The petitioner, Suni, the first accused in Crime No. 530/2007 of Kalady Police Station, challenges the continuation of trial in CC 121/2021 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Perumbavoor for offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. The prosecution alleged that on 28.06.2007 police conducted a raid at Gimmy’s Lodge and found accused 1–4 engaging in sexual activity, resulting in their arrest and a charge sheet. The trial record shows Annexure A4 acquittals of co-accused, and the petitioner contends that since co-accused have been acquitted, the substratum of the prosecution is shattered, rendering continued prosecution an abuse of process. The petitioner relies on Annexure A5, a Government Order, to contend that the Circle Inspector of Police, Chengamanad was not appointed as a Special Officer under the Act, impugning the legality of the investigation. The Public Prosecutor counters, insisting that the petitioner must face trial in the lower court and that this Court should not exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash. The High Court, invoking several precedents, holds that if the substratum of the case is destroyed by acquittals of co-accused, continuing the prosecution is an abuse of process and can be quashed. The court ultimately allows the Criminal Miscellaneous Case and quashes all further proceedings against the petitioner. The order emphasizes proper officer appointments under the IT Act and the principle that substratum can justify quashing to prevent judicial wastage.”
WP(C) No. 24327 of 2014 (and connected WP(C) No. 14825 of 2014) Two writ petitions were heard together challenging a Labour Court award dated 15 January 2014 in ID No.10/2012 that ordered reinstatement of the respondent workman with 25% back wages, and the workman's petition seeking 100% back wages. The petitions were filed by Apollo Tyres Ltd (the management) and by the employee, C.P Sebastian, who had suffered disciplinary action including suspension following acts of violence and misconduct at the Perambra factory and subsequently transferred to the company's registered office. The Labour Court found that the promotion/transfer were acts of victimization and allowed the workman's reinstatement with partial back wages. The High Court, however, held that the workman's status under the Industrial Disputes Act is not tenable since he had superannuated before the 2009 Supreme Court decision Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. C.P Sebastian (2009) 14 SCC 360; The Court also considered Everestee v District Labour Officer (1999) (2) KLT 560 to interpret the scope of 'workman' under Section 2(s) and found that a voluntarily retired employee cannot be treated as a 'workman'. Accordingly, WP(C)24327/2014 filed by the management was allowed and the award set aside; WP(C)14825/2014 filed by the workman was dismissed. The judgment clarifies limitations on jurisdiction and the definition of 'workman' under the ID Act.
Two petitioners, Jose and Lissy, were accused in CC No. 24 of 2021 for offences under sections 417, 418, 420, 427, and 120B read with 34 IPC, registered in Kalady Police Station (Crime No. 1110/2019). They approached the Kerala High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground that the civil disputes between the parties have been resolved through a settlement, with documentary evidence including an annexure and communications to establish that funds were transferred in settlement. Their counsel argued that continuing the prosecution would be an abuse of process since the disputes were settled and the matter involved private, civil-type transactions rather than a public interest crime; thus quashing would serve ends of justice. The respondents contended that disputes had been resolved in principle and that the agreement would be relevant, but the court carefully examined the law. The court invoked precedents—State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab—to articulate that under Section 482 CrPC, quashing is permissible where civil character predominates, typically in commercial or private disputes, and when parties have settled. The court held that the offences were private in nature and the settlement justified quashing, noting that maintaining the prosecution would be a waste of time and could adversely affect ends of justice. The petition was allowed, and Annexure IX’s Final Report and all further proceedings in CC 24/2021 were quashed, on 25 August 2023 by a single-judge bench.
This Kerala High Court criminal appeal arises from a conviction under sections 376 and 377 IPC and sections 3(a)(d) read with 4, and 5(l)(m)(n) read with 6 of the POCSO Act, based on an alleged prolonged sexual assault by the father against his daughter, starting when she was in IVth standard. The survivor disclosed the abuse in a school setting; the school authorities and police acted, with the case recorded under Crime No.496/2014 and eventually tried by the Special Court for the Trial of Offences against Children in Kozhikode. The trial court found the appellant guilty of the POCSO and related IPC offenses, sentencing him to life imprisonment for the POCSO-related charges and seven years for the offence under Section 377 IPC, with a fine. The High Court’s reassessment, however, focused primarily on whether the survivor could be classified as a “child” under the POCSO Act, given that Ext.P5 (the birth date certificate) and other age-determination materials were not robust. The court also scrutinized whether the alleged sexual acts constituted rape under Section 375 IPC or fell within Section 377 IPC, and whether the long delay and solitary testimony affected reliability. Ultimately, the court partly allowed the appeal: upholding the conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC, while setting aside the POCSO/377 convictions, and maintaining the life sentence with a Rs.1,00,000 fine, along with the compensation order and set-off. The judgment underscores evolving jurisprudence on age determination, the necessity (or lack) of corroboration in rape cases, and the cautions against regressive medical tests, while affirming the core outcome of the applicant’s guilt for rape under IPC.
This Kerala High Court judgment, delivered by Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V, concerns anticipatory bail under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in a case where the appellant is charged with IPC offences (Sections 354, 354A, 376) and offences under the SC/ST Act (Sections 3(r), 3(s), 3(w)). The sole accused moved for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 CrPC before the Sessions Court, which dismissed the application on the ground that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory bail for offences under the Act. The appeal is filed under Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act, 2015 amendments. The appellant contends that the 2015 amendments created Exclusive Special Courts and defined their jurisdiction, and that Section 14-A(2) permits an appeal to the High Court against bail decisions, requiring the court to examine the FIR to determine prima facie if an offence under Section 3 of the Act is made out, rather than mechanically dismissing the application. The Public Prosecutor argues that Section 18 of the Act bars pre-arrest bail and that Section 14-A(2) cannot override this bar. The court considers amendments, definitions (Special Court under Section 2(d); Exclusive Special Court under Section 2(bd)), and relevant precedents, notably Vilas Pandurang Pawar, and holds that Section 14-A(2) is applicable to bail orders and an appeal lies. The matter is remitted for reconsideration in accordance with law, with an emphasis on expediting trials under the amended Act and ensuring proper bail procedures.
This is a Kerala High Court judgment in OP(KAT) 393/22 (OA 1720/2020) arising from a Kerala Administrative Tribunal matter. The petitioners before the High Court are the State of Kerala and senior administrative officers challenging the Kerala Administrative Tribunal’s (KAT) order in OA 1720/2020 which directed appointment/transfer of LD Typist posts under the 10% quota to the next eligible candidate. The applicant before the Tribunal, Nisha P., an office attendant, had sought a promotion to LD Typist and retrospective promotion from 10.12.2018. The Tribunal allowed the OA and directed the 3rd respondent to issue appointment orders to the next eligible person against the 10% quota within three weeks, effectively promoting the next in line from the LD Typist cadre. The respondents argued that the LD Typist cadre in Kozhikode comprises 40 posts divided into four categories (LD Typist, UD Typist, Senior Grade Typist, and Selection Grade Typist) in a 1:1:1:1 ratio; thus the cadre strength fixes only one LD Typist post for the 10% low-paid quota, and the first in seniority having already been promoted leaves no immediate vacancy for the petitioner. They relied on Note (3) to Rule 5 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules 1958 and on apex court decisions (V K Girija; Prasad Kurien) to argue cadre-strength-based recruitment. The High Court held that the Tribunal erred by applying vacancies and not cadre strength, clarifying that ratio must be applied to cadre strength rather than vacancies. Consequently, the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the original petition allowed. The judgment emphasizes cadre-strength-based quotas and rejects promotion by transfer beyond the fixed cadre distribution.
This OP(KAT) No. 321/2022 challenges a Kerala Administrative Tribunal order in O.P.(KAT) No.1205/2019 directing pay protection under Rule 28A Part I of the Kerala Service Rules for respondents who had prior service in Municipal Common Service before joining municipal bodies. The Tribunal held that the respondents are entitled to pay protection and that the Government is bound to pass necessary orders and release the pay difference within three months (Ext. P6). The State Government sought to challenge this order on the ground that Municipal Common Service and Government Service are distinct services, hence prior Government service cannot be reckoned for pay fixation. The judgment cites Santosh Kumar v. Director of Panchayats (2013) 2 KLT 548, noting that Panchayat/Municipal Common Service employees are Government servants, and that under Rule 28A Part I KSR, government servants are entitled to pay protection. The Government issued G.O.(MS).No.104/2023(121)/Fin dated 3/7/2023 revising pay and allowances and clarifying that prior Government service would be reckoned for service weightage in Municipal Common Service in the 2014 Pay Revision. The Court relies on O.P.(KAT).No.219/2022 and, finding no need to interfere with the Tribunal’s order, dismisses the petition, holding the effect from 01/07/2014. The decision closes the matter without modification to the tribunal order.
CRL.A No.114 of 2006; CRL.A No.472 of 2006 This is a consolidated High Court of Kerala judgment disposing of two criminal appeals (Crl.A. Nos. 114 of 2006 and 472 of 2006) arising from a 2005 Sessions Court judgment in SC No.199/2005 (Kottayam). The two accused, A1 Antony @ Siby and A2 Jiji, were convicted under sections 323 and 324 IPC read with 34 IPC; A1 was also convicted under 308 IPC. A1 and A2 appealed under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. A1 died during pendency, triggering abatement provisions, while the fine-portion of A1’s composite sentence could proceed per the proviso to Section 394(2) Cr.P.C. The High Court addressed the abatement issue, noting that appeals against imprisonment abate on death, but appeals under Chapter XXIX against fines do not abate, citing Ramesan v. State of Kerala and E. Muhammed @ Kunhalan v. Sub Inspector of Police. It then examined the evidence (PW1–PW7, Exts.P1–P11, MO.1–MO.2) and the arguments, finding inconsistencies in PW1 and PW3 but holding they did not destroy the prosecution’s core case given the lack of independent witnesses. The court dismissed A1’s appeal (472/2006) and partly allowed A2’s appeal (114/2006), altering the sentences to a day’s imprisonment for each offence with fines (₹3,000 for 323 IPC and ₹4,000 for 324 IPC), plus ₹6,000 compensation to PW1 under Sec. 357(3) Cr.P.C. A2 is to surrender on 17/08/2024; sentences to run concurrently. The proceedings were presided over by Judge C.S. Sudha (Single Judge).
Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 1631 of 2003 K.P. Easy, the accused, was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kochi, and the II Additional Sessions Court, Ernakulam, confirmed the conviction and reduced the substantive sentence from six months to four months, while confirming the Rs.48,000 compensation awarded to the complainant. Challenging both the conviction and the sentence, the accused filed this criminal revision petition under sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. The matter had a long procedural history: proceeding before the Lok Adalat in 2014, notes of compromise, and a settlement with the accused paying Rs.52,000 through the complainant’s authorised representative. The Lok Adalat recorded a settlement but could not pass a formal award due to the complainant’s absence, and the matter was returned to the High Court for recording the compromise. The petitioner’s counsel urged that, given the settlement and the civil nature of the offence, the punishment should be substituted by compensation, emphasizing the rehabilitative and restorative aim consistent with Supreme Court precedents. The respondents argued to uphold the conviction and the sentence as modified by the appellate court, stressing the gravity of the offence and the procedural history. The High Court ultimately relied on the compensatory approach endorsed in Damodar S. Prabhu and Kaushalya Devi Massand and disposed of the revision by converting the sanction to a Rs.52,000 fine treated as compensation under Cr.P.C. 357(1)(b), with no default sentence, and directed necessary entries in the trial court’s register.
The petitioner, an aided educational institution, challenged four provisional assessment bills (Exts.P1–P8) and final bills (Exts.P10–P13) issued by the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) following inspections by the Anti Power Theft Squad. The institution runs four consumer connections under VIA and VIB tariffs; the respondents contend the premises were used for other self-financing institutions, which would justify higher tariffs (VIIA and later VI-F) and that VI.F tariff would have been applicable to the petitioner's connection. The petitioner argues that the tariff governing the four connections remains VIA/VIB (and, for consumer No. 30901, VIA/VIB), and contends the statutory remedy is to file an appeal under Section 127 of the Electricity Act, 2003, within 30 days of a final order issued under Section 126 for unauthorised use of electricity. The petitioner also sought to exempt the period of pendency of the writ petition from the appeal period. The court, after considering the material, disposed of the petition by directing the petitioner to approach the Appellate Authority under Section 127(1) within one month, staying the operation of Exts.P10–P13 for two months, and directing that the appellate authority consider the writ petition period and require certified copies, with a warning of loss of benefits for non-compliance.
WP(C).No. 27370 of 2013 (U) This writ petition challenges the removal of G. Prasanth, a Mechanic Grade II in KSRTC, from service on the ground of suppression of material facts in the attestation form regarding pendency of a criminal case. The petitioner was appointed based on the Kerala Public Service Commission (PSC) advice dated 24 January 2012. He faced a charge of involvement in CC No. 647/2007 for offences under sections 279 and 304A IPC; the district court later acquitted him on 7 August 2013, after his removal. The KSRTC contends that the attestation form (Ext. P5) disclosed suppression of material facts and that the appointment was obtained by fraud; thus, removal was justified. The petitioner argues that the offence occurred when he was around 20 years old and non-disclosure of such a minor matter cannot be fatal to the appointment, especially as it did not pertain to moral turpitude and would unlikely affect his suitability for service. He relies on Supreme Court precedents including Commissioner of Police v. Sandeep Kumar and Avtar Singh v. Union of India, as well as a Division Bench decision of this court (W.A. No. 2072 of 2016) to contend that verification of character and antecedents must be objective and contextual. The court examines Part II Rule XB III of the Kerala State Rules and the broader principle that suppression of material information should be dealt with reasonably and not arbitrarily. Ultimately, the court holds that non-disclosure not impacting fitness may not justify cancellation, sets aside the removal, reinstates the petitioner, and directs seniority from the original appointment date with no monetary benefits for the period out of service.
A Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 r/w Order XLII, CPC 1908 challenges decrees in O.S. 1226/2017 (Additional Munsiff II, Ernakulam) and A.S. 64/2022 (VI Additional District Court, Ernakulam) arising from a family partition dispute over a flat of the late Rajesh. The trial court partitioned the estate, allotting 1/4 share to plaintiffs (mother and two minor children) and a share to the defendant, Rajesh’s second wife. The appellate court confirmed the partition. The appellant argues that there is a substantial question of law and that the appeal should be admitted; however, the High Court, per A. Badharudeen J., held that no substantial question of law is involved. The judgment elaborates the legal framework for maintainability of a second appeal: Section 100 CPC read with Order XLII Rule 2 requires formulation of a substantial question of law; the High Court must examine whether such a question exists, and the respondent may argue that it does not. The Court cites Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala, Kondiba Kadam, Santosh Hazari, Biswanath Ghosh, and Government of Kerala v. Joseph to underscore the mandatory procedure and the meaning of “substantial question of law.” Ultimately, the Regular Second Appeal is dismissed without admission; interlocutory orders are vacated and mediation at the final decree stage is left open.
The petitioner, T. K. Santhosh, challenges Ext.P3, an order rejecting his Form-5 application under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008, based on an Agricultural Officer’s report. He holds 2.02 acres in Nedumbassery, Aluva Taluk. The Court cites a line of precedents emphasizing the Data Bank’s scope and the status of land as of key dates. Salim C.K. et al. hold that the Data Bank should include only cultivable paddy land and wetlands within LLMC’s jurisdiction. Lalu P.S. clarifies that the Data Bank data corresponds to land as on 24.12.2008, while Joy v. RDO/Sub Collector stresses that the land’s character and fitness on 12.08.2008 determine inclusion or exclusion. Arthasasthra Ventures LLP v. State of Kerala allows resort to scientific data like satellite imagery if material is insufficient. Muraleedharan Nair v. RDO and Aparna Sasi Menon v. RDO underscore independent assessment and the predominant factor of paddy feasibility for Form-5. Despite these standards, the Ext.P3 order was passed solely on LLMC’s stance without independent verification. The Court sets aside Ext.P3 and directs the 2nd respondent to reconsider the Form-5 application, obtain the KSRSEC report, and decide afresh within three months, after site inspection and weighing Rule 4(4f) factors. The Petitioner may file argument notes with relevant judgments.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case under section 482 CrPC filed by seven petitioners (accused nos. 1 to 7) in Crime No. 1722/2013 of Pathanamthitta Police Station. The accusations involve offences under Indian Penal Code sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 427 and 506(ii), and section 139 of the Electricity Act. The prosecution alleges that the accused, said to be members of RSS and BJP with political enmity towards the defacto complainant (a CPM worker), formed an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant’s house, damaged property including window glass, vehicles and the electricity meter, and thereby committed various offences. The dispute is presented as private in nature, with the parties having settled the matter. The court directed the petitioners to implead the Kerala State Electricity Board and deposit Rs. 15,000 in a nationalised bank in favor of the learned Magistrate; the KSEB’s stance on withdrawal of the deposit was discussed. The Public Prosecutor expressed some reservations about quashing solely on the basis of a settlement but acknowledged the settlement. Relying on Supreme Court precedents (Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh, Narinder Singh), the court held that non‑compoundable offences could be quashed under S.482 CrPC where disputes are private and resolved. Consequently, the petition is allowed, all further proceedings are quashed, and the third respondent may seek disbursement of the deposited amount.
Mat.Appeal Nos.212/12 & 354/16 These two matrimonial appeals arise from disputes between Thresiamma Manshoven and her husband Manshoven Jacques Joseph, who married in 1985 under the Special Marriage Act after living in Belgium and Kerala. The husband filed OP(S.M.A.) 681/2007 seeking a divorce on grounds of cruelty; the wife challenged and cross-claimed in OP 876/2012 a sale deed and related relief. The Family Court found cruelty by the wife, dissolved the marriage, and dismissed the sale-deed relief petition as meritless. The wife challenged these orders in Mat.Appeal Nos. 212/12 and 354/16, contending that the petitions were maintainable under the Foreign Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act even though the marriage was solemnized abroad, and that the sale deed was executed under coercion. The husband argued lack of maintainability if the marriage was not solemnized or registered under the FM Act and questioned the distribution of wealth and alleged extramarital relations. The Kerala High Court, adopting a cross-border interpretive approach to the FM Act and SM Act, noted that one party is Indian and Section 18 of the SM Act applies to foreign marriages, allowing petitions under SM Act to proceed. It relied on Gracy v. Mathiri to frame jurisdiction. On merits, the High Court affirmed the Family Court’s finding of cruelty and dismissed both appeals, with no costs.
WP(C).No. 30875 of 2015 (H) Petitioner Madhu C., an office attendant of the Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. (KSFE), challenges a government directive (Exhibit P3) directing KSFE to extend a loan of about twelve crore rupees to the KSFE Staff Co-operative Society (the fifth respondent). The fifth respondent, a cooperative society comprising KSFE employees, operates from KSFE premises and has faced massive misappropriation of funds, with deposits raised and tens of crores involved. Misappropriations led to surcharge proceedings and criminal prosecutions against some office-bearers and members of the managing committee. As the society could not repay depositors, the government, after consulting KSFE’s Board, issued Exhibit P3 to extend a loan to the fifth respondent, allegedly to safeguard depositors. The petitioner contends that KSFE is an autonomous entity and cannot be coerced by government directives to lend; the Memorandum and Articles of Association do not empower such an order, rendering Exhibit P3 ultra vires. The Government, however, argues that KSFE is under government control (Article 38 of Exhibit P4 and related provisions) and that the directive is a public-interest measure, consistent with the parens patriae role in a welfare state. The court, recognizing the petitioner's locus and examining the legality of Exhibit P3, cites Management of the Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Workmen, K.K. Bhaskaran, S.P. Gupta, and Vijay Shankar Pandey to uphold the directive, directing the KSFE Board to implement the loan with safeguards and to pursue recovery from wrongdoers, while ensuring genuine depositors are repaid. The writ petition is disposed of, with no costs order.
W.P.(C) Nos.11249 & 11252 of 2017 This is a Kerala High Court writ petition (two petitions consolidated) challenging renewal of toddy shop licences in Kothamangalam Excise Range. The petitioners, licensees of toddy shops in Group I (Nos. 1 and 5) and Group IV (No. 17), sought renewal of licences for extended periods as permitted by government orders, and contended that landlord consent is not required for renewal when the Government extends the licence period under Rule 3(1)’s first proviso to Rule 3 of the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002. The land/building where the shops operated was jointly owned by co-owners (respondents 3–5) which should cure the consent issue. The respondents argued that sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 of the Disposal Rules mandates written consent/lease deed from the landowner for grant or renewal of a toddy shop licence, and that renewal during tenancy still requires owner consent. The court examined constitutional Article 226 jurisdiction, the Disposal Rules, and relevant case law (notably Shajahan M.I. v. Alice George; Sudhakaran; Bharat Singh; Meena Chaudhary; and State of Maharashtra v. Narmada Estates) to determine whether renewal could be granted without landlord consent and on what basis government extensions could operate. The court ultimately held that consent is mandatory for grant/renewal and dismissed the petitions, denying relief beyond the extended period already granted by Government orders. The decision underscores the primacy of the statutory consent requirement over government extensions for renewal.
WP(C).Nos. 25292/2016 (and connected cases: 25619/2016, 25622/2016, 25695/2016, 25790/2016) These writ petitions, heard together, challenge a Kerala Legislative Assembly resolution dated 18.07.2016 and the subsequent government notification dated 27.07.2016, which vest privately managed aided schools in the State Government. The petitioners are erstwhile managers of such schools who, under the Kerala Education Act and Rules (KE Act/Rules), sought to close down their institutions. They argued that under Section 15 KE Act, the Government can take over an aided school only if prerequisites exist, and that by the time the government decided to acquire, the schools had already been closed in compliance with KE Act/Rules; thus there could be no “aided schools” to acquire. They urged compensation to be determined under the central Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, arguing potential repugnancy with the KE Act. The State Government contended that the schools remained aided during the implementation phase and that the Cabinet decision on 29.06.2016 ratified the Chief Minister’s 07.06.2016 decision to take over, with procedural requirements duly followed. It argued that Article 254 repugnancy does not apply since KE Act concerns education while the 2013 Act concerns land acquisition, and that compensation should be under KE Act. The High Court, upholding Section 15 powers as exercised in public interest, held there is no irreconcilable inconsistency with the 2013 Act and dismissed the petitions, validating the government’s acquisition and vesting process.
CRL.R.P. No. 2242 of 2008 This Kerala High Court Criminal Revision Petition challenges a conviction under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The 1st accused, D. Mohanachandran, was convicted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nedumangad, under Section 16(1-A)(i) read with Section 2(ia)(f) and Section 7(i)(iii) PFA Act and the related PFA Rules, for sale of adulterated food items (Vadaparipppu) at Parandode junction. The Public Analyst’s report (Ext. P-10) formed the basis of the conviction, indicating adulteration with weevilled grains and excessive uric acid. The defense contends that no prescribed or validated method of analysis existed under Section 23(1A)(ee) and (hh) of the Act, and that Central Government rules defining laboratories and methods were not in place at the relevant time; hence Ext. P-10 cannot sustain conviction. The petition cites PepsiCo India Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Food Inspector (2011) and Kerala decisions Gopalakrishnan v. Food Inspector and Rasheed N.K. v. Food Inspector to urge that reports by a public analyst are unreliable where laboratories or methods are undefined. The High Court agrees that the lack of defined laboratories and methods invalidates the report, and that the conviction cannot stand. The revision petition is allowed, and the 1st accused is acquitted; the judgments below are set aside.
WP(C).No. 31796 of 2015 (Y) This writ petition (WP(C).No.31796 of 2015) concerns internal recruitment in the Kerala Tourism Development Corporation (KTDC). The petitioner, a KTDC receptionist, challenged Ext.P10 circular (and Ext.P4 GO dated 14.02.2011) which introduced new Recruitment Rules for KTDC’s marketing cadre and laid down qualifications for posts such as Marketing Executive, Assistant Manager (Marketing), Deputy Manager (Marketing) and Marketing Manager. Initially, vacancies arose in 2010 under extant rules allowing promotions to Deputy Manager (Marketing) from internal candidates possessing an MBA with Marketing as an optional subject or a Post Graduate Diploma in Marketing Management. After the KTDC created a separate marketing division, the 2010 Recruitment Rules were superseded by new Rules (Ext.P8), effective from 22.06.2010, and further detailed by Ext.P7 judgment in WP(C).No.5886/2011 directing that appointments be made strictly under the new Rules. The petitioner contends she was qualified under the prior regime for the Deputy Manager post and that her vested right should be respected, citing Deepak Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) to consider qualifications as of the date of consideration. The court, however, held that the new Rules apply to vacancies as they arise and that the petitioner did not meet the requisite qualifications on the relevant dates. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
