This is a criminal revision petition challenging the conviction of the sole accused under Sections 418 and 420 IPC for an agreement for sale of immovable property. The trial and appellate courts had found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to six months' RI under Section 418 IPC and two years' RI under Section 420 IPC, arising from a contract between the complainant and the accused detailing future actions including execution of a sale deed. The High Court of Kerala emphasizes that mere breach of an obligation arising out of a contract for sale, including where money was paid as advance or earnest money, does not automatically attract criminal liability under Sections 418 or 420 IPC unless there is an inducement coupled with a dishonest intention. The court distinguishes between the concepts of “inducement” and mere dishonest intent, noting that inducement must persuade or compel the other party to enter the contract or to deliver property. The judgment discusses that where a contract contains a clause obligating the seller to clear liabilities and where only breach occurs, it would fall under breach of contract rather than criminal liability; however, if a sale deed is executed without disclosing existing liabilities and is accompanied by deceptive assertions, it could amount to cheating under Section 415 IPC, depending on the presence of inducement. Relying on later Supreme Court authorities (Sarabjit Kaur; ARCI v. Nimra Cerglass Technics), the High Court acquits the accused, holding that the prosecution failed to prove inducement and hence no crime under Sections 418/420 IPC was made out. The revision petition is allowed accordingly, and the accused is acquitted and set at liberty.
WP(C) No. 10612 of 2024 and connected matters (10612/2024) This is a consolidated judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam by Justice T. R. Ravi, dealing with a cluster of Writ Petitions under Article 226 challenging freezing of bank accounts by banks under police/cybercrime inquiries and portal directives (WP(C) 10612/2024 and connected cases). The court records multiple petitions from various financial institutions, CSB banks, and individuals whose accounts were frozen following intimation from cybercrime authorities. The presiding judge acknowledges the practice of freezing bank accounts pending investigation and issues a unified set of directions limiting freezes strictly to the amount in dispute as stated in police notices or requisitions, to allow account operation beyond the frozen limit. The judgment borrows from the principle in Dr. Sajeer v RBI (2023 KHC OnLine 661) and prescribes that banks confine the freezing to the disputed sum and require police authorities to specify the limit; banks may withdraw or adjust freezes upon new information. It disposes of the petitions with these directions and outlines a framework for compliance, keeping the petitioner’s ability to operate accounts within the allowed limits. The decision incorporates references to related cases and demonstrates the Court’s approach to balancing investigation needs with the rights to access funds for legitimate transactions.
WP(C) No. 10612 of 2024 and connected cases These consolidated writ petitions concern freezing of bank accounts by various police cybercrime units during cybercrime investigations. Petitioners include cooperative banks, private entities, travel agencies, and individuals whose accounts were blocked or funds frozen by banks in response to police directives, notices, or cyber-crime portal actions. The petitioners argue that blanket freezes or freezes exceeding the amounts in dispute cause irreparable harm to ordinary business and domestic needs, and that freezing orders should be precise, proportionate, and limited to the dispute amount with proper notice and procedural safeguards. The court acknowledges the need to curb cybercrime but emphasizes proportionality and the protection of legitimate financial interests. Relying on a guiding precedent from Dr. Sajeer v RBI (2023 KHC Online 661) and citing prior judgments like WP(C) 28155/2023, the Kerala High Court issues interim directives to confine freezes to the disputed amounts as communicated by police authorities, requires banks to inform authorities if further freezing is contemplated, and permits petitioners to approach the court again if no information is provided. The judgment consolidates a large batch of petitions from multiple states, reflecting a unified approach to balance anti-fraud measures with the rights of account holders.
Annies and Vinnus ( petitioners ) seek to quash CC No.2018/2017 arising from Crime No.1114/2012 at Kalady Police Station. The allegations trace to 10.09.2012, when the petitioners allegedly abused the de facto complainant and, despite a Munisiff Court injunction in OS No.69/2012, trespassed on the complainant’s residential property and threatened him, allegedly with intent to intimidate. The petitioners contend there is a boundary-dispute between family property partitions, and even if the allegations are accepted, offences under Sections 447 (criminal trespass), 294(b) (obscene acts in a public place), and 506(ii) (criminal intimidation) read with Section 34 IPC are not made out. A central contention is that cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC cannot be taken on the basis of a police charge-sheet, in light of Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C., a point the Court connects with Shajahan v. State of Kerala (2021 KHC 5632). The Court also considers James Jose v. State of Kerala (2019 (3) KHC 531) to explain the scope of Section 294(b). After examining Annexure A2 (final charge sheet) and the evidence, the Court holds that none of the allegations suffices to constitute any offence; consequently, the Crl.M.C is allowed and all further proceedings in CC No.2018/2017 are quashed. Annexures A1–A4 accompany the petition.
This writ appeal, WA No.510/2023, challenges Ext.P4 attachment under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act (KRRA) on a tax arrears dispute from 1991-1992. The appellant, Bindu Kishore, contends the recovery is illegal and unsustainable as the debt is time-barred, and that she was not afforded due opportunity under Section 44(3) of the KRRA; she also argues that recovery cannot proceed for dues alleged to be owed to the Government of Karnataka. The respondents defend the impugned order, asserting the transfers surrounding the defaulter’s property were fraudulent and part of an attempt to defeat or delay recovery, and that the proceedings complied with audi alteram partem; Ext.P4 records notice, hearing, and counsel appearance. The High Court, after hearing, holds that the KRRA Section 44(3) framework permits recovery notwithstanding possible pending court orders on fraud, and that the dominant purpose of subsection (3) is to address transfers intended to defeat recovery. It cites Gourikutty Amma to support the view that recovery can proceed subject to any competent-court orders; but it distinguishes the Kalyanikutty proposition (time-bar is fatal) on the facts. The court also endorses cross-district recovery under Central Act No.1 of 1890 and rejects the appellant’s contentions, ultimately dismissing the writ appeal and upholding the lower judgment.
Yesudasan, a Village Officer at Anavoor Village, was convicted by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, on 28 February 2019 for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹2,000 to facilitate mutation of land. The prosecution’s case arises from a decoy who sought mutation assistance and offered a tainted ₹5,000 bribe; after negotiation the demand was reduced to ₹3,000, with ₹1,000 paid on 26/11/2011. A trap was set on 7/12/2011 with a tainted MO2 series notes and a button camera recording the incident. The accused allegedly admitted that the remaining ₹2,000 would be paid within two weeks; the decoy later reported to PW6 of VACB, Ext. P11(a) (declaration) and Ext. P11 (FIR). The prosecution’s evidence included pre-trap mahazar Ext. P1, trap testimony, and forensic/chemical tests showing phenolphthalein positivity on tainted notes and on the drawer and on the decoy’s shirt pocket; MO10, the memory card with visuals, was subjected to analysis (Ext. P19). The decoy died before trial, so direct evidence of demand and acceptance was unavailable. The trial court nonetheless convicted on circumstantial evidence, including the video, the chemical tests, and the recovery. The High Court, while confirming conviction, held that the absence of direct evidence could be overcome by circumstantial evidence and reduced the sentence from three years to one year.
CRL.A Nos. 1699/2011 & 1914/2011 This is a division bench of the High Court of Kerala hearing two connected criminal appeals arising from the Special Court for NIA Cases, Ernakulam, concerning the Kozhikode twin blasts of 03.03.2006. The conviction of A1 (Nazeer) and A4 (Shafnas) under sections 16(1) and 18 of the UAPA, along with related IPC provisions and Explosives Substances Act, was challenged, while NIA appealed against acquittals of A3 and A9. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of PW1, an approver, supported by disclosures under Sections 27/8 of the Evidence Act, call-details, and discovery at crime scenes. The Trial Court and appellate court treated the approver’s evidence as credible with substantial corroboration. The High Court meticulously re-examines the credibility of PW1, the reliability of the disclosure memos (Exts.), the admissibility under Sections 27, 8, 25, 26 of the Evidence Act, and the accuracy of call-details and identifications. It highlights inconsistencies, possible police influence, and the risk of self-serving disclosures. After detailed analysis of precedents on approver evidence (Sarwan Singh, Pulukuri Kottaya, Jnanendra Nath Ghosh, Navjot Sandhu, etc.), the court reverses part of the lower acquittals and allows the appeals of A1 and A4, ordering their release, while upholding acquittals of A3 and A9 and dismissing the NIA appeal.
CRL.R.P. No. 2715 of 2005 Ziraj @ Poov Ziraj, the revision petitioner, challenges the conviction and sentence recorded under Section 20(b)(ii)A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) in C.C. No. 793 of 2002, on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court -I, Kochi, as affirmed by the Sessions Court in Crl. Appeal No. 92 of 2005. The prosecution case rests on a 07.11.2001 incident at Fort Kochi, in which 101 packets of ganja weighing 145.900 grams were seized from the revision petitioner after police intercepted him near the Dutch Cemetery, following a search conducted with a Gazetted Officer present under Section 50 NDPS Act. The trial court convicted him, which the Sessions Court upheld on appeal. The revision petition before the Kerala High Court contends that the evidence adduced by police officials was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that independent witnesses were hostile and did not corroborate the case. During arguments, it was revealed that the accused had died on 05.04.2009, and though opportunity for impleadment of legal representatives was provided, none appeared. The High Court examined the evidence, held that the testimony of official witnesses was reliable, and noted that keeping ganja in 101 packets argued for sale. Ultimately, the court held the conviction should stand but modified the sentence to six months’ simple imprisonment, setting aside the fine and its default sentence, and declared the revision abated due to death. The decision reflects reliance on established principles regarding the weight of official witness testimony and the probative value of seizure-based evidence.
This appeal under MACA 3188 of 2021 is from the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha, in a death-claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The petitioners (respondents) claimed compensation for the death of Kurian, a 54-year-old coolie, who sustained fatal injuries after an autorickshaw moved forward as he was alighting on 12.05.2016; he succumbed on 05.09.2016. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 12,54,950 (with interest and costs) in favor of the petitioners. The insurer/appellant contends four grounds: (i) the Tribunal erred in not attributing contributory negligence to the deceased; Ext.A2 (police final report) allegedly confirms driver negligence, and burden to discredit lies with the party challenging it; (ii) the notional monthly income fixed at Rs. 9,000 is too high, citing the deceased’s work as a coolie and Supreme Court guidance (Ramachandrappa) to fix lower incomes; (iii) compensation under conventional heads is improper; (iv) Rs. 20,000 for pain and suffering is unreasonable. The court upholds the Tribunal’s findings, relying on precedents that negate pure reliance on charge sheets without rebuttal, justify notional income in 2016, and permit non-fatal pain-and-suffering awards where death did not occur instantly. The appeal is ultimately dismissed, maintaining the Tribunal’s award and rationale.
This is a Rent Control Revision petition under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 filed by the tenant, K. Prakash Kammath, challenging an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (RCAA) in favor of the landlady, Naseema. The Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Thaliparamba, had dismissed eviction under Section 11(3) after finding, inter alia, the landlady’s need not bona fide with respect to her son’s plan to start a ready-made shop, though the parent petition for eviction under Section 11(2)(b) (arrears) was handled by the tenant. The Appellate Authority reversed and granted eviction under Section 11(3), holding the landlady’s need to be bona fide. The petitioner-tenant then approached this Court in revision. The High Court, after analyzing the statutory framework and the jurisprudence on bona fide need (notably the distinction between sincere need and mere pretext, and the praesenti requirement), affirmed the Appellate Authority’s finding and dismissed the revision, upholding eviction. To balance exceptional circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court granted six months for peaceful surrender on conditions including unconditional affidavit, arrears deposit, and continued payment of rent, failing which the stay on eviction would terminate. The overall conclusion is that the Appellate Authority’s decision is well-supported by the evidence and law.
This writ appeal challenges an order under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 directing gratuity payment to the 4th respondent, Sindhu S. The appellant, a society registered under local charitable laws, contends that it is not governed by the Act and that the controlling authority’s ex parte order (Exhibit P2, dated 28.03.2019) was issued after the retirement of the 4th respondent and without giving the society an opportunity to present its case. The 4th respondent had filed an application under Section 7(4) of the Act for gratuity, which was admitted by the Controlling Authority; a notice was sent and the matter was set for counter statement, but the appellant did not participate and the order was passed ex parte. The appellant filed a writ petition, challenging the applicability of the Act to the society and the post-order actions. The appellate process under Section 7(7) of the Act was invoked but the appeal was rejected as belated. The Division Bench examined whether the delay could be condoned or excused, noting statutory time limits and the limited extension under the Act, as well as the impact of the Covid period. It concluded that the appeal was time-barred and devoid of merits, upholding the single-judge decision and dismissing the W.A. with costs.
Ansar, the sole accused in S.C. No. 1044 of 2021 before the Assistant Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha, challenges under Section 482 CrPC the order/criminal proceedings arising from an incident dated 29 November 2020. The petitioner faced charges under IPC sections 323, 324 and 308, for allegedly assaulting the de facto complainant with an iron rod, in a case characterized by private disputes with civil undertones. The petitioner argued that the disputes between the parties have been amicably settled, supported by an affidavit from the second respondent, and that terminating the proceedings would restore peace and enable both sides to move forward. The High Court had directed the investigation to verify the genuineness of the settlement and whether the petitioner has any criminal antecedents or impediments to quashing the proceedings. The Public Prosecutor voiced reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement, highlighting that the case involves non‑compoundable offences and requires careful scrutiny of the record. Relying on Supreme Court authority, the court considered that, where matters involve private disputes with civil character and the offences are non‑serious, the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised if the settlement is genuine and does not undermine public interest. The court found the circumstances favourable—no enduring grievances, potential for peace, and bleak chances of conviction—and consequently quashed the proceedings, including Annexure-A2 Final Report and subsequent actions in SC 1044/2021.
Raman S/o Vellar, the appellant, was convicted by the Special Court for the Trial of Offences Against Children (Additional Sessions Court – I), Manjeri, for rape of a 10-year-old girl and offences under the POCSO Act (IPC 376(1) and POCSO Act Section 6, while acquitted of Section 14(3) POCSO). The incidents spanned September 2013 to February 2014, when the accused, a neighbor, allegedly abused the victim in his quarters, including circulating videos of the acts and showing pornographic material. The trial court judged the evidence, including testimony of PW3 (the victim), PW17 (her mother), PW1 (school Headmistress), and PW6 (the medical examiner), as sufficient to convict and sentenced the accused to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment plus a Rs 1,00,000 fine, with an additional year’s RI on default for Section 6 POCSO. On admission by the High Court, the learned Advocate for the appellant challenged the reliance on the child witness, pointing to alleged contradictions and lack of corroboration, and questioned the sufficiency of medical evidence. The Public Prosecutor defended the verdict, asserting the victim’s credible and consistent testimony and corroboration from medical findings (Ext. P3). The Court held that a child victim’s testimony is entitled to great weight, corroboration is not an absolute rule, and the medical evidence supports the version, affirming the conviction and sentence and dismissing the appeal.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous petition (CRL.MC No. 3838 of 2016) challenging Crime No.1085/2012 registered at Palarivattom Police Station and the consequent final report in CC No. 935/2015 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kunnumpuram, Kakkanad. The petitioners – three businessmen (K. A. Hussain Kutty, Farooq Hussain and Fahim Hussain) who claim to operate HI-tech Ultra Modern Electrified Bus Shelters – contend the registration of the FIR and the filing of the final report are an abuse of process under Section 482 CrPC. They argue Annexure-I (the FIR) does not show offences under 294(b) IPC or 506(1) IPC, and that Annexure-II (the final report) introduces improvidence by alleging obscene words without support in Annexure-I. The respondents (State and the complainant Minimul V.K.) submit that the final report, along with subsequent statements under Section 161 CrPC, shows acts constituting the offences alleged. The court, evaluating the material, holds that the actions do not attract offences under 294(b) or 506(1) IPC and concludes there is abuse of process. Consequently, the petition is allowed and all further proceedings in CC 935/2015 are quashed. The judgment, delivered by Justice Gopinath P., is a single-judge decision quashing the proceedings and allowing the Crl.M.C. petition.
The Kerala High Court, in R.C.Rev. No.67 of 2023, heard a Rent Control revision challenging the Rent Control Court's order and the Appellate Authority's judgment regarding the maintainability of an eviction petition under Section 11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The eviction petition was filed by the Church of South India Trust Association (CSITA) against petitioners described as three linked lease matters in a single eviction petition: M/S. Sree Narayana Tourist Home, represented by its Managing Partner V.K. Sadanandan, and V.K. Sadanandan personally. The petition sought eviction in respect of three portions of a building (items 1–3) on grounds of rent default and arrears after CSITA alleged a tenancy relationship and default in payments. On appearance, respondents challenged the petition on technical grounds: misjoinder of three transactions in one eviction petition, lack of a valid authorization by the petitioner to file the petition (alleged inadequacy of the Power of Attorney), and absence of a landlord-tenant relationship within the Act. They relied on documents produced in court— leases and an apparent Power of Attorney—to argue the petition was not maintainable and that the matter involved title disputes and composite transactions. The Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority differed on these threshold questions. The High Court remitted the matter to the Appellate Authority to consider the appeal afresh with opportunity for hearing, ultimately allowing the revision petition and directing fresh consideration within a specified period. The judgment is delivered by a Division Bench comprising P.B. Suresh Kumar, J., and Sophy Thomas, J. on 26 May 2023.
WP(C) Nos. 8094/2022, 8212/2022, 16323/2022 These connected writ petitions challenge the proposed closure of Haji Essa Haji Moosa Memorial School (High School) and its Lower Primary section at Mattancherry. The manager petitioner sought permission to close the two institutions for the 2022-23 academic year under Section 7 of the Kerala Education Act and Rule 24 of Chapter V of the Kerala Education Rules; a prior rejection dated 18.08.2021 is under scrutiny. The court analyzes the statutory framework: Section 7(6) permits a manager to close a school with one year’s notice; Rule 24 prescribes notice before closure; the Right to Education Act (RTE) and its Rules, especially Rule 6(10), are invoked to argue that closures cannot be prohibited without recommendations and government sanction. Relying on a 2016 Division Bench decision (State of Kerala v. Manager, Aided Upper Primary School, Kozhikode) that Rule 6(10) is ultra vires, the court holds that RTE Rule 6(10) cannot constrain KE Act closures. The court cites a 2019 unreported case as a related discussion and notes ongoing availability of nearby schools to absorb students. Consequently, the petitions are allowed; the State is directed to accommodate about 178 students in nearby institutions, and the 16323/2022 petition by the PTA is dismissed as moot with liberty to seek clarification. LibeRTy for further relief is granted as applicable.
W.P.(Crl.) No. 275 of 2023 This is a writ petition (criminal) under Article 226 challenging FIR No.775/2021 registered at Aranmula Police Station, the final report, and proceedings in S.C. No.463/2021 before the Addl. Sessions Court-I (POCSO Special Court), Pathanamthitta. The victim, a 14-year-old girl, went missing on 28 July 2021. Her stepfather lodged a missing person report leading to FIR No.772/2021 under Section 57 of the Kerala Police Act to locate the missing person. The victim later disclosed, through a counsellor, that she was sexually assaulted, prompting FIR No.775/2021 under Sections 75 of the JJ Act and 7, 8, 9(l), 10 of the POCSO Act, and further investigation culminating in a final report in the same case. The petitioner submits that registering FIR No.775/2021 after closure of FIR No.772/2021 violates the principles in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 and Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of U.P. and Another (2021) 5 SCC 435, i.e., the prohibition on second FIRs for the same incident/transaction and Article 21 concerns. The State/Prosecution counters that the Section 57 inquiry aimed to locate the missing person and cannot be treated as CrPC 154 FIR, while cognizable offences disclosed in the victim’s statement justified a separate FIR. The High Court ultimately holds that TT Antony has no application on these facts, clarifies that Section 57 is not a CrPC 154 FIR, and dismisses the petition in limine: the information flow and investigation were within the proper scheme of Cr.P.C. and KP Act.
Harikumar challenges a conviction under Section 55(g) Abkari Act for possession of 70 litres of wash in two jerry cans near his residence at Adoor, Pathanamthitt a. He was convicted by the Addl. Sessions Court (Ad hoc II), Pathanamthitta, after trial in Sessions Case No. 607 of 2005, for possession of liquor in contravention of the Abkari Act. On appeal to the Kerala High Court, the prosecution relied on PWs 1–4 and Exts P1–P7, and MO 1–MO 2, but the defence raised multiple gaps in the chain of custody and the link to laboratory analysis. The appellant argued that the wash seized at the scene was not shown to have been sealed properly, that Ext P1 seizure mahazar lacks seal details, that the specimen seal was not produced for verification, and that the custody of the sample from 08.10.2003 to 05.11.2003 was unexplained; the arrest itself was questioned due to the presence of a crime number in Ext P2. The court cited Santhosh v. State of Kerala and other authorities to emphasize the need for a tamper-proof chain of custody and proper sealing, and to require forwarding notes and specimen seals to be produced. Observing the absence of proof of tamper-proof despatch of the sample to the laboratory, Ext P6’s evidentiary value was undermined, and the link to the accused was not established. The High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused, setting aside the conviction and sentence and directing his release.
This is a writ petition (WP(C) 17706 of 2021) filed in the Kerala High Court by Mable Kunjachan and Bejoy Thomas (UPSA, MAR Basil Higher Secondary School, Kothamangalam) challenging the 5th respondent school's direct recruitment notifications for the post of HSST (Chemistry). The petition contends that the post should be filled by transfer under Rule 4, Chapter XXXII of the Kerala Education Rules (KER), applying a 1:3 ratio to arising vacancies; only one vacancy arose in 2020-21, so the vacancy must be filled by transfer with the petitioner eligible for appointment. The petitioner also cites the Supreme Court decision in Girija V.K. v. Reshma Parayil and Others (2019) 2 SCC 347 to support vacancy-based filling of the HSST post. Exts. P5 and P6, which call for direct recruitment, are argued to be contrary to this position. The respondents opposed direct recruitment on grounds that vacancies must be filled according to arising vacancies and cadre strength, with the 3rd respondent to decide entitlement to by-transfer after hearing. On 02.09.2021, the court stayed Exts. P5-P6 to the extent of direct recruitment, and directed the 3rd respondent to decide the petitioner's entitlement by transfer. The judgment disposes of the petition with directions: file a representation within three weeks; the 3rd respondent to consider and decide within two months after hearing; all contentions left open; petitioner to furnish a certified copy of the judgment for compliance.
This High Court of Kerala, in a suo motu de novo proceeding initiated under TDB Report No.140 of 2014, examines the stalled construction of a Nettorkkottukavu Temple auditorium in Muvattupuzha under the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB). Initiated in 2009, the project began with sanctioned estimates for the ground floor (Rs 63 lakhs) and the first floor (Rs 96.9 lakhs), but commissioning was never completed and essential safety, soundproofing, fire protection, and finishing works remained undone. The Court issued multiple directions in 2014, directing the Board’s Secretary, Chief Engineer, and project engineer to appear and to file statements detailing expenditure and remaining requirements. An Advocate Commissioner and technical experts were appointed to inspect the building and assess estimates for completion. The Ombudsman’s reports highlighted cost overruns, tender irregularities, and a lack of progress, prompting the Court to consider guidelines for temple works, special rates, and the Board’s tendering and sanctioning process. In subsequent years, the Court again directed funds release on bond, supervised progress, and, ultimately, directed energisation of the transformer, with disputes about statutory payments and mains connections. The present order disposes the petition by directing a comprehensive statutory audit by the State Audit Department and by framing a DBAR process to audit income and expenditure, while mandating timely completion of remaining works and energisation.
