This writ petition challenges Ext.P6, an order of the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) rejecting the petitioner’s Form 5 application to remove land from the Data Bank under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008. The petitioner, Suresh Kumar, claims ownership of about 8 ares 10 sq.m. in Sy. No. 160/27, Kodumbu village, Palakkad district, by sale deed Ext.P1, and asserts the property is neither paddy land nor wetland, yet has been placed in the Data Bank. The RDO refused to remove it, relying on a report from the Agricultural Officer that the land is not converted and is fallow but suitable for paddy cultivation. The petitioner contends the RDO failed to apply mind, did not obtain KSRSEC status on 12.08.2008, and did not independently assess the land as required by Rules 4(4E)-(4F). The High Court reiterates that the decisive inquiry is the land’s character as on the Act’s date of coming into force. Following decisions in Muraleedharan Nair, Mather Nagar, and Sudheesh, the Court holds that fallow land cannot automatically be treated as wetland or paddy land, and that independent verification is essential. The Court sets aside Ext.P6 and directs the RDO to reconsider Ext.P5 after obtaining KSRSEC’s report at the petitioner’s expense, within two months, with the petitioner to comply by obtaining KSREC reports and filing the judgment copy as directed.
The High Court of Kerala exercises its revisional remit in RFA No. 375 of 2016 against a Sub Court Pathanamthitta decree on a money claim arising from a construction contract for metalling work at the Pathanamthitta Municipality bus stand yard. Ext. A1, dated 14 September 2007, provided for two phases of work with three months for completion, but site handover was belated and disputes arose, culminating in termination and re-tendering. The plaintiff contended for payment of the value of work done beyond the cost of materials and for the value of labour incurred, including items 1, 3 (materials) and 4 (labour) under Ext. A1, and sought return of a security deposit. The trial court decreed partly in the plaintiff’s favour; the defendants did not appeal the specific reductions. The High Court re-examined quantities, area measurements, and the scope of works across the two phases, noting that the plaintiff completed phase‑I partially and that materials were supplied in items 1 and 3 with labour in item 4. It held the plaintiff entitled to the value of materials under items 1 and 3 and the labour for item 4, but restricted some claims due to discrepancies in area/quantity calculations and applied deductions from the quoted rates. Clause 10 was read to permit use or auction of materials and not to bar removal. The court awarded Rs 10,12,568 with interest and set aside the trial court decree, directing payment with 9% interest from suit date to decree and 6% thereafter, along with costs.
This is a Rent Control Revision petition filed by Fathima, the successor-in-interest of the tenant, challenging an ex parte eviction order under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The eviction petition was allowed ex parte in 2018. The tenant moved I.A.1664/2019 to set aside the ex parte eviction and to condone the 15-day delay, but the Rent Control Court dismissed for lack of power to condone such delay. The tenant then challenged the ex parte eviction in RCA 81/2020 before the Appellate Authority; that appeal was filed after a long delay (535 days) and was dismissed. The revision petition contends that the delay was only 15 days for the underlying I.A. and that condonation should have been entertained; it asserts that the Appellate Authority and Courts acted on technicalities contrary to justice and cites Deepak S.P. v. B. Govardhanan Nair (2021) to support this. The High Court, after considering the arguments, agrees that the delay cannot be treated purely as a technicality, but ultimately holds that the revision petition lacks merit and dismisses it. However, in a departure from a pure technical outcome, it grants the petitioner a six-month window to surrender vacant possession, with conditions to file an unconditional undertaking to vacate and to pay arrears and continue paying rent. The decision emphasizes diligence in prosecution and warns that indulgence cannot undermine the legitimate expectations of respondents.
W.P.(C) Nos.378, 389, 400, 412 & 437 of 2024 The five writ petitions challenge Exts.P2 and P3 notices issued by the Joint Registrar under Rule 16 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. The Sulthan Bathery Co-operative Urban Bank members (Chairman, Vice‑Chairman and others) are accused of dual membership, making them ineligible under Rule 27(1). The petitions proceed together as the issues are identical. The petitioners assert lack of jurisdiction for the Registrar to order expulsion, relying on Johny KT v Joint Registrar to contend that removal cannot be made by the Registrar; they also argue that if any false statement occurred at nomination, the proper remedy is an election petition under Section 69 of the Co‑operative Societies Act. They further contend that Ext.P2 notices were issued when some petitioners had already terminated or lost memberships. The respondents, led by the Senior Government Pleader, counter that membership rights and liabilities are governed by Chapter III, and by‑laws of the Bank expressly prohibit dual membership (Clause 9(iv) and 9(b)(1)); Rule 16(3) and 16(4) empower the Registrar to remove or declare cessation after due hearing, and Rule 16(1)(c) requires compliance with all statutory conditions. The Court considers the arguments and records, and holds that Ext.P2/3 notices were issued in accordance with law; the petitioners may present their case before the Registrar. Consequently, the petitions are dismissed, upholding the Registrar’s action and the statutory framework governing membership eligibility.
This is an appeal by the complainant Abdulrahiman Haji against the acquittal of K. Sulaiman under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate-II, Kasaragod in CC No. 224 of 2005. The trial court concluded that the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumptions in favour of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act and that the complainant failed to prove that the cheque dated 07.10.2002 for Rs. 2,60,000 was issued in discharge of a debt. The prosecution alleged a loan of Rs. 2,60,000; upon presentation, the cheque was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds, despite a statutory notice. PW1 testified and Exhibits P1–P5 were marked; DW1 testified with Exhibits D1–D3. The trial court accepted the defense that the signed blank cheque used in Exhibit D2 was misused and that PW1’s testimony regarding the loan was not credible. On appeal, the appellant contended that Exhibits D1 and D2 show agreements unrelated to the transaction and that the trial court erred in accepting the rebuttal of presumptions. Amicus argued PW1’s cross-examination and Exhibits D1–D3 undermine the loan claim. The High Court, considering the materials and authorities, held that the accused rebutted the presumptions and dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court’s findings.
This is a criminal appeal filed by Victory Press (P) Ltd. challenging the acquittal of U.V. Louis for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arising from a cheque issued in discharge of a debt. The Trial Court had convicted Louis and sentenced him to three months’ simple imprisonment and to pay Rs. 75,000 under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., with a further three months’ imprisonment in default under Section 255(2) Cr.P.C. On appeal, the Fast Track Court-1, Thrissur, reversed the conviction and acquitted Louis on the ground that the Ext.P1 cheque bore entries in different inks and handwriting, suggesting the debt was not legally enforceable. The High Court of Kerala (C.S. Dias, J.) analyzes the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act and the reverse onus doctrine, citing Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, Kalamani Tex, Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel, and others to reiterate that once the cheque is signed the reverse onus shifts to the accused to raise a probable defence. It finds the Appellate Court’s reasoning perverse for disregarding the documentary evidence (Exts. P1, P8, P9, P4) and the accompanying testimony. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the conviction is restored, and Louis is sentenced to one day’s imprisonment and Rs. 75,000 as compensation, with six months’ default imprisonment if the compensation is unpaid. The court directs appearance for execution on 27.11.2023.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed by Muhammad Jasim Sidiq, the 3rd accused in Crime No. 449/2023 of Veeyapuram Police Station, Alappuzha, alleging offences under 379 read with 34 IPC. The court records that the final report in the underlying FIR has been filed and the parties contend for quashing the proceedings in light of a settlement between the victim and the accused. The victim has filed an affidavit supporting the settlement, and though the complainant’s statement was not recorded due to his being in West Bengal, a notary-attested affidavit was produced. The Public Prosecutor expressed initial reservations about quashing solely on settlement yet conceded the parties’ dispute is settled. Relying on the Supreme Court decisions in Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh, and Narinder Singh, the court emphasizes that quashing non‑compoundable offences under Section 482 CrPC is permissible where the dispute is private and resolved, except for serious offences or those under special statutes. The court ultimately finds the dispute private in nature and accepts the settlement, quashing all further proceedings and the final report in Crime No. 449/23. The order reflects a balance between private resolution and public interest.
CRP No.334/2021; CRP No.23/2022 The Kerala High Court hearing concerns Civil Revision Petitions (CRP Nos. 334 of 2021 and 23 of 2022) filed by Ouseph Antony (the claimant) challenging an order in O.P. (Electricity) No.1251 of 2012 awarding compensation for damage caused by the drawing of 400 kV power transmission lines across his land. The claimant alleged that while trees on his Sy. No. 92/7-8 were cut, only a paltry compensation of Rs. 1,38,142 was paid for trees and no compensation was awarded for diminution in land value. The trial court had rejected enhanced compensation for trees and, for land value, relied on Ext. A11 and Ext. C2/C2(a) to determine a diminished land value, fixing the land value at Rs. 1,80,063 per cent (20% less than Ext. A11) and granting 40% of land value for the central corridor and 20% for outer corridors. The claimant argued the court’s approach ignored the Advocate Commissioner’s report and improperly discounted land value, while the respondent argued the enhancement was excessive and that the court should not be bound by government packages. The High Court, applying the KSEB v. Livisha doctrine and citing V.V. Jayaram v. KSEB, held that the lower court erred in deducting prior compensation and in the percentage-based awards, and partially allowed the revision petitions, directing payment of enhanced compensation within three months without deduction and dismissing the corporation’s revision petition.
CRL.M.C. No. 5167 of 2023 This Criminal Miscellaneous Case arises from ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 registered by the Enforcement Directorate in connection with Crime No. 376/2022 at Valappad Police Station for an alleged IPC 420 offense. The ECIR was registered after a complaint, and the petitioners sought to quash the ECIR and all proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The petitioners claimed an amicable settlement with the complainant and argued that the predicate offence had already been quashed by this Court (Annexure-A10), thereby depriving ECIR of a valid substratum to proceed under PMLA. They relied on the Supreme Court’s observations in Vijay Madan Lal Chaudhary v. Union of India and on Sekar @ Sekar Reddy v. Directorate of Enforcement to contend there can be no money-laundering action without a continuing predicate offence. The respondents countered that ECIR is an internal ED mechanism and necessary for information-sharing and enforcement actions under the PMLA, relying on Section 66 of the PMLA and related provisions. The Court, after detailed consideration, held that since the FIR linked to the predicate offence was quashed, there could be no proceeds of crime and no valid basis for a PMLA proceeding. Accordingly, ECIR/36/KCZO/2022 and all further proceedings were quashed, with a safety valve that ED may revive proceedings if the predicate offence revives. The decision follows the ratio in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary and related authorities, emphasizing that money-laundering actions require a subsisting connected offence.
Navodhayakuries Private Limited, represented by its Chairman and Managing Director, Jos. K. Francis, filed a batch of writ petitions challenging the imposition of service tax on subscriptions to chit funds with effect from June 2007 under the Finance Act, 1994 as amended by the Finance Act, 2015. A Division Bench previously held in W.P. (C) No. 11018 of 2015 (dated 14.03.2018) that chit fund subscriptions were not exigible to service tax prior to the 2015 amendment and that the amendment was not retrospective in operation; it directed that refunds for amounts paid should be considered by authorities on evidence produced by assessees, extending the limitation date to 14.03.2018. The petitioner claimed refunds under the Supreme Court’s Vatika Township ruling (CIT v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., 2015) and argued that refunds could be processed if tax was collected from mutual subscribers. The central issue concerned whether refunds could be allowed where the tax was collected under the amended regime and whether time limits under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could bar such refunds when filed after judgment. The court held that Section 11B (and 12B) imposes a one-year time limit, and that the extended period provided by the 2018 judgment does not override the express limitations. Relying on these and other authorities, the court dismissed the petition as devoid of merit, upholding Ext. P6 (order of rejection).
A.S. Nos.460 and 352 of 1999 George Jacob, a saw mill owner, filed suit for declaration of title over timber logs and damages against M.S. Viswambharan, owner of a tea estate, and subsequent legal heirs and associates. On 13.07.1992, Ext. A1 contract in the context of sale of 180 Aanjili trees, 20 softwood trees and 35 rosewood trees for Rs. 18,00,000 was executed. The defendant claimed cutting permits for 24 rosewood trees but the permit was available for only 16; the plaintiff cut 13 rosewood trees. A Revenue Department dispute arose because some trees purportedly stood on government puramboke. The plaintiff paid Rs.14,50,000 on multiple dates (including Rs.1,00,000 at contract inception and subsequent payments), and a further claim of Rs.40,000 for firewood was denied by the defendant. The trial court accepted that Rs.5,50,000 was paid under Ext.A2, and held that softwood trees were removed, while dismissing the firewood claim. The High Court considered five issues: (i) sustainability of the Rs.5,50,000 payment; (ii) evidence of removal of softwood as per Ext.A1; (iii) denial of firewood sale; (iv) whether a decree for declaration of title over 13 rosewood trees could be granted; and (v) whether the decree warranted interference. Relying on Ext.A1, the court found that Rs.7,00,000 was for rosewood and Rs.11,00,000 for Aanjili/softwood; the plaintiff had paid Rs.14,50,000, including Rs.3,50,000 for rosewood, and the 13 cut rosewood trees were valued at Rs.2,60,000. The court held title to the 13 rosewood trees passed to the plaintiff and upheld the trial court’s decree. The appeals were dismissed with no costs, affirming the plaintiff’s title over the timber and the earlier payments.
Antony Frederic Baiju, the judgment debtor in EP 27/2021 arising from OS 465/2015 before the Principal Munsiff’s Court, Kochi, challenges Exts. P11, P14 and P16 orders that empowered the decree holder to deputize an Amin to break open the lock and hand over possession of the shop room to the decree holder. The petition contends that the decree should have been stayed under Order XXI, Rule 29, CPC, pending adjudication of OS 133/2015 (the earlier suit), since Ext. P8 granted an injunction in that earlier action. It argues that Section 10 CPC should apply to stay the execution until the pending suit is decided and that the execution court erred by not staying proceedings. The first suit culminated in a decree, while the subsequent suit seeks boundary fixation and surrender of vacant possession. The petitioner asserts that if the first suit were decreed, the respondent would no longer be the exclusive owner, potentially prejudicing his interests, and a stay is essential to avoid irretrievable harm. The respondent contends that the issues were already resolved in the later suit and that the decree holder has already obtained possession, plus Order XXI, Rule 29 is discretionary, not mandatory. The High Court clarifies that Order XXI, Rule 29 uses “may” and is guidance-based, requiring a sufficient cause and arguable questions in the pending suit, and that the fruits of the decree should not be denied without good reason. It finds no irreparable harm, and that the rights of the parties can be safeguarded in the pending suit. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. The judgment underscores that the decree has traversed multiple rounds of litigation and that the pending suit may resolve the core issues. Moreover, the court notes that the petitioner has already received a payment of Rs. 1,00,000 for use and occupation, which reduces the urgency of a stay. Overall, the original petition fails and is dismissed.
This writ petition challenges Exhibit P9, an order of the State Election Commission that held the petitioner, T. L. Sabu, disqualified under the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999 (the Act) for defecting. The facts are that Sabu contested the Ward 23 seat in Sulthan Bathery Municipality as a Kerala Congress (M) candidate with the “Two Leaves” symbol, and was later elected Chairman with support of the Left Democratic Front (LDF). After Kerala Congress (M) decided to join the United Democratic Front, the party directed his resignation from the Chairman post; he refused. The petition argues that the party’s direction to resign was not properly communicated in writing to him, and that proof of receipt is lacking, making Exhibit P9 illegal. It relies on case law questioning service of directions and the scope of defection under Section 3(1)(a), arguing that service requirements apply to the second limb (acting contrary to a written whip) and not to the first limb (voluntarily giving up membership). The State contends that the petitioner voluntarily gave up party membership when he refused to resign after the party’s withdrawal from the coalition, triggering Section 3(1)(a). The court ultimately held that the petition cannot succeed, upholding the order and dismissing the writ petition. The decision rests on the primacy of the first limb of Section 3(1)(a) (voluntary relinquishment of party membership).
WA Nos. 1436/2023, 1431/2023, 1432/2023 This batch of writ appeals concerns the attempt by the V.N. Public Health and Educational Trust (the appellant/petitioner) to start a new medical college with an intake of 150 MBBS seats. The Trust had earlier secured an Essentiality Certificate in 2014 for a 150-seat college but could not pursue the project, and the State government later adopted a policy denying Essentiality Certificates for self-financing medical colleges. After a series of proceedings, inspections, and orders, the University granted consent of affiliation for 150 seats but the State Health Department issued its own order on 07.07.2023 reducing the permitted intake to 100 seats. The National Medical Commission (NMC) rejected the 150-seat proposal for 2023-24 on 12.07.2023, citing non-submission of requisite documents in time. The learned Single Judge had dismissed the three petitions on 26.07.2023. The High Court, in a Division Bench decision, allowed all three appeals, holding that the reduction of seats from 150 to 100 was not properly grounded in the 2020 Regulations (Minimum Requirements for MBBS Admissions) and stating that bed strength considerations (330 beds for 150 seats) were to be applied at the recognition stage, not at admission. The Court quashed the impugned order and directed consequences as per the judgment. The decision relies on, among other authorities, R. v. essentiality decisions and the Supreme Court’s stance that an Essentiality Certificate is not ministerial action.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal M.C. under Section 482 Cr.P.C., challenging the order in SC 826/2022 of the Fast Track Special Court (POCSO), Ponnani. Petitioners Nos. 1–3 are accused in Crime No.213/2022, facing offences under IPC Sections 363, 354B, 354D and 376(2)(n) r/w Section 34, along with Section 6(i) r/w 5(l), 8 r/w 7, 12 r/w 11(ii)(iv) and 17 r/w 16(ii) of the POCSO Act. The prosecution contends the allegations relate to kidnapping/abduction, sexual offences against a minor, and rape. The petition argues that the relationship between the first petitioner and the victim, who was 17 at the time, culminated in marriage; Annexure A2 is the marriage certificate, and the victim now cohabits as his wife. The court relies on Vishnu v. State of Kerala to acknowledge that where a minor victim consents to a mature relationship and a genuine marriage ensues, closure may promote justice. It emphasises the ‘best interest of the child’ and “ends of justice” principles, and notes that grave offences should not be subject to compromise. Ultimately, the court finds that continuing the proceedings would cause greater prejudice and that conviction remains remote; thus the petition is allowed and SC 826/2022 proceedings are quashed against the petitioners, with the remainder of the matter unaffected.
The petitioner, a Nationalised Bank, seeks a directive to register Ext.P4 sale certificate in favour of its auction purchaser de hors the attachment noted in Ext.P6 Encumbrance Certificate. The borrower executed an equitable mortgage in favour of the petitioner on 24.09.2007 and defaulted on installments, prompting SARFAESI proceedings that culminated in a sale of the secured asset to the auction purchaser (the 3rd respondent) and issuance of Ext.P4. When steps were taken to register Ext.P4, the Sub Registrar refused, citing an attachment dated 22.07.2013 in O.S. 664/2012 and a pending W.P. (C) 30656/2021. The petitioner contends that the attachment postdates the equitable mortgage and cannot bar registration of Ext.P4 under SARFAESI, arguing that the attachment should be effaced from the Encumbrance Certificate. The borrowers later sold the property to respondents 4 and 5, who contend they are bona fide purchasers and that their rights are superior to those of the auction purchaser. The petition relies on Madhan S. v. Sub Registrar and subsequent decisions (Ali Asharaf M.M.; Secretary, Keechery Bank; Kerala State Financial Enterprises) to contend that attachments after a mortgage do not affect title and must be erased to enable sale. The Court holds that the attachments are post-mortgage and must be effaced; Ext.P4 can be registered de hors the encumbrance, subject to stamp duty. The writ petition is disposed of with directions to register Ext.P4 accordingly.
BAIL APPL. NO. 2559 OF 2023 and 2893 OF 2023 These two bail applications arise from Crime No. 183/2023 in Sooranad Police Station (and the related matter in Sastamcotta Police Station) involving accused persons implicated in a property-dispute related assault. The prosecution alleges that on 5 February 2023, while the defacto complainant was travelling in his car, the accused restrained and assaulted him with an iron rod, a knife, and a wooden stick, causing injuries to the head and chest and other injuries, with offences under IPC sections 294(b), 323, 324, 308, 427 and 506(ii) read with 34. The petitioners in BA 2559/2023 are accused Nos. 4 and 6, while BA 2893/2023 pertains to accused Nos. 7, 5 and 3. The petitioners seek anticipatory bail arguing absence of specific overt acts against them, lack of weapon use, and readiness to cooperate with the investigation. The State contends that the FIS and the wound certificate point to overt acts by some accused and that custodial interrogation and weapon recovery are essential for a meaningful investigation. The court hears both sides, considers the case diary and medical records, and grants bail to accused 4–7 with stringent conditions while dismissing bail for accused 3. The order emphasizes cooperation, non-interference with witnesses, and regular meetings with the IO, aiming to preserve investigation integrity.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 1117 OF 2011 Zachariya, the revision petitioner, challenges the concurrent conviction under Section 138 NI Act and the sentence recorded by the Trial Court (C.C. No. 479/2002, JFCM-II, Ernakulam) and confirmed by the Appellate Court (Crl.Appeal No.181/2010). The Trial Court held that the petitioner issued Ext. P1 cheque for Rs.48,000 in discharge of a legally enforceable debt; the cheque bounced for insufficient funds, a lawyer’s notice (Ext. P3) was issued, and the petitioner failed to pay. The Appellate Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 55,000 with a two-month default imprisonment. The High Court, in revisional jurisdiction under Cr.P.C. Secs. 397-401, assisted by an Amicus Curiae, reaffirms that revisional interference is sparing and that the reversal onus under Sec.139 NI Act is applicable when a cheque is dishonoured, with Sec.118(a) and Sec.139 initiating presumptions in favour of the complainant. It examines whether the accused could rebut the presumption and finds no probable defence. The court ultimately dismisses the revision petition, upholds conviction and sentence, and directs payment of the fine with deferment of execution until 05.11.2023, while ensuring the trial court is notified.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 CrPC (CRL.MC No. 2579 of 2023) challenging the order in CC No. 1172 of 2018 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Muvattupuzha. Accused Nos. 1–3 (Jijothomas, Lijo Johnson, Lijo Joseph) are alleged to have committed offences under Sections 323, 324, 447 and 506(i) read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution narrates that on 11.04.2018, the petitioners trespassed into the de facto complainants’ courtyard and assaulted them with a stick, causing injuries, allegedly acting in furtherance of a common intent. The petition asks the Court to quash the criminal proceedings on the basis that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, supported by affidavits from respondents 2–4 (annexed affidavits II–IV). The Public Prosecutor initially voiced reservations but stated respondents have no enduring grievances and no other complaints against the petitioners. The Court cites and applies settled Supreme Court law on quashing private, non‑compoundable offences where the dispute has been settled (noting exceptions for heinous offences, special statutes, and public‑interest considerations). After considering gravity, injuries, antecedents, and the parties’ relationship, the Court finds that quashing would promote peace and ends of justice and would not adversely affect society. Accordingly, the petition is allowed; Annexure-I Final Report (Crime No. 1662/2018) and all further proceedings in CC No. 1172/2018 are quashed, bringing the matter to an end.
CRP(WAKF) Nos. 641/2018, 650/2018, 653/2018, 672/2018, 673/2018, 674/2018, 676/2018, 688/2018, 699/2018 The judgment concerns a consolidated challenge by tenants (revision petitioners) to eviction orders issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the Kerala State Wakf Board under Section 54 of the Wakf Act, 1995, and related rulings of the Wakf Tribunal. The Jama-ath committee constructed a building on Wakf property and leased it to tenants; the Jama-ath moved the CEO to treat occupiers as encroachers after the lease expired. The petitioners argued lack of jurisdiction for the CEO and Tribunal to adjudicate eviction appeals, and questioned whether the building was Wakf property/registered with the Wakf Board. The court notes the Wakf Act amendment in 2013 introducing Section 3(ee), defining encroachers broadly as occupiers on Wakf property without authority, including tenants with expired leases. The decision clarifies that under Sections 54, 55, and the 2013 amendment, the CEO and Tribunal have jurisdiction to order eviction of encroachers. The court considers that the Wakf property is properly registered and that enforcement of eviction is permissible. Although relying on earlier decisions cited by petitioners, the court distinguishes them as pre-amendment authorities and upholds the CEO’s and Tribunal’s powers. Ultimately, the petitions are dismissed, with six months for tenants to vacate upon timely payment of arrears and continued rent obligations.
