This is a Kerala High Court writ petition (WP(C) No.41661/2022) by Leneesh M. Paul challenging a SARFAESI-related recovery action initiated by South Indian Bank for a cash credit facility default. The bank issued a notice under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. The petitioner does not dispute the liability or the merits of the proceedings but seeks time to clear the outstanding sum in installments. The bank's counsel submitted that writ petition under Article 226 is generally not maintainable in SARFAESI matters and that remedy lies in filing a securitization application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act; they also cited several authorities including United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others and other precedents. The petitioner’s counsel argued for a supervisory intercession to permit installment payments, drawing on Sundaram BNP Paribas Home Finance Ltd. v. Nisha (2016) KHC 167, which had accommodated installments in a similar scenario. The court acknowledged that the petitioner is not challenging the proceedings on merits and that the bar of strict SARFAESI jurisprudence may not apply mechanically. It ultimately disposed of the petition by permitting twelve equal monthly installments totaling Rs. 9,79,152.67, with conditions including a first payment by 10 February 2023 and coercive proceedings kept in abeyance.
This Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA No.1252 of 2014) arises from an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, granted by the MACT, Muvattupuzha in O.P.(MV) No.841 of 2009. The appellant challenged the quantum of compensation, contending that the award of Rs. 1,83,700 with 8% interest was inadequate, particularly for permanent disability (7%). The insurer-respondent obtained a liberty to recover amounts from the cross-objector if required, though the cross-objection only attacked quantum as exorbitant. The respondents argued the compensation was already exorbitant. On appeal, the court scrutinized the computation of income and the multiplier used. The Tribunal had fixed the monthly income notionally at Rs. 6,000 despite Ext. A9 showing higher earnings (Rs. 11,466 gross, Rs. 10,961 net). It applied a multiplier of 8 based on the appellant’s age (33 years) at the time of accident, considering KS E B superannuation. The High Court, applying Sarla Verma guidelines and Pranay Sethi’s later articulation, held that permanent disability is compensation for loss of bodily integrity and is not barred by absence of earnings loss; the multiplier must reflect age and future earnings. It concluded the Tribunal erred in both multiplier and multiplicand, re-quantified compensation for permanent disability, and allowed the appeal. The cross-objection was dismissed. The court directed deposit of additional compensation with interest and retained the Tribunal’s liberty against recovery.”
This Kerala High Court matrimonial appeal arises from OP No.424/2005 before the Family Court, Kottayam, which decreed in favor of the 2nd party that the petition schedule property belonged to the 1st respondent and that Ext.A2 settlement deed was not binding on him, while restraining trespass. The appellant, K.M. Mathew @ Dayee, challenged the Family Court’s decree contending that Ext.A3, the Power of Attorney (POA) used to execute the gift deed, was fraudulently created and that the original POA was never produced; thus the lower court erred in shifting the onus of proving genuineness onto him. The respondents argued that fraud was indeed contemplated and that the POA aided in transferring property in the 1st respondent’s favour. The High Court examined whether a photostat copy of a Power of Attorney could be received as secondary evidence and whether Section 85’s presumption in favor of notarized instruments could sustain a registration-based transfer. It discussed several authorities on notarization, foreign notaries, and the presumption of due execution, noting that the original POA was not produced but that the photostat could be treated as secondary evidence if properly grounded under Section 65. Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the Family Court’s judgment, and held that the registration/POA could be considered under the statutory presumption.
This intra-court writ appeal (WA No. 1618 of 2016) arises from an order dated 02.11.2015 in WPC No.11615 of 2014, challenging the Kerala authorities’ insistence on licensing certain Ayurvedic preparations containing self-generated alcohol under the Kerala Spirituous Preparations (Control) Rules, 1969. The appellant, a registered Ayurvedic practitioner with Form 25-D licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the 1945 Rules, contends that after the GST regime repealed the 1955 Act, there is no necessity to obtain SP VI/VII licences for the wholesale/retail sale of Arishtas and Asavas manufactured under Form L-2. He asserts repugnancy between Central and State legislations (Article 254) and relies on earlier precedents (e.g., Thirumuruga Kirupananda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal) to argue Central law prevails in case of inconsistency. The State counters that SP VI/ SP VII licences are required under the 1969 Rules for spirituous preparations and that the State can regulate such activities under the Abkari Act and the 1940 Act, with references to CSR and other authorities, including Priyamvada and State of Bihar v. Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan. The High Court accepted the single-judge view and dismissed the appeal, endorsing the legality of the State’s licensing regime and the pre-eminence of central law only where repugnancy is established. The court ultimately held the appeal devoid of merit.
This is a Kerala High Court ruling by Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V, dated 15 February 2017, in Crl.MC.No.8671 of 2016 arising from CC No.355 of 2015 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Perinthalmanna. The petition under Section 482 CrPC seeks to quash proceedings initiated on an FIR registered at Perinthalmanna Police Station (Crime No.1088 of 2015) for offences under Sections 447, 341, 326 read with Section 34 IPC, leading to a pending trial. The petitioners, Unnenkutty and Muhammedali, contend that a settlement has been arrived at between the parties, supported by the second respondent’s affidavit and mediated by well-wishers, and that continuing the criminal proceedings would be a futile exercise. The learned Public Prosecutor expressed reservations but did not oppose the principle of settlement. The court invokes established jurisprudence, citing Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, to hold that in appropriate cases, High Courts can quash criminal proceedings where an amicable settlement ensures ends of justice and prevents abuse of the process. After weighing the circumstances, the court concludes that quashing is warranted; the final report and proceedings against the petitioners are quashed, and CC No.355 of 2015 is terminated.
This is a criminal miscellaneous case under Section 482 CrPC challenging the proceedings in S.C. No. 62 of 2015 before the I Additional Sessions Court (Special Court for the Trial of offences relating to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act) Kollam. Abdul Rahman @ Riyas, the accused, allegedly committed offences including rape under POCSO and related crimes (IPC 366, 376) based on Crime No. 725/2014 of Kottiyam Police Station. During pending investigations, the couple, Abdul Rahman and the 3rd respondent (Radhamani’s daughter Saranya Prakash) grew closer, eloped, and later married under the Special Marriage Act, thereafter living as husband and wife. The 3rd respondent’s family filed affidavits stating no grievance, and the 2nd respondent supported continuing life after settlement. The police concluded cognizable offences; a final report was submitted. The applicant contends that, given the settlement and marriage, continuing prosecution would cause grave hardship and that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC allows quashing in appropriate circumstances, especially where offences are not heinous. The court recognizes the settled principles (Gian Singh; Narinder Singh) and the non-compoundability of rape, yet, in view of the peculiar facts, grants quashing to prevent injustice and undue social strain, quashing the final report and proceedings in SC 62/2015.
This intra-court appeal challenges a Single Judge’s 7 June 2023 order in W.P.(C) No.16541/2023, which directed the Notified Registrar (Deputy Director, Dairy Development Department) to constitute an Administrative Committee from among the present Managing Committee to manage day-to-day affairs of Kampalady Ksheerolpadaka Co-operative Society till elections scheduled for 10 July 2023. The appellants (Nazarudeen P., Basheer M., and Shaji Navas B) contend that the Judiciary’s invocation of Sec.33 of the Kerala Co‑operative Societies Act, 1969, to appoint an administrator or an administrative committee must be confined to the enumerated contingencies, such as expiry of term when a new committee has not been constituted, or where quorum or regular meetings are not possible, among others. They submit that the writ petitioners’ case requires the Society’s presence as a party and that the impugned directions were issued without proper notice, violating statutory safeguards, and that Sec.33(1)(b) should be invoked only after considering objections and hearing affected parties. The respondents argue for a mandamus to appoint an administrative body and to resume elections, insisting that the Registrar’s powers under Sec.33 are applicable. The court, however, emphasizes that the Cooperative Society should be heard, and that the Registrar must exercise discretion under Sec.33(1)(b) afresh, with due notice, within a narrow timeframe, keeping the ad hoc arrangement in place until a fresh order is issued. The appeal ultimately sets aside the impugned judgment and remands for fresh consideration by the Notified Registrar.
This High Court of Kerala (Ernakulam) O.T. Appeal No.2 of 2019 concerns the penalty order issued under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for the assessment year 2013-14. Jalaludeen Global Wood Industries, a registered timber dealer, challenged Annexure C (30.10.2018) issued by the Commissioner of State Taxes in suo motu revision under Section 58, which set aside the earlier revisional order and restored the initial penalty order (Annexure A). The sequence began with an Intelligence Officer’s penalty for suppression of turnover, based on a sale of imported teak logs not reflected in returns (Rs.9,04,050), with a proposed penalty of twice the evaded tax. The first revisional authority (Annexure B, 2016) reduced the penalty to Rs.15,927, limiting it to tax evaded on the value addition of Rs.1,09,842, while accepting the appellant’s contention of a lower gross margin (12.15%). The Commissioner’s suo motu revision (Annexure C) then restored Annexure A, prompting this appeal. The appellant argues that amendments post-2017 affect the Commissioner’s revisional power and that input tax credit cannot be claimed for suppressed purchases. The Revenue counters that input tax credit must be supported by returns and proper invoices. The court held that the revisional power under Section 58 remains available and guaranteed by law, criticized the cryptic reasoning of Annexure B, and ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the revenue’s order.
Meera, the petitioner and mother of Ajual.R., aged about 2.5 years, challenged a Family Court Palakkad order that denied interim custody to her and granted limited visitation to the father. She filed O.P. (FC) No. 28/2023 under Article 227 of the Constitution, seeking relief against Ext. P4 (the Family Court’s 09.12.2022 order in I.A. No. 2/2022 in O.P. No. 796/2022). The Family Court, after considering reports from police, the Dy.S.P., and the Child Welfare Committee, held that the child was living with the respondent father and refused interim custody to the mother, allowing only interaction on specified Saturdays. The petitioner claimed the child is breastfed and that denial of custody jeopardizes the child’s welfare and safety. The respondent opposed the petition, arguing welfare considerations and the maintenance of custody arrangements already in place. The Kerala High Court, while acknowledging the primacy of the child’s welfare and referring to established principles, found the Family Court’s reasoning inadequate and inconsistent with the welfare-centric approach. The High Court set aside Ext. P4, allowed the interim custody petition (I.A. 2/2022), and directed the father to hand over custody to the mother within a week, with defined visitation rights and a process to facilitate interaction through the CMOs. The decision reaffirms the welfare of the child as the governing standard in custody disputes.
Ranjith A, the petitioner in BA No.443 of 2024, approached this High Court under Section 438 CrPC seeking pre-arrest bail in Crime No.775/2023 registered at Karimannoor Police Station, Idukki, for offences under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 34 IPC. The crux of the prosecution case is that the petitioner misrepresented to the defacto complainant and others that he would secure an employment visa abroad (Czechoslovakia) and, in reliance on this promise, the complainant transferred Rs.3,93,500 via Google Pay. The money was not returned, leading to allegations of cheating/custodial offences. The petitioner’s counsel submits that the applicant is innocent, has no criminal antecedents, and is prepared to comply with stringent conditions and cooperate with the investigation, contending that custodial interrogation is not presently necessary. The Public Prosecutor opposes bail, arguing that the amount was received under a deceitful scheme, necessitating custodial interrogation to locate and recover the amount, and that grant of bail could impede proper investigation. The court references Supreme Court guidance on anticipatory/pre-arrest bail from Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre, Sibbia, Jai Prakash Singh, and P. Chidambaram to underscore that bail powers are extraordinary and must be exercised with caution, but concludes that the petitioner has not shown exceptional grounds for pre-arrest bail at this stage.
This is a bail application under Section 438 CrPC filed by accused 1 to 3 in Crime No.892/2023 of the Vandanmedu Police Station, Idukki, arising from an incident on 22.12.2023 in which eight accused allegedly formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted the de facto complainant with an iron rod, causing grievous injuries. The petitioners contend they are innocent and falsely implicated; they point to the FIR and injury details as not alarming, argue that Section 326 was included to bar bail, have no criminal antecedents, and claim custodial interrogation is unnecessary though they are willing to comply with conditions. The respondent State, through the Public Prosecutor, counters that the injured victims sustained serious injuries, including Jithu Jose with facial fractures and other injuries, and that custodial interrogation is necessary at this preliminary stage to recover and unearth the facts, with a risk of witness tampering if bail is granted. The court cites Supreme Court jurisprudence on anticipatory bail, including Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, 2011, (no inflexible guidelines) and Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar (2012) emphasizing that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary privilege to be granted only in exceptional cases; and Sibbia (1980) on prudent discretion. After careful consideration, the court finds no exceptional grounds to grant anticipatory bail and dismisses the application, while directing surrender within 10 days for potential re consideration by the appropriate court on merits.
BAIL APPL. NO. 445 OF 2024 This is a second bail application under Section 439 CrPC filed by accused 1 to 3 in Crime No.963/2023 of KunNamangalラム Police Station, Kozhikode, alleging offences under Sections 365, 341, 323 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC. The petitioners were arrested on 20.11.2023. The prosecution case is that on 15.11.2023 at about 16:30 hours, the accused forcibly compelled the younger brother of the de facto complainant to get into a car near KMCT Engineering College and brutally assaulted him, resulting in grievous injuries. The earlier bail petition was dismissed on the ground that the injured was in a comatose state and cannot record a statement; hospital records later showed discharge on 05.12.2023, leading to the argument that the injured was not in coma. The court notes that the petitioners have been in custody for over 63 days and that the investigation is practically complete with recoveries to be effected if necessary. The Public Prosecutor opposed grant of bail, maintaining ongoing investigation. After considering these materials, the Judge concludes that the petitioners are entitled to bail subject to stringent conditions. The order grants bail on bonds of Rs.50,000 each with two solvent sureties, and imposes conditions including regular appearance, non-interference with witnesses, prohibition against new offences, surrender of passports, and a provision for cancellation or modification of bail if violated. The court also cites a Supreme Court principle via Sushila Aggarwal to permit recoveries on information while on bail.
M/S AA Nuts, a partnership firm, challenges an ex parte gratuity award under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The 4th respondent employee claimed gratuity for service from 21.06.1990 to 31.12.2018, with last drawn salary of Rs. 20,000, and requested the employer to determine and pay gratuity. The controlling authority issued notice, but the notice was returned with a postal endorsement “intimation 06.07.2022.” Finding willful refusal of notice, the authority declared the employer ex parte on 21.12.2022 and passed Ext.P1, directing payment of Rs. 3,34,615/- with 10% interest from 01.01.2019. The petitioner contends it did not receive notice, and therefore had no opportunity to participate; it invoked Rule 11(5) of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972, arguing that deemed service and ex parte hearing are permissible; it sought to rehear the matter via Ext.P2. The respondent state counters that the notice was deemed served and the ex parte order valid; the second proviso to Section 7(7) bars review under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC, and the remedy sought in the writ is untenable. The court ultimately holds that the remedy under Order 9 Rule 13 is not available given the appeal was dismissed for non-deposit, and dismisses the writ petition, upholding Ext.P1.
The writ petition, filed under WP(C) 21146 of 2014, challenges a 2014 best-judgment assessment under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (KVAT Act) on Srinivasa Builders for alleged turnover related to wind‑mill imports and installation at Ramakkalmedu, Idukki. The petitioner contends that electricity is not “goods” under Section 2(xx) of the KVAT Act, and hence sale or turnover from electrical energy cannot be taxed, with electricity already exempt in the 1st Schedule. The windmill project, approved in 2007–2008, involved imports and a supply contract with Vestas; the wind turbine remained operational, supplying power to KSEB as evidenced by Ext.P15, Ext.P22–P24 and Ext.P16. In 2014, the department issued Ext.P19 and Ext.P20 notices under Section 25(1) seeking best-judgment assessment, based on the assertion that three consignments of windmill parts were imported and disposed of in the year under assessment. The petitioner argued there was only one windmill transported in three parts, and that electricity, being exempt, could not constitute escaped turnover. The court held that Ext.P20 failed to satisfy the ingredients of Section 25(1), set aside Ext.P19 and Ext.P20 (and Ext.P26), and allowed the writ petition, emphasizing the need for fair procedure and reasonable opportunity before best-judgment assessments. The decision cites Shamon K.S. and Suzion Infrastructure for the required procedural safeguards.
This writ petition challenges the appointment process for the post of Kazhakam-cum-clerk at Sree Marakkatteeri Mahadeva Temple, Cheruvayur. The petitioner contends that Ext. P2 notification, which issued the recruitment call, together with Exts. P4 (appointment of the 8th respondent) and P7 (interview procedures) are invalid because the fit-person appointed under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 had no power to conduct regular appointments. Ext. P1 shows the 6th respondent was appointed as a fit person with broad powers until a Trustees’ board could be formed. The petitioner argues that the fit person’s role was limited to day-to-day administration and could not authorise recruitment to permanent vacancies, and that Ext. P7 was issued in violation of Ext. P8 circular. The respondents counter that Sections 45, 47, 48 and 58 of the 1951 Act empower a fit person to act pending disposal or formation of a scheme, and that vacancies among non-hereditary offices may be filled by the trustee when authorised. The court, after examining the statutory provisions and the record, holds that the fit person’s appointment was not limited to a restricted purpose and that the petitioner, having participated in the selection process, cannot challenge the notification, its procedure, or the ensuing appointment. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed.”
This is a criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 CrPC filed by three petitioners—DEEPAKT.L, LALUT.L and THANKAYYANG—in CRL.MC No.5633 of 2023 challenging Crime No.1107/2023 of Neyyattinkara Police Station (Thiruvananthapuram). The accused faced offences under IPC sections 294(b), 341, and 323 read with 34. The petition argues for quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground of amicable settlement between the parties, supported by an affidavit from the respondent. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing solely on the basis of a settlement, noting that the Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction with caution, especially where serious or non-private offences or public interest concerns are involved. The learned judge surveys the evolving jurisprudence, citing State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, to lay down the governing principles. The court clarifies that Section 482 CrPC power to quash non-compoundable offences may be exercised where the offence is predominantly civil/private in nature and the parties have resolved the dispute, but not for heinous offences or those under special statutes. After considering factors such as the gravity of offence, antecedents, and the nature of the settlement, the court concludes that quashing would serve the ends of justice and peace. The petition is therefore allowed, and the FIR and further proceedings in Crime No.1107/2023 are quashed.
CRL.APPEAL NO. 574 OF 2021 This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CrL.A. No. 574 of 2021) challenging a 2019 trial conviction in SC No. 88 of 2016 of the Additional Sessions Court-V, Kottayam, for offences including murder (Section 302 IPC), and offences under Sections 397 and 201 IPC. The sole accused, Deben Nath, hails from Assam; he and the deceased Mohandas were employed as loading/unloading workers at Kumarakom Gas Agencies’ godown in Vaikom and resided together in a room on the premises. Mohandas’s body was recovered from a stream on 22 May 2015; investigation revealed the accused as the culprit. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence: last seen alive together on 16 May 2015, disappearance on 17 May 2015, the accused’s abrupt departure to his native place, the accused’s mobile phone usage, and recoveries from the scene (MO7 iron plate and MOs 1–2 coin boxes) with related inquest and autopsy evidence. The trial court convicted the accused after evaluating 27 witnesses and several Exts. The Kerala High Court, applying Sharad Birdhichand Sarda’s standard for circumstantial evidence and subsequent jurisprudence (Munikrishna @ Krishna, Rahul; with caution from Malleshappa and Akhtar), upheld the conviction and rejected defence arguments that the circumstances were not probative or watertight. The court concluded the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete and pointed to the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
CRL.MC NO. 4211 OF 2021; CRL.MC NO. 5617 OF 2021 The High Court of Kerala, sitting with a single judge, quashed the criminal proceedings against accused Nos. 3–5 (two directors of a seafood export company and another director) in CP No.2 of 2021 arising from Palluruthy Police Station crime 1706/2016. The petitioners challenged criminal miscellaneous petitions (CrM.C Nos. 4211/2021 and 5617/2021) seeking to quash the proceedings and delete offences under Section 370(3) IPC and Sections 75 and 79 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act from the final report. The court noted that the final report and statements under Section 161 CrPC did not show recruitment, transport, harbouring, transfer or reception of victims by use of threat, coercion, fraud, deception, abuse of power, or inducement by the petitioners, who were merely directors. It relied on the principle that penal provisions must be strictly interpreted and that the circumstances did not satisfy the essential ingredients for trafficking under Section 370(3) IPC, nor did they establish offences under JJ Act sections 75 or 79 against the accused directors. The petitioners argued, supported by Nizamudhin A and Jibin Joseph, that mere employment as directors does not imply control or bondage over victims, particularly where allegations of actual control or bondage were absent. Accordingly, the court allowed the Cr.M.Cs and quashed the proceedings against the petitioners, while clarifying that observations do not bind other accused.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case invoking the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings arising from Crime No. 481/2022 (Town East Police Station, Thrissur) and CC No. 612/2022 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Thrissur. Seven petitioners (accused in CC 612/2022) contended that the dispute with the detought complainants has been amicably settled, with affidavits filed by the victims stating no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations but acknowledged the settlement. The court surveyed principles from leading Supreme Court decisions beginning with Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) and the line of authorities it relies upon (Gian Singh and Narinder Singh) to delineate when quashing non-compoundable offences can be invoked where the dispute is private and settled, emphasizing that the power is not available for heinous or serious offences or for offences under special statutes (e.g., P.C. Act, public servants’ offences) and that matters such as 307 IPC or the Arms Act would generally fall outside this ambit. The court found the dispute private, accepted the settlement, and allowed the petition, quashing all further proceedings in CC 612/2022 arising from Crime No. 481/2022. The order underscores careful application, evaluating antecedents and the nature of the offence, especially when evidence has been collected and a settlement exists between the parties.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.MC No. 2756 of 2022) filed by Rasaq KK @ Maravan Rasaq challenging Annexure-A1 issued by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Thalassery in Crime No. 220/2021 (State). The petitioner contends that Annexure A1 does not contain the substances of the information received or the basis for satisfaction under Section 107 Cr.P.C. The matter was admitted on 27.09.2023 and the court examined the mandatory requirements of Section 107 read with Section 111 Cr.P.C. and the need for a clear disclosure of information in the order under Section 111 to enable the respondent to defend; the court relied on earlier Kerala High Court decisions including Girish P. and others v. State of Kerala; Santhosh M.V. and others v. State of Kerala; Bejoy K.V v. State of Kerala; and Ahammad Kabir v. State of Kerala to evaluate the formal sufficiency of Annexure-A1 and the rationale behind initiating proceedings under 107 Cr.P.C. The court concluded that Annexure-I (Annexure-A1) failed to disclose the substance of the information and that past conduct alone does not justify initiation under Section 107 Cr.P.C., referencing the Moidu Full Bench principle. Consequently, the Criminal Miscellaneous Case is allowed and all further proceedings against the petitioner based on Annexure-A1 are quashed.
