W.P.(C) Nos. 24992/09 & 27553/10: N.R. Satheesan Nair, President, Nattakom Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Ushakumary P. and Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT :** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR** **TUESDAY, THE 15TH NOVEMBER 2011 / 24TH KARTHIKA 1933** **WP(C).No. 24992 of 2009(T)** **----------------------------------** **PETITIONER(S):** - **-------------------** **N.R.SATHEESAN NAIR, S/O.K.S.RAGHAVA PANICKER, PUSHPAVILASOM, MARIYAPPALLY P.O., KOTTAYAM.** **BY ADV. SRI.KISHOR B.** ## **RESPONDENT(S):** **---------------------** **1. USHAKUMARY P., W/O.K.P.PEETHAMBARAKURUP, MATTAKKATTU HOUSE, PALLOM P.O., KOTTAYAM.** ## **2. JOINT REGISTRAR OF CO-OP. SOCIETIES** **(GENERAL), KOTTAYAM.** **R1 BY ADVS. SRI.S.EASWARAN** **SRI.P.MURALEEDHARAN (IRIMPANAM) R2 BY GOVT. PLEADER SRI. PADMALOCHANAN** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 18/10/2011, ALONG WITH WPC NO. 27553 OF 2010 THE COURT ON 15/11/2011 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **svs** ## **W.P.(C). NO. 24992/2009** ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:** - **P1: COPY OF APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY USHAKUMARY DATED 08/05/2009.** - **P2: COPY OF LETTER ISSUED TO USHAKUMARY DATED 09/05/2009.** - **P3: COPY OF APPLICATION FOR LEAVE DATED 06/07/2009 FROM USHAKUMARY.** - **P4: COPY OF LETTER DATED 12/08/2009 ISSUED TO USHAKUMARY.** - **P5: COPY OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CARD.** - **P6: COPY OF CERTIFICATE SUBMITTED BY USHAKUMARY DATED 20/08/2009.** - **P7: COPY OF FITNESS CERTIFICATE DATED 20/08/2009.** - **P8: COPY OF FITNESS CERTIFICATE DATED 20/08/2009 ISSUED BY DR. VARGHESE.** - **P9: COPY OF USHAKUMARY'S LETTER DATED 20/08/2009.** - **P10: COPY OF LETTER DATED 24/08/2009 ISSUED TO USHAKUMARY** - **P11: COPY OF ORDER NO.CRP (1)6695/2009 DATED 25/08/2009 ISSUED BY THE JOINT REGISTRAR, KOTTAYAM.** - **P12: COPY OF ORDER NO.CRP (1)6695/2009 DATED 14/01/2010.** - **P13: COPY OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE DATED 10/09/2009.** - **P14: COPY OF FIR IN CRIME NO.134/2010 OF CHINGAVANAM POLICE STATION.** ## **RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS:** - **R1(a):COPY OF ORDER DATED 1ST OCTOBER, 2009 IN WPC. NO.24992/2009.** - **R1(b):COPY OF PETITION DATED 5TH JANUARY, 2010 FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT UNDER RULE 176 OF THE KERALA CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES RULES, 1969.** ## **/TRUE COPY/** ## **P.A. TO JUDGE.** **svs** ## **C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.** ## **-------------------------------------------W.P.(C). Nos.24992 OF 2009 & 27553 OF 2010 --------------------------------------------** Dated this the 15[th] day of November, 2011 ## **JUDGMENT** The former Writ Petition has been filed by the President of the Nattakom Co-operative Bank Ltd. No.86, Pakkil (for short 'the Bank') in his personal capacity and the latter Writ Petition has been filed by the Bank through its Secretary. One Usha Kumary P., an employee of the bank is the common first respondent and the Joint Registrar of the Cooperative Societies (General), Kottayam is the common second respondent in both these Writ Petitions. All the documents and facts of the former Writ Petition have formed part of the pleadings in the latter Writ Petition and that apart, it also contains narration of the subsequent developments. For the sake of convenience, the latter Writ Petition is taken as the leading case and the facts and documents are referred to hereafter in the manner they are set out therein, unless otherwise specified. 2. The first respondent is the Assistant Secretary of the Bank. By virtue of the said capacity, at times, she had to discharge the duties of Branch Manager as well, it is contended. On 8.5.2009, the first **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 2 respondent submitted Ext.P1 application for half pay leave for two months from 13.5.2009 stating imbelicity, debility and amnesia as reasons and further that, she was finding it difficult to take on the routine works and to co-ordinate the functions of the bank properly. Leave of that duration was sought to avert a possible erring futurity and for mental healing and convalescence. Since she was not having eligible leave to her credit, she was sanctioned leave on loss of pay from 9.5.2009 for two months as per Ext.P2. On 6.7.2009, ie, prior to the expiry of the sanctioned leave, the first respondent submitted Ext.P3 leave application stating that she had undergone hysterectomy on 15.5.2009 and requested for leave altogether for 45 days in terms of the existing Government Order on the said subject, from 9.7.2009. It was sanctioned as per Ext.P4. However, she was directed thereunder to produce medical certificate in the light of Ext.P1 application for rejoining duty. Subsequently, Ext.P6 fitness certificate dated 20.8.2009 was produced by the first respondent to the effect that she attained fitness to resume duties of the Bank with effect from 24.8.2009. On the same day itself, she has produced Ext.P7 certificate as well. In Ext.P7, it is stated that she had presented with a request of certificate regarding her mental health. It is stated therein thus:- **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 3 “Mental status examination doest not reveal any obvious psychopathology. She does not appear to suffer from any major mental disorder at present.” 3. Subsequently, she submitted an application dated 20.8.2009 stating that her leave would expire on 22.8.2009 and that she had recuperated fully. Accordingly, she sought permission to rejoin duty on 24.8.2009. When she turned up to rejoin duty, the petitioner in the former Writ Petition, in his capacity as the President of the Bank, issued Ext.P8 letter requiring the first respondent to produce the medical certificate and fitness certificate evidencing the fact that she had undergone treatment for the diseases mentioned in the application dated 8.5.2009 and attained complete cure. In fact, as per Ext.P8 (Ext.P10 in the former Writ Petition ), she was asked to produce the certificate from the medical board to show that she had undergone treatment for the diseases mentioned in Ext.P1 application for leave and that she had regained fitness to resume duty. The contention of the petitioners is that taking into account the reasons cited by the first respondent in Ext.P1 and also the nature of duties attached to the post held by her in the Bank, such a certificate is highly essential to permit her to rejoin duty and also to regularise her service from 13.5.2009. Instead of producing the said certificate, the first respondent approached the Joint Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, the second **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 4 respondent through C.R.P.No.(1) 6695/2009 alleging that she was not allowed to rejoin duty. Ext.P11 marked as such in the former Writ Petition, is the order passed thereon on 25.8.2009 by the second respondent under Section 66A of the Co-operative Societies Act (for short 'the Act') and the Secretary of the Bank was directed to permit the first respondent to join duty. It also carried a further direction to treat the days between the date of expiry of the leave till the date of joining duty as eligible leave. In fact, it is challenging the said order of the second respondent dated 25.8.2009 that the former Writ Petition has been filed. The further prayer therein is for a declaration that the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General), Kottayam has no authority to invoke Section 66A in disputes connected with employment in a Co-operative Institution. Later, the Bank constituted a sub-committee alleging that the first respondent has committed deliberate disobedience of the lawful orders of the managing committee and the President. Memo of charges and statement of allegations were then served on her. On finding the explanation submitted by the first respondent as unsatisfactory, she was placed under suspension and an enquiry officer was appointed to conduct an enquiry. The enquiry officer issued Ext.P9 letter marked as such in the latter Writ Petition, to the first respondent requiring her to appear for the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 5 enquiry. The secretary of the Bank, the witness on the side of the management, filed an affidavit in lieu of chief examination and on behalf of the first respondent the witness was cross examined. The enquiry was then adjourned. Two days prior to the said posting date, the first respondent submitted an application for further adjournment. Thereupon, the enquiry officer informed the first respondent the next posting date and directed her to be present on that day and cautioned that upon her failure to attend the enquiry on that day, it would be proceeded ex parte. On receipt of the said letter, the first respondent approached the second respondent with a petition under Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (for short 'the Rules') to rescind resolution based on which the order dated 12.10.2009 suspending her from service was issued. On receipt of the said petition from the first respondent, the second respondent issued Ext.P10 (Ext.P10 in the latter Writ Petition) requiring the Bank to stop the enquiry proceedings. Thereafter, the first respondent submitted Ext.R1(d) marked as such in the latter Writ Petition, dated 3.5.2010 before the second respondent requesting to issue appropriate direction to the President of the Bank to reinstate her in service. Alleging inaction on Ext.R1(d), she approached this Court by filing W.P.(C).No. 15709/2010. The said Writ Petition was disposed of as per Ext.P6 judgment dated **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 6 24.5.2010 directing the second respondent herein to take a final decision on Exts.R1(c) and R1(d) petitions submitted by the first respondent. Thereupon, the second respondent passed Ext.P11 final order under Rule 176 of the Rules. It is challenging Ext.P11 order dated 13.8.2010 that the latter Writ Petition has been filed. It is also alleged thereunder that Ext.P12 certificate dated 10.9.2009 produced by the first respondent is a fabricated one and a complaint was preferred by the petitioner before the Judicial first Class Magistrate, Changanassery. Pursuant to the directions by the learned Magistrate, crime No.134/2010 of Chingavanam Police Station was registered against the first respondent under Sections 466, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned counsel for the first respondent and also the learned Government Pleader. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent in the latter Writ Petition. She has virtually admitted the factum of submission of Ext.P1 application dated 8.5.2009 and also the reasons assigned in Ext.P1 for availing the leave. In fact, that is why she has produced Ext.P7 certificate on 20.8.2009 while seeking permission to rejoin duty. In the context of the contentions raised in these Writ Petitions, **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 7 it is relevant to refer to the reasons assigned by the petitioner in Ext.P1 leave application. They read thus:- “ഞ�ന ശ�ര�ര�കമ�യ�� മ�നസ�കമ�യ�� വളരര തളര� അവസയ�ല�ണ�. ശര�രത�ന� വളരര ക�ണവ�� തളര�യ�� ഇപ!�ള ത�ടര�യ�യ� അന�ഭവര!ട���. അത�പലര% മനസ�ന� വളരര പ�ര�മ�%�ക� അന�ഭവര!ട���. ഈ രണവസയ�ല�� സ�ഖമ�ല�തത�ന�ല ബ�ങ�രല ദ1ന�1�നക�ര2ങള ശര�യ�യ� ര4യ�വ�പന� ബ�ങ�ര6 ബബ�ഞ�ല ബപവരതന� ശര�യ�യ� മ�പ��ട രക�ണ �പപ�ക�വ�പന� സ�ധ�ക ���ല. ഓര<ശക� ത�രര ക�ട ���ല. ആയത�ന�ല ബ�ങ�ല ഭ�വ�യ�ല എ��ലന���� ഉണ�പയക�വ�� പലതരത�ല�ള രതറ�ക�റങള ഒഴ�വ�ക��ത�ന� പര�പശ�ധനകള നടത� എര6 ശര�രത�ര6 ആപര�ഗ2വ��, മ�നസ�കപ�ര�മ�%�ക� ക�%�� മ�നസ�ക�പര�ഗ2വ�� വ�രണട �പകണത�യ�ണ�. അത�പലക�യ� ഈ മ�സ� രമയ� 13-ം� ത�യത�മ�തല രണ�മ�സക�ലപതക� എന�ക�പക �ത�ശ�ബളപത�ട�കJട�യ അവധ� അന �വ1��� തര �മ�%�കണരമ�� വ�നയപ �രസര� അപപക�ക��� .” 6. Admittedly, based on Ext.P1 application submitted by the first respondent on 8.5.2009 to grant her leave for two months from 13.5.2009, leave on loss of pay for the said period was granted as per Ext.P2 from 13.5.2009 as there was no other eligible leave available to her credit. Ext.P2 would reveal that while granting leave, the petitioner was also required to produce the medical certificate which she ought to have submitted along with Ext.P1 application for medical leave and, further, to submit fitness certificate at the time of rejoining duty after undergoing the treatment. Obviously, the first respondent has not disputed the said aspects as well, in the counter affidavit. Later, the first respondent submitted Ext.P3 leave application dated 6.7.2009 citing the reason that **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 8 she underwent hysterectomy on 15.5.2009. After considering the said leave application, leave was sanctioned. In this context, it is to be noted that, earlier, based on Ext.P1 application, she was granted two months leave from 13.5.2009. In fact, it is just two days prior to the expiry of the leave period granted as per Ext.P1 that she submitted Ext.P3 dated 6.7.2009 stating that she had undergone hysterectomy and requested for further leave for 45 days from 9.7.2009. Later, Ext.P4 letter was served on the first respondent intimating her that her leave application dated 6.7.2009 was considered by the Managing committee and 45 days leave with salary was sanctioned in terms of relevant Government Orders. She was further directed thereunder to produce medical certificate in respect of Ext.P1 leave application besides requiring her to submit an explanation for not submitting the required Medical Certificate, within 7 days of receipt of the letter. Ext.P5 would reveal that the first respondent has received Ext.P4 letter. In fact, the first respondent has not disputed the service of Ext.P4 notice on her. Ext.P6 fitness certificate dated 20.8.2009 issued by the doctor who issued the Medical Certificate for uterus removal certifying that she regained fitness to resume duties with effect from 24.8.2009. In Ext.P7 issued by one Dr.Varghese P.Punnoose, it is stated thus:- “Mrs.Usha Kumary P., 49 years wife of Mr.K.P.Peethambarakurup, Mattakkattu house, Pattom **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 9 has presented with a request of certificate regarding her mental health. Mental status examination doest not reveal any obvious psychopathology. She does not appear to suffer from any major mental disorder at present.” 7. The stand of the petitioners has to be analysed and appreciated taking into account the nature of of duties attached to the post held by the first respondent as also the nature of the business in which the very Cooperative institution involve. Necessarily, in her capacity as Assistant Secretary of the Bank, she has to deal with public and may have to deal with valuable documents. The contention of the petitioners that, at times, she had to discharge the duties of Branch manager was also not disputed by the petitioner. Certainly, such occasions require dealing with public money as well. In short, it is an onerous job and the element of public interest involved in the matter also cannot be ignored in the circumstances considering the fact that the institution is involved in banking activities. 8. Now I may advert to the contentions raised by the petitioners. It is contended that since the bye laws of the society and also the Cooperative Societies Act and the Rules had not prescribed the conditions for leave, the Kerala Service Rules are made applicable to the employees of the Co-operative Societies in such matters. Rule 117 of Part I of the KSR provides the form of medical certificate to be submitted along with the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 10 application for leave on medical grounds. The form of medical fitness certificate is also provided thereunder. A perusal of Ext.P6 would reveal that it is in tune with the form given under Rule 117 of Part-I KSR. However, it is issued by the doctor who issued the certificate relating hysterectomy and further that it did not contain any certification with regard to the mental state of the first respondent. The first respondent was also fully aware of the said position lest she would not have produced Ext.P7. However, Ext.P7 cannot be considered as a fitness certificate satisfying the requirements under law besides being not in the prescribed form. Since the certificates produced by the first respondent was not sufficient to grant permission to rejoin duty and she has failed to produce requisite certificate in terms of Ext.P2, Ext.P8 was issued to her. Even after receipt of Ext.P8 as also Ext.P4, the first respondent had not produced such certificates. It is the said allegations and circumstances that led to the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against her. After taking part in the disciplinary proceedings and cross examining the witness for the management, the first respondent approached the second respondent through Ext.R1(c) petition complaining that she was not permitted to rejoin duty. As per Ext.P10, the second respondent directed the Bank to stop the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the first **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 11 respondent. Earlier, the second respondent issued Ext.P11 order under Section 66A of the Act directing the Bank to reinstate the petitioner. That order is under challenge in the former Writ Petition and initially a stay was granted 28.8.2009. However, Ext.R1(b) order dated 1.10.2009 in the former Writ Petition would reveal that this Court declined to grant extension of the stay order. Admittedly, the Bank initiated disciplinary proceedings against the first respondent, in the meanwhile, and the first respondent was not permitted to rejoin duty. Thereupon, the first respondent has chosen to approach the second respondent through Exts.R1 (c) & R1(d). As per Ext.R1(c) dated 5.1.2010, the second respondent was requested to revoke the resolution based on which the order dated 12.10.2009 suspending her from service was issued, by invoking the power under Rule 176 of the Rules and to direct the Bank to reinstate her in service. Ext.R1(d) is dated 3.5.2010. It is stated therein that she was kept under suspension for more than six months and further that by virtue of Rule 198(6) of the Rules, the first respondent could not be kept under suspension for a period exceeding six months at a time. Later, alleging inaction on Exts.R1(c) and R1(d), the first respondent filed W.P.(C). No.15709/2010 and, it was disposed of as per Ext.P16 judgment. Ext.P11 order marked as such in the latter Writ Petition, was passed in pursuant to **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 12 the directions in Ext.P16 judgment in W.P.(C).No. 15709/2010. As per Ext.P11 order dated 13.8.2010, the resolution No.75 dated 10.10.2009 suspending the first respondent from service was rescinded by invoking the power under Rule 176 of the Rules and the Bank was directed to reinstate the first respondent in service. Further, it was directed to treat the period from the date on which she was not admitted to duty till the date of rejoining duty as eligible leave. The contention of the petitioners is that the action on the part of the second respondent in issuing Ext.P11 under Section 66A of the Act in the former Writ Petition and Ext.P11 in the latter Writ Petition rescinding the resolution No.75 under Rule 176 with further directions as mentioned above, are unsustainable. The contention of the first respondent is that on the strength of Exts.P6 and P7 certificates produced by her, she should have been permitted to rejoin duty and there was absolutely no reason for placing her under suspension and also for conducting domestic enquiry against her while continuing to keep her under suspension. 9. As already noticed hereinbefore, the first respondent had not disputed the fact that she had assigned the reasons extracted above while applying for leave as per Ext.P1. That apart, In the counter affidavit, she has not refuted the contention of the petitioners that in her capacity as the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 13 Assistant Secretary of the Bank, at times, she had to function as Manager of the Bank. As already noticed hereinbefore, the duties attached to the said posts require the petitioner to deal with public as also to deal with valuable documents. Occasions may also arise to deal with public money. Considering the nature of duties attached to the post of Assistant Secretary and also the fact that the institution is involved in banking activities, the concern shown by the petitioners cannot be said to be uncalled for. Interest of public is also to be safeguarded. Necessarily, as a person holding a responsible position in the bank, the petitioner has to be fit, both mentally and physically to discharge the onerous duties. Even according to the first respondent, the degree of her mental tension and physical tiredness coupled with the loss of memory had reached up to a particular stage at which she herself apprehended occurrence of some lapse or mistakes in discharging her duties. She was under the firm opinion that she would not be able to carry on with the duties attached to her post with such a state of mind. It was that apprehension based on the aforesaid reasons that constrained the first respondent to submit Ext.P1 application for leave. Though no eligible leave was available in her credit, considering the reasons cited by the first respondent in Ext.P1 application and finding that with such a state of mind refusing permission to the first **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 14 respondent to enter on leave would be detrimental to the best interest of the Bank that leave on loss of pay was granted to her from 13.5.2009 onwards for two months. 10. I have carefully considered the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent. It is to be noted that as per Ext.P4, she was asked to produce medical certificate in relation to the reasons cited in Ext.P1 and also to produce a fitness certificate. Such certificates were not actually produced by her while making Ext.P3 application and seeking for permission to rejoin duty. Admittedly, the first respondent had produced only Exts.P6 and P7 certificates. Obviously, Ext.P6 certificate of fitness issued by the doctor who issued the medical certificate for uterus removal. A bare perusal of Ext.P7 would reveal that it cannot be construed as a fitness certificate. The concerned doctor had not certified that the first respondent is medically fit to resume duty. In this context, it is also to be noted that in the latter part of Ext.P7 it is stated :- “she does not appear to suffer from any major mental disorder at present.” ## (emphasis supplied) 11. Considering the fact that the first respondent herself assessed the level of her mental tension, physical tiredness and loss of memory to such a degree incapacitating her to attend the duties attached to her post **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 15 and that doctor certified only to the effect that she did not appear to suffer from any major mental disorder at present, the petitioners cannot be found at fault in demanding a proper certificate from a Board in relation to the reasons stated in Ext.P1 application. Ext.P11 in the former Writ Petition would reveal that the second respondent was also very much aware of the said reasons assigned by the first respondent. Sympathy cannot rule the situation as public interest also involves in a matter like the one on hand considering the fact that the institution involved in banking activities and that the first respondent is holding a responsible position in the bank. Even after receiving Exts.P4 and P8, the required certificates were not produced by the first respondent while seeking permission to rejoin duty. 12. The legality of Exts.P4 and P10 whereby the petitioner was asked to produce medical certificate and medical fitness certificate in relation to the reasons in Ext.P1 leave application and also that of Ext.P11 in the former Writ Petition and Ext.P11 in the latter Writ Petition are now to be considered in view of the materials available on record and also in view of the relevant provisions of law. The specific contention of the petitioners is that in respect of matters of leave of employees of the Bank, the provisions under the Kerala Service Rules (for short 'KSR') are applicable. There is no specific rebuttal of the said contention in the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 16 counter affidavit filed by the first respondent. I may also hasten to add that the second respondent did not consider the applicability of the provisions under the KSR while passing Ext.P11 orders in both these Writ Petitions. 13. Rule 190(8) of the Kerala Co-operative Rules assumes relevance in the context of the cases. It reads thus:- “Every employee of a society shall be eligible for different kinds of leave (including surrender of earned leave for the purpose of encashment) as in the case of State Government employees as prescribed under the Kerala Service Rules.” 14. For deciding the applicability of KSR to the employees of Cooperative Societies, the expression 'as in the case of State Government employees as prescribed under the Kerala Service Rules' employed in Rule 190(8) of the Rules has to be looked into. It would undoubtedly reveal that all prescriptions mentioned under the KSR in respect of the government employees will be applicable to the employees of Cooperative Societies in the matter of grant of all kinds of leave. In other words, the eligibility to all kinds of leave as regards the employees of the Co-operative Societies are governed by the provisions under the KSR. I am fortified in my view by a decision of this court in _**Bindu v. State of Kerala**_ reported in _**ILR 2008(1) Kerala 427**_ . A perusal of Ext.P1 **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 17 application would reveal that it was on medical ground that the first respondent sought for leave for two months. It is very much evident from the following recital in Ext.P1:- “ആയത�ന�ല ബ�ങ�ല ഭ�വ�യ�ല എ��ലന���� ഉണ�പയക�വ�� പലതരത�ല �ള രതറ �ക�റങള ഒഴ�വ�ക��ത�ന� പര�പശ�ധനകള നടത� എര6 ശര�രത�ര6 ആപര�ഗ2വ��, മ�നസ�കപ�ര�മ�%�ക� ക�%�� മ�നസ�ക�പര�ഗ2വ�� വ�രണട�പകണത�യ�ണ�.” 15. In the circumstances obtained in this case, Rules 117 and 71 of Part I KSR assume relevance. Rule 117 reads thus:- “Before an officer can be granted leave or an extension of leave on medical certificate, he must obtain a certificate in the following form from such medical authority as the Government may by general or special order prescribe.” The form of medical certificate is also provided thereunder. Note 3 under Rule 117 of the KSR is also having relevance and the same reads thus:- “This form should be adhered to as closely as possible, and should be filled in after the signature of the applicant has been taken. The certifying officer is not at liberty to certify that the applicant requires a change to (or from) a particular locality, or that he is not fit to proceed to a particular locality. Such certificate should only be given at the explicit desire of the administrative authority concerned, to whom it is open to desire, when an application on such grounds has been made to him, whether the applicant should go before a Medical Board to decide the question of his fitness for service.” 16. Going by the provisions under Rule 117 of the KSR and the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 18 notes thereunder, the form should be adhered to as closely as possible and it is open to the administrative authority to decide whether the applicant should go before a Medical Board to decide the question of his fitness for service. Rule 71 of Part I KSR reads thus:- “No officer who has been granted leave on medical certificate may return to duty without first producing a medical certificate of fitness in the following form from a Medical Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Surgeon or the Director of Indigenous Medicines.” 17. The form of fitness certificate is also provided thereunder. A perusal of Ext.P7 certificate would go to show that it did not satisfy the requirements under the aforesaid relevant rules. The signature of the petitioner is not there in Ext.P7. So also, it is not certified that the first respondent has recovered from the illness that constrained her to avail leave on medical ground and now, now regained fitness to resume duties. Going by the said provisions under Rule 71, it is mandatory for the certifying authority to examine the original medical certificate and statement(s) of the case (or certified copies thereof) on which leave was granted or extended and to take them into consideration before arriving its decision. Rule 118(a) and 118A are also relevant in the context of the cases. However, in these cases, the medical certificate as also the fitness certificate, in the prescribed form in terms of Rule 117 and 71 of Part I **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 19 KSR have not been produced by the first respondent. Going by Rule 124 of Part I KSR, an officer returning from leave is not entitled, in the absence of specific orders to that effect, to resume as a matter of course, the post which she/he held before going on leave. The employee must report for return to duty and await orders. A conjoint reading of all the aforesaid provisions under the Rules and KSR would reveal that the action on the part of the petitioners in issuing directions to the first respondent to produce medical certificate and medical fitness certificate in relation to the reasons (disease) stated in Ext.P1 leave application to resume duty cannot be said to be illegal and in fact, the aforesaid provisions would reveal that it is legal. After submitting the application seeking permission to return to duty, the first respondent has produced only Exts.P6 and P7 certificates. Even the first respondent did not have a case that Ext.P6 would satisfy the requirement of fitness certificate to return to duty as regards the reasons stated in Ext.P1 and the said fact is evident from the conduct of the first respondent in producing Ext.P7 certificate on the same date. I have already found that Ext.P7 certificate produced by the first respondent cannot be said to be one which satisfies the requirements under the relevant provisions mentioned earlier in KSR. Therefore, in view of the directions of the petitioners as per Exts.P4 and P10, the first respondent **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 20 was bound to comply with the same to return to duty. As already noticed hereinbefore, Ext.P6 certificate was issued by the doctor who issued the medical certificate in respect of hysterectomy. Therefore, the production of Exts.P6 and P7 certificates will not legally make the first respondent eligible to resume duty. Exts.P22 and P27 produced in the latter Writ Petition would reveal the circumstances under which disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the first respondent. As a reply to Ext.P22 show cause notice and memo of charges, the first respondent submitted Ext.P23 and it is stated therein as hereunder:- ഇതര� ക �റ�പര�പണ രമപ<�കള മന�ഷL�വക�ശല�ഘനമ�കയ�ല മന�ഷL�വക�ശക<�ഷന� പര�ത�നലക�വ�ന ഞ�ന ന�രബന�തയ�യ�ത�ര��ര�ക�കയ�ണ�. 18. In view of the order I propose to pass in these Writ Petitions I think I should refrain from making any observation touching the same, as consideration of the show cause memo, the memo of charges as also its reply submitted by the petitioner is uncalled for and that apart, any such consideration may hamper the prospects of either of the parties in the disciplinary proceedings, in case , its continuation becomes necessary. 19. Now I may deal with Ext.P11 in these Writ Petitions. It is **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 21 true that as per Ext.R1(b), this Court declined to extend the order of stay issued in W.P.(C).No. 24992 of 2009. At the same time, it would reveal that this Court had not gone into the legality of the action in insisting for production of medical certificate and medical fitness certificate by the petitioners and also, of the question, whether Ext.P7 certificate would satisfy the requirements in terms of the relevant provisions under the KSR. I have already found that, after considering the relevant provisions under the KSR, requiring production of medical certificate and medical fitness certificate cannot be considered as illegal in the circumstances involved in these writ petitions and, in fact, it is only legal. Going by the provisions, in fact, medical certificate should have been produced along with the application for leave. Merely because, leave was sanctioned based on Ext.P1 without producing the medical certificate cannot be a reason for adding that for resuming duty. Production of medical certificate is absolutely unnecessary and unwarranted. In fact, the very conduct of the first respondent in producing Exts. P6 and P7 certificates would reveal that the first respondent is not having any such contention. However, Ext.P7 certificate cannot be considered as a fitness certificate in conformity with the relevant provisions under the KSR. The genuineness or otherwise of such a certificate need not be gone into in this proceedings. Therefore, the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 22 direction of the petitioner cannot be considered as a direction to obtain a second medical opinion and, in fact, it is only an insistence for production of a proper medical certificate and fitness certificate in conformity with the provisions under the relevant rules. Admittedly, the first respondent could not resume duty even after Ext.R1(b) and the petitioner insisted for production of the aforesaid certificates. Subsequently, upon the failure of the first respondent to produce such certificates, as required vide Exts.P4 and P10, she was placed under suspension and later, disciplinary proceedings have been initiated leveling certain specific charges. In fact, it was against such actions that the first respondent approached the second respondent. 20. In the context of the contentions, it is also relevant to refer to Ext.P18 dated 14.09.09 submitted by the first respondent before the President and board members of the society through its Secretary. In Ext.P18, which is in fact in the form of an apology, it is stated thus: “My leave application dtd. 8.5.09 submitted by me was wrongly prepared by mistake and confers that the mental problems as stated therein was mischievous and irrelevant. The statement made out in the application were reconcieved and has **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 23 nothing to do with facts and circumstances of the case. I also regret that the stated reasons attributed to be a wrong message in regard to my ability/capacity to work/discharge functions in office. Hence I do apologise with regard to the mistakes/wrong doings committed by me in good faith and without negligence and submit the above facts and circumstances for your kind consideration to enable me to rejoin duty forthwith.” (emphasis supplied) 21. The above extracted portion from Ext.P18 would reveal that the first respondent herself admits the fact that Ext.P1 application submitted by her on 8.5.09 sent a wrong message in regard to her ability/capacity to work and discharge functions in the office. In view of the nature of the order I propose to pass I do not think it proper or necessary to make any further observation or comment on Ext.P18 submitted by the first respondent. It is adverted to only for showing that the first respondent herself admitted the fact that Ext.P1 application dated **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 24 8.5.09 was sufficient to send a wrong message with respect to her ability/capacity to work and discharge the functions attached to the post she held. If that be so, how can one attribute arbitrariness, illegality or impropriety on the action of the bank in insisting the first respondent to produce the medical certificate and medical fitness certificate to ensure that she has regained the ability, to work and discharge her functions. While considering such issues, one cannot lose sight of the public interest involved in the matter as well considering the nature of business activities of the bank. In this context, I may have to refer to Ext.P7 certificate produced by the first respondent again. Evidently, that was produced by the first respondent herself with a view to convince the authorities that she has regained her mental health. The nature of the business in which the petitioner society is engaged would definitely make it accountable and answerable and therefore, taking into account the reasons stated in Ext.P1 application, the petitioner cannot be found fault with for asking the first respondent to produce medical certificate as also medical fitness certificate for returning to duty. As already noticed, it was against the said action that the first respondent approached the second respondent. Subsequently, the first respondent had approached this Court to alleviate the grievances regarding the delay in the matter of disposal of Ext.R1(c) and R1(d) by the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 25 second respondent by filing W.P.(C).No.15709/2010. The said writ petition was disposed of as per Ext.P16 judgment. Evidently, the first respondent had only sought for appropriate directions for an expeditious disposal of Exts.P1 and P2 representations, referred as such in the said writ petitions. Obviously, the first respondent had not sought for any relief in view of Ext.R1(a) interim order passed by this Court dated 1.10.2009 in the former writ petition or based on Ext.P11 order dated 25.8.2009 of the second respondent, in W.P.(C).No.15709 of 2010 though, by that time, 6 months' time had elapsed since her suspension. In view of the nature of the reliefs sought for in the said writ petition, it was disposed of with a direction to the first respondent therein viz., the second respondent herein, to consider and pass orders on the said representations referred thereunder as Exts.P1 and P2, in accordance with law with opportunity of being heard to the petitioner/first respondent herein and the bank. It is thereafter that Ext.P11, the impugned order in the latter writ petition was passed by the second respondent mainly on account of the failure to comply with the directions in the order dated 25.8.2009 viz., Ext.P11 in the former writ petition and in the light of Ext.R1(b) order of this Court in the former writ petition. As per Ext.P11 order in the latter writ petition, the resolution suspending the first respondent was interfered with Rule 176 of the KCS **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 26 Rules and the petitioner in the latter writ petition was directed to admit the first respondent to duty and to treat the period during which she was kept out of service as eligible leave. 22. As already noticed hereinbefore, a perusal of Ext.P11 in the latter writ petition would reveal that it is founded on Ext.P11 in the former writ petition. Ext.P11 in the former writ petition would reveal that it was passed invoking the power under Section 66A of the Act. Certainly, section 66A empowers the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies to issue general directions and guidelines to the Co-operative Societies in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. By virtue of the delegation of that power, the second respondent is also empowered to exercise that power. In the decisions in _**Aji v. State of Kerala**_ ( _**1995(1) KLT 363)**_ and _**Thiruvalla East Co-operative Bank v. Joint Registrar**_ ( _**2006 (4) KLT 959),**_ this Court held that the said power shall be exercised with due care, caution and circumspection. It shall be exercised only when it is really called for. Therefore, the question is whether due care, caution and circumspection have been shown by the second respondent while exercising the power under section 66A having regard to the facts and circumstances. I may, first consider the sustainability of Ext.P11 in the former writ petition as Ext.P11 in the latter writ petition was passed **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 27 heavily relying on it. . It is obvious from the said order dated 25.8.2009 that, it was passed on a petition filed by the first respondent on the same day itself viz., on 25.8.2009. Evidently, no notice was issued to the bank, either to its Secretary or to its President, before passing the said order. Evidently, the sustainability of the said order was not considered by this Court while passing Ext.R1(b) order. As already noticed, going by the decisions mentioned above, the power under section 66A of the Act has to be exercised with due care, caution and circumspection and only when it is really called for. Obviously, the complaint, rather, petition filed by the first respondent before the second respondent was one pertaining to the action on the part of the bank in not permitting her to return to duty after the expiry of the leave period. The second respondent has come to the conclusion that there was absolutely no justification for not permitting the first respondent to return to duty and therefore, the said action on the part of the authorities of the bank are illegal and unjustified. It is based on such a conclusion that he has exercised the power under section 66A and passed Ext.P11 order dated 25.8.2009 on the very same day on which a petition was received from the first respondent. Evidently, without issuing notice and affording an opportunity of being heard to the bank authorities, the second respondent has reached the conclusion regarding absence of **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 28 justification. Admittedly, the second respondent was dealing with the action on the part of the bank authorities in refusing permission to the first respondent to return to duty without producing the medical certificate and medical fitness certificate in respect of the reasons assigned for availing leave as per Ext.P1 application. When that was the case, going by the salutary principle of 'hear the other side' the second respondent should have issued notice to the bank and call for explanation. The manifest error in complying with the said principle of natural justice itself would indicate the non-application of due care, caution and circumspection while exercising the power under section 66A. In short, on account of the flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, Ext.P11 order dated 25.8.2009 is liable to be interfered with. It is to be noted that the second respondent has not chosen to file counter affidavit in these writ petitions. Therefore, in the light of the rival contentions, I am inclined to look into the sustainability of Ext.P11 dated 25.8.2009 on merits, as well. The manner in which petition dated 25.8.2009 filed by the first respondent and the issue involved thereunder were considered by the second respondent are self evident from paragraph 2 of Ext.P11 and it reads thus:- “മ�നസ�ക�സO�സ2രത ത�ടര��� യJബടസ�സ�ബനമ�യ അസ�ഖരതത�ടര��മ�ണ� ബശ�മത�.ഉഷ�ക�മ�ര� രമഡ�കല ല�രവട�ത�ട�ളരത�� ക�ണ���.പമല�പട� ട� രണ � വ�ഷയങള�ല�� ബനര!ട പഡ�കരമ�ര�രട രമഡ�കല **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 29 ഫ�റ�നസ� സരട�ഫ�കറ� സഹ�തമ�ണ� ബശ�മത�.ഉഷ�ക�മ�ര� പT�ല�യ�ക� %�പ!�രട� ര4യ�ത�ട�ളരത�� ക�ണ���. ആ ന�ലയ�ക� മ�നസ�ക�പര�ഗ2� വ�രണട �ത� എ� �ള രമഡ�കല പബ�രഡ�ര6 സരട�ഫ�കറ� ഹ�Tര�ക�യ�പല ട�യ�രള പT�ല�യ�ല ബപപവശ�!�ക�കയJളJ എ� ബ�ങ� അധ�ക2തര�രട ത�ര �മ�ന� ന�ത�കര�ക�ന�വ ��തരല�� ക�ണ���. ട�യ�ളക� മ�നസ�കപര�ഗമ�രണ�� രതള�യ�ക��ത�ന�ള യ�രത�ര � സരട�ഫ�കറ�കള�� ഹ�Tര�ക�രതയ�ണ� ഭരണസമ�ത� ട�യ�ളക� ല�വ� അന�വ1���ട�ളത� എ�ത �രക�ണ�തര� ഇത�സ�ബനമ�യ� രമഡ�കലപബ�രഡ�ര6 ഫ�റ�നസ� സരട�ഫ�കറ� പവണരമ� �ള ബ�ങ�ര6 ന�ലപ�ട� ന�ത�കര�ക�ന�വ��തരല�� എന�യ�ക � പബ�ദ2മ�യ�ര�യ�ക��J.” 23. A perusal of the above extracted portion from Ext.P11 dated 25.8.2009 would reveal that the second respondent was fully aware of the fact that the first respondent had availed leave as per Ext.P1 application assigning the reason of mental problems as well. One cannot accept that the second respondent was unaware of the nature of the activities in which the bank has been indulged into and also the involving public interest in the issue. There can be no doubt that during the course of the business, the officers of the bank, including the first respondent, will necessarily, have to deal with money and invaluable documents. Therefore, when there is room for suspicion regarding the mental capacity and ability to discharge the functions attached to a particular post of a particular employee of the bank and that particular employee himself/herself applied for leave citing **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 30 such reason insistence for production of medical fitness certificate in that regard cannot be styled as illegal and in fact, the bank is duty bound to protect the public interest by ensuring that the concerned employee has regained ability to work and discharge the functions attached to the post held by him/her. Such a matter should not have been lightly taken by the second respondent and, in fact, it was rightly taken with all seriousness by the authorities of the bank. As already noticed, the second respondent has arrived at conclusions without calling for explanation from the authorities of the bank. In the context of the contentions, it is relevant to refer to Ext.P18, marked as such in the latter writ petition. I have already adverted to its contents hereinbefore. The contentions in Ext.P18 would reveal that the first respondent herself would admit the fact that Ext.P18 was capable of conveying an impression on herself as a person suffering from imbelicity, debility and amnesia and, as such, lacking ability and capacity to work and to discharge the functions attached to the post held by her. As already noticed, the first respondent is the Assistant Secretary of the bank and, at times, she was to discharge the duties of the manager of the bank. In Ext.P1 application, the first respondent has assigned imbelicity, debility and amnesia as reasons besides stating that she was finding it difficult to take on the routine work and for co-ordinating the functions of **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 31 the bank properly. When that be the reasons assigned in Ext.P1 application, no responsible authority could grant permission to resume duty merely on the request for permission to return to duty on expiry of the leave period before ensuring that the concerned employee has regained the mental capacity to discharge the functions attached to the concerned post. Considering the public interest involved in the activities of the bank, the authorities of the bank could not have and should not have taken such a matter lightly. In fact, in these cases, obviously, the authorities of the bank viewed the matter rightly with all deserving seriousness. It is evident from Ext.P11 that the second respondent had not gone into the question as to whether the fitness certificate produced by the first respondent would satisfy the requirement under relevant provisions of law. Ext.P7 is the fitness pertaining to the mental health of the first respondent. Ext.P11 dated 25.8.2009 would reveal that the second respondent was fully aware of the fact that the first respondent availed the leave through Ext.P1. I have already found after referring to the relevant provisions under the relevant rules, that Ext.P7 could not meet the requirements under the rule. In Ext.P11 dated 25.8.2009, produced as such in the former writ petition, it is stated thus:- “ട�യ�ളക� മ�നസ�കപര�ഗമ�രണ�� രതള�യ�ക��ത�ന�ള യ�രത�ര� സരട�ഫ�കറ�കള�� ഹ�Tര�ക�രതയ�ണ� **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 32 ഭരണസമ�ത� ട�യ�ളക� ല�വ� അന �വ1���ട�ളത� എ�ത�രക�ണ�തര� ഇത �സ�ബനമ�യ� രമഡ�കലപബ�രഡ�ര6 ഫ�റ�നസ� സരട�ഫ�കറ� പവണരമ��ള ബ�ങ�ര6 ന�ലപ�ട� ന�ത�കര�ക�ന�വ��തരല�� എന�യ�ക � പബ�ദ2മ�യ�ര�യ�ക��J.” 24. The above extracted portion from Ext.P11 would reveal the view of the second respondent in the issue. The second respondent found that the Managing Committee had sanctioned the leave to the first respondent without obtaining certificates proving mental illness and therefore, according to the second respondent, the insistence for production of medical fitness certificate is illegal. As already noticed hereinbefore, such reasoning has been made for issuing a direction under section 66A of the Act, without notice to the bank. At the very outset, it is not a case wherein the bank terminated the service of the first respondent citing unsoundness of mind. Here, the first respondent herself applied for leave through Ext.P1 application citing the reasons specifically mentioned hereinbefore. When that be the case, reasoning in Ext.P11 cannot be comprehended. When such reasons were assigned by an employee in a leave application, no prudent employer could have refused leave and insisted for continuance on duty. The reasoning of the second respondent that since leave was sanctioned before obtaining certificates proving mental illness, the bank should not have insisted for fitness **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 33 certificate showing that she has regained health and recovered from the illness referred to in the application for permitting to return to duty is nothing but a palpably unsustainable view and cannot be accepted in a matter of serious concern. Ext.P11 would reveal that the second respondent has not cared to consider the relevant provisions under the relevant law before arriving at the conclusions and findings made as per Ext.P11 and holding the actions of the bank as illegal. I am of the considered view that such an order cannot form the basis for an order under Rule 176 of the KCS Rules. As already noticed, Ext.P11 order in the latter writ petition was passed by the second respondent relying heavily on Ext.P11 order in the former writ petition. Evidently, it is the violation on the part of the authorities of the bank in compliance with the directions in Ext.P11 in the former writ petition, in the light of Ext.R1(b) order dated 1.10.2009 in the said writ petition, that formed the basis for Ext.P11 order in the latter writ petition by invoking the power under 176 of the Rules. In this context, it is also relevant to note that by the time, the first respondent approached this Court by filing W.P.(C).No.15709/2010 she had undergone suspension for a period of six months. Obviously, the first respondent had not sought for orders / granted orders taking into account Ext.R1(b) in the former writ petition as also Ext.P11 order dated 25.8.2009 **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 34 in the former writ petition. The first respondent sought only for appropriate directions for an expeditious disposal of Exts.P1 and P2 representations submitted before the second respondent. A perusal of Ext.P11 in the latter writ petition would reveal that the second respondent was swayed away by the facts that the directions in Ext.P11 order dated 25.8.2009 in the former writ petition were not complied with and even after this Court declined to extend the stay of Ext.P11 dated 25.8.2009. Even in the said circumstances, the first respondent had not chosen to pursue for reliefs, based on such circumstances, in W.P.(C).No.15709 of 2010 and by the time she instituted the same, she had already undergone suspension for a period of six months. Admittedly, by the time Exts.P1 and P2 representations referred as such in W.P.(C).No.15709 of 2010 were taken up for consideration by the second respondent, the bank has already initiated disciplinary proceedings against the first respondent. In fact, in contemplation of such a disciplinary action that she was placed under suspension. The mere the fact that six months period had elapsed since the placement under suspension cannot be a reason to interfere with an order of suspension passed by a competent authority in respect of a particular employee. It is an established position that initiation of disciplinary proceedings, primarily, depends upon the satisfaction of the **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 35 competent disciplinary authority. It is for that authority to decide whether for maintaining discipline in the concerned institution or on account of the misconduct alleged against the concerned employee, disciplinary action is called for or not. Initiation of such disciplinary proceedings by a competent authority cannot be nipped at the bud unless the very initiation of disciplinary action is against any specific statutory provision or with mala fide intention and without even a prima facie evidence on record. In this case, memo of charges has been served on the first respondent and an enquiry officer was appointed and in fact, enquiry proceedings have also been commenced. In the said circumstances, it is relevant to look into the question as to whether the second respondent was justified in invoking the power under rule 176 of the KCS rules for passing Ext.P11 order in the latter writ petition. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that the second respondent is having competency to invoke the power under rule 176 if the resolution in question is one pertaining to disciplinary action against an employee (see the decisions in 1996 (1) KLT 100 and 1996 (2) KLT 66). However, in regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision which is relevant is the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in _**Parappuram Milk Producer's Co-operative Society v. Deputy Director, Department of Dairy Development**_ reported in _**1999 (1)**_ **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 36 _**KLT 121.**_ In paragraph 3 thereunder it is stated thus: “In a proceeding under R.176, Joint Registrar can certainly examine whether R.198 or any other provisions of the Act or rules or Bye-laws were violated or not, while taking disciplinary action notwithstanding the right of appeal or any other alternative remedy”. 25. It is thus obvious that invocation of the said power is permissible in case the initiation of disciplinary action is contrary to the better interest of the society. Going by the said decision taking disciplinary action against an erring employee would not amount to disturbing the peaceful and orderly working of the concerned society and therefore, could not said to be contrary to the better interest of the concerned society. I have already found that in the facts and circumstances of these cases, i.e., in view of the nature of the business in which the bank is involved and the reasons assigned in Ext.P1 application together with Exts.P7 and P18 that the insistence for production of medical certificate and fitness certificate in relation to Ext.P1 cannot be said to be an action which would disturb the peaceful and orderly working of the bank or contrary to its better interest. In fact, it can only be **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 37 construed as an action in the better interest of the bank and essential to safeguard public interest. Therefore, an abrupt termination of disciplinary proceedings could not have been and should not have been effected by the second respondent. At the same time, it is evident that the first respondent is under suspension. The bank has actually required the first respondent to produce the aforesaid certificate to return to duty. It is the subsequent developments, rather, failure to produce such documents that ultimately culminated in her suspension from service. The power to keep an employee under suspension in terms of Rule 198 of the KCS Rules is not authority to continue a person under suspension indefinitely or till the culmination of the disciplinary proceedings. The authorities are under an obligation to consider whether it is necessary to keep the employee away from the concerned post. At the same time, in view of the circumstances obtained in these cases, I find no reason to sustain the order of the second respondent interfering with the order of suspension of the first respondent, on the grounds referred to hereinbefore, and also directing the petitioner to the latter writ petition to permit the first respondent to return to duty without production of medical certificate and medical fitness certificate in relation to Ext.P1 application as also to treat the period in between as on duty and that too, with the consequential impact of foreclosing the liberty **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 38 to continue with the disciplinary action already initiated. In the circumstances, Ext P11 in the latter writ petition is set aside. In the wake of the facts and circumstances of the cases as also in the interest of justice, I am of the view that it will only be appropriate for the authorities of the bank to consider the question of revocation of suspension and to grant permission to the first respondent to resume duty in case the first respondent produces the required medical certificate and medical fitness certificate in relation to Ext.P1 application, without prejudice to the right to continue with the disciplinary proceedings. The second respondent shall ensure such consideration by the bank within a period of two weeks from the date of production of the medical certificate and medical fitness certificate by the first respondent, in relation to Ext.P1 application. I may hasten to state, at this juncture, that the observations made hereinbefore are made only to show that the action on the part of the second respondent indirectly bringing about an abrupt termination of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the first respondent, at this stage was unjustified and unwarranted. In case of production of such certificates and subject to the decision taken thereafter, the bank shall take a decision whether to continue with the disciplinary action against the first respondent. In view of the decision in the latter writ petition, viz., **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 39 CRP (1) 6695/09 dated 25/8/2009 (Ext.P11 in the former writ petition) that was relied on while passing Ext.P11 in the latter writ petition shall not be acted upon any further. It is made clear that this Court has not made any observation with respect to the disciplinary proceedings or the necessity for its continuance. W.P.(C).No.27553 of 2010 is accordingly disposed of. In view of the judgment in W.P.(C).No.27553 of 2010, W.P.(C).No.24992 is closed. ## **(C.T. RAVIKUMAR, JUDGE)** ## **spc** **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 40 ## **C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.** **JUDGMENT September, 2010** **W.P.(C) 24992/09 & 27553/10** 41