Writ Appeal No. 1242 of 2023 (K. Bhaskaran and Padmavathi L v State Bank of India and others)
Case Details & Bench
- Court
- High Court of Kerala
- Hon'ble Judges
- Alexander Thomas
- C. Jayachandran
- Judgment Date
- 2023-07-19
- Court Decision / Holding
- The Division Bench upheld the learned Single Judge’s dismissal of the petitions and dismissed the writ appeal in limine, holding no illegality in the impugned judgment. It reaffirmed that, under Naveen Mathew Philip and related authorities, interference by the High Court in commercial SARFAESI matters is constrained and that extraordinary circumstances are required for interference; the bank may proceed with its SARFAESI remedy against the principal borrower as appropriate.
- Final Disposition
- Dismissed in limine
Parties to the Case
Appellants / Petitioners
- K Bhaskaran
- Padmavathi L
Respondents
- State Bank of India, Mavelikkara Branch
- The Authorised Officer (Under the SARFAESI Act, 2002) State Bank of India, Stressed Assets Recovery Branch
- K Sukumaran
Legal Representation & Advocates
Counsels for Petitioners
- • C.S. Manu
- • Dilu Joseph
- • T.B. Sivaprasad
- • C.A. Anupaman
- • C.Y. Vijay Kumar
- • Anandhu Satheesh
- • Manju E.R.
- • Alint Jose
Counsels for Respondents
- • Sri Jithesh Menon
- • Sri C. Unnikrishnan
Case Synopsis & Summary
Appellants K. Bhaskaran and Padmavathi L, guarantors for a cash-credit facility of Rs 100 lakhs availed by Lakshmi Copra Trading Company Ltd from State Bank of India, Mavelikkara, stood mortgaged along with properties of the principal borrower. On 12 August 2022, the authorised officer issued SARFAESI notice for sale of six properties to realise Rs 4,67,88,447. The guarantors challenged the notice in a writ petition and obtained a stay on condition of 25% payment; they asserted compliance and sought relief including time and installments, or sale to a purchaser proposed for Rs 3.5 crores, while the outstanding balance was about Rs 3.9 crores. The 3rd respondent Sukumaran (brother of the 2nd appellant, impleaded as per order) challenged coercive proceedings in a separate petition. The learned Single Judge dismissed both petitions, relying on the Supreme Court’s Naveen Mathew Philip decision (2023) SCC OnLine SC 435, which narrows High Court interference in SARFAESI matters when statutory redressal exists and discourages bypassing prescribed channels. On appeal, the Division Bench affirmed, citing the same jurisprudence and observing that there is no illegality in the impugned judgment. It held the offer of a purchaser and requests for more time fall outside the narrow sphere for interference. The appeal was dismissed in limine, preserving the bank’s SARFAESI proceedings.
Provisions of Law Cited
Legal Doctrines & Maxims
- A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. In the absence of any legal right, the Court cannot exercise the said power.
- Approaching the High Court for consideration of an offer by the borrower is frowned upon by this Court.
- Filing writ petitions under Article 226 by borrowers in commercial matters involving a lender can amount to abuse of the process of court.
- If a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court.
Submissions & Arguments
Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners
The appellants argued they complied with interim directions, having paid Rs 1.80 crores and substantial sums towards the loan account, and sought extension of time and installments for repayment. They also claimed a bona fide purchaser ready to pay Rs 3.5 crores, which could have cleared the outstanding amount (approx. Rs 3.9 crores). They urged the Court to exercise its discretion to provide more time and permit restructuring, arguing that equity and the possibility of recovering dues justify relief. They relied on Naveen Mathew Philip (SC) to seek non-interference only in exceptional circumstances.
Contentions of Respondents
Respondents contended that, following Naveen Mathew Philip, High Courts should refrain from interfering in SARFAESI proceedings except in extraordinary circumstances, particularly when statutory redressal mechanisms exist. They emphasised that the bank must be allowed to proceed against the principal borrower and its properties and that guarantors possess no right to compel equal prioritisation or to defer sale. They noted a residential house claim pending for the principal borrower and argued there is no entitlement to rearrange the security without following the prescribed SARFAESI process.
Cited Precedents (2)
| Case Name | Citation | Treatment | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip | 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435 | Positive | Cited as controlling authority for the principle that High Courts should limit interference in SARFAESI matters and follow the statutory channels. |
| State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew.K.C. | (2018) 3 SCC 85 | Positive | Used to illustrate the established stance that interference is to be restrained in SARFAESI matters and that the statutory mechanism is preferred. |
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