections found measures to control pollution were in place. The Court held that the Secretary to the Panchayat is the licensing authority and that the Panchayat Committee cannot dictate licensing outcomes; it emphasized that expert opinion under Section 233A must be sought where appropriate, and that the Panchayat’s interference was unlawful. The judgment ultimately directs renewal for both petitions’ licences, while preserving the Board’s oversight and permitting further expert input if needed, thereby balancing environmental safeguards with the petitioner’s lawful operation and noting that the Board may inspect as necessary.
CRL.RC Nos. 1809/2018, 1810/2018, 1991/2018, 2088/2018, 2446/2018, 2723/2018, 2941/2018, 3214/2018 This common order arises from eight connected criminal revision petitions (Cr.R.C. Nos. 1809/2018, 1810/2018, 1991/2018, 2088/2018, 2446/2018, 2723/2018, 2941/2018 and 3214/2018) brought suo motu by this Court after the Kollam Judicial First Class Magistrate-III (Temporary) disposed of a batch of cases under Section 258 Cr.P.C. cryptically, discharging accused. In 2017, by resolution of the Administrative Committee, the Court decided to initiate suo motu revisions on account of miscarriage of justice in such disposals. The court reviews the limits of the Magistrate’s power under Section 258, guided by earlier decisions Neela Lohitha Dasan Nadar v State of Kerala (2003 (1) KLT 844), Radhamany Amma v Kunju Pillai (1980 KLT 393) and Balakrishna Panicker v Thevan (1987 (1) KLT 628). The Court emphasizes that Section 258 is an enabling provision to be used only in very special and compelling circumstances where the usual procedure under Section 254 cannot be followed and the prosecution would fail due to technical defects. It warns that invocation must be reasonable and judicious and that the normal rule is that both parties have an opportunity to adduce evidence. The Court also cites Suo Motu proceedings v. State of Kerala (2019 (3) KHC 188) to stress the same principle. On that basis, the Court holds that the Magistrates' cryptic discharge orders were illegal; the revision petitions are allowed, the discharge orders set aside, and the cases are to be re-registered and proceeded with in accordance with law. The respondents/accused must appear on 16.11.2021.
WP(C) No. 14033 of 2015 (D) This writ petition concerns fixation of salary for re-employed ex‑servicemen employed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India in the Kottayam division. Petitioners 1–5 had been appointed in 2009 and underwent refixation as per Exts. P7, P11, P13 and P15 (2013) but were later reduced under Exts. P22–P26. Exts. P33–P37 contemplated recovery of excess payments. The petition challenged the downward revision and the proposed recovery. While the matter was pending, fresh pay fixation was ordered under Exts. P40–P44 referencing the 2017 circular, and the petition was disposed of (23.10.2018) on that basis, though later recall of the judgment occurred. In W.P. (C) No. 35749/2017 and connected cases, a learned single judge held the refixation valid and prospective from 06.01.2017, applying the Supreme Court’s White Washer principle to bar recovery of past payments. A Division Bench in W.A. No. 1887/2022 upheld the pay revision; however, another Bench in W.A. No. 922/2023 revived the original pay scale. The petitioners accepted the fixation under Exts. P40–P44 and urged disposal with no recovery. The respondents cited the unsettled status and the revived/original pay scale. The court ultimately disposes of the petition by upholding Exts. P40–P44 fixation and directing no recovery of excess salary, consistent with the White Washer principle.
This criminal miscellaneous case arises from FIR No.13/2021 of Ernakulam Town South Police Station, registered on 13.01.2021, under sections 406 and 420 read with 34 IPC. The petitioners, accused nos. 2–4 (Ajay Kumar, Arun Puspagathan, and Boby Jacob Markose), seek quashing under section 482 Cr.P.C. The first respondent is the State of Kerala; the second respondent is the SHO, Ernakulam Town South Police Station; the third respondent is Joby N. Mathew, and the fourth respondent is A.S. Enterprises represented by Joby N. Mathew. The prosecution case alleges that the petitioners, dealing in hill produce, induced the defacto complainant to supply items worth Rs.30,75,975/- with a commitment to payment in instalments; cheques issued later were dishonored, causing loss and alleged ill-gain. The petition contends this was a civil dispute in disguise and that an award passed by Lok Adalat (Annexure A2, 31.01.2020) resolved the matter, with instalments to be paid. The court notes the civil nature of the transaction, the Lok Adalat settlement and an earlier civil suit/court action, and concludes malafide intent cannot be inferred; the delay argument is considered in light of existing precedent. Consequently, the FIR is quashed in exercise of ex debito justitiae, and the Crl.M.C. is allowed.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 Cr.P.C before Justice A. Hariprasad of the Kerala High Court. The petitioner, M/S Thirupathi Traders, seeks to quash the order of JFCM II, Haripad, which impleaded the petitioner as the fourth accused under Section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, in S.T. No. 6/2008 arising from an allegation that Moong Dal purchased from the first accused was adulterated with tartrazine. The Food Inspector filed the complaint and cognizance was taken under provisions including 2(1a)(a)(j) and 7 & 16(i)(A) & A.18/06/10 of Appendix B of the PF Rules, 1955. The impugned order was passed while the court contemplated a warrant-trial or summary-trial framework under Section 16A of the PF Act. The petitioner argues that Section 20A allows impleadment only on evidence adduced during the trial and after the trial has begun, and that the procedure under Cr.P.C. was not properly followed; he relies on Omprakash Shivaprakash v. Kuriakose (1999 KHc 684) and Chandak v. Food Inspector (1990 KHc 131) to emphasize that the court cannot prematurely add a fourth accused. The High Court ultimately sets aside the order, directs adherence to Section 244 Cr.P.C before framing charges, and allows the trial to proceed with proper procedure, leaving the question of impleadment to be decided in due course. All pending interlocutory applications are dismissed.
WP(C) Nos. 37607/2023; 37622/2023; 38612/2023; 41286/2023; 41369/2023; 41539/2023; 41546/2023; 41628/2023; 41950/2023 This judgment consolidates nine writ petitions (W.P.(C) Nos. 37607/2023 and connected cases) challenging a general transfer order issued by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC). The petitioners, mostly Drivers and Conductors stationed across depots (Mannarkkad, Palakkad, Ernakulam, Payannur, Adoor and other depots), allege that Exts. P2 and P3 transfers breach the bipartite Service Agreement (Ext. P1), violate circle seniority, and disregard incumbency completed by working away from home depots. They argue that the general transfer should occur in April per the settlement, that online data (G-SPARK) should be used as per government directive (G.O. 2017) and that transfers should consider compassionate grounds and family hardship (e.g., illness in families). The respondents counter that transfer is an incidence of service with no right to be posted at a particular location; guidelines are not statutory, and administrative discretion is essential for a large state-wide organization. They contend the KSRTC faces financial strain and administrative exigencies, making a broad, statewide transfer necessary. The court, applying established precedents (Gujarat Electricity Board v Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, State of MP v S.S. Kourav, Babu v State of Kerala, Nixy James v KSRTC, among others), upholds broad discretion and dismisses most petitions, while directing sympathetic consideration for the first petitioner in a specific case (41369/2023) and deferring Ext. P2 for that petitioner for four weeks. The judgment emphasizes restraint in reviewing transfers absent statutory violations or mala fides, while recognizing limited equitable relief in compelling compassionate circumstances.
WP(C).No. 24192 of 2016 (Y) Petitioners are owners of autorickshaws challenging the Regional Transport Authority’s rejection of their applications seeking variation of permit conditions. They allege that the 2nd respondent did not accept their applications nor consider them, contravening the principles laid down by this court in Rajesh v. Secretary, RTA, which held that general orders regarding parking and picking up passengers by autorickshaws cannot be insisted upon. The petition argues that such blanket restrictions adversely affect the petitioners’ livelihood and that individual permit conditions should be examined on the merits and in conformity with law. The respondents, represented by the Senior Government Pleader, oppose any blanket order and maintain that permit variation must follow statutory and administrative norms. The court frames the sole question as whether the petitioners are entitled to the same treatment as articulated in Rajesh. After hearing both sides, the court concludes that the petitioners have a right to seek variation and to have their applications accepted and considered in accordance with law. Consequently, it directs the 2nd and 3rd respondents to accept the petitions and examine the applications within six weeks from receipt, applying the Rajesh principles. The decision effectively ensures that autorickshaw owners are not forced to operate under general, potentially restrictive orders and that permit variation requests are evaluated on individual facts and lawful standards, aligning administrative action with contemporary judicial expectations.
This regular second appeal, filed by Krishnanunni (the 1st defendant), challenges the decree and judgment in A.S. No.103 of 2021 (Palakkad) dated 04.10.2023, which affirmed the final decree in FDIA 1349 of 2006 in O.S. No.141 of 2004 before the Munsiff Court, Chittur. The suit sought partition of plaint schedule properties; the trial court partitioned the properties excluding the tank. The Appellate Court concurred, and this Court previously in RSA 1060/2011 held that the preliminary decree excludes the tank's actual extent and that the final decree would determine the extent at that stage. Commissioner Exts. C1 and C1(a) found 24 cents of the 57-cent tank area and 3 cents road widening; excluding 27 cents (24+3), the final decree proceeded with the remaining land. The appellant argued that 62 cents, described as tank area in the schedule, should be excluded, and that the concurrent verdicts were erroneous for disregarding the preliminary decree. The Court notes a well-established line of authority—Nazir Mohamed, Kondiba Kadam, Santosh Hazari, Government of Kerala v. Joseph—holding that an appeal under Section 100 CPC requires a substantial question of law and that the court must not interfere without such questions. Consequently, the regular second appeal is dismissed without admission, and interlocutory applications are also dismissed.
This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 8305 of 2023) arises from Crime No. 532/2018 at Ponnani Police Station and the charge sheet CC No. 58/2019 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ponnani. The petitioners, MUHAMMED ASHIF, AFSAL, and ASHIK, are accused of offences under Sections 341, 323, 324 r/w 34 IPC. The prosecution alleges wrongful confinement and assault resulting in injuries to the victim. The parties have reportedly settled their dispute; affidavits filed by the victims indicate consent for quashing the proceedings, and the victims have no objection. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing solely on settlement but accepted that the matter is settled. The court carefully considers the submissions, records, and the guidance of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) (5) SCC 688, which, building on Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, lays down the scope of the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash non‑compoundable offences in private disputes when the entire dispute is resolved. It emphasizes that such power should not apply to heinous or public‑interest offences and that antecedents and conduct of the accused may be relevant. Applying this framework, the court finds the dispute private, the settlement legitimate, and quashes the proceedings; the petition is allowed.
Raju Ouseph @ Sebastian, the claimant in OP(MV) No.289 of 2013 before the Addl. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-II, Alappuzha, challenged Ext.P6 of the Tribunal, a common order passed on I.A. Nos. 937/2018 and 938/2018 filed by the third respondent insurer. Ext.P6 reopened the evidence and directed the claimant to be referred to the Kerala State Medical Board for disability assessment, with travel expenses to be paid by the insurer. The petition, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution, contended that such interlocutory measures were unsustainable and that the I.A.s were improper, amounting to an impermissible rollback of the merits of the MACT proceeding. The court examined Article 227 powers, citing Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil to emphasize supervisory power is intended to ensure efficiency and prevent disrepute of the system, not to re‑try cases. It also cited Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation to stress that interference under Article 227 requires patent perversity or grave infirmities; and Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair to limit appellate-like scrutiny. The Kerala High Court found that Ext.P6 was not perverse and dismissed the petition, while modifying the time frame for disability assessment to three weeks from production of a certified copy of the judgment.
This writ petition challenges Exts. P9 and P11, orders issued in the wake of a departmental audit that flagged substantial misappropriation in the Valapattanam Service Co‑operative Bank (branch at Manna). The petitioner, T. Saifudeen, was the President of the first respondent society and headed a Managing Committee elected in 2013 with tenure until 2018. Following a police investigation into alleged misappropriation by the branch manager, the society faced serious criminal proceedings (Cr. No. 1015/2013) and the 3rd respondent ordered an inquiry under Sec. 65 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (KCS Act). Concurrently, Sec. 32(1) actions were initiated to supersede the Managing Committee, prompting resignations by the petitioner and other members. The petition examined whether supersession could proceed where the elected committee had ceased to exist. Relying on the Full Bench decision in Anil M.S. v. Joint Registrar (General) of Co-operative Societies (ILR 2021 (4) Ker 5), the court held that continuing proceedings under Sec. 32 in the absence of a functioning committee would be futile. Consequently, Exts. P7 and P11 were quashed, while criminal and related proceedings could continue under law. The court left open contentions arising from Ext. P9’s enquiry report. The petition was disposed of with directions, preserving the criminal case’s integrity and allowing law‑based continuation of proceedings.
R.C. Rev. No.65 of 2021 arises from a landlord-tenant eviction dispute under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The revision petition challenges an eviction order under Section 11(3) issued by the Rent Control Court on 17.06.2017, which held that the landlord's bona fide need to occupy the petition schedule building for starting a car accessory business and servicing car air-conditioners was genuine, and that the first proviso to Section 11(3) did not apply and the second proviso did not protect the tenant. The Rent Control Appellate Authority confirmed this eviction on 12.10.2020. The tenant challenged the decision in a revision under Section 20, arguing that the lower courts misapplied the law, and that the revisional court cannot re-appreciate evidence. The court surveys the statutory framework for Section 11(3) and its provisos, and surveys a line of decisions on bona fide need and the burden of proof on the tenant under the second proviso. It cites Adil Jamshed Frenchman and Shiv Samp Gupta to stress that bona fide need must be real and honest rather than pretext. It also relies on Deena Nath, Ammu v. Nafeesa, Kunju T.P., Narayanan Nair, Prasannan, Vineethan, Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Ubaiba, Hindustan Petroleum, T. Sivasubramaniam, and Thankamony Amma to frame the scope of revisional review and burden of proof. The High Court ultimately dismisses the revision petition but grants five months to surrender possession with conditions, in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, including affidavit and arrears payments.
Peravankandi Abdul Salam, the respondent-tenant, challenges a eviction order issued under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, by the Rent Control Court, Nadapuram, which was sustained by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in RCA No.11/2023. The landlord sought eviction on bona fide need to run a supermarket in a multi-storey building; the petition schedule comprises six shop rooms on the ground floor. The Rent Control Court held the need bona fide and held that the first proviso to Section 11(3) was not attracted, directing eviction within 30 days. The tenant challenged this order in RCA No.11/2023, and the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 31.10.2023, thereby confirming eviction. This Rent Control Revision under Section 20 contends for interference with the concurrent orders, specifically on the applicability of the first proviso to Section 11(3). During arguments, the tenant’s counsel confined the challenge to the first proviso, while the landlords’ counsel defended the bona fide need and non-application of the proviso. The High Court examined Section 11(3) and the line of precedents on revisional jurisdiction (Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Hindustan Petroleum, Ubaiba, T. Sivasubramaniam, etc.) and concluded that the findings were not perverse or illegal. Consequently, the revision is dismissed, but the Court grants six months to the tenant to vacate, subject to conditions including an unconditional surrender affidavit, arrears deposit, and continued licensing compliance.
MACA Nos. 200, 1566 & 1686 of 2011 This is a consolidated High Court of Kerala judgment dealing with three motor-accident claims (MACA Nos. 200, 1566, 1686 of 2011) arising from a single accident on 31.08.2004 in which a jeep (KDE 1409) hit a motorcycle, injuring three claimants travelling on KL 8/Y 7001. The jeep was owned by the 1st respondent and insured with the 3rd respondent insurer. The tribunal held that the 1st respondent had suppressed material facts—namely that the jeep was used as a contract carriage vehicle—and directed the insurer to pay compensation to the claimants and then recover the amount from the owner. The insurer challenged this order, arguing that the policy was obtained for a private vehicle and therefore void under Section 149(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The High Court answered the core issue in the insurer’s favour, holding that concealment or misrepresentation of material facts renders the insurance policy void and the insurer not liable for the awarded amount. Relying on Section 149(2)(b) and related provisions (and comparing with Section 94 of the 1939 Act), the court noted utmost good faith (uberrimae fidei) and the duty to disclose material facts, as articulated in Julian v. Peethambaran and later MACA decisions. Consequently, the common appeals are allowed; the insurer is exonerated of liability to pay, and the 1st respondent may recover the award from the 2nd respondent’s person, with costs borne by the parties as directed.
Crl.MC.No.1678 OF 2021(H) This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, involving AISWARYA V.K., accused in CC 1362/2016 under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petition challenges an order dated 8.3.2021 in Crl.M.P.1400/2021 issued by the Temporary Special Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Thiruvananthapuram, which permitted a witness list (Annexure-A4) including a person named Shameer, who was not shown to be connected to the transaction. The petitioner contends that the Magistrate failed to exercise due discretion in admitting the witness list and that the proposed witness has no bearing on the case, making the order erroneous and liable to be set aside. The 2nd respondent had testified earlier and, after cross-examination, filed Annexure-A4 seeking to summon the proposed witness. The petitioner argued lack of purpose and irrelevance of the witness, objecting to Annexure-A5. The Magistrate relied on Section 254(2) Cr.P.C read with Section 145(2) NI Act to admit the witness, asserting that excluding evidence at the initial stage would prejudice justice. The High Court, referencing Shobha Rani v. State, held that while Section 254(2) Cr.P.C endows wide discretion to summon witnesses, the court must ensure that examination is not harassing and is relevant. The Court found no error in Annexure-A6 and dismissed the petition, preserving the Magistrate’s discretion and the right to cross-examine. The decision upholds the impugned order and declines intervention under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
