WP(C).No.18111 of 2019 (L) - Soman vs District Collector, Alappuzha District & Ors.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **MONDAY, THE 05TH DAY OF AUGUST 2019 / 14TH SRAVANA, 1941** ## **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** ## **PETITIONER/S:** **SOMAN AGED 56 YEARS** **S/O.LATE NARAYANAN, KALLUPURAYIL, PATHYOOR KALA MURI, PATHYOOR VILLAGE, KEERIKADU.P.O., PIN-690508.** **BY ADV. SRI.K.R.SUNIL** ## **RESPONDENT/S:** - **1 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT, ALAPPUZHA, PIN-688001.** - **2 THE REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, CHENGANNUR, PIN-689121.** - **3 THE PATHIYOOR GRAMA PANCHAYAT, PATHIYOOR, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PIN-690508.** - **4 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, KAYAMKULAM POLICE STATION, KAYAMKULAM, PIN-690106.** - **5 LAKSHMANAN, S/O.LATE NARAYANAN, AGED 67, KALLUPURAYIL PUTHAN VEETTIL, PATHYOOR KALA MURI, PATHYOOR VILLAGE, KEERIKADU.P.O., PIN-690508.** - **6 RAMYA, W/O.ANEESH, AGED 36, KALLUPURAYIL HOUSE, PATHYOOR KALA MURI, PATHYOOR VILLAGE, KEERIKADU.P.O., PIN690508.** **7 ADDL.R7. THE DIRECTOR OF PANCHAYATS, PANCHAYAT DIRECTORATE, PUBLIC OFFICE BUILDING MUSEUM P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,PIN-695 033. IS SUO MOTU IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 03.07.2019.** **BY ADVS. SRI.RENJIT GEORGE SRI.OMAR SALIM SRI.ABDULLA ZIYAD KUM. K. REMIYA RAMACHANDRAN** **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 2 **SRI RANJITH GEORGE- R3 ; SRI MANU RAJ K.JGOVERNMENT PLEADER** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 05.08.2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 3 ## **JUDGMENT** The petitioner, who is working in the General Reserve Engineering Force of Indian Army, who is stated to be the owner in possession and enjoyment of 0.5.26 Ares of property in Re.Survey No.261/1/B of Pathiyoor Village with a residential building in Ward No.5 of Pathiyoor Grama Panchayath has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 to 3 to remove the nuisance as highlighted in Ext.P3 complaint within a period to be fixed by this Court. 2. The grievance of the petitioner is the damage to the residential building in question, alleged to have been caused by the coconut tree standing in the property of respondents 5 and 6, as pointed out in Ext.P3 complaint submitted before the Secretary of the 3[rd] respondent Grama Panchayat. The petitioner would also place reliance on Ext.P2 communication dated 19.09.2017 of the Officer Commanding, 58 Road Constr Coy (GREF), whereby the complaint of the petitioner dated 18.09.2017 was forwarded to the 2[nd] respondent Revenue Divisional Officer. **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 4 3. On 30.07.2019, when this petition came up for admission, the Director of Panchayats, Directorate of Panchayats was suo motu impleaded as additional 7[th] respondent. The learned Government Pleader took notice on admission for respondents 1, 2 and 4 and also for the additional 7[th] respondent. This Court also issued urgent notice on admission by speed post to respondents 3, 5 and 6, returnable within two weeks. 4. Heard Sri K.R.Sunil, the learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri Manu Raj K.J, the learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1, 2 and 4 and also for the additional 7[th] respondent; Sri Renjith George, the learned Standing Counsel for the 3[rd] respondent Grama Panchayat; and Sri Omar Salim, the learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6. 5. The sole issue that arises for consideration in the petition is as to whether a writ of mandamus can be issued to the Secretary of the 3[rd] respondent Grama Panchayat to consider Ext.P3 request made by the petitioner, invoking the provisions under Section 238 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 5 Act, 1994. 6. In **Joseph v. Kadanad Grama Panchayat [2019 (3) KHC 545],** this Court held that the difference, which is discernible from the language of sub-section (1) and subsection (2) of Section 238 of the Act is that, sub-section (1) empowers the Village Panchayat to take appropriate measures when any branch or portion of a tree or the fruits of any tree is likely to fall and thereby endanger any person or any structure or any cultivation. Though clause (a) of sub-section (1) contemplates a notice by the Village Panchayat to the owner of the said tree, requiring him to secure, lop or cut down the said tree or remove the fruits thereof, so as to prevent any danger therefrom; clause (b) of sub-section (1) empowers the Village Panchayat to secure, lop or cut down the said tree or remove the fruit thereof, etc. before giving notice under clause (a) of sub-section (1) or before the period of such notice expire, if immediate action is necessary. On the other hand, sub-section (2) of Section 238 empowers the Secretary of the Village Panchayat, without notice trim or prune any hedge bordering on a public street; cut and trim **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 6 any hedge or tree overhanging the said street and obstructing it or the view of traffic or cause damage to it; or remove fallen trees on public roads and water ways which obstruct traffic. Paragraphs 5 to 8 of the said judgment read thus; “5. Section 238 of the Act deals with precautions in cases of dangerous trees and pruning of hedges and trees. Sub-section (1) of S.238 deals with the powers of a Village Panchayat. As per clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S.238, if any tree or any branch or portion of a tree or the fruits of any tree deemed by the Village Panchayat to be likely to fall and thereby endanger any person or any structure or any cultivation, the Village Panchayat may, by notice, require the owner of the said tree to secure, lop or cut down the said tree or remove the fruits thereof so as to prevent any danger therefrom. As per clause (b) of sub-section (1), if immediate action is necessary, the Village Panchayat shall itself, before giving such notice or before the period of such notice expires, secure, lop or cut down the said tree or remove the fruit thereof, fence off a part of any street or take such other temporary measures as it thinks fit to prevent danger, and the cost of so doing shall be recoverable from the owner of the tree in the same manner as an arrear of public revenue due on land. As per clause (c) of sub-section (1), if any tree or the branch thereof in the opinion of the Village Panchayat, causes pollution to the drinking water of a well or tank, the Village Panchayat may, by **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 7 notice, require the owner of such tree to cut down and remove such tree or branch thereof. 6. Sub-section (2) of S.238 of the Act deals with the power of the Secretary of a Village Panchayat. As per sub-section (2), the Secretary of a Village Panchayat may, without notice, (a) trim or prune any hedge bordering on a public street so that it may notice exceed such height from the level of the adjoining roadways as may be provided for this purpose; or (b) cut and trim any hedge or tree overhanging the said trees and obstructing it or the view of traffic or causing damage to it; or (c) remove fallen trees on public roads and waterways which obstruct traffic. 7. The difference which is discernible from the language of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 238 of the Act is that, sub-section (1) empowers the Village Panchayat to take appropriate measures when any branch or portion of a tree or the fruits of any tree is likely to fall and thereby endanger any person or any structure or any cultivation. Though clause (a) of sub-section (1) contemplates a notice by the Village Panchayat to the owner of the said tree, requiring him to secure, lop or cut down the said tree or remove the fruits thereof, so as to prevent any danger therefrom; clause (b) of sub-section (1) empowers the Village Panchayat to secure, lop or cut down the said tree or remove the fruit thereof, etc. before giving notice under clause (a) of sub-section (1) or before the period of such notice expire, if immediate action is necessary. On the other hand, subsection (2) of Section 238 empowers the Secretary of **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 8 the Village Panchayat, without notice, trim or prune any hedge bordering on a public street; cut and trim any hedge or tree overhanging the said street and obstructing it or the view of traffic or cause damage to it; or remove fallen trees on public roads and water ways which obstruct traffic. 8. In the instant case, the proceedings that can be initiated against the petitioner based on the complaint made by the 3[rd] respondent falls under sub-section (1) of S.238 of the Act, which has to be initiated by a notice issued by the Village Panchayat under clause (a) of sub-section (1), if immediate action under clause (b) of sub-section (1) is not warranted. In such circumstances, conclusion is irresistible that Ext.P2 notice issued by the 2[nd] respondent, who is the Secretary of the 1[st] respondent Panchayat, is one issued absolutely without any authority of law.” 7. In view of the law laid down in the decision referred to supra, power under sub-section (1) of Section 238 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act can be exercised only by the Village Panchayat and not by the Secretary of the Panchayat. In the instant case, Ext.P2 complaint made by the petitioner dated 20.12.2018 squarely falls within the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 238 of the Act. Such a request has to considered only by the Village Panchayat constituted under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act. **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 9 8. In **Vinod Kumar v. District Geologist and others [2019 (3) KHC 79]** in the context of Rule 14 of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, this Court held that if the application made seeking permission under sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 for mineral transit pass is not supported by the mandatory documents as per the proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 14, and also an affidavit as per the mandate of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14, it cannot be said that there is any failure on the part of the District Geologist in discharging his statutory obligations, so as to enable the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus for considering that application. When the application made by the petitioner is not supported by the mandatory documents, as per the provisos to sub-rule (2) of Rule 14, and also an affidavit as per the mandate of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14, this Court cannot direct the District Geologist to consider that application in contravention of the statutory provisions, as no mandamus can be issued to do something which is contrary to law. Paragraphs 9 to 16 of the said decision read thus; “9. A reading of the provisions under sub-rules (2) and **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 10 (3) of Rule 14 of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules make it explicitly clear that an application for mineral transit passes for transportation of ordinary earth shall be accompanied by a valid building permit for construction of building, obtained from the Local Self Government authority concerned; land development permit obtained from the Local Self Government authority concerned, in cases where the levelling of the land and extraction of earth is involved; and possession and enjoyment certificate of the land issued by the Village Officer concerned. As per the second proviso to sub-rule (2), in cases where the levelling of the land and extraction of ordinary earth is involved, the building permit shall be accompanied by an approved building plan obtained from the Local Self Government authority concerned, which shall contain the area of the land to be developed for the construction of the building and quantity of ordinary earth to be extracted for such construction. 10. As per sub-rule (3) of Rule 14, a person who applies for mineral transit passes for transportation of ordinary earth under Rule 14 shall also submit along with the application, a sworn affidavit in stamped paper to the effect that he will carry out the proposed construction as per the building plan and building permit and shall complete at least the construction of basement of the building within one year from the date of issuance of mineral transit passes and intimate the same to the competent authority. 11. In the instant case, the fact that Ext.P3 application made by the petitioner before the 1[st] respondent for issuance of mineral transit passes is not supported by any **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 11 of the documents as per the mandate of the provisos to sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 and also an affidavit as per the mandate of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules is not in dispute. Though Ext.P3 application is one dated 04.02.2019, the same was sent by speed post to the office of the 1[st] respondent only on 20.02.2019, as evidenced by Ext.R1(a) envelop, which was received in the office of the said respondent only on 23.02.2019. The said fact is also not in dispute. During the course of arguments, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is prepared to produce Ext.P1 building permit, Ext.P2 development permit and also an affidavit as per the mandate of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 before the 1[st] respondent, within a time limit to be fixed by this Court. 12. In **Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 145]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. Paragraph 15 of the said decision reads thus; " **15.** .......... There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 12 the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute to enforce its performance. (See Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer [1966 (1) SCR 120 : AIR 1966 SC 334], Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College [1962 Supp (2) SCR 144 : AIR 1962 SC 1210] and Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar [(1973) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1973 SC 964]. In the instant case, it has not been shown by respondent No. 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Art.226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 13 issue the same." (underline supplied) 13. In **Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain [(2008) 2 SCC 280]** the Apex Court held that, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities. In the said decision, the Apex Court noticed that the principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated in 'The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies' by F. G. Ferris and F. G. Ferris, Jr. that, mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said decision read thus; " **11.** The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in 'The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies' by F. G. Ferris and F. G. Ferris, Jr. : **Note 187** .- Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 14 said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duly to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed. **Note 192** .- Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and Tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty. **Note 196** .- Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the Court, subject always to the well settled principles which have been established by the Courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and Judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 15 issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the Court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned - an interest which private litigants are apt to over look when striving for private ends. The Court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. **Note 206** .- .......... The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action. **12.** These very principles have been adopted in our country. In **Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 145 : AIR 1977 SC 2149]** , after referring to the earlier decisions in **Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah [AIR 1966 SC 334]** , **Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Nalanda College [AIR 1962 SC 1210]** and **Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar [(1973) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1973 SC 964]** , this Court observed as follows in paragraph 15 of the reports: "15. .......... There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 16 mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of the officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate Tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. ......... In the instant case, it has not been shown by respondent No. 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Art.226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same." **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 17 Therefore, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities. The respondents have not been able to show that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on the appellant bank to declare their account as NPA from 31[st] March, 2000 and apply RBI guidelines to their case." 14. **In State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [(1996) 9 SCC 309]** the Apex Court held that, under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. Paragraph 10 of the said decision reads thus; " **10.** Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of its erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution a mandamus **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 18 can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, if any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. ......." 15. In **Bhaskara Rao A.B. v. CBI [(2011) 10 SCC 259]** the Apex Court reiterated that, generally, no court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor can the court direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass orders or directions which are contrary to what has been injected by law. Vide: State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla [(1996) 8 SCC 90], State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [1996 (9) SCC 309], Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. [(1996) 4 SCC 453], University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 19 [(1997) 10 SCC 264] and Karnataka SRTC v. Ashrafulla Khan [(2002) 2 SCC 560]. 16. In the instant case, as borne out from the pleadings and materials on record, the petitioner filed this writ petition before this Court on 22.02.2019, even before the receipt of Ext.P3 application for mineral transit passes by the 1[st] respondent. Moreover, the said application is not supported by the mandatory documents, as per the provisos to sub-rule (2) of Rule 14, and also an affidavit as per the mandate of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that there is any failure on the part of the 1[st] respondent in discharging his statutory obligations, so as to enable the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of mandamus for consideration of Ext.P3 application. When Ext.P3 application made by the petitioner is not one supported by the mandatory documents as per the provisos to sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 and also an affidavit as per the mandate of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14, this Court cannot direct the 1[st] respondent to consider that application in contravention of the statutory provisions, as no mandamus can be issued to do something which is contrary to law.” 9. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the decision referred to supra, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of the 2[nd] respondent Grama Panchayat to consider Ext.P3 complaint made by the petitioner, which is one coming under the purview of sub- **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 20 section (1) of Section 238 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, which has to be considered by the Village Panchayat constituted under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act. 10. The learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 would raise various contentions as to the right of the petitioner on the property in question and point out the pendency of a civil suit as O.S.No.268/18 before the Munsiff's Court, Kayamkulam, which is one between the petitioner and respondents 5 and 6. The said suit is filed by the 5[th] respondent as the plaintiff. This Court need not go in to all those issues, considering the nature of relief proposed to be granted. 11. In such circumstances, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions.: (i) The Secretary of the 2[nd] respondent Panchayat shall place Ext.P3 complaint made by the petitioner before the Village Panchayat and thereafter, the Village Panchayat shall consider the same, invoking its powers under sub-section (1) of Section 238 of the Act and take an appropriate decision thereon, strictly in accordance with law, **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 21 with notice to the petitioner and also to respondents 5 and 6, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents 5 and 6 that the said respondents are prepared to cut and remove the coconut tree, based on any orders to be passed by the Village Panchayat is recorded. Sd/- Dxy **ANIL K.NARENDRAN JUDGE** **WP(C).No.18111 OF 2019(L)** 22 ## **APPENDIX** **PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:** **EXHIBIT P1 SERIES: THE TRUE COPIES OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS EVIDENCING THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY THE PETITIONER'S RESIDENTIAL BUILDING.** **EXHIBIT P2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED 19.9.2017 SEND BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT.** **EXHIBIT P3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED 5.3.2019.**