Vivek V. v. LIC Housing Finance Limited

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** # **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS** **THURSDAY, THE 24[TH] DAY OF MARCH 2022 / 3RD CHAITHRA, 1944 WP(C) NO. 14509 OF 2020** ## **PETITIONER:** VIVEK V. AGED 1 YEARS EMPLOYEE CODE 70989, ASSISTANT MANAGER (OUT OF EMPLOYMENT) LIC HOUSING FINANCE LIMTED, MANNIL ARCADE, 2ND FLOOR, PALAKKAD, KERALA-678 014, PERMANENTLY RESIDING AT T.C 9/2076(2) F9, SRUTHI, THJAMARAKULAM LANE, SASTHAMANGALAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 010 BY ADVS. K.M.GEORGE KUM.CHITHRA P.GEORGE ## **RESPONDENTS:** 1 LIC HOUSING FINANCE LIMITED REPRESENTED BY THE MANAGING DIRECTOR AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MAKER TOWER-F 13TH FLOOR, CUFF PARADE, MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA-400 005. 2 GENERAL MANAGER HR, OS, ESTATES AND IT), LIC HOUSING FINANCE LTD, MAKER TOWER-F 13TH FLOOR, CUFF PARADE, MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA-400 005. 3 THE REGIONAL MANAGER, LIC HOUSING FINANCE LTD, HARRINGTON CHAMBERS, BLOCK C NO 30/1A, ABDUL RAZACK 1 STREET, SAIDAPET CHENNAI, TALIL NADU-600 015. 4 AREA MANAGER, LIC HOUSING FINANCE LTD, PALAKKAD AREA OFFICE, MANNIL ARCADE, 2ND FLOOR, PALAKKAD, KERALA-678 014. BY ADVS. SHRI.S.EASWARAN, SC, LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA SRI.S.EASWARAN 2 ## W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 15.11.2022, THE COURT ON 24/3/2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 3 ## **JUDGMENT** The writ petitioner is a B.Tech.Degree Holder with MBA, who was recruited as Management Trainee in the office of the first respondent – LIC Housing Finance Limited, (hereinafter referred to as the “LICHFL” for short ) represented by the Managing Director. The 4[th] respondent is the Area Manager and the 2[nd] and 3[rd] respondents are the other officers of the LICHFL. According to the petitioner, he was pursuing Chartered Financial Analysis(CFA) course, which had high prospects in the banking and insurance industries. He had passed two levels and proposed to appear for the final level CFA Professional Charter examination. Since he could not complete his studies before the examination, which was scheduled in June 2020, he claimed that he was forced to submit resignation letter dated 27/1/2020, by giving three months notice as contemplated under Rule12(a) of the LICHFL(Remuneration and Certain Other Terms and Conditions of Service of Employees) Rules,1990,expressing his intention to resign from service on 27/4/2020. His prospective notice of resignation was accepted on 17/2/2020 by the second respondent by Ext.P4 e- mail dated 17/2/2020. He was informed that the resignation would come into effect on the prescribed day. 2. According to the petitioner, due to the out break of Covid-19, the examination was postponed and thereupon he got sufficient time to prepare for the examination. After deliberating over that issue, he decided to withdraw W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 4 Ext.P3 resignation. He submitted a request to withdraw his resignation through the 3[rd] respondent- Regional Manager by Ext.P5 e-mail on 26/4/2020, at 11.11 a.m. He discussed his withdrawal of resignation with the 4th respondent and submitted a request to him. According to the petitioner, while his application for withdrawal was pending, the 4th respondent unauthorisedly terminated his services on 27/4/2020, at the close of the office hours by Ext.P6 relieving order. Ext.P7,P7(a) to P7(c) and Ext.P8 communications were sent by him requesting to withdraw his termination and to permit him to continue. By Ext.P9 reply it was informed that his request could not be acceded and hence he was requested not to communicate further on it. Claiming that the petitioner is entitled to withdraw his resignation before that was accepted, petitioner has approached this court . The relief sought in the writ petition was to call for the records leading to the issue of Exts.P6 & P9 and to quash it. The next prayer was to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction compelling the 2[nd] respondent to accept Ext.P5 revocation of Ext.P3 resignation and to reinstate him in service with continuity of service. 3. Respondents appeared and filed a detailed counter affidavit raising a preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable. It was claimed that LIC Housing Finance Ltd.was only a public Limited Company. The LIC of India held only 40.31% of shares of the LIC Housing Finance Limited Company as on 30/6/2020. Neither the Central Government nor the State Government has a deep or pervasive control of the affairs of the company nor is Central Government sanctioning any grant to the respondent company. It was not a W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 5 creature of any Statute like LIC of India, which was constituted under the LIC of India Act 1956. LIC Housing Finance Ltd.does not exercise or discharge any statutory functions. It was held that the Rules governing the terms and conditions of service to the LIC Housing Finance Ltd. is framed by the Board of Directors. It was hence, contended that the writ petition itself was not maintainable. 4. On merits, it was contended that the claims set up by the petitioner could not be accepted. It was stated that the petitioner had submitted resignation letter dated 27/1/2020 to the manager informing that he was resigning from the post of assistant manager and wanted to be relieved on 27/4/2020. That proposal was accepted by the competent authority and he was informed accordingly on 17/2/2020 that his resignation has been accepted and he would be relieved on 27/4/2020. Accordingly, withdrawal of resignation after the termination of service was not possible. The petitioner chose to sent the intimation regarding the withdrawal of the resignation notice by way of an e-mail on 26/4/2020 at 11.11pm. 5. It was a Sunday and was not a working day. It was not addressed to the competent authority. It was not further contended that, though the resignation letter was accepted by Ext.P4 on 14/2/2020 with effect from 27/4/2020, he did not raise any objection. The relieving order was only consequential to the competent authority having accepted the resignation. The contention that the 4[th] respondent has no authority to issue Ext.P6 cannot be countenanced . When the resignation was accepted by the competent authority W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 6 and the mandatory requirement of three months was required to be followed under Rules, the relieving order was inconsequential in so far as the order of accepting the resignation which was passed on 14/2/2020. The only consequence, according to the petitioner, was that the employer employee relationship stood terminated with effect from 27/4/2020 and it was accordingly in terms of the earlier order passed, the 4[th] respondent had issued the relieving order. It was reiterated that the request for withdrawal of resignation was never given to the appointing authority prior to the expiry of the notice period. 6. Responding to the counter affidavit, a reply affidavit was filed by the petitioner who produced several documents to contend that LICHFL was an associate company of the wholly Government owned public Ltd.Company, the LIC of India, which was parent company. LICHFL was incepted as its associate company in 1989. LIC is its largest single shareholder. It was also contended that writ was maintainable against LICHFL. 7. Heard both sides and examined the records, 8. The prayer made in the writ petition was objected by the learned counsel for the respondents on the specific ground that the writ petition was not maintainable. It was contended that LIC Housing Finance Ltd.was a Public Limited Company and the Central Government did not have a deep or pervasive control over the functioning or any grant to the respondent company. LIC Housing Finance Ltd.does not exercise or discharge any statutory function. Hence, writ was not maintainable as against the LICHFL, it was contended. To supplement the above contention, the learned counsel specifically relied on the W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 7 decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas and others [(2003) 10 SCC 733)** ], and High Court in **Mathew Ignitious C. v. Catholic Syrian Bank Limited (2019 SCC Online Ker.3536)** , **Unimoni Financial Services Ltd. v. IDBI Bank Ltd. (2020 SCC Online Ker. 7347)** , **Girish G. and Another v. State of Kerala and Others (2020 KHC 289)** , **South Zone LIC, SC/ ST Employees Welfare Association v. The LIC Housing Finance Ltd. (2016 SCC Online Mad 31990** ) and S **reenivasulu S. V. LIC Housing Finance Ltd. (1995 SCC Online Kar.590)** . In Sreenivaslu S.case(supra), the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka had occasion to deal with a matter in which a writ was sought against the LIC Housing Finance Ltd. Itself. The court held that the respondent was a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. LIC held a limited share and the rest of the shares were held by the general public. It was held that no material was placed before the court to come to the conclusion that the respondent was a 'State' within Article 12 of the Constitution of India . It was also held that the writ was not maintainable. Identical stand was taken by the Madras High Court in South Zone LIC, SC/ ST Employees Welfare Association case (supra). In both the cases, the petitioners did not have materials to establish that LIC Housing Finance Ltd. would come under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Taking note of the fact that it was a company registered under the Companies Act and LIC held only limited shares, it was held not to be a State and hence not susceptible to the writ jurisdiction. 9. The other cases referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 8 specifically referred to other institutions, but claimed to be identical in functioning as that of the LIC Housing Finance Ltd.. In Sagar Thomas's case(supra), Supreme Court had considered the entire law on the subject and considered whether the writ was maintainable against a company incorporated under the Companies Act not being a Government company under Section 617 of the Companies Act. It was held that incorporation of regulatory provisions to ensure that business or commercial activity carried on by the private bodies remains within a discipline, do not confer any status upon the company, nor put any obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under Article 226. It was clarified that writ will not be issued where there may not be any non compliance with or violation of any statutory provision by a private body. In Girish G.'s case, the question that arose was whether the CIAL(Cochin International Airport Ltd) had any statutory duty to perform. After taking note of the Constitution of the Company and its functioning and also the fact that it was a company incorporated under the Companies Act with State Government holding a minor share, it was held to be not a “State,” as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution. It was held that the termination of service of an employee of CIAL cannot be challenged in a writ proceeding. 10. In Mathew Ignitious 's case (supra), almost similar issue came up before the Division Bench. In that, the question related to service of an employee under a Bank. The claim set up by the petitioner was that, the functions of the first respondent bank was similar to that of a Nationalized Bank and hence it was discharging a public function. The court, referring the various W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 9 decisions including that of the Sagar Thomas case, concluded that the respondent bank, which was a scheduled bank and registered as a company under the Companies Act, did not fall within the definition of a 'State' and 'Other Authorities' in Article 12 and the Bank could not be termed as an institution or company performing any public function/duty. Consequently, it was held that the dispute arising out of the contract of personal service between the Bank and the appellant was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Unimoni Financial Services Ltd' case.(supra), identical situation came up in relation to the function of IDBI Bank Ltd. which was a Bank registered not under the Companies Act,but a Company constituted under the provisions of Banking Regulation Act,1949 and was categorized as other public sector bank by the Reserve Bank of India. In that case also replying to the claim that a writ was being maintainable, the bank contended that in the absence of any administrative or functional control by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the bank was State or an instrumentality of the State and not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. After referring to the various decisions, it was held that even if the bank was a public sector bank, by demanding processing fee or withholding of title deeds towards security, cannot be said to be one involving any element of public duty. Hence, the writ was not maintainable. 11. In answer to the above, learned counsel for the writ petitioner relied on Exts.P10 to P15(a) documents as well as a catena of decisions to contend that respondent, though a company constituted under the Companies Act, was W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 10 under the direct control and had functional integrality with the LIC of India and thus discharging a public function. It was claimed that the writ was sustainable. It was claimed by the writ petitioner that, LICHFL was an associate company of the wholly Government owned Public Limited Company, the LIC, and was incepted as an associate company of the LIC which was the largest single share holder with 40.31% of share holding. It had several regional offices, centres and marketing offices through out India and had office even outside India. LIC has promoted LIC Housing Finance Ltd. to undertake housing and related activities carried out by it on a large scale as a diversified activity as evident from main objective and ancillary objectives. It was further stated that, it was intended to satisfy the requirements of the public in accordance with the guarantee given under the various International covenants and also under the Constitution of India. It was also intended to take up and implement various public policies in connection with the various Government programmes. The petitioner relied on several documents to show that the LIC was enforcing various policy decisions of the Government. It was further contended that, LICHFL was an extended arm of statutory Corporation and was discharging functions which were of public importance closely related to the Government functions. 12. To supplement the above contentions, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner relied on the decisions reported in **Electricity Board Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1967 SC1857), Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram [(1975) 1 SCC 421], Kumkum Khanna v. Mother Aquinas.(Manu/DE/0100/1976], Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority(1979) 3 SCC 489), Ajay** W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 11 **Hassia v. Khalid Mujib Schravandi (1981) 1 SCC 722), Oliga Tellis v. Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545), Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Broj Nath Ganguly & Ors. (Manu/SC/0439/1986, Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. R.Rudani (1989) 2 SCC 691), Shantistar Builders v. Naryan K.Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520), Ganapath National Middle School v. Durai Kannan by LRs & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 2803), K.Krishnamacharyulu & Ors v. Sri.Venkateswara Hindu College of Engineering & Anr. (1997) 3 SCC 571), Visakha & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1997 SC 3011), Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111), Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr.v. Union of India & Ors.(2005) 4 SCC 649), Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 330), John Kuriakose v. State of Kerala (2015 (1) 720), BCCI v. Cricket Associatiion of Bihar & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC 251), Kelvin Jute Company Limited Workers Provident Fund And Ors. v. Krishnakumar Agrawala & Ors (2016) 14 SCC 327), S.Sreesanth v. BCCI & Ors. ( 2019 ICO 771) and Unitech Ltd. & Ors. v. Telangana Industrial Infrastructure Corporation & Ors. SCC Online SC 99 ) .** 13. It is pertinent to note that most of the decisions including Olga Tellis(supra) and Visakha's case (supra) were relied on by the petitioner to argue that LICHFL was carrying out public function by implementing various Government Welfare Schemes and associated with the various Governmental and Public functions. Suffice to hold that all the above decisions were relied on by the petitioner to support the ancillary question regarding the public functions. W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 12 14. To contend specifically that writ petition is maintainable, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions reported in **Union of India &** **and Others v, Gopal Chandra Misra(Manu/SC/0370/1978), I.P.Chattopadhyay v. ICWA & Ors. ( Manu/WB/0230/1986), Balram Gupta v. UOI (Manu/SC/0608/1987), Punjab National Bank v. P.K.Mittal Manu/SC/0425/1989), Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project & Dvp.India Ltd. & Ors. (Manu/SC/0183/2002), Srikanth S.M. v. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (Manu/SC/2119/2005), M/s.Padia Timber Company Ltd. v. The Board of Trustees of Vishakhapatnam Port Trust ( SC 2008 WWW live. In ).** 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner further referred to an unreported decision of this court in **W.P.(C) No.19758/2021** , a copy of which was made available after the hearing was over. 16. In Electricity Board Rajasthan's case(supra) Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether the Electricity Board of Rajasthan was 'State” as defined under a Constitution of India. It was held that expression”other authorities” under Article 12, will thus include all Constitutional or statutory bodies on whom powers were conferred by law. It was held that the Board under Electricity Supply Act was required to carry on some activities in the nature of trade or commerce but did not give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word “State”. It was ultimately held that the Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution were applicable. In Sukhdev Singh and Others (supra), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether the various institutions like W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 13 ONGC, Industrial Finance Corporation, etc.were “State” as defined under the Constitution of India. After referring to the nature of functions and also the constitution of those institutions, the Supreme Court held that statutory Corporations carrying on business of public importance were authorities within the meaning of Article 12, despite that they had no power to issue binding directions of penal consequences. 17. In Kumkum Kanna and others (supra), which was another decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, an identical question came up in relation to a private college. It was noticed that, though the respondent was a private college, once it was admitted to the privileges of the University, it ceased to be an entirely private institution and became the subject of statutory provisions and was regulated by it. The colleges, whether private or Government or maintained by the University were therefore, parts of the University. The ordinance of the University are 'law” as they were enacted in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 30 and 31 of the Delhi University Act. 18. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation(supra), essentially, the question of maintainability was not seen set up . Though the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the other decisions referred above, they did not directly relate to the question of maintainability of writ and whether they fell under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. However, in unreported decision in **W.P.(C) No.19758/2021** (K.N.Madhusoodanan v. Reserve Bank of India), the learned Single Judge of this Court had occasion to consider whether a private sector banking company was amendable to a writ jurisdiction. W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 14 19. The preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of writ petition was defended by the respondents relying on Sagar Thomas's case(Supra) and _**Sulochana Gupta & Anr. v. RBG Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.[(2020) SCC OnLine KER 4153]**_ . After detailed discussion of the entire facts, it was held that a Banking company, whether in the private sector or public sector, is handling public money and also has necessarily complied with several statutorily requirements including conducting of business in accordance with national policies, cannot be held that there is no public law element at all in the functioning of a Bank. There may be cases wherein individual actions relating to contract with a depositor or a customer who has taken a loan may arise which necessarily is in the field of a private contract. It was held that, it was the constitution of the Board which finally determines the way the Bank functions in the public domain. It was further held that if the Bank is functioning in the public domain, its activities are not confined to identified private persons. It was further held that where the constitution of the Board of Directors is mandated to be in a particular form by the Statutes which govern the very existence of the banking company, it cannot be said to be an affair in a private field, which is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. 20. Though essentially it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that LIC of India is having a deep and pervasive control in the functioning of the LIC Housing Finance Ltd, that itself is not sufficient. There cannot be any dispute that the Housing Finance Ltd.is constituted as a Private Limited Company and thereby a separate entity. Merely because it does the W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 15 commercial activities and implements various Governmental projects or that it is intended to cater to the various interests of the public which have been recognized under the International covenants or Constitutional Guarantees, that by itself cannot treat its entire functioning as one in public duty especially in maters within private domain like a contract of individual employment. However, it seems that in W.P.(C) No.19758/2021 (supra), learned Single Judge has taken the view that wherever the banks function in public domain and the activities are not confined to identified private persons, it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction. Evidently, law laid down in Sagar Thomas' case (supra) dominates the facts of the case. This is supplemented by the decisions of this court in Unimoni's case (supra) and Girish G.'s case(supra). Directly on the point are the decisions in Mathew Ignitious 's case and two decisions of the Madras High Court as well as the Karnataka High Court referring to LIC Housing Finance Ltd. Itself. 21. Hence, regarding the termination of service of an employee is concerned, writ is not maintainable. 22. Notwithstanding the finding that the writ is found to be not sustainable, I am inclined to consider on merits also. 23. It is an admitted fact that by virtue of Ext.P3 dated 27/1/2020, the petitioner had submitted his resignation. It was addressed to the Manager, LIC Housing Finance Ltd. He had clearly stated that the last working day will be on 27/4/2020 and his service would come to an end with effect from 27/4/2020. It was accepted by Ext.P4 document of the 4th respondent dated 17/2/2020. It W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 16 was stated therein that the resignation has been accepted. Ext.P4 shows that the date of resignation was 27/1/2020 and 14/2/2020 was the date of acceptance of resignation. The notice period prescribed was three months. Evidently, the petitioner has submitted his resignation in accordance with Rule12(f) applicable to the petitioner. Thereafter, by Ext.P5 e.mail communication dated 26/4/2020 the petitioner is stated to have withdrawn his resignation. According to the petitioner, he is entitled to withdraw the resignation at any time before it is accepted. Rule12(f) provides that in case of resignation, an employee who has selected to resign under that Rule and has to give necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority and shall be allowed to withdraw his/her notice with the specific approval of appointing authority, provided that request for such withdrawal shall be made on or before the expiry of the notice period. Though the respondents have taken up a stand that resignation was accepted on 14/2/2020, and it was not withdrawn before its acceptance, I cannot agree with that contention. Rule 12 (f) provides that withdrawal shall be made before the expiry of notice period. According to the petitioner, e-mail was sent on 26/4/2020 well before the resignation came into effect on 27/4/2020. According to him, what is prescribed under section 12(f) is that, it should be made on or before the expiry of the notice period. Hence, he has complied with Rule 12 (f), it was contended. In spite of the above, he was relieved by Ext.P6 dated 27/4/2020, is the grievance of the writ petitioner. 24.The learned counsel for the respondents invited my attention to Ext.P5, the e-mail. It shows that, e-mail was sent by the petitioner addressed to the 4[th] W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 17 respondent on 26/4/2020 at 11.11PM. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that Ext.P5 itself shows that it was sent on a Sunday **.** It was further pointed out that, Sunday was not a working day. It was sent at 11.11PM during night. There is absolutely nothing to show that it was received by the competent authority before the expiry of notice period. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Rule 12 (f) specifically provided that, appointing authority shall permit withdrawal of notice with the specific approval of the appointing authority. In the case at hand, there was no approval by the appointing authority. 25. Evidently, Ext.P5 was sent on a Sunday late night. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that it was addressed to the appointing authority. There is also nothing to show that he had obtained the permission of the appointing authority or atleast to show that the notice was served on the appointing authority before the expiry of notice period. Since the learned counsel for the respondents have a specific case that his notice stood accepted and informed about the acceptance of the resignation by Ext.P4, by efflux of notice period, subsequent notice of withdrawal will have no effect . Hence, what is contemplated is not the date of acceptance, but the expiry of the notice period. Though Ext.P5 seems to have been issued before the expiry of the notice period, there is absolutely nothing on record to show that it was seen or whether approval was granted by the competent authority as demanded under Rule 12 (f). Having appreciated the entire facts, I am inclined to hold that the writ W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 18 petition is not maintainable both on law as well as on facts. No relief can be granted to the petitioner. Writ petition fails and is dismissed. Sd/- **SUNIL THOMAS Judge** dpk W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 19 ## **APPENDIX OF WP(C) 14509/2020** PETITIONER EXHIBITS EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF OFFICER OF APPOINTMENT AS AN ASSISTANT MANAGER IN THE LIC HOUSING FINANCE LTD DATED 9.1.2020 ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT - EXHIBIT P1 (A) TRUE COPY OF ORDER OF EXTENSION OF PROBATION PERIOD OF THE PETITIONER FORM THE 2ND RESPONDENT - EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE LIC HOUSING FINANCE LTD (REMUNERATION AND CERTAIN OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF EMPLOYEES)RULES 1990 - EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE PETITIONERS LETTER OF PROSPECTIVE RESIGNATION W.E.F 27.4.2020DATED 27.1.2020 - EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF E-MAIL DATED 17.2.2020 OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT ACCEPTING EXHIBIT P-3 RESIGNATION ON 27.4.2020 - EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF PETITIONERS REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS RESIGNATION THROUGH THE 3RD RESPONDENT BY E-MAIL DATED 26.4.2020 - EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF RELIEVING ORDER ISSUED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT, DATED 27.4.2020 - EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF EMAIL DATED 28.4.2020 OF THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO ACCEPT HIS EXHIBIT P5 REVOCATION OF EXHIBIT P3 RESIGNATION LETTER AND TO REINSTATE HIM IN SERVICE EXHIBIT P7 (A) TRUE COPY OF REMINDER EMAIL DATED 29.4.2020 OF THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO ACCEPT HIS EXHIBIT P5 REVOCATION LETTER OF EXHIBIT P3 RESIGNATION LETTER AND TO REINSTATE HIM IN SERVICE EXHIBIT P7 (B) TRUE COPY OF REMINDER-EMAIL DATED 9.5.2020 OF THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO ACCEPT HIS EXHIBIT P5 REVOCATION LETTER OF W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 20 ||EXHIBIT P3 RESIGNATION AND TO REINSTATE HIM| |---|---| ||IN SERVICE| |EXHIBIT P7 (C)|TRUE COPY OF REMINDER-EMAIL DATED 22.5.2020| ||OF THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO| ||ACCEPT HIS EXHIBIT P5 REVOCATION LETTER OF| ||EXHIBIT P3 RESIGNATION AND TO REINSTATE HIM| ||IN SERVICE| |EXHIBIT P8|TRUE COPY OF REMINDER-EMAIL DATED 3.6.2020| ||OF THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO| ||ACCEPT HIS EXHIBIT P5 REVOCATION LETTER OF| ||EXHIBIT P3 RESIGNATION AND TO REINSTATE HIM| ||IN SERVICE| |EXHIBIT P9|TRUE COPY OF E-MAIL DATED 30.6.2020 OF THE| ||2ND RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER REJECTING| ||HIS REQUEST REINSTATE HIM IN SERVICE| |Exhibit P10|TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION| ||AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF LICHFL.| |Exhibit P10(A)|TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE| ||ANNUAL REPORT 2019-2020 OF LICHFL.| |Exhibit P11|TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. REF.CO/HPF.735| ||DATED 04/03/2010 ISSUED BY THE CHIEF| ||(L&HPF) OF LIC SHOWING THAT ITS ENTIRE| ||DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITIES OF HOUSING WAS| ||TRANSFERRED TO LIC HFL.| |Exhibit P11(A)|TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE 62ND| ||ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LIC (2018-2019).| |Exhibit P12|TRANSFER ORDER REF. PER.ADMN/20-21/PO-11| ||DATED 30/05/2020 OF THE LIC.| |Exhibit P12(A)|THE DEPUTATION POLICY OF THE LICE OBTAINED| ||UNDER THE RTI ACT.| |Exhibit P13|TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE| ||PRADHAN MANTRI AWAS YOJANA GRAMIN (PMAYG),| ||HOUSING FOR ALL (RURAL) SCHEME.| |Exhibit P13(A)|TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF PRADHAN| ||MANTRI AWAS YOJANA URBAN (PMAYU), HOUSING| ||FOR ALL (URBAN) SCHEME.| ## W.P.(C) No.14509/2020 21 Exhibit P13(B) TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT UNION BUDGET 2017 ARUN JAITLEY GIVES INFRASTRUCTURE STATUS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING INDIA TODAY 01/02/2017. Exhibit P13(C) TRUE COPY OF THE GAZETTE NOTIFICATION NO.1/2018-CENTRAL TAX (RATE) DATED 25/01/2018 ACCORDING INFRASTRUCTURE STATUS TO HOUSING. Exhibit P14 TRUE COPY OF LIC HOUSING FINANCE DISBURSES RS.2,115 CRORE SUBSIDIES TO OVER 1 LAKH CLSS CUSTOMERS MONEY CONTROL, ACCESSED ONLINE ON 12/10/2020. Exhibit P14(A) LIC HOUSING EYES TO DISBURSE RS. 55,000 CRORE IN FY19-20, ECONOMIC TIMES, DATED 16/11/2019. Exhibit P15 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. M-11011/08/2020MEDIA DATED 20/03/2020 OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, ADDRESSED TO ALL CHIEF SECRETARIES OF STATE/UNION TERRITORIES. Exhibit P15(A) TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. M-11011/08/2020MEDIA DATED 20/03/2020 OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, ADDRESSED TO ALL EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATIONS.