High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed

Viswesardas Gokuldas v. B. K. Narayan Singh & Anr.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1851 of 1968
Neutral Citation:Viswesardas Gokuldas v. B. K. Narayan Singh & Anr., (1969) 3 SCR 581

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S. M. Sikri
  • R. S. Bachawat
  • K. S. Hegde
Judgment Date
1969-02-06
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed. The appellant must pay costs to the respondents.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Viswesardas Gokuldas

Respondents

  • B. Narayan Singh
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Satyamala Pappu
  • • Vineet Kumar

Counsels for Respondents

  • • K. R. Chaudhuri
  • • K. Rajendra Chaudhuri
  • • S. V. Gupte
  • • G. R. Ethirajulu Naidu
  • • B. N. Sen
  • • O. P. Khaitan
  • • A. N. Parikh

Case Synopsis & Summary

Viswesardas Gokuldas v. B. K. Narayan Singh & Anr. concerns whether a contract to assign a mining lease was ever concluded. A contract dated August 3, 1957 contemplated sale of 40,000 tons of float iron and a right to win and remove ore from a 184-acre lease in Mysore. On September 2, 1957, the defendant wrote that, “Further to our agreement dated 3rd August 1957, I hereby agree to assign the said lease area … subject to your paying me Rs. 1,80,000 within three months.” The plaintiffs did not accept within three months, and the defendant revoked the offer by a letter dated October 31, 1957, received November 6, 1957. The plaintiffs sued (O.S. No. 55 of 1957) for specific performance. The High Court held, on appeal, that the plaintiffs had accepted the offer by their plaint in O.S. No. 46 of 1957, and that the acceptance was communicated before the revocation. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the September 2, 1957 document was in law only an offer, and that revocation prior to acceptance was effective. It emphasized that acceptance must be communicated and that filing a plaint in a separate suit is not a valid acceptance of an offer. The old chancery practice that a suit’s filing suffices as acceptance was not applicable under current Indian practice. The appeal is dismissed with costs to the respondents.

Provisions of Law Cited

Contract Act, 1872 – ss. 2(6), 3, 7Constitution of India, Art. 133Code of Civil Procedure, Ist Schedule, Appendix A, Form No. 48

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Acceptance must be communicated to the offeror.
  • An offer may be revoked before acceptance.
  • Old chancery practice of treating filing of a suit as acceptance is not applicable under modern Indian practice.
  • Mere mental assent is not sufficient; communication of assent is necessary.
  • Consideration is required for an option to keep an offer open; lack of consideration means no valid option.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the September 2, 1957 letter, though worded as an agreement, was in law an offer. The plaintiffs accepted the offer by their plaint in O.S. No. 46 of 1957 and that acceptance was communicated before November 6, 1957, before revocation. They argued a concluded contract existed and that the defendant failed to obtain the central government’s consent for assignment, a breach constituting specific performance. They urged that the old chancery notion that filing a suit sufficed as acceptance should apply, or at least be persuasive evidence of a concluded contract, and relied on authorities like Blom’s/Beav. cases to support acceptance by action.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued there was no concluded contract; the September 2 letter was merely an offer, revocable before acceptance. No valid acceptance occurred prior to revocation; the plaint in O.S. No. 46 of 1957 did not constitute acceptance. They argued that the old chancery practice is not applicable to modern procedure, and that acceptance must be communicated. They also noted that any conveyance would require government sanction, and non-fulfilment of this condition prevents specific performance.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Boys v. Ayerst(1822) 6 Madd. 316, 326; 56 ER 1112, 1115DistinguishedCited as an outdated authority; the court held that acceptance by filing a plaint cannot be treated as acceptance in the present practice.
Agar v. Biden(1833) 2 L.J. Ch. 3DistinguishedDistinguished for the same reason; early common law rules on acceptance are not applicable.
Bloxam's Case(Beav. 33 Beav. 529)DistinguishedSelected to illustrate the limited applicability of the old rule; not controlling.
In re Pellatt's CaseL.R. 2 Ch. App. 527PositiveApplied to support the need for a communicated acceptance rather than mere mental assent.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

**A** **B** ## c **D** E F G 581 VISWESARDAS GOKULDAS _v._ **B.** K. NARAYAN SINGH & ANR. _February_ 6, 1969 [S. M. SIKRI, R. S. BACHAWAT AND K. S. HEGDE, JJ.] _Contract Act,_ 1872 (9 _of_ 1872), _ss._ 2 (6), 3 _and_ _?-Suit._ _for specific_ _performance_ _of_ _contract-Contract whether concluded-Acceptance of_ _offer_ _through_ _plaint_ _filed_ _in another suit whether constitutes proper accep-_ _**tance-Service of copy**_ _**of**_ _**plaint whether constitutes communication**_ _**of**_ _**acceptance.**_ Under a contract dated August 3, 1957 the def~ndant agreed to sell to the plaintiffs 40,000 tons of float iron lying in a mining area in the Hooadurgo Taluka in Mysore State, and gave them a right to win and remove iron ore. On September 2, 1957, the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs that further to the agreement dated August 3, 1957, he agreed to assign the said lease area of 184 acres for iron and manganese ores to the plaintiffs subject to their paying one lakh and eighty thousand rupees within three months. The three months expired on November 6, 1957 without the offer being accepted by the plaintiffs orally or by letter. On October 31, 1957 the defendant posted a letter to the plaintiffs revoking the offer, which reached them on November 6, 1957. The plaintiffs instituted a suit (0.S. No. _55_ of 1957) against the defendant alleging that by contract dated September 2, 1957 the defendant had agreed to **aasign** **to** **the plaintiffs his leasehold interest** **in** **the aforesaid** **184** **acres** **of** **land** **and** **claiming** **specific\** **performance** **of** **the contract.** **The** **trial** **court** decreed the suit. The defendant appealed to the High Court. On the question whether the offer made in the defendant's letter of September 2, 1957 had been accepted by the plaintiffs the High Court held that the plaintiffs had accepted the said offer in their plaint in anothe'r suit relating to the possession of the same land (O.S. No. 46 of 1957) a copy of which was served On the defendant on November _5,_ 1957 a day earlier than the defendant's letter revoking the offer reached the plaintiffs. Despite this finding, on another ground, the High Court allowed the defendant's appeal and dismissed the suit, namely, O.S. No. 55 of 1957. The plaintiff appealed with certificate to this Court. HELD : The appeal must be dismissed on the ground that Ihm was no concluded contract between the parties. [585 C-Dl The letter dated September 2, 1957 sent by the defendant to the plainti1fs, though worded as an agreement was in point of law an offer only. The defendant was at liberty to revoke the offer at any time before its acceptance by the plaintiffs. The defendant's letter revoking the offer reached the plaintiifs on Novembe'r 6, 1957. Before that date the plaintilh did not accept the offer either orally or by letter. The High Court ~as wrong in holding that the plaintiffs accepted the offer by their plaint m O.S. No. 46 of 1957 and that this acceptance was communicated to the defendant before November 6, 1957. [583 B-E] **H** . Considering the contents of its relevant paragraphs the plaint in ques**tion** **was** **not** **in** **point** **of** **law** **an** **acceptance** **of the** **offer,** **nor** **was** **it** **·intend-** ed .to be an acceptance. It is not usual to accept a business offer by a plamt; nor is it usual to communicate an acceptance by serving a copy 582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1969] 3 S.C.R. of the plaint through the medium of the Court. To hold thu8 would be **A** straining the language of ss. 2(6), 3 and 7 of the Contract Act. [585 A-Bl The old chancery practice under which the mere filing of a bill in a suit to enforce specific performance was regarded as sufficient acceptance of the defendant's offe'r unless the offer had been withdrawn before the filing of the suit, cannot be applicable under the present Indian praci- **B** tice and procedure. [585 C-EJ The argument based on _Bloum's_ case that the communication of an **assent** **was** **not necessary** **and** **mere mental assent** **of** **the plaintiffs** **to** **the** defendant's proposal was sufficient. was misconceived. [585 Fl _Boys_ v. _Ayerst,_ (1822) 6 Madd. 316, 326=56 E.R. 1112, 1115, _Agar_ v. _Biden,_ (1833) 2 L.J. Ch. 3 and _Bloxam's_ _case,_ 33 Beav 529, distinguished. C _In_ _re_ : _Pe/latt' s_ _case,_ L.R. 2 Ch. App. 527, applied. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1851 of 1968. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated June 19, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. 231 of 1960. **D** _Sltyamala Pappu_ and _Vineet Kumar,_ for the appellant. _K. R. Chaudhuri_ and _K. Rajendra Chaudhuri,_ for respondent No. 1. _S. V. Gupte, G._ _R._ _Ethirajulu Naidu, B. N. Sen, 0. P._ _Khaitan,_ _A._ _N. Parikh, K._ _1?.._ _Chaudhuri_ ·and _K.._ _Rajendra Chaudhuri,_ for E respondent No. 2. The· Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat J. The plaintiffs instituted a suit (O.S. No. _55_ of 1957 against the defendant alleging that by a contract dated September 2, 1957 the defendant had agreed to assign to the plaintiffs his leasehold interest under a mining lease in respect of 184 acres of land in Kudrekainave Kava!, Hosadurga Taluk, and claiming specific performance of the contract. The Trial Court decreed the suit. The defendant filed an appeal against the decree. The High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The present appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs after obtaining a certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution. The main question arising in this appeal is whether therr. was a contract as alleged in the plaint. Under a contract dated August 3, 1957, the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiffs 40000 tons of float iron lying in the aforesaid mining area and gave them the right to win and remove the iron ore. We are not directly concerned with this contract in this appeal. On September 2, 1957 the defendant wrote the following letter to the plaintiffs : F G **H** •• A B ## c D E F G H GOKULDAS _v._ NARAYAN SINGH _(Bachawat,_ J.) 583 "Further to our agreement dated 3rd August 1957 I hereby agree to assign the said lease area of 184 acres for iron and manngase ores, in your favour, subject to your paying me one lakh and eighty thousand rupees at your option to be decided by you within three months from this date." This document though worded as an agreement wasi in point of law an offer only. As a matter of fact, on September 2, 1957 the plaintiffs had not agreed to purchase the mining lease. Until both parties were bound there could be no coDcluded contract. The promise to keep the offer open for three months was not supported by any consideration. The defendant was at liberty to revoke the offer at any time before its acceptance by the plaintiffs. On October 31, 1957, the defendant posted a letter to the plaintiffs revoking the offer. This letter reached the plaintiffs on November 6, 19S'l. Before that date the plaintiffs did not accept the offer either orally or by any letter sent to the defendant. On November 1, 1957, the plaintiffs filed a suit (0.S. No. 46 of 1957) against the defendant claiming a declaration that they were entitled to remain in possession of the mining area. The primary object of the suit was to enforce the plaintiffs' right under the contract dated August 3, 1957. The defendant filed his written statement in that suit on November 5, 1957. The High Court held that the plaintiffs accepted the offer of September' 2, 1957 by their plaint in O.S. No. 46 of 1957 and that this acceptance was communicated to the defendant before November 6, 1957. We are unable to agree with this finding. The pleadings and issues raised the question whether a contract was made 001 September 2, 1957. If the plaintiffs desired to set up a new case that the contract was concluded in November 1957 they should have amended their pleadings accordingly. We need not say anything more on this point because we find that the plaintiffs have failed to establish the new case. In paragraphs 14 and 19 of the plaint in O.S. . No. 46 of 1957 the plaintiffs alleged that by the letter dated September 2, 1957 the defendant agreed to assign the mining lease, that they were read:,: and willing to perform the CQntract and that they reserved their right to file a suit for specific performance. The suggestion was that the contract was concluded on September 2, 1957 and that in breach of the contract the defendant failed to apply for a00 obtain the necessary consent of the central government to the assignment of the mining lease. Paragraph 17 and the. prayer portion of the plaint suggested that by virtue of this contract and the earlier contract dated August 3, 1957 they were entitled to remain in possession of the mining area. ~84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (! 969] 3 S.C.R. The suggestion was an atempt to add to the terms of the offer of September 12, 1957. On acceptance of the offer according to its !erms the plaintiffs could not get a possessory ri$ht before executl?n of a conveyance of the mining lease. :fjit pomt of law, the plamt was not an acceptance of the offer, not was it intended to be an acceptance. It is not usual to accept a business offer by ~ plaint; nor is it us~al to commujllicate an acceptance by servmg a copy of the plamt through the medium of the Court. We shall ~e straining the language of ss. 2(6), 3 & 7 the Contract Act 1f we were to hold that the plaint was an acceptance and that the service of a copy of the plaid! along with the writ of summons was 'a communication of the acceptance. A B Under the old chancery practice the mere filing of a bill in C a suit to enforce specific performance was regarded as sufficient acoeptance of the defendant's offer unless the offer had been withdrawn before the filing of the suit, see _Boys_ v. _Ayerst('),_ _Agar_ v. _Biden(_ _[2]_ _);_ _Fry_ _ori_ _Specific Performance,_ 8th ed., art. 306, page 142, _Pomeroy on Specific Performance,_ :!rd ed., art. 66, pp. 169-170. It may well be doubted whether this rule D can apply under our present practice and procedure. A plaint in a suit for specific performance should allege a concluded contract, see the Code of Civil Procedure Ist Schedule Appendix A, Form No. 48. The offer as well as the acceptance should precede the institutioo of the suit. However, the precise paint does not arise in this case. 0.S. No. 46 of 1957 was not a suit for specific performance of the contract. Before the pre- E sent suit for specific performance of the contract was institllted, the offer had been withdrawn. D E Counsel for the appellant relyilllg on _Bloxam's_ Case( [3 ] ) submitted that the communication of an acceptance was not necessary. The argument is misconceived. We have held that the plaint in O.S. No. 46 of 1957 was not an acceptance. There was no other acceptance either oral or in writing. Mere mental assent of the plaintiffs to the defendant's proposal is not sufficient. In the peculiar facts of _B/oxam's_ case a contract to take shares was concluded by an oral -application for shares followed by allotment though no notice of allotment was given _t?_ the applica.nt. Ordinarily there is Olb contraot unless there is an acceptance of the application for shares and the acceptance is communicated to the applicant, see _In_ re: _Pe/latfs_ Case('). In the last case Lord Cairns, L.J.' pointed out that _B/oxam's_ case tllmed on its own special facts. Bloxam was orally informed that if he did not receive 3ill answer within a certain tinte he was to consider,his application granted. In the peculiar cir (1) 1822 6 Madd. 316, 326=56 E.R.1112, 1115.. (2) 1833 2 L. J. Ch. 3. (3) 33 Beav. 529. (4) L.R. 2 Ch. App, 527. F G H GOKULDAS _v._ NARAYAN SINGH _(Bachawat,_ _J.)_ 585 A cumstances, Bloxam could be regaided as having dispensed with the necessity of the communication Oif the acceptance: In the present case we are not concerned with a contract to take shares. The defendant made an offer to assign a minfug lease. No acceptance was made or communicated to the defendant before he withdrew the offer. There was no concluded contract ai:id B the appeal must .fail on this ground. ### c D The High Court held that the assignment of the mining lease could not be lawfully made without the sanction of the State Government and the approval of the 'Central Government ~d that as the governments concerned could not be compelled to . accord the necessary sanction and approval, the contract to assign the minipg lease could not be specifically pcrf ormed and on this ground the High Court dismissed the suit- We do not #### think it necessary to express any opinion on . this question. The appeal is liable to be dismissed in view of our conclusion that 1Aere was no .concluded contract between the parties. #### In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay one set of costs to the respondents. G.C. _Appeal dismissed._