W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch

W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 1: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM ## PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1801 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 32272/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: ASHOK KUMAR M.R. AGED 58 YEARS S/O.RAMAKRISHNAN NAIR, MARACHERI PUTHANPURA HOUSE, METHALA P.O., ASAMANNUR, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683545 BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENT/S: 1 THE TAHSILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 101. 2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR, VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673101 BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH W.A. Nos. 1802, 1803, 1804, 1816, 1817, 1828, 1838, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1848, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1863, 1874, 1879, 1883, 1885, 1888, 1900, 1901, 1903 & 1916 of 2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 2: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1802 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 36137/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: NOORUDHEEN AGED 48 YEARS S/O.SAINUDHEEN, KIZHAKKEPEEDIYEKKAL HOUSE, TRIPRANGODE, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 676 108. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE TAHSILDAR TALUK OFFICE, TIRUR, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676101 2 THE VILLAGE OFFICER THIRUNAVAYA VILLAGE, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 676301 BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 3: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1803 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 35788/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: SHAIBU P AGED 43 YEARS S/O.P. KRISHNAN, P.K. INFRASTRUCTURE, 5/3403, C311, SPACE MALL, JAFARKHAN COLONY ROAD, KOZHIKKODE, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT. PIN – 673 001. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE TAHSILDAR TALUK OFFICE, KOZHIKKODE, PIN – 673 001. 2 THE VILLAGE OFFICER KOTTOOLI VILLAGE, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 004 BY ADV SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 4: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1804 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 35613/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: JALEEL P.K. AGED 42 YEARS S/O.AHAMMED, PERUVANKUZHIYIL HOUSE, VALAKKULAM P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 676 508. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENT/RESPONDENTS: - 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE TIRURANGADI POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 676 306. - 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE TIRURANGADI POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 676 306. BY ADV GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 5: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1816 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 35601/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: MUHAMMED YASIR P AGED 30 YEARS S/O.SAIDALI, 49/18, KURURAMBATHOOR P.O., TIRUR, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 676 301. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: - 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE MALAPPURAM POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT , PIN – 676 505 - 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE MALAPPURAM POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 676 505. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 6: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1817 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34381/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: MUHAMMED RASHID P AGED 29 YEARS S/O.ABOOBACKER P., ELEDATH HOUSE, PULIKKAL P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 637. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 673 638 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 673 638 BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 7: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1828 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33874/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/S: SUDHEER T AGED 43 YEARS S/O.NARAYANAN T., THEEYATH HOUSE, VALIYAPARAMBIL, FEROKE P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 631. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## - RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER, KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 638. 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673638. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 8: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1838 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34680/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: RAJITH K.V. AGED 41 YEARS S/O.RAJAN K.V., KARAKKEPURATH THAZHAM, KODAKKATTUMURI, MUCHUKUNNU P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT , PIN - 673307 BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENT/S: - 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE PAYYOLI POLICE STATION, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 523. - 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE PAYYOLI POLICE STATION, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 523. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 9: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1844 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33865/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: ARUNJITH C AGED 35 YEARS S/O.CHERUNNI C., THAYYIL HOUSE, PULIKKAL, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 673637. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: - 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 673 638. - 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 638. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 10: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1845 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33861/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: SANTHOSH N.K. AGED 45 YEARS S/O.DASAN, THAZHE ELENTHANGATTU HOUSE, RAMANATTUKARA P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 633. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDNETS; - 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER, KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 673 638. - 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 673 638. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 11: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1846 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29973/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: ASHOK KUMAR AGED 52 YEARS S/O.RAMAKRISHNAN NAIR, MARANCHERI PUTHANPURA HOUSE, ASAMANNUR, PERUMBAVOOR, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN – 683 549. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE TAHSILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 101. 2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 101. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 12: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1848 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34133/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANTS/PETITIONER: 1 VIJEESH P AGED 34 YEARS S/O.VIJAYAN, 12/478, PAZHAMKANDATHIL HOUSE, SUKAPURAM P.O., EDAPPAL, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 679 576. 2 SHAJEER N.P. AGED 30 YEARS S/O.N.P. ABBAS, NEDUMOOLI HOUSE, POTTAMMAL, FAROOK COLLEGE P.O., RAMANATTUKARA, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 632 BY ADV SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE THENHIPALAM POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 636. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 13: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1855 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 31585/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: SUBHADRA C.K. AGED 65 YEARS W/O.KUTTIKRISHNAN, POOPARAMBIL HOUSE, VARAVOOR P.O., THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 680 585. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: - 1 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER WADAKKANCHERY POLICE STATION, WADAKKANCHERY, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 680 582. - 2 THE DISTRICT GEOLOGIST DISTRICT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY, MINI CIVIL STATION, CHEMBUKKAVU, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 680 020. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 14: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1856 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29847/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: MUHAMMED RASHIK A AGED 26 YEARS S/O.ASSANKOYA A., ARAMBACHALIL HOUSE, PAYADITHAZHAM, PANTHEERANKAVU, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 019. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER VAZHAKKAD POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 640. 2 THE GEOLOGIST DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY, DISTRICT OFFICE, MANJERI, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 676 121. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 15: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1857 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33673/2002 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS: 1 MUHAMMED RASHIK A AGED 31 YEARS S/O.ASSANKOYA A., ARAMBACHALIL HOUSE, PAYADITHAZHAM, PANTHEERANKAVU, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 019. 2 ANAS C.K. AGED 33 YEARS S/O.VEERANKUTTY, THEERKULATH HOUSE, CHEMMANGOTTUKUTTIYIL, CHELEMBRA P.O., MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 631. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE/STATION HOUSE OFFICER, KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN – 673 638. 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE KONDOTTY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 638. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 16: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1863 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 32240/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: ANNIE ISSAC, AGED 61 YEARS W/O.PAILY ISSAC, KAVANAMATTOM HOUSE, ASAMANNOOR, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT PIN – 683 543. BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE TAHSILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 101. 2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR, VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 101. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 17: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1874 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34952/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: MUHAMMED AGED 52 YEARS S/O.MOIDEEN, POOLATT HOUSE, KARIPUR P.O., PALLIKKAL, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 647. BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE THENHIPALAM POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 636. 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE THENHIPALAM POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT PIN – 673 636. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 18: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1879 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29827/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANTS/PETITIONER: 1 SAJEESH P.B. AGED 42 YEARS S/O.BALAN P.K., PUTHANPURAKKAL HOUSE, KANJIRAKKODE, KUMARANALLUR, THRISSUR DISTRICT – 680 590. PIN – 680 590. 2 KANNAN P.G. AGED 33 YEARS S/O.GOPALAN, PISANTHI PUNCHAYIL HOUSE, MANGAD, KOTTUPURAM, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 680 667. BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: - 1 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER ERUMAPETTY POLICE STATION, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 680 584. - 2 THE GEOLOGIST DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY, DISTRICT OFFICE, THRISSUR, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 680 001. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 19: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1883 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 32252/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: JITHESH T.P. AGED 47 YEARS S/O.KRISHNAN, THAVARAPARAMBATH HOUSE, MAYYANNUR P.O, VILLYAPPALLI, KOZHIKKODE – 673 542. , PIN - 673542 BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE TAHSILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 101. 2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 101. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 20: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1885 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 29586/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: JAMSHID P AGED 32 YEARS S/O.MAMU, PARAKOTTU HOUSE, ILLATHUTHAZHAM, PANTHEERANKAVU P.O., PERUMANNA, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 019. BY ADV SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE TAHSILDAR KOZHIKKODE TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 001. 2 THE DEPUTY TAHSILDAR KOZHIKKODE TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 001. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 21: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1888 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 33515/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/S: SHIBILAL N AGED 36 YEARS S/O.SIVADASAN, PUNNATHUVAYALIL HOUSE, MOODADI, MUCHUKUNNU, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 307. BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE TAHSILDAR KOYILANDI TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 101. 2 THE VILLAGE OFFICER KEEZHARIYUR VILLAGE, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 307. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 22: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1900 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 36995/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: SAJEESH P.B. AGED 43 YEARS S/O.BALAN P.K., PUTHANPURAKKAL HOUSE, KANJIRAKKODE, KUMARANALLUR, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 680 590. BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: - 1 THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE CHERUTHURUTHI POLICE STATION, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 679 531. - 2 THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, CHERUTHURUTHI POLICE STATION, THRISSUR DISTRICT PIN – 679 531. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 23: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1901 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 34485/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANTS/PETITIONER: 1 SHAMEER ALI N AGED 36 YEARS S/O.ABDUL AZEEZ N., MATTUMMAL HOUSE, KOZHIPPURAM, PALLIKKAL, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT , PIN – 673 634. 2 SUBHA AGED 41 YEARS W/O.SHAJI, MUTHIRAKALLU NILATHUKUNI, THIKKODI P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 529. BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENT/S: 1 THE TAHSILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 101. 2 THE DEPUTY TAHSDILDAR VATAKARA TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 101. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 24: IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 WA NO. 1903 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 20520/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS: 1 ABDUL SALAM P AGED 46 YEARS S/O.AMMED P., PURAPPILATT HOUSE, MUYIPOTH, MEPPAYUR, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 524. 2 ABHIJITH P.M. AGED 26 YEARS S/O.ASHOKAN, KARAYATTUVALAPPIL HOUSE, NARAKKODE, KEEZHARIYOOR P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 307. BY ADV BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS: 1 THE GEOLOGIST DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY, DISTRICT OFFICE, KOZHIKKODE, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN – 673 001. 2 THE SPECIAL DEPUTY TAHSILDAR H SECTION, TALUK OFFICE, KOYILANDI, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 305. 3 THE TAHSILDAR KOYILANDI TALUK, KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT PIN – 673 305. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, ALONG WITH WA.1801/2022 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 25: # IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 30TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ## WA NO. 1916 OF 2022 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.11.2022 IN WP(C) 17394/2022 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ## APPELLANT/PETITIONER: RAHUL P.U. AGED 29 YEARS S/O.UNNIKRISHNAN P.V., PADINJARE HOUSE, THENOOR, PARLI, PALAKKAD DISTRICT PIN – 678 612. BY ADV. SRI. BABU S. NAIR ## RESPONDENT/S: 1 THE GEOLOGIST DEPARTMENT OF MINING AND GEOLOGY, DISTRICT OFFICE, TOWN BUS STAND COMPLEX, PALAKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT PIN – 678 001. 2 THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICE, PALAKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT PIN – 678 001. BY ADV. SRI. TEK CHAND, GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.12.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 26: ## **‘C.R’** ## **S. MANIKUMAR, CJ & SHAJI P. CHALY, J.** ----------------------------------------------------------------W.A. Nos. 1801, 1802, 1803, 1804, 1816, 1817, 1828, 1838, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1848, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1863, 1874, 1879, 1883, 1885, 1888, 1900, 1901, 1903 & 1916 of 2022 --------------------------------------------------------------------Dated this the 21[st] day of December 2022. ## **JUDGMENT** SHAJI P. CHALY, J. The captioned appeals are filed by the petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos. 32272, 36137, 35788, 35613, 35601, 34381, 33874, 34680, 33865, 33861, 29973, 34133, 31585, 29847, 33673, 32240, 34952, 29827, 32252, 29586, 33515, 36995, 34485, 20520 and 17394 of 2022 challenging the common judgment of the learned single Judge dated 30.11.2022 dismissing the writ petitions. 2. The subject issue arises under the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (‘Act, 1957’ for short) vis-a-vis seizure of vehicles belonging to the appellants allegedly for violation of the provisions of the Act, 1957; the primary reliefs sought for in the writ petitions are: (i) to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to release the Excavator/JCB/other vehicles to the petitioners; and (ii) declare that the seizure of the vehicle under the provisions of the Act, 1957 by the Tahsildar/Deputy Tahsildar are per se illegal, in view of Section W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 27: 21(4) of the Act, 1957, as he is not an officer specially empowered to seize the vehicle. 3. The pleadings, material and contentions raised in the writ appeals are substantially typical in nature and therefore, separate narration of facts are not required. 4. The vehicles belonging to the appellants were seized by the Revenue Authority concerned, alleging violation of the provisions of the Act, 1957. The case projected by the appellants is that after the seizure of vehicles, they were kept in custody of the respondents depriving the appellants of their valuable property without proceeding further. According to the appellants, they have no other option than to approach the writ court seeking the release of their vehicles, as the respondents cannot further initiate any proceedings under the Act, 1957, for the reason that the confiscating authority under the Act is the court competent to take cognizance upon a complaint filed under Section 22 of the Act, which the State Government does not designate 5. Apparently, during the pendency of the writ petitions, the vehicles were directed to be released on interim custody by imposing appropriate conditions; and we are informed that the vehicles were released to the appellants, accordingly. 6. The paramount contention raised by the appellants is that W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 28: the seizure effected under Section 21(4) of the Act, 1957 is on the basis of the commission or violation of offences under Sections 4(1) and 4(1A) of the Act, 1957. It is submitted that under the unamended Act, 1957, the punishment prescribed was imprisonment for two years and fine, and the procedure for the disposal of the property seized is under Section 21(4A) of the Act, which stipulates that it can be confiscated by the order of the court competent to take cognizance of the offence under sub-Section (1) of the said provision. Therefore, according to the appellants as the law originally stood, under the provisions of Section 26(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, every Judicial Magistrate of First Class was competent to take cognizance of the offence on the cases instituted under the Act, 1957, and there was no confusion as regarding the procedure under the unamended provisions of the Act 1957. 7. It is further pointed out that the State of Kerala had notified the officers who are empowered to file a complaint before the Magistrates under Section 22 of the Act, 1957. The paramount contention of the appellants is that the Act, 1957 had undergone an amendment in the year 2015, whereby Sections 30B and 30C have been incorporated, which provides for the constitution of Special courts, and that the special courts constituted shall be W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 29: presided over by a District and Sessions Judge. The said provision is incorporated under the Act, 1957 on and with effect from 12.01.2015, which was published in the gazette on 27.03.2015. 8. The grievance is that even though the said provision came into force with effect from 12.01.2015, the Government of Kerala has not constituted any special courts in the State of Kerala. The further contention of the appellants is that insofar as Section 21 of the Act, 1957 is concerned, there is no amendment to the provisions regarding the seizure and confiscation; whereas, in subSection (1) of Section 21 of Act, 1957, imposition of punishment was enhanced from 2 years to 5 years and the fine is enhanced up to Rs.5,00,000/-. 9. In sum and substance, the contention advanced by the appellants is that only a special court constituted under Section 30B of the Act, 1957 alone has the power to confiscate and give interim custody of the vehicle, and in the absence of special courts, the authorities cannot detain the vehicle as they cannot proceed further. It is further contended that unlike other special enactments, both Central and State, the power of confiscation of the properties under the Act, 1957 is given to the court itself and such confiscation is depending upon the conclusion in the trial or in other words; a successful prosecution is sine qua non for confiscation of properties W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 30: under the Act, 1957. 10. Therefore, it is contended that when there is no complaint and when there is no special court to try the offence, and there are no other authorities or modes prescribed under the Act, 1957 in regard to the confiscation of the vehicles, the authorities cannot detain the vehicles. The appellants have also submitted that in all other special enactments, the prosecution, adjudication and confiscation of the properties seized are separate, distinct and parallel, which makes the provisions under the Act, 1957 distinct. It is further pointed out that when the prosecuting authority and confiscating authority are one and the same and when a trial is required before the competent court for ordering confiscation, in the absence of such a court, no proceeding can be initiated against any of the properties involved in the offences under the Act, 1957. Therefore, it is contended that the learned single Judge had gone in a totally different tangent and has arrived at erroneous conclusions. 11. Above all, it is contended that since Section 30B is incorporated under the Act, 1957, no other procedure as contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially Sections 4 r/w Section 26(b) of the Cr. P. C., can be resorted to, in view of the legal proposition “generalia specialibus non derogant”. Other contentions are also advanced on the basis of Sections 4 and W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 31: 26(b) of Cr. P. C. 12. It is further argued that when a statute prescribes that a particular thing is to be done in a particular manner, it can be done in that manner alone and in no other manner. In that regard, the appellants have relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in _**State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Sing and others**_ [AIR 1964 SC 358], _**Babu Varghese v. Bar Council of Kerala**_ [(1999) 3 SCC 422], _**Chandrakishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad & others**_ [(1999) 8 SCC 266] and _**State of Jarkhand v. Ambay Cements**_ [2005 (1) SCC 368]. It is also contended that the judgment of the Apex Court in _**Pradeed S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka**_ [2021 (14) SCALE 303] relied upon by the learned single Judge has no relevance in order to sort out the issue raised by the appellants. 13. It is also submitted that the appellants have not challenged any procedure with respect to the committal to be made by the Magistrate to a special court. Other contentions are also raised to substantiate the legal position stated above. The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in _**Gangula Ashok v. State of A.P**_ [2000 (1) KLT 609 (SC)] to assert how cognizance is to be taken by the special court. Learned counsel has also relied on the decision in _**India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu**_ [AIR 1990 SC 85], dealing with Cess W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 32: on royalty on mineral rights under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (67 of 1967) vis-a-vis the State Legislation; judgment of the Apex Court in _**Hardeep Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others**_ [2014 (1) KHC 170], which considered the power to be exercised by the criminal courts under Section 319 of the Cr. P. C at the inquiry stage; and a Division Bench judgment of this court in _**Abdul Majeed Kallathil v. District Collector, Malappuram and others**_ [2009 (3) KHC 637 (DB) in regard to the constitutional validity of Section 17 of the Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 and also the restriction contained under Section 17; and held to be violative of Articles 19(1)(g), 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 14. The learned Senior Government Pleader, on the other hand, advanced arguments supporting the findings rendered by the learned single Judge. It is the basic contention of the State Government that Section 30B of Act, 1957 grants sufficient leverage and option to the State Government to go for constitution of special courts for the speedy trial of offences in contravention of the provisions of sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (1A) of Section 4 of the Act, 1957, since the expression ‘may’ is employed in the said provision. 15. It is also pointed out that if and when the State W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 33: Government constitutes special court or special courts for such area or areas as specified in the notification issued, the special court so constituted shall have all the powers of a District and Sessions Court to try the offence under the Act, 1957. It is further pointed out that since the State has not constituted any special court, the procedure prescribed under Sections 4 and 26 of Cr.P.C would apply in the instant case and therefore, there is no confusion at all with regard to the release of the vehicles and trialability of the offences under the Act, 1957. 16. It is further submitted that though, as per Section 21 of the Act, 1957, whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (1A) of Section 4 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees per hectare of the area, by virtue of part II of the First Schedule of Cr. P. C, dealing with classification of offences, the Judicial First Class Magistrate is vested with ample powers to try offences punishable upto 7 years of imprisonment. It is further pointed out that, even though the Judicial First Class Magistrate is vested with powers to impose punishment only upto 3 years as per Section 29 (2) of the code, by virtue of sub-Section (1) of Section 325 of C.R.P.C dealing with the procedure when Magistrate cannot pass sentence sufficiently W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 34: severe; whenever a Magistrate is of opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from, or more severe than, that which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or, being a Magistrate of the second class, is of opinion that the accused ought to be required to execute a bond under Section 106, he may record the opinion and submit his proceedings, and forward the accused to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom he is subordinate, who is vested with powers to punish as provided under Section 29 of the code. 17. Therefore, it is contended that even if as per the penal provision of Section 21 of the Act, 1957, the maximum punishment imposed is 5 years, it is an offence triable by virtue of the powers conferred under Sections 4(2) and 26(b) of Cr.P.C., and if at all the Magistrate feels that a severe punishment is to be imposed, the mechanism provided under Section 325 of Cr.P.C would take care of every situation so as to cope up with Section 21(1) of the Act, 1957. It is further pointed out by the learned Senior Government Pleader that since the Central Government has left the liberty to the State Government to constitute a special court, merely because a special court is not constituted, that would not take away the regular procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 35: to institute a complaint and prosecute the perpetrators of the crime under the provisions of the Act, 1957. 18. The learned Senior Government Pleader has also produced the notification issued by the State Government bearing No. 6/2019 dated 19.02.2019 authorising the officers for instituting complaints in various districts in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1957, which is in supersession of the notification issued under G.O.(P) No. 77/2015/ID dated 05.06.2015, from where it is clear that certain officers are given power to file complaints in the entire State of Kerala, district wise, area wise, and all the District Collectors to deal with any complaints within the 14 districts. So also, the State Government has issued an order dated 21.06.2017 for compounding offences under the Act 1957, which are made part of the record. 19. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants Sri. Babu S. Nair and the learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. Tek Chand appearing for the respondents, and perused the pleadings and material on record. 20. In order to consider the issues raised by the rival parties, a reference to some of the provisions of the Act, 1957 and the Code of Criminal Procedure is required. Section 4 of the Act, 1957 deals with prospecting or mining operations to be under licence or lease, W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 36: and sub-Section (1) thereto specifies that no person shall undertake any reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a reconnaissance permit or of a prospecting licence or, as the case may be, of a mining lease, granted under the Act and the rules made thereunder. 21. Sub-Section (1A) of Section 4 stipulates that no person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. Apparently, it is for violation of the provisions of Sections 4(1) and 4(1A) of the Act, 1957, seizure of the vehicles of the appellants were effected by the Tahsildar concerned. Section 21 of the Act, 1957, as it stands after the amendment, deals with penalties, and sub-Section (1) stipulates that whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or subsection (1A) of section 4 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees per hectare of the area. 22. In fact, sub-Section (1) was substituted by Act 10 of 2015 and prior to the amendment, sub-Section (1) specifies that whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or subsection (1A) of Section 4 shall be punished with imprisonment for a W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 37: term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twenty-five thousand rupees, or with both. 23. The predominant contention advanced by the appellants revolves around Sections 30B and 30C of the Act, 1957, and they read thus: “30B. **Constitution of Special Courts.―** (1) The State Government may, for the purposes of providing speedy trial of offences for contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (1A) of section 4, constitute, by notification, as many Special Courts as may be necessary for such area or areas, as may be specified in the notification. (2) A Special Court shall consist of a Judge who shall be appointed by the State Government with the concurrence of the High Court. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge of a Special Court unless he is or has been a District and Sessions Judge. (4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Special Court may prefer an appeal to the High Court within a period of sixty days from the date of such order. 30C. **Special Courts to have powers of Court of Session.** ―Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply to the proceedings before the Special W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 38: Court and for the purpose of the provisions of this Act, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and shall have all powers of a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before the Special Court shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor.” 24. Therefore, it is argued that since a special court is envisaged under the Act, 1957, the State Government is duty bound to constitute a special court or such number of special courts in contemplation of the provisions of Section 30B in order to deal with the offences prescribed under the Act, 1957, which alone has the power to try any offences. It is also pointed out that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Special Court, unless he is or has been a District and Sessions Judge. 25. Relying upon the provisions of Section 30B of Act, 1957, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the procedure prescribed under Section 4 r/w 26(b) of the Cr.P.C will not come into operation. The said contention is raised on the basis that, when a court is mentioned in a statute, irrespective of whether the Government constitutes a special court or not, the regular procedure contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure Code empowering the Magistrate to entertain a complaint would stand eliminated. That apart, it is also submitted that from sub-Section 4 of Section 30B of the Act, 1957, it is clear that any person W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 39: aggrieved by the order of the Special Court may prefer an appeal to the High Court within a period of sixty days from the date of such order and therefore, the State Government has no option than to constitute a special court. 26. Relying upon Section 30C of Act, 1957, it is stated that special courts shall have all the powers of a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before the Special Court shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor. In order to have a proper appreciation of Sections 4 and 26 of Cr.P.C, they are extracted hereunder: ## “4. **Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other** ## **laws** .— (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. ## 26. **Courts by which offences are triable.—** Subject to the other provisions of this Code,— (a) any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 40: tried by (i) the High Court, or (ii) the Court of Session, or (iii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable: [Provided that any [offence under section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, Section 376DA, Section 376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)] shall be tried as far as practicable by a Court presided over by a woman.] (b) any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such Court and when no Court is so mentioned, may be tried by— (i) the High Court, or (ii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable:” 27. On a reference to Section 4(1) of the Act, 1973, it is clear that all offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained thereunder. Therefore, sub-Section (1) makes it clear that it is dealing with offences coming under the Indian Penal Code. 28. The issue arises under sub-Section 2 of Section 4 of W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 41: Cr.P.C., which stipulates that all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. 29. Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention advanced by the appellants is that by virtue of sub-Section (2) of Section 4 of Cr.P.C, if any enactment regulates the manner of place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences, the said provision would have supersession over Section 4(2) of Cr.P.C. 30. Clause (a) of Section 26 of Cr.P.C enumerates the courts which are empowered to deal with any offences under the Indian Penal Code. However, clause (b) of Section 26 stipulates that any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in that behalf in such law, be tried by such Court and when no Court is so mentioned, may be tried by (i) the High Court; or (ii) any other Court by which such offence is shown in the First Schedule to be triable. 31. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed heavy reliance on the expression ‘mentioned’ contained in clause (b) of W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 42: Section 26 of the Code and contended that since Sections 30B and 30C of the Act, 1957 are provided under the Act, 1957 dealing with the formation of special courts whereby a court is ‘mentioned,’ the procedure prescribed thereunder has to be followed. 32. In sum and substance, the contention advanced is that if the State Government has not constituted a special court by appointing a person qualified to be a District and Sessions Court, the Magistrate is not vested with any powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure to take cognizance of the offence. 33. In our considered opinion, the word employed in Section 30B is ‘may’. However, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the word ‘may’ employed thereunder shall be treated as ‘shall’, since the rest of the provisions of Sections 30B, and 30C of the Act, 1957 makes it clear that by employing the word ‘shall’, Constitution of a special court is indispensable . 34. It is also pointed out that since the punishment prescribed under Section 21 of the Act, 1957 is 5 years and a fine of rupees five lakhs, the Magistrate is not vested with powers to entertain a complaint as is prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that regard, it is relevant to extract Part II of the First Schedule of the Cr. P. C., dealing with classification of offences against other W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 43: ## laws, and it reads thus: ## — II. **CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES AGAINST OTHER LAWS** |Offence|Cognizable or non-|Bailable or|By<br>what| |---|---|---|---| ||cognizable|non-bailable|court triable| |If punishable with death,<br>imprisonment for life, or<br>imprisonment for more than|Cognizable|Non-bailable|Court<br>of<br>Session| |7 years|||| |If<br>punishable<br>with<br>imprisonment for 3 years<br>and upwards but not more<br>than 7 years|Ditto|Ditto|Magistrate of<br>the<br>First<br>Class| |If<br>punishable<br>with<br>imprisonment for less than<br>3 years or with fne only.|Non-cognizable|Bailable|Any<br>Magistrate| 35. Our attention is also drawn to Section 325 of Cr.P.C., wherein the procedure is prescribed when the Magistrate cannot pass sentence sufficiently severe, and it reads thus: “325. **Procedure when Magistrate cannot pass sentence** — **sufficiently severe.** (1) Whenever a Magistrate is of opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from, or more severe than, that which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or, being a Magistrate of the second class, is of opinion that the accused ought to be required to execute a bond under section 106, he may record the opinion and submit his proceedings, and forward the accused, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom he is subordinate. (2) When more accused than one are being tried together, and the Magistrate considers it necessary to proceed under subsection (1), in regard to any of such accused, he shall forward all the accused, who are in his opinion guilty, to the Chief Judicial W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 44: Magistrate. (3) The Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the proceedings are submitted may, if he thinks fit, examine the parties and recall and examine any witness who has already given evidence in the case and may call for and take any further evidence and shall pass such judgment, sentence or order in the case as he thinks fit, and is according to law.” 36. Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention advanced by the learned Senior Government Pleader is that merely because a punishment exceeding three years is prescribed under Section 21 of the Act, 1957, it cannot be said that the offence is not triable by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. 37. Considering the rival submissions, we are inclined to, first of all, consider the terminology ‘may’ used in Section 30A of Act, 1957. The term ‘may’ gives an implication that the Central Government, by virtue of the powers conferred under the Act, 1957, has given sufficient leverage or option to the State Government to form a special court to try the offences under sub-Section (1) or Section (1A) of Section 4 of the Act, 1957. 38. It is true, if and when a special court is constituted, a person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the Special Court, unless he is or has been a District and Sessions Judge. It is also equally true that if and when a special court is W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 45: constituted and the offence is tried by the special court, the appeal from the same shall only lies to the High Court. We are of the view that once a special court is constituted by the State Government, it has all the powers of a Court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution before the special court shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor. Therefore, in our opinion, the imperative phraseology used in sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 30B of the Act, 1957 is applicable only in the eventuality of the State Government constituting a special court. 39. The employment of expression ‘may’ in different enactments are considered by the Apex Court in various judgments. Whatever that be, the learned counsel for the appellants have a contention that whenever there is a special court mentioned under a statute, it has to be guided by the provisions of the said statute. In that regard, we have gone through the provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, etc., wherein the expression employed is ‘shall’ and therefore, the State Government has no other choice than to constitute special courts in terms of the statute. 40. The term ‘mention’ is defined in the Chambers Concise Dictionary to mean ‘the occurrence or introduction of a name or W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 46: reference,— to notice briefly; to remark; to name etc. In our view, the word 'mention’ employed in the said provision has to be given a purposive interpretation to mean that ‘mentioned specifically and definitely for the purpose of trying an offence. If such an interpretation is not adopted by us, the consequence is that no offence can be tried by the Magistrate, if a special court is not constituted by the State Government in accordance with Section 30B of the Act, 1957. 41. Even though the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that entry 54 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule of Constitution of India being ‘mines and minerals’, whenever there is a conflict, the creation of special courts under the Act, 1957 is a mandatory requirement, for the reasons assigned above, we do not think that the contentions so advanced has any force. 42. It is also significant to point out that Section 23A of the Act, 1957 deals with compounding of offences, which reads thus: “[23A. Compounding of offences.―(1) Any offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder may, either before or after the institution of the prosecution, be compounded by the person authorised under section 22 to make a complaint to the court with respect to that offence, on payment to that person, for credit to the Government, of such sum as that person may specify: Provided that in the case of an offence punishable with fine only, no such sum shall exceed the maximum amount of fine which W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 47: ## may be imposed for that offence. (2) Where an offence is compounded under sub-section (1), no proceeding or further proceeding, as the case may be, shall be taken against the offender in respect of the offence so compounded, and the offender, if in custody, shall be released forthwith.” 43. It is true the power to compound, will not grant any liberty to the State Government to withhold filing of a complaint or reporting seizure of the matter before the Magistrate concerned, since both provisions are independent of each other. 44. The issue with respect to the usage of the term ‘may’ in a special enactment was considered by the High Court of Bombay in _**Kashinath Shetye v. State, through its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Bombay at Goa, Panaji, Goa and Another**_ [2014 SCC Online Bombay 15] in the realm of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the rules thereto, and it is held that under Rule 11 constituted under the Electricity Act, 2003, the jurisdiction of Courts, other than Special Courts, would not be barred under Section 154(1) of the Act till the time the Special Court is constituted under that provision. Therefore, it was held that if in any State, the State Government has not constituted any Special Court, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court or the Court of Session would be as per general law. 45. The contention of the petitioner in that case was that such W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 48: offences would have to be tried by the Sessions Court, consequent upon Section 153(3) of the Electricity Act, 2003, which requires the Judge who has been only an Additional District and Session Judge to be appointed as the Judge of the Special Court and under Section 155 of the Electricity Act, 2003, under which the Special Court would have the power of the Court of Session. After considering the issues raised in the said writ petition, it was held at paragraph 9 thus: “ **9.** This would be only after the Special Courts are constituted and not before. Hence, when the State Government has not constituted the Special Courts, since the power and the duty of the State Government is not mandatory as denoted by expression ‘ **may** ’, under Rule 11 of the Electricity Rules, 2005, the jurisdiction of the general Courts would not stand barred.” 46. A reference to a few of the provisions of the Family Court Act, 1984 in that regard would be appropriate. Section 3 deals with ‘establishment of Family Courts’ and sub-Section (1) stipulates that for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on a Family Court by the Act, the State Government, after consultation with the High Court, and by notification,— (a) shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of the Act, established for every area in the State comprising of city or town whose population exceeds one million, a Family Court; (b) may establish Family W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 49: Courts for such other areas in the State as it may deem necessary. 47. The Apex Court considered the effect of ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the Family Courts Act in _**M.P. Gangadharan v. State of Kerala**_ **, (2006) 6 SCC 162,** and it is held as follows: **“13.** Dr. Dhavan, however, submitted that the emphasis should be laid on the expression “every area” and not on “town having a city whose population exceeds one million”. We, with respect, cannot subscribe to the said contention. Clauses ( _a_ ) and ( _b_ ) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act operate in two different fields. Whereas in the area which would attract clause ( _a_ ), the State is bound to establish a Family Court, over areas which are not covered by clause ( _a_ ), the State has a discretion to establish or not to establish a Family Court. In the case of the former, the State may not have any power to shift the Family Court from the city or town whose population exceeds one million; but we do not find any reason why a Family Court established at a place having jurisdiction over an area including more than one town or village cannot be shifted from one place to another within that area.” 48. Section 28(1) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 deals with designation of special courts, which stipulates that for the purposes of providing a speedy trial, the State Government shall, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, designate for each district, a Court of Session to be a special court to try the offences under the Act. W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 50: 49. Sub-Sections (2) and (3) also empowers the special court so constituted to try offences other than the offence referred to in sub-section (1), with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, be charged at the same trial. 50. Section 14 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 deals with ‘special court and exclusive special court’ and sub-Section (1) thereto stipulates that for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an Exclusive Special Court for one or more districts. 51. The proviso thereto specifies that in districts where less number of cases under the Act is recorded, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the official gazette, specify for such districts, the court of session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 makes it clear that it shall be the duty of the State Government to establish an adequate number of courts to ensure that cases under the Act are disposed of within a period of two months, as far as possible. 52. Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 deals with the power to appoint special Judges and sub-Section (1) W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 51: thereto stipulates that the Central Government or the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, to appoint as many special Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas or for such case or group of cases as may be specified in the notification to try any offence punishable under the Act etc. Therein, it can be seen that the Central as well as the State Governments are given the liberty to constitute special courts and even though the expression employed is ‘may’, in the State of Kerala, special courts are constituted to try the offences. 53. So also, the employment of the word ‘may’ was considered by the Apex Court in _**Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd.**_ _**v. Axis Bank Ltd.**_ **,** (2022) 8 SCC 352, wherein it was held as follows: **“64.** Ordinarily the word “may” is directory. The expression “may admit” confers discretion to admit. In contrast, the use of the word “shall” postulates a mandatory requirement. The use of the word “shall” raises a presumption that a provision is imperative. However, it is well settled that the prima facie presumption about the provision being imperative may be rebutted by other considerations such as the scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from the construction.” ## 54. In _**Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P.**_ **,** (1973) 1 SCC 216 the Apex Court has held thus: “22. … In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 52: rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is what does that provision say? If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear. …” ## 55. In _**B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal,**_ (2011) 4 SCC 266, it was held by the Apex Court thus: “9 **.** It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide _Swedish Match AB_ v. _SEBI_ [(2004) 11 SCC 641 : AIR 2004 SC 4219].” ## 56. In **Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of** **India** , (1997) 9 SCC 132, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the language couched in the statute under consideration and its object, purpose and effect, and it is held that the distinction reflected in the use of the word ‘shall’ or ‘may’ depends on conferment of power. Paragraphs 17, 18 and 26 of the judgment read thus: “ **17.** The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 53: effect of the language depends upon the language couched in the statute under consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The distinction reflected in the use of the word ‘shall’ or ‘may’ depends on conferment of power. In the present context, ‘may’ does not always mean may. May is a must for enabling compliance of provision but there are cases in which, for various reasons, as soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes duty to exercise. Where the language of statute creates a duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the duty. In _Craies on Statute Law_ (7th Edn.), it is stated that the court will, as a general rule, presume that the appropriate remedy by common law or mandamus for action was intended to apply. General rule of law is that where a general obligation is created by statute and statutory remedy is provided for violation, statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope and language of the statute and consideration of policy at times may, however, create exception showing that the legislature did not intend a remedy (generality) to be exclusive. Words are the skin of the language. The language is the medium of expressing the intention and the object that particular provision or the Act seeks to achieve. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the intention. The word ‘shall’ is not always decisive. Regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. No universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to whether a particular provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory or directory. It is the duty of the court to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or section or a phrase under consideration. As stated earlier, the question as to whether the statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not always upon the language in which the intent is couched. The meaning and W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 54: intention of the legislature would govern design and purpose the Act seeks to achieve. In _Sutherland's Statutory Construction_ , (3rd Edn.) Vol. 1 at p. 81 in para 316, it is stated that although the problem of mandatory and directory legislation is a hazard to all governmental activity, it is peculiarly hazardous to administrative agencies because the validity of their action depends upon exercise of authority in accordance with their charter of existence — the statute. If the directions of the statute are mandatory, then strict compliance with the statutory terms is essential to the validity of administrative action. But if the language of the statute is directory only, then variation from its direction does not invalidate the administrative action. Conversely, if the statutory direction is discretionary only, it may not provide an adequate standard for legislative action and the delegation. In _Crawford on the Construction of Statutes_ , at p. 516, it is stated that: “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other…. **18.** In _Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes_ , 10th Edn. at p. 381, it is stated thus: “On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 55: The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them.” **“26.** Thus, this Court, keeping in view the objects of the Act, had considered whether the language in a particular section, clause or sentence is directory or mandatory. The word ‘shall’, though prima facie gives impression of being of mandatory character, it requires to be considered in the light of the intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the scope of the statute, its nature and design and the consequences that would flow from the construction thereof one way or the other. In that behalf, the court is required to keep in view the impact on the profession, necessity of its compliance; whether the statute, if it is avoided, provides for any contingency for non-compliance; if the word ‘shall’ is construed as having mandatory character, the mischief that would ensue by such construction; whether the public convenience would be subserved or public inconvenience or the general inconvenience that may ensue if it is held mandatory and all other relevant circumstances are required to be taken into consideration in construing whether the provision would be mandatory or directory. If an object of the enactment is defeated by holding the same directory, it should be construed as mandatory whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons of general public without much furthering the object of enactment, the same should be construed as directory but all the same, it would not mean that the language used would be ignored altogether. Effect must be given to all the provisions harmoniously to suppress public mischief and to promote public justice.” ## 57. In _**State of U.P and Ors. s v. Babu Ram Upadhya**_ [AIR W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 56: ## 1961 SC 751], it was held as follows: “29. The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus: When a statute uses the word "shall", prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.” 58. In _**Sarla Goel v. Kishan Chand**_ **,** [(2009) 7 SCC 658], the Apex Court, while interpreting the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, has held that it is well settled that where the word “may” shall be used as “shall”, would depend upon the intention of the legislature. ## 59. In _**State (Delhi Admn.) v. I.K. Nangia,**_ [(1980) 1 SCC 258], it was held that normally, the word “may” implies what is optional, but for the reasons stated, it should in the context in which it appears, mean “must”, and that then, there is an element of compulsion and it is a power coupled with a duty. ## 60. In _**Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui**_ **,** (1973) 3 SCC W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 57: 889, the Apex Court had occasion to consider how to deal a provision in a statute or a rule and to identify as to whether it is mandatory or directory, and it is held thus: “ **13.** Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each case one must look to the subject-matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured. …” 61. In _**Presidential Poll, In re,**_ (1974) 2 SCC 33, it is held as follows: “ **13.** In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the importance of the provision, the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory. It is the duty of the Courts to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending the whole scope of the provision to be construed. “The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the _animus imponentis_ , the intention of the law maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole [ _Brett_ v. _Brett_ , (1826) 3 Addam 210, 216].” 62. Therefore, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances and the law discussed above, we are of the undoubted opinion that the State Government is given the liberty under the Act, 1957 to decide whether to constitute a special court W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 58: to try the offences under the said Act. This we say because, what is essential, significant, and relevant is the prosecution of the perpetrators of the crime under the provisions of the Act, 1957. 63. The Act, 1957 is constituted for the development and regulation of mines and minerals under the control of the Union Government and therefore, what is relevant is the action to be taken against the person who violates the provisions of the Act, 1957. Therefore, irrespective of whether the State constitutes a special court for the purpose or not, the State Government has to ensure that the culprits under the Act, 1957 are dealt with under the penal provisions of the Act, 1957 appropriately. An accused in a crime has no right to say that he shall be tried before a special court, when the law does not prescribe so. 64. It can be seen that by virtue of Section 4 r/w Section 26 of Cr.P.C., offences under other statutes, other than Indian Penal Code, can be proceeded with, if no special courts are constituted as per the provisions of any particular statute. To say otherwise, under the statute, a court should be designated for the purpose of one which shall be constituted as per the mandate of the enactment. In this case, both are lacking, thus, enabling the State to seek the regular remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 65. This will have to be read along with the finding rendered W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 59: by us in respect of Section 30B of the Act, 1957 and we are of the view that since the word ‘may’ is employed in Section 30B of Act, 1957, the State Government is not compelled to constitute a special court. If the State Government has not constituted any special court as is desired by the Act, 1957, then there can be no doubt that it has all the trappings of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially when as per Part II of Schedule I of Cr.P.C, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class is vested with powers to try any offence exceeding three years and upto seven years, with a power to refer the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 325 of Cr.P.C., to impose with more severe punishment than the power for punishment prescribed for the Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 66. It is true, as per Section 22 of the Act, 1957, cognizance of offences can be taken by a court under the Act or any rules made thereunder, except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in that behalf by the Central Government or the State Government. 67. The appellants have a contention that the seizure of the vehicle is not reported by the officers competent to take action under the Act, 1957 before the court concerned and therefore, the aggrieved persons are unable to seek for any orders for the release W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 60: of the properties seized. However, Chapter XXXIV of Cr.P.C deals with disposal of property and Section 451(1) therein clearly stipulates that when any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial. Likewise, Section 457 Cr.P.C., which deals with the procedure by police upon seizure of property, reads thus: “457. **Procedure by police upon seizure of property** .—(1) Whenever the seizure of property by any police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code, and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, the Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof, or if such person cannot be ascertained, respecting the custody and production of such property. (2) the person so entitled is known, the Magistrate may order the property to be delivered to him on such conditions (if any) as the Magistrate thinks fit and if such person is unknown, the Magistrate may detain it and shall, in such case, issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which such property consists, and requiring any person who may have a claim thereto, to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation.' Therefore, no manner of prejudice is caused to the aggrieved W.A. No.1801/2022 & batch : 61: persons to file suitable applications before the Magistrate concerned seeking interim custody of any property. 68. Even though the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon various judgments referred to above, we are of the considered opinion that the proposition of law laid down in those cases may not apply to the facts of instant cases, especially to decide the question raised by the appellants. 69. Considering the facts and the law as above, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that the appellants have not made out any case to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge, there being no jurisdictional error or other legal infirmities justifying our interference in an intra court appeal, though for our own reasons. Needless to say, writ appeals fail, and accordingly, they are dismissed. sd/- **S. MANIKUMAR, CHIEF JUSTICE.** sd/- **SHAJI P. CHALY, JUDGE.** Rv