This is an appeal under MFA No.5 of 2014 (A) arising from WCC No.81/2005 before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Thiruvananthapuram. The deceased, Charles, died on 30 November 2004 while on duty as an electrician employed by the 3rd respondent. His parents filed a claim under section 22(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, seeking compensation for the loss sustained. The Commissioner held that the death arose out of and in the course of employment and that the insurer, The New India Assurance Company Limited, was liable to indemnify and thus directed payment of Rs.4,39,900 with 12% interest from the date of the accident. The insurer appealed, contending that the policy exclusion clause precluded payment of interest and that such interest could be contracted out of given the Insurance Act framework. The respondents argued that the exclusion is not absolute but conditional, and that the employer promptly informed the insurer and admitted the claim; thus interest should be payable. The High Court held that the exclusion clause is not absolute; it is conditional and the insurer must prove the employer's failure to comply with requirements under the WC Act. In this case no such proof was produced, while the employer had promptly informed the insurer and admitted the claim. Consequently, the insurer cannot escape liability for interest, and the appeal was dismissed with all interlocutory applications closed.
ITA Nos. 68/2017; 196/2019; 63/2019; 1/2018; 219/2019 This is a batch of consolidated Income Tax Appeals before the Kerala High Court challenging ITAT orders on the grant of deduction under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to Sahyadri Co-operative Credit Society Ltd (a multi-state cooperative society registered under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002). The lead ITA is 68/2017, with related matters ITA 196/2019, 63/2019, 1/2018, and 219/2019. The Court undertakes a holistic constitutional-legal examination of whether MSCS societies fall within the expression “co-operative society” under Section 2(19) and thus are eligible for 80P relief, despite the MSCS Act’s departure from state-level cooperatives. Relying on liberal interpretive principles for benevolent tax provisions (citing Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT; CIT v. Mahindra & Mahindra), and authoritative precedents such as Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Citizen Co-operative Society Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, the court holds that MSCS societies can come within the Section 2(19) definition and are entitled to 80P (2) deductions. The Tribunal’s findings on income from surplus funds are treated as either business or other sources and remanded to the AO in light of Peroorkada Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. The Court allows the Revenue’s objections on maintainability but ultimately disposes of the appeals in a manner favorable to the Assessee on key questions, with the second issue remitted for fresh adjudication.
This motor vehicle accident claim arises from an award of Rs.24,200 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kalpetta, in O.P.(MV) No.524/2003 (the petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988). The appellant, a minor aged 8, was injured when a motorcycle (KL-10/A-1174) ridden by the first respondent struck him on a public road. The insurer (third respondent) was held liable to indemnify the owner. The Tribunal awarded compensation under various heads: disability Rs.9,000; transportation Rs.500; extra nourishment Rs.1,000; damage to clothing and articles Rs.200; bystander’s expenses Rs.500; medical expenses Rs.7,000; pain and suffering Rs.6,000; total Rs.24,200. Ext.C1 records a 4% permanent disability. The sole issue on appeal is enhancement of the compensation. Relying on Master Mallikarjun v. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. (AIR 2014 SC 736), the High Court recalculates the compensation for a child with permanent disability and determines a higher entitlement. The court fixes a new total of Rs.1,25,000 for the heads considered and holds that the claimant is entitled to an additional Rs.1,00,800 over the Tribunal’s award, with interest at 8% per annum from the petition date, excluding a condoned delay of 1017 days. The insurer is directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months. The appeal is disposed of; no costs are awarded.
W.P.(C) No.8433 OF 2021(D) The petitioner, Alkem Laboratories Limited, filed this Article 226 petition seeking a writ of mandamus to ensure adequate protection for its business activities and a peaceful working atmosphere for its managers, and protection of its property and products from threats or obstruction by the 11th respondent (KMSRA) and its members. It alleges that during field visits to hospitals, the association’s members appear in large numbers, abuse the managers, and threaten consequences, hindering operations. The petitioner furnished numerous complaints before various Station House Officers seeking police protection and action against the miscreants, and urged the court to intervene. The Government Pleader submitted that the issues are being addressed in conciliation proceedings before the District Labour Officer and that protection should be provided if there is a threat to law and order. The court reiterates the Kerala Police Act, 2011, with Section 3 mandating impartial enforcement and protection of life, liberty and property, and Section 4 detailing police functions. Relying on Manohar Lal Sharma and Ankush Maruti Shinde, and Gujarat Steel Tubes, the court recognizes the police’s essential protective role within constitutional bounds. The petition is disposed of with directions to the Station House Officers (SHOs) to prevent threats to law and order, to provide protection on request, and to ensure cooperation with pending conciliation, while permitting democratic protests without obstruction.
Challenge in this writ petition is against Exhibit P6, an assessment order under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975. The petitioners claim to be the power of attorney holders of the owners of three units and contend that the tax ought to be assessed separately for each unit rather than as a single building. They point to earlier rounds in this court where Exhibit P4 (2007) set aside combined assessment and Exhibit P5 (2012) allowed evidence on separate construction under Bavasons Constructions (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, with a fresh opportunity to prove unitwise construction. Exhibit P6, issued after those judgments, is challenged on the ground that relevant factual aspects were not adequately considered. The respondents rely on the statutory definition of 'owner' under Section 2(e) and its Explanation 2, which provides that where a building consists of different apartments owned by different persons and the cost of construction was met jointly, each unit may be deemed a separate building. The court reviews Bavasons and Varghese P.D. v. State of Kerala (2013) to reiterate that the benefit of Explanation 2 requires proof of separate ownership and joint funding; in the absence of such evidence, the building must be assessed as a single unit. The court ultimately holds that the petitioners, who carried out construction through power of attorney, remain liable to pay building tax for the entire building; the petition is dismissed with directions regarding credit for payments and interest.
This is a bail application under Section 438 of the CrPC filed by Anoop Nair and Sudha Devi in Crime No. 1058/2020 of Chavara Thekkumbhagam Police Station, Kollam, alleging offences under 498A read with 34 IPC and Section 66E IT Act, 2000. The prosecution’s case is that the petitioners subjected the defacto complainant to mental and physical harassment, including alleged misuse of nude photographs, allegedly in violation of a Grama Nyayalaya order (Annexure-A1). The petitioners contest the allegations, claiming the matrimonial relationship continues and asserting willingness to comply with conditions if bail is granted. The respondent State, represented by the Public Prosecutor, opposes bail, citing need for custodial interrogation and potential harm to the complainant. The defacto complainant, through her counsel, opposes bail on grounds of alleged misuse of photographs and breach of court orders. The court, after hearing, notes the ongoing matrimonial link and emphasizes safeguarding fair trial while considering public health guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing Supreme Court directions on prison contagion and the bail principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception. The judge ultimately allows bail with stringent conditions to balance interests and societal concerns, including interrogation timelines, bond/sureties, travel restrictions, and compliance with distancing norms.
This High Court of Kerala decision arises from a criminal misc. petition (Crl.M.C. No.6937/2019) filed by Nagarajan challenging an order under Section 451 CrPC. A jewellery shop owner, Nagarajan, was robbed of gold and silver ornaments worth Rs. 9,00,000 in August 2019; Crime No. 250/2019 was registered at Walayar Police Station under Section 392 read with Section 34 IPC. The seized ornaments were produced in court, and an interim custody order (Annexure-A) allowed keeping them with the owner under conditions, including a non-alienation clause until final disposal. Nagarajan sought deletion of the condition and permission to sell the ornaments, claiming the items form his entire stock and that sale would protect his livelihood. Annexure-B, denying sale, was challenged. The State opposed wholesale sale but acknowledged that sale with safeguards might be permissible if identity of the property is preserved. The Court examined Section 451 CrPC, and precedents including Basavva Kom Dyamogouda Patil v. State of Mysore, Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, and K.W. Ganapathy v. State of Karnataka to balance the owner’s livelihood against the prosecution’s need for evidence. The High Court ultimately held that sale could be permitted with proper safeguards, inventory, photographs, and signatures, setting aside Annexure-B and allowing sale under specified conditions.
This writ petition concerns admission to the 2017-18 BAMS course under the 15% Non-Resident Indian (NRI) quota. The first petitioner is a self-financing Ayurveda college; petitioners 2 and 3 are students seeking admission under the NRI quota at the 1st petitioner college. The Admission Supervisory Committee called for lists of admitted candidates and supporting documents. The Committee approved the admissions for all except petitioners 2 and 3, withholding the NRI admissions on the ground that they had not produced the employment details/embassy certificate/visa copy of their sponsor to establish their right to admission. Petitioners submitted additional documents, but the Committee remained doubtful about genuineness of the certificates. The case then turned to whether petitioners fall within the statutory NRI quota under the Kerala Act, 2006, and particularly whether petitioners are “dependants” of their sponsors as required by Ext.P2 clarifications. The judgment canvasses jurisprudence from TMA Pai Foundation, Islamic Academy, and P.A. Inamdar, and emphasizes that NRI seats are limited to 15% and must be used bonafide by NRIs with merit within the quota. It also constrains the meaning of “dependant” to those who are truly dependent. The Court ultimately holds that petitioners 2 and 3 failed to prove dependency and were ineligible for NRI seats; the writ petition is dismissed with no costs.
OP(C).No. 2988 of 2014 (O) This is an original petition under OP(C).No. 2988 of 2014 (O) before the Kerala High Court, challenging an order in I.A.3120/2014 in O.S.54/2009 before the Additional Munsiff, Palakkad. The suit is for partition and the parties claim tenancy rights in a certain property derived from Chathu. The petitioners, led by Unnikrishnan (the 8th plaintiff), contend that tenancy rights are to be determined under Section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, and that the question of tenancy can and should be referred to the Land Tribunal for resolution. They assert that the property belongs to Chathu and that the plaintiffs are his descendants who derive rights by succession; hence, tenancy rights are intertwined with title. The respondents contend that Chathu was not the tenant; his grandson Kannappan was the tenant, making the tenancy issue a matter of title rather than a separate tenancy determination to be referred. The court cites established authorities, notably Balakrishnan Nair v. Radha Amma (1987) and Sivakami v. Kumaraswamy (1998), to emphasize that in rival title claims the tenancy question effectively becomes a title dispute and need not be referred in all circumstances. Having considered the well-settled law and the impugned order, the court finds no illegality and dismisses the Original Petition. This results in the tenancy issue being resolved within the partition suit itself, rather than through a Land Tribunal reference.
This is a Rent Control Revision from Kerala High Court (Division Bench) involving Abdul Samad (tenant) challenging eviction orders under Sec.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act passed by the Rent Control Court and affirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The landlady, Amina C. (represented by power of attorney holder Ahmmedkutty), sought to recover possession to accommodate her husband for conducting a vegetable business. The courts below held the need bona fide and did not accept the tenant’s defenses under Sec.11(3) provisos. The tenant contended technical issues: (i) the petitioner was not the landlady; (ii) the power of attorney did not authorize filing the petition or evidence; and (iii) Sec.15 bar due to a prior proceedings. The High Court examined Ext A1 (POA) and Ext A2 (lease) and PW1’s testimony, noting that the husband, though not a party, could testify for the landlady under Sec.120 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that the petitioner remained the owner. It relied on Radha Lekshmi G. v. Indian Saree House to interpret Sec.15 and dismissed the revision, but granted the tenant eight months to vacate with conditions, including affidavit, arrears clearance, and continuous rent payment to the date of vacating.
This writ petition challenges Exts. P3 and P4 orders passed under Section 68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act against nine members of the Board of Management of Melukavu Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. The petitioners had approved an investment of Rs 25 lakh in SBI Mutual Fund on 22.12.2006, which was withdrawn on 05.05.2014, earning a profit of Rs 7,99,696. The authorities contended that the investment violated a Registrar’s decision dated 13.12.2006 and triggered surcharge proceedings under Section 68. The court first clarifies that the circular relied upon by the impugned orders post-dates the decision and that Section 68 must be triggered only when the loss to the society is the result of wilful negligence or mis-management. It follows the precedent in A.K. Francis v. Joint Registrar to emphasise that negligence alone is not enough; mens rea is required and adequate material must demonstrate breach of trust, wilful negligence, misappropriation or fraud. The court notes that the society did not suffer any loss; rather, the deposit yielded profit. It considers the element of risk in mutual fund investments and the discretionary powers of management. Consequently, the impugned orders are set aside and the writ petition is allowed, as the invoked reliance on Section 68 was unsustainable given the lack of loss and mens rea."
7269/2019; 7270/2019; 7271/2019 This is a bail application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. filed by V.K. Beena, a veteran advocate, who stands as the sole accused in Crime Nos. 3172/2014, 3255/2014 and 3171/2014 registered at Muvattupuzha Police Station. The allegations center on manipulation of complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the Power of Attorney Holder of Gokulam Chits & Finance Co., with the accused accused of re-presenting returned complaints after allegedly altering dates in orders passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thodupuzha. The prosecution contends that Beena, acting as counsel for the chit company, had received the returned complaints and re-presented them before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Muvattupuzha, and that handwriting and signature analysis pointed to her involvement. Investigation witnessed attempts to obtain 311A statements and, after forensic examination, the expert report indicated similarities in writing between the sample and the contested documents, leading to an assertion that the accused obtained the complaints and presented them. The defense argues that the handwriting report does not conclusively establish manipulation by Beena, noting her long-standing reputation and absence of compelling material linking her to alterations. The court emphasized that the handwriting report did not prove she altered dates and concluded that custodial interrogation was unnecessary. Consequently, the court allowed pre-arrest bail with conditions, balancing investigation needs with Beena’s rights as a seasoned professional.
OP(C). No. 2496 of 2016 (O) This is an original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed in the Kerala High Court by the Election Commission challenging nominations rejected during the election process for the Alappuzha Anandanarayanapuram Thuravur Thirumala Devaswom election. The Devaswom, a Hindu public religious trust governed by a district-court–framed scheme (OS.8/1958), is under the Court’s parens patriae supervision to ensure scheme-compliant conduct of elections. The District Court initially entertained the challenge to nominations, with a non-speaking order, which this Court later set aside to re-examine maintainability and the merits. The Election Commission contended that once the nomination process began, interference by the courts was improper except via a proper election petition after the election concludes. The petitioner argued that maintainability of the petition should be recognized under the Scheme. The respondents contended the District Court’s order was proper and that rejection of nominations was warranted, and argued against court intervention during ongoing proceedings. The Kerala High Court, invoking its parens patriae role to protect the Scheme, examined whether the lower court’s maintainability ruling was correct. It concluded there was no maintainability issue to disturb the order, and dismissed the petition, while permitting the Election Commission to fix a new schedule for completing the process from the halted stage, in line with the impugned order.
Crl.A. No. 1168 of 2011 (A) The appellant, Sujatha, was convicted under Sections 302 (murder) and 309 (attempt to commit suicide) of the IPC in Sessions Case No. 1350 of 2009 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Kollam. The prosecution case is that Sujatha and PW11 Raju lived as man and wife and had a son, Abhiraj, while Sujatha was about seven months pregnant at the time of the alleged crime. Sujatha allegedly suspected that PW11’s marriage to CW13 Jisha was aided by her mother-in-law, Ponnamma, and she sought property from PW11. Four days prior to the incident Sujatha and her children began residing with the deceased. On the night of 01/05/2004 to 02/05/2004, Ponnamma was killed by a head injury inflicted with a wooden piece (M.O.3) and Abhiraj was smothered; Sujatha then cut her own wrists with M.O.6 blades. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence: witness accounts (PW1–PW16), DNA/Blood test results (M.O.3 showing blood; M.O.14/15 linkage), autopsy findings (Ponnamma’s multiple injuries; Abhiraj’s asphyxia). The defence contended outsiders could have been involved and pointed to gaps in the chain, including non-robbery motive, lack of direct eyewitness, and questioned the reliability of some hostile witnesses. The High Court, applying the Sarad Birdhichand standard, found the chain of circumstantial evidence complete and consistent with the appellant’s guilt, dismissed the appeal, and upheld the conviction and sentence. The order directs Sujatha to serve the sentence with bail cancelled.
WP(C) No. 35764 of 2015 (U) The petitioners, O.P. Raju and M.K. Sarojini, challenge directives directing retirement at the age of 58 for employees of the Kerala Sarvodaya Sangh Khadi Gramodhyog Bhavan, asserting Ext.P1 fixes retirement at 60. They contend that service conditions prescribe 60 as the retirement age and that the administrative actions leading to 58 were not properly authorised. The respondents filed counter affidavits raising maintainability against the 2nd respondent, a society, arguing it may not come within Article 12. The court examines whether the 2nd respondent should be treated as a State instrumentality, invoking the Constitution Bench decision in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others, which endorses a broad concept of State action through instrumentality and control. The court also notes the four indicia of State action derived from Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and elaborated in Pradeep Kumar Biswas, including State financial support with control, public function, provision of important public service, and whether the operation is for the Government’s benefit. The court rejects the contention that the 2nd respondent is outside Article 12, finding it satisfies the indicia and is a State instrumentality. On retirement, Ext.P1 prescribes 60; no evidence of a valid amendment is shown. The petition is allowed; the retirement age is 60, with full salary due up to superannuation. Interim salary restrictions are lifted; no costs.
This is an election petition challenging the 2014 election of Dr. Sasi Tharoor from the Thiruvananthapuram parliamentary seat, filed by Elias John, a voter, under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The petitioner alleges corrupt practices based on declarations in two booklets (Annexures D and E) that purportedly highlighted development achievements in the constituency. On information obtained through RTI, the petitioner contends that several tall claims were false and made with the intent to influence voters, thereby violating Section 123(2) (undue influence) and Section 100(1)(b) of the RP Act, and ultimately vitiating the election. The respondent denies the allegations, arguing the petition is not maintainable and lacks the required particulars under Section 83 RP Act, 1951, asserting that Annexures D and E were published before nomination and that, even if untrue, the acts do not constitute corrupt practices under Section 123. The High Court engages in a comprehensive review of pleadings, the material facts and full particulars, and the onus of proof in corruption claims, drawing on a line of decisions including Hari Shanker Jain, Moidutty, Ananga Uday, CP John, Alauddin Khan, and others. It concludes that pleadings are deficient, the alleged acts do not fit within the enumerated corrupt practices, and that the petition fails to present triable issues. Ultimately, the court rejects the petition under Order VII Rule 1 CPC, dismissing the challenge to the election.
Cheerapurath Haris and the Indian Union Muslim League challenged an eviction order under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The petition schedule building was rented to the first respondent to impart religious education under Exhibit A1. The first respondent, as President of the IUML, asserted a right to use the premises for the second respondent's party office, arguing that the second respondent, a distinct legal entity, occupied the property with his permission. The Rent Control Court, and later the Rent Control Appellate Authority, held that the second respondent was in exclusive possession, effectively constituting a sublease, and thus ordered eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act. The revision petitioners contended that the tenancy was created in the first respondent's personal capacity and could not be equated with occupation by the second respondent; evidence included PW1 and RW1, plus a Commission report Exhibit C1 showing flags and a board 'C.H Center' at the premises. The court relied on Armughan v. Rajasekharan (1999) to note that when physical possession by a sublessee is established, the initial burden shifts to the tenant to show the relationship. The High Court concluded that the second respondent's occupancy was manifest, and that the rights and liabilities flow from Ext. A1. The revision petition was dismissed; the court granted two months to vacate subject to an affidavit to surrender possession.
Crl.M.C.No.6936 of 2019 (F) This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.M.C.6936/2019) involving Sarath Kumar, accused under Sec.22(b) NDPS Act, challenging an order by the trial court dismissing his request to have a village officer prepare a scaled plan showing five landmarks, to be produced in court, under Sec.91 Cr.P.C read with Sec.233(3) Cr.P.C. The court’s decision hinges on the scope of Sec.91 and the principle that a process under Sec.233(3) is limited to producing existing documents or things, not to creating new ones. The petitioner sought a new document (a plan) not in existence, arguing the investigation required an accurate sketch, a request the trial court refused. The High Court affirmed that Sec.91 contemplates producing documents believed to be in someone’s possession, not the pre-trial preparation of new documents. It rejected reliance on Angadh v. State of Maharashtra (2007) to compel creation of a plan, clarifying that Angadh concerned production of statements under Sec.161 Cr.P.C. It also discussed Koshy @ Baby v. State (1991 KLJ 453), which criticized sketch preparation but stated as guidance for sessions judges rather than a broad right for accuseds. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as lacking merit, reinforcing the limits of directives under Sec.91/ Sec.233(3).
OP (FC) No. 114 of 2017 (R) This is an original petition (OP (FC) No. 114 of 2017) before the Kerala High Court challenging orders in I.A. Nos. 1482/2015 and 1483/2015 in O.P. No. 952/2010 of the Family Court, Malappuram. The petitioners are Assainar and his wife Hafsath; respondents 1–3 are Sabira (wife of the 4th respondent) and her minors Asna and Bilal, and 4th respondent Rafeeq, the petitioners’ son. An ex parte decree dated 5 July 2011 (Ext. P3) directed the 4th respondent and the petitioners to return 45 sovereigns of gold and Rs. 5,50,000. The petitioners learned of the decree only after execution and contended that their son had conducted the case and failed to apprise them. They moved I.A. 1482/2015 (condonation of delay) and I.A. 1483/2015 (set aside ex parte decree). The Family Court granted relief but on onerous terms: deposit 30% of the decree amount and pay Rs. 10,000 as costs. The petitioners argued lack of opportunity, possible collusion, and material hardship, asserting they should have a fair opportunity to contest. The High Court held that such a deposit condition is too onerous and set it aside, while preserving the decree against the 4th respondent and directing that the petitioners be permitted to contest within six months. The court also noted that notice to the 4th respondent was not strictly necessary for the disposal of the petition.
This is a Rent Control Revision under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, heard by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. T.V. Rajan, the landlord/petitioner, challenged concurrent orders of the Rent Control Court and Rent Control Appellate Authority which had dismissed his eviction petition on the ground of lack of proven bona fide need and protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3). Rajan claimed a bona fide need to start a hardware shop in the petitioned premises and argued that several neighboring rooms were already vacant or were vacated by tenants during proceedings, making the entire building necessary for his business. Keezhatta Abdul Nazer, the tenant, contended that the landlord’s need was pretextual, that the landlord had other sources of income, and that no credible proof showed no viable alternative arrangements in the locality. The Rent Control Court granted eviction under 11(3); the Appellate Authority confirmed. On revision, the High Court reaffirms the concurrent findings, holding that the bona fide need is proven and that the landlord is not shielded by the first or second provisos to Section 11(3) due to lack of adequate evidence from the tenant about income and alternatives. The court ultimately dismisses the revision petition but grants six months to vacate with conditions, emphasizing the evidentiary burden to prove bona fides and availability of alternative spaces.
