W.P.(C). No. 5318 of 2017 (L): Sree Krishna College of Pharmacy and Research Centre v. Admission Supervisory Committee

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN WEDNESDAY, THE 29TH DAY OF MARCH 2017/8TH CHAITHRA, 1939 WP(C).No. 5318 of 2017 (L) --------------------------- PETITIONER: -------------- THE CHAIRMAN SREE KRISHNA COLLEGE OF PHARMACY AND RESEARCH CENTRE NEAR RAILWAY STATION, PARASSALA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. BY ADVS.SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM SMT.NISHA GEORGE SRI.RIJI RAJENDRAN RESPONDENT: --------------- THE ADMISSION SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE REPRESENTED BY THE CHAIRMAN, TC-15/1553-4, PRASANTHI BUILDINGS, M.P. APPAN ROAD, VAZHUTHACAUD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695 014 BY SMT.MARY BENJAMIN, SC, ADMISSION SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 29-03-2017, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: WP(C).No. 5318 of 2017 (L) --------------------------- ## APPENDIX ## PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS ---------------------------- EXT.P1: TRUE COPY OF THE AGREEMENT DATED 13.6.2016 - P2 : TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 11.8.2016 IN WP(C) NO.25203/2016 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT. - P3 : TRUE COPY OF THE LIST OF CANDIDATES - P4 : TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE NO.ASC(P)223/16/HO/TVPM/B.PHARM/LBS DATED 5.10.2016 - P5 : TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 5.10.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE - P6 : TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 13.10.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE - P7 : TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.ASC(P)223/16/HO/TVPM/B.PHARM/LBS DATED 14.10.2016 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE - P8 : TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT DATED 5.10.2016 - P9 : TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE DATED 18.10.2016 - P10 : TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO ASC(P)/223/16/HO/TVPM/B.PHARM/LBS DATED 19.10.2016 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE. - P11 : TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.ASC 100/16/PHARMACY/SKB DATED 31.12.2016 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE - P12 : TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION DATED 3.1.2017 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW EXT-P11 ORDER - P13 : TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.ASC100/16/PHARMACY/SKB DATED 24.1.2017 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE. ## RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS: NIL ----------------------------- // TRUE COPY // TKS P.S. TO JUDGE ## **C.T.RAVIKUMAR & ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JJ.** ------------------------------- W.P.(C))No.5318 of 2017 -------------------------------Dated 29[th] March, 2017 ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Ravikumar, J.** The petitioner who is the Chairman of Sree Krishna College of Pharmacy and Research Centre, a Self Financing College filed this writ petition mainly with the prayer to quash Exts.P11 and P13. Ext.P11 is an order dated 31.12.2006 passed by the respondent Admission Supervisory Committee (for short `ASC'), rejecting approval of admission of 22 candidates in the College in B.Pharm course. Ext.P13 is the order passed by the ASC on Ext.P12 filed by the petitioner seeking review of Ext.P11 order. The further prayers were as follows:- - “ii. Issue a writ declaring that Ext.P11 is bad in law since the said order has been passed by the present Chairman of the Committee after initiating the proceedings by the previous incumbent without a hearing by the present incumbent, is against the law and accordingly bad in law; - iii. Issue a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or direction directing the Committee to hear the petitioner on Ext.P3 and to take a decision after verifying the records and the academic papers of the students.” WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 2 2. The facts led to the filing of the captioned writ petition are as follows:- Self Financing College in which the petitioner is the Chairman admitted students in B.Pharm course in the year 2016-2017. The College is not a member of the Management Association. Admittedly, during the academic year 2016-2017, in the matter of admission of students in the Pharmacy courses, the Management entered into an agreement with the State Government on 13.6.2016. Later, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.25203 of 2016, essentially, raising grievance with respect to the allotment of students by the LBS Centre, to the said course during the same academic year, after 15.7.2016. The said writ petition was dismissed as per Ext.P2 judgment repelling the contention of the petitioner that the cut off date for allotment by LBS to B.Pharm course was 15.7.2016 and holding that time was available, in that regard, up to 15.8.2016 and then up to 31.8.2016. Obviously, the twenty two students whose admissions were declined to be approved by the ASC as per Ext.P11, were admitted to the said course in between 15.7.2016 and 31.8.2016. Ext.P11 which is one of the impugned orders would reveal that the ASC took into account the fact that the challenge against WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 3 the allotment by LBS after 15.7.2016 repelled by this Court in Ext.P2 judgment in W.P.(C)No.25203 of 2016 and thereupon held that the admissions were effected virtually in disobedience with the order of this Court in Ext.P2 judgment. Feeling aggrieved by Ext.P11 order, Ext.P12 review petition was filed by the petitioner before the ASC. After hearing the petitioner and two others for the College Ext.P13 order was passed. Paragraph 4 of Ext.P13 would reveal that the ASC after considering all aspects including the decision of this Court in W.P.(C)No.25203 of 2016 held that there was no sufficient ground for reviewing Ext.P11 order and consequently, rejected Ext.P12 review petition. It is in the said circumstances that seeking quashment of Exts.P11 and P13 and such other consequential reliefs the captioned writ petition has been filed. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. Mainly, twin contentions have been raised by the petitioner to challenge Ext.P11. It is contended that the respondent is a quasi judicial authority and therefore, Ext.P11 order ought not to have been passed without affording an opportunity of being heard. That apart, it is contended that Ext.P11 order was passed in violation of the WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 4 salutary principle “ _he who heard must decide_ ”. In elaboration of the said contention it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Exts.P7 to P10 would reveal that the matters were heard by Justice James, the then Chairman of the ASC. It is further contended that if Ext.P11 is taken as a continuation of the said proceedings it would violate the principle “ _he who heard must decide_ ” and at the same time, if it is not taken as continuation of the proceedings and as an independent proceedings, it is then bad for violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as, it was passed without hearing the petitioner. To buttress the contention the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association** v. **Designated Authority and others ((2011) 2 SCC 258)** and a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in **Jesudasan G.** v. **Registrar of Cooperative Societies and Others (2009 (2) KLT 86)** . Evidently, in the decision in **Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association's** case (supra), taking note of the relevant rules which impose a duty on the authority to afford to all the parties who have filed objections and adduced evidence, a personal hearing before taking a final decision in the matter, the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the very purpose of affording personal hearing and held that a personal hearing would enable the authority concerned to WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 5 observe the demeanour of the witnesses etc. and also to clear up his doubts during the course of arguments. Furthermore, it was held that even written arguments, in such circumstances, would be no substitute for an oral hearing. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering a batch of civil appeals filed under Section 130-E of the Customs Act, 1962 arising out of a common judgment and order passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal confirming the levy of anti-dumping duty, imposed under Section 9-A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The original order levying anti-dumping duty was passed by the Designated Authority on an application filed under the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of AntiDumping Duty on Dumped Articles and Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995. The Hon'ble Apex Court reversed the findings of the Tribunal that the imposition of anti-dumping duty is legislative in nature, that the principles of natural justice were not applicable to the proceedings before the Designated Authority and therefore, persons affected had no right to be heard before the imposition of duty. The Hon'ble Apex Court reversed the said findings and held that the Designated Authority performs quasi-judicial functions under the Tariff Act read with the 1995 Rules and that the duty to follow the principles of natural justice is implicit in the exercise of power conferred on the Designated Authority. WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 6 After an elaborate consideration and such findings it was held in paragraphs 83 & 84 of the said decision thus:- **“83.** The procedure prescribed in the 1995 Rules imposes duty on the DA to afford to all the parties, who have filed objections and adduced evidence, a personal hearing before taking a final decision in the matter. Even written arguments are no substitute for an oral hearing. A personal enables the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses, etc. And also clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments. Moreover, it was also observed in _**Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others**_ v. _**A.P.State Road Transport Corporation and another (AIR 1959 SC 308)**_ , if one person hears and other decides, then personal hearing becomes an empty formality. **84.** In the present case, admittedly, the entire material had been collected by the predecessor of the DA; he had allowed the interested parties and/or their representatives to present the relevant information before him in terms of Rule 6(6) but the final findings in the form of an order were recorded by the successor DA, who had no occasion to hear the appellants herein. In our opinion, the final order passed by the new DA offends the basic principle of natural justice. Thus, the impugned notification having been issued on the basis of the final findings of the DA, who failed to follow the principles of natural justice, cannot be sustained. It is quashed accordingly.” The decision in **Jesudasan's** case (supra) is relied on by the learned counsel to canvass the position that when a duty to decide on a matter is imposed by a Statute, the authority/body clothed with the power while exercising the said power should act judicially and further that in WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 7 such circumstances, the judicial function of decision making entrusted to one officer could not be delegated to another officer. In short, under such circumstances, the salutary principle ` _one who heard must decide_ ' could not be deviated. The said contention was raised based on the factual position obtained in this case that Exts.P7 to P10 proceedings were issued by the erstwhile Chairman of the ASC and Exts.P11 and P13 orders were passed by the subsequently appointed Chairman of the ASC. 5. The learned standing counsel appearing for the ASC contended that Exts.P11 and P13 orders call for no interference on the ground of being orders passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended that while passing orders invoking the power under Section 4 of the Kerala Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of capitation fee, regulation of admission, fixation of nonexploitative fee and other measures to ensure equity and excellence in professional eduction) Act, 2006 (for short Act 19 of 2006) ASC is not bound to hear the parties. Prima facie, we find it difficult to countenance with the said contention in view of the nature and scope of power exercisable by ASC under sub-sections (7) and (8) of Section 4 of Act 19 of 2006. Under sub-section (7) ASC is competent to make WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 8 appropriate recommendation to the Government for imposing a fine up to rupees `ten lakhs' upon finding violation of the provisions for admission on the part of the unaided professional colleges or institutions and in such eventuality Government may fix the fine and collect the same in the case of each of such violation or any other course of action as it deems fit and the amount so fixed together with interest thereon could be recovered as if it were an arrear of public revenue due on land. Going by the said provision ASC is also competent to declare admission made in respect of any or all seats in a particular college or institution to be de-hors merit and therefore, invalid. On its communication the University concerned shall have to debar such candidates from appearing for any further examination and cancel the results of examinations already appeared for. Under subsection (8) of Section 4 ASC, on satisfaction of violation of any of the provisions of Act 19 of 2006 by any professional college or institution could recommend to the University or statutory body for withdrawing of the affiliation or recognition of such college or institution or any other course of action it deems fit. However, we do not think it necessary to delve into the question any further as according to us, it need be gone into only if we ultimately come to the conclusion that to avoid injustice principles of natural justice ought to have been complied with. It is also WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 9 contended by the learned Standing Counsel that pursuant to the passing of Ext.P11 the petitioner himself filed Ext.P12 review petition and after hearing the petitioner and two others, for the College, Ext.P13 order was passed. As per Ext.P13, Ext.P11 order was declined to be reviewed. According to the learned counsel, in such circumstances, the said ground of violation of principles of natural justice is not available to the petitioner to mount challenge against Exts.P11 and P13, any further. 6. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions the question to be considered is whether Exts.P11 and P13 warrant interference. But, we are of the view that it is only profitable to refer to certain indisputable facts and factors pertaining to the issues involved in this case for a proper disposal. Ext.P2 judgment itself would reveal that the petitioner himself had earlier approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.25203 of 2016 virtually, challenging the allotment made by LBS subsequent to 15.7.2016 in respect of the same course for the same academic year. Essentially, the contention was that in view of clause 9 of the agreement dated 13.6.2016 the cut off date for allotment of seats under the Government merit quota for the year should be taken as 15.7.2016 or the date of first allotment of candidates by the director WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 10 of LBS Centre, whichever was later. It was also contended therein that the first allotment of 17 candidates were made by LBS against Government merit quota on 19.7.2016 and therefore, the petitioner was entitled to fill up the remaining seats set apart as Government merit quota, by virtue of the terms of the said agreement dated 13.6.2016. The said writ petition was filed, raising such contentions when LBS allotted more students against the remaining seats under the Government merit quota on 24.7.2016. Paragraphs 7 and 11 of Ext.P2 judgment would reveal that such contentions were repelled by this Court and ultimately after considering all relevant factors this Court held that the cut off date could not be reckoned as 15.7.2016 and it was extended up to 15.8.2016 and subsequently till the end of the month in question. In paragraph 11 this Court further found that the very agreement was placed for approval before the ASC only on 26.7.2016 that is, after the alleged cut off date on 15.7.2016. Consequently, the said writ petition was dismissed as per Ext.P2 judgment and the petitioner, admittedly, allowed the said judgment to become final. Another relevant factor also assumes relevant in this context. Twenty two students whose admissions were declined to be approved as per Ext.P11 too, had earlier approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.3269 of 2017 challenging the same. The said writ petition WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 11 was dismissed by this Court as per judgment dated 3.2.2017 evidently, taking note of Ext.P2 judgment and also of the further fact that the students were admitted to the said course after 15.7.2016 and prior to the expiry of the period for allotment of students under Government merit quota. In the said judgment for declining to accept the contentions this Court also relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in W.P.(C) No.677 of 2016 dated 23.01.2017. That was a case where on similar circumstances the petitioner concerned took up the contention that he had not committed any fault and therefore, he should not be made a victim of an apparent wrong committed by the College concerned. Paragraph 15 thereof is worthy to be extracted in this contextual situation. The Apex Court held:- “15. The question before this Court is not who is to be blamed for the present state of affairs - whether it is the students or the College or the State of Chhattisgarh. The question is really whether the rule of law should prevail or not. In our opinion, the answer is unambiguously in the affirmative. The College and the State of Chhattisgarh have not adhered to the law with the result that the petitioner became a victim of circumstances giving him a cause of action to proceed against the College and the State of Chhattisgarh being a victim of their maladministration. The plight of the petitioner is unfortunate but it cannot be helped.” WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 12 Evidently, in the said decision, the Apex Court held that in such matters what matters is not the question as to who had committed the blameworthy action and the crucial question is whether the admission is an outcome of non-adherence to the law and if so, the inevitable consequences must follow irrespective of the question who had committed the said blameworthy action. Evidently, relying on Ext.P2 judgment and also the said decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, W.P.(C) No.3269 of 2017 filed by the students whose admissions were declined under Ext.P11, was dismissed. True that the said writ petition was dismissed at the admission stage itself without issuing notice to the 5[th] respondent, the petitioner herein. Later, the petitioner who was the fifth respondent therein filed R.P.No.290 of 2017 in W.P.(C)No.3269 of 2017. That review petition was dismissed on 20.3.2017. It is thereafter that this writ petition was filed by the petitioner, on 16.2.2017. We are of the view that the said facts also have to be borne in mind while appreciating the contentions of the petitioner raised to mount challenge against Exts.P11 and P13. 7. As noticed hereinbefore, the core contention of the petitioner is that Ext.P11, the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as, no opportunity of hearing WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 13 was afforded to the petitioner before passing the same. Violation of the principle ` _he who heard must decide_ ' was raised based on the factual contention that Exts.P7 to P10 were issued by Justice James, the then Chairman of ASC and Exts.P11 and P13 orders were passed by his successor in office. It is also the contention that if Ext.P11 is taken as continuation of the earlier proceedings viz., Exts.P7 to P10 then, it is bad in the eye of law on the principle ` _he who heard must decide_ ' and if Ext.P11 is taken as an independent proceedings then, it is violative of the salutary principles of natural justice inasmuch as, prior to the passing of the same the petitioner was not heard. At the first blush, the said contentions would appear to be of great force. But, in the light of the indisputable facts referred hereinbefore, and also the facts discernible from Exts.P12 and P13, the question is whether the orders are to be interfered with and the matter is to be sent back for fresh disposal. While considering the said question besides those indisputable facts adverted hereinbefore, Ext.P12 is also to be taken into account. Admittedly, Ext.P12 is a representation filed by the petitioner herein on being aggrieved by Ext.P11 order and seeking virtually for its review. In Ext.P12, the petitioner herein stated thus:- WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 14 “......During the admission process for the current academic year, we could not submit the agreement for prior approval of ASC, which we accept as our mistake and hence all these mishaps occurred. We apologize for this mistake and assure that this will not be repeated in future. Kindly excuse us for this time. By giving humanitarian consideration to the future of 22 admitted B.Pharm candidates, we humbly and respectfully pray to the Hon'ble Chairman of ASC to approve the 22 merit lapsed candidates (B.Pharm 2016-17 batch) of Sree Krishna College of Pharmacy & Research Centre.” It is considering Exts.P12 that Ext.P13 order was passed. Ext.P13 would reveal that the petitioner herein, the Chairman of the College, its Principal and also its Administrative Officer had represented the College in the said proceedings before the ASC which culminated in the said order. It is evident that during the course of arguments before the ASC which culminated in Ext.P13 the petitioner, the Chairman of the College submitted that the order rejecting approval to 22 candidates selected under the lapsed seats should be reviewed lest the students who are undergoing the study in the College would be put to hardship. Evidently, the respondent Committee arrived at the conclusion that in the light of the decision of this Court in W.P.(C)No.25203 of 2016 and the other attending circumstances dealt with in Ext.P11 order a review of order in Ext.P11 is not called for. Consequently, Ext.P12 review petition was rejected under Ext.P13 order. The learned standing WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 15 counsel appearing for the ASC submitted that in the matter of scrutiny of the correctness or otherwise of admission of students by a Self Financing Institution, Act 19 of 2006 never contemplates an opportunity of being heard in such matters. We made our prima facie view on the said submission hereinbefore. As noticed earlier, the petitioner contended that the defect incurred at the time of passing of Ext.P11 order viz., violation of the principles of natural justice would not get cured merely because, prior to the passing of Ext.P13 order on a petition, virtually, seeking review of Ext.P11 order, filed by the petitioner he along with two other persons were heard, on behalf of the College. We are of the considered view that these attractive arguments beckon no consideration in view of two reasons. In other words, this writ petition must fail, on two other grounds. 8. We have already taken note of the fact that contending that the cut off date in the matter of admission of students to B. Pharm course in the College for the academic year 2016-17 is 15.7.2016 or 19.7.2016, the date of first allotment and challenging the right of LBS to allot students after that date the petitioner had earlier filed W.P.(C) No.25203 of 2016. The said writ petition was dismissed as per Ext.P2 judgment. One among us (Anil K. Narendran, J.) was a party to the WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 16 said judgment. As per Ext.P2 judgment, the contention of the petitioner was repelled and it was thereafter that instead of admitting the students allotted by the LBS the above mentioned 22 students were admitted as management quota candidates, ignoring Ext.P2 judgment, that too before the expiry of the period for allotment of students against the Government merit quota. In fact, all of them were admitted against the seats set apart for Government merit quota as management quota students presumably citing the reason that they are lapsed seats. It is also to be noted that another Bench of this Court, in which one among us (C.T.Ravikumar, J.) was a party, in W.P.(C)No.3269 of 2017 filed by the very same students whose admissions were declined to be approved by Exts.P11 and P13, rejected the prayers for quashment of the said orders and also the prayer for a declaration that they were entitled to continue and pursue with the study in the B.Pharm course under the 5[th] respondent and that they had been validly granted admissions. As noticed hereinbefore, for the purpose of declining the prayers this Court relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in W.P. (C)No.677 of 2016. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said writ petition and also in view of the undisputed position that there occurred non-adherence of law in the matter of admission that too, by willful violation of Ext.P2 judgment which he WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 17 allowed to become final the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise any such grounds to justify willful, non-adherence of law committed in the matter of admission. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to Ext.P12 review petition filed by the petitioner himself. We have already quoted the relevant portion. The above extracted portion from Ext.P12 would reveal that the petitioner himself owns the fact that the College could not submit the agreement for prior approval of ASC and the consequential mishaps occurred owing to the mistakes committed by them. Admittedly, the admission of 22 students in B.Pharm course was done prior to the expiry of the extended period for allotment of candidates by LBS and the petitioner cannot dispute this as he had allowed Ext.P2 judgment to become final. In other words, the blameworthy action which resulted in disinclination to approve the admission of the students in Ext.P11 is not in dispute rather, it cannot be disputed in the circumstances explained hereinbefore. When it is evident that the 22 students whose names were given were admitted in the said course after 15.7.2016 and prior to the expiry of the cut off date for allotment by LBS against Government merit quota, the action could be only styled as one done without adhering to the relevant procedures requiring strict compliance. Exts.P11 and P13 would reveal that the ASC had also taken note of the fact that such admissions were WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 18 effected in respect of the 22 students after Ext.P2 judgment in W.P.(C) No.25203 of 2016. But, at the same time, it is to be noted that in the judgment in W.P.(C)No.3269 of 2017, taking note of the fact that two among the 22 students who were also allottees by the LBS, this Court held that those two students were validly admitted to the said course. In other words, this Court in the said judgment confirmed the order only in respect of rest of the 20 students and interfered with the nonapproval of the admission of two students and issued necessary, consequential direction in their case. Subsequently, the petitioner herein filed R.P.No.290 of 2017 in W.P.(C)No.3269 of 2017 virtually taking up similar contentions which are raised in this writ petition. The review petition was dismissed as per order dated 20.3.2017. In the light of the said indisputable facts we are of the view that no purpose could be served by remanding the matter for fresh consideration as, in the given circumstances, no other view, can be taken by the ASC, even if the contention of the petitioner is that Ext.P11 order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, solely to comply with the principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in **Aligarh Muslim University and Ors** . v. **Mansoor Ali Khan ((2000) 7 SCC 529)** rendered referring to its earlier decision in **S.L.Kapoor** v. **Jagmohan Chinnappa Reddy ((1980) 4 SCC 399)** held that if upon WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 19 admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then, in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words, if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it would be unnecessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. In the decision in **A.K.Kraipak and others** v. **Union of India and others (AIR 1970 SC 150)** the Hon'ble Apex Court held:- “The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.” Therefore, when the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice we are of the considered view that when a person raises such contention to take advantage of his own mistake or wrong, he cannot be permitted to rely on the principles of natural justice to gain advantage of his own wrong. According to us, in such circumstances, accepting violation of the principles of natural justice would not only defeat the very purpose of rules of natural justice that is, to prevent miscarriage of justice but also sub serve sustainment of injustice. In the light of Ext.P2 judgment, the judgment in W.P.(C) WP(C).No.5318 of 2017 20 No.3269 of 2017 and also the order in R.P.No.290 of 2017 in W.P.(C) No.3269 of 2017, as also in view of our findings on the contention of violation of the principles of natural justice the impugned orders Ext.P11 and P13 invite no interference. The contention of violation of the principle ` _one who heard must decide_ ', also did call for any deep probe in the circumstances. The upshot of the discussion is that the petitioner is not entitled to the other reliefs sought for. The writ petition is devoid of any merit and it is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. Sd/- **C.T.RAVIKUMAR** **Judge** Sd/- **ANIL K. NARENDRAN Judge** TKS