High CourtDivision BenchAppeals dismissed.

VIMALESHWAR NAGAPPA SHET v. NOOR AHMED SHERIFF & ORS.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal Nos. 4279-4280 of 2011
Neutral Citation:2011 (6) S.C.R. 392

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • P. Sathasivam
  • H. L. Gokhale
Judgment Date
2011-05-11
Court Decision / Holding
Appeals dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet

Respondents

  • Noor Ahmed Sheriff & Others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • S. N. Bhat

Counsels for Respondents

  • • P. P. Rao
  • • Mahalakshmi Pavani
  • • Utav Sidhu
  • • Filza Moonis
  • • G. Balaji
  • • Apeksha Sharan

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court appeal arises from a suit for specific performance concerning a dwelling-house property inherited by undivided co-sharers from Abdul Momin Sheriff. After the death of the original owner, his surviving sons held 2/11th shares and his daughters 1/11th shares. To dispose of the dwelling-house, the co-sharers executed an agreement of sale with Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet for 9/11th of the property, but Defendant No.3 (the minor) did not join the agreement. The trial court decreed specific performance in favor of the appellant; the High Court determined a market value (Rs. 300 per sq ft) and, viewing Defendant No.3 as a non-party to the agreement, directed that the 9/11th share could be purchased by paying the value to the plaintiff, with the condition that Defendant No.3 would be paid within three months, failing which the plaintiff would obtain relief of specific performance. The High Court’s order was treated as a consent order. The appellant argued that since Defendant No.3, a minor, was not a party to the agreement, his share could not be bound and that no guardian had been appointed to protect his interests; the minority’s share could not be sold without proper guardianship. The Supreme Court held that the agreement covering the entire property was void as to the minor’s share, that the order was a consent order, and that Section 96(3) CPC bars appeals from consent decrees. It dismissed the appeals and directed specific payment by the minor’s share with interest and returned sums received by others, keeping costs open.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 s. 96(3)Partition Act, 1893 s. 4Specific Relief Act, 1963 s. 20

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • No appeal lies from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties (CPC, s.96(3)).
  • A concession by counsel on a question of fact binds the client, but on a question of law it is not binding.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant submits that the sale agreement for the entire property, including the minor’s share, was executed only by some co-sharers and did not bind Defendant No.3, who was a minor and not a party to the agreement. Since the property includes a minor’s share and guardianship was not arranged, the agreement is void as to the minor’s share. The Partition Act, s. 4, contemplates a right to purchase by co-sharers to exclude outsiders, and it appears Defendant No.3 should be allowed to purchase his share, not the whole. The High Court’s consent-order treatment and the advice given by counsel do not bind the client on a point of law, and the court should not have treated the transaction as consent-like; Section 96(3) CPC bars appeals from consent decrees, thus no interference is warranted.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the co-sharers intended sale of the entire property, and Defendant No.3, though a minor, held a share that could be purchased by the others under Partition Act, s. 4. The High Court fixed market value and directed sale of the 9/11th share in the suit property, with a provision enabling Defendant No.3 to pay his share or face specific performance. The counsel’s statements before the High Court, recorded in the judgment, reflect consent on facts, binding on the client for that aspect. The order, as a consent order, is immune from appeal under CPC, s. 96(3). The court should not disturb a consent-based disposition where substantial justice has been done; the minor’s interests and the other co-sharers’ rights are balanced by the accompanying directions to ensure payment and return of funds already received.

Cited Precedents (9)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
M. Meenakshi & Ors. v. Metadin Agarwal(2006) 7 SCC 470PositiveRelied on. Para 9.
Nirmala Anand v Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. & Ors.(2002) 5 SCC 481PositiveRelied on. Para 9.
Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathrew v Nedumbar Karuvila's Son & Ors.(1987) Supp. SCC 340PositiveRelied on. Para 9.
State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr.(1982) 2 SCC 463PositiveRelied on. Para 11.
Shankar K. Mandal & ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.(2003) 9 SCC 519PositiveRelied on. Para 11.
Roop Kumar v Mohan Thedani(2003) 6 SCC 595PositiveRelied on. Para 11.
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee & Anr. v C. K. Rajan & Ors.(2003) 7 SCC 546PositiveRelied on. Para 11.
Nedunuri Kameswaramma v Sampati Subba Rao & Anr.(1963) 2 SCR 208PositiveRelied on. Para 12.
B.S. Bajwa & Anr. v State of Punjab & Ors.(1998) 2 SCC 523PositiveRelied on. Para 12.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

[2011) 6 S.C.R. 392 A ## VIMALESHWAR NAGAPPA SHET ## _v._ NOOR AHMED SHERIFF & ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 4279-80 of 2011) B MAY 11, 2011 **[P. SATHASIVAM AND H.L. GOKHALE,** JJ.] - - _Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 s. 96(3) Pursuant to death of the original owner of the property in question, his_ C _sons, daughters_ as _also minor grandson succeeding to their_ - _respective share in the property Co-sharers-sons and daughters entering into an agreement to sell the entire_ - _property with appellant-buyer Non-execution of sale deed_ - _by co-sharers despite having received certain amount Suit_ o _for specific performance_ - _Decreed by trial court_ - _Appeal_ - _before High Court High Court fixing the market value of the_ - _property Defendant No. 3-minor grandson, who was not party to the agreement, proposing to purchase the share of the co-sharers by paying the value to the appellant- Counsel_ E _for the appellant on instructions from the appellant agreeing_ - _to the said proposal High Court directing co-sharers to execute the sale deed to the extent of their share in the suit_ - _property On appeal, held: Order of the High Court shows that it is_ a _consent order_ - _No appeal lies from_ a _decree_ F _passed by the court with the consent of the parties- Defendant No. 3 has right to purchase, to exclude the outsider who holds an equitable right of purchase of the shares of other_ - _defendants He was not bound by the agreement executed_ - _by other defendants to the extent of his share Since defendant No. 3 did not join the other co-sharers, no_ G _agreement of sale could be entered with the appellant for the_ - _entire property including the minor's share Thus, the agreement of sale covering the entire property was void and_ - _ineffective Also, before the High Court, both parties_ H 392 ## VIMALESHWAR NAGAPPA SHET _v._ NOOR AHMED 393 SHERIFF & ORS. _including the appellant agreed for a reasonable market_ - _valuation Statement made by the counsel before the High Court, cannot be challenged before Supreme Court- Partition_ - _Act, 1893_ s. _4._ - _Concession Concession made by counsel, on a_ - - - _question of fact Effect of Held: Is binding on the client However, concession on a question of law, is not binding._ B After the death of 'M', his surviving sons-Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 succeeded to the extent of 2/11 th share and his surviving daughters- Defendant Nos. 5 to 7 · C succeeded to 1/11th share in the property. Defendant No. 3, grandson of 'M' is a minor and he succeeded to 2111 th shar . The division in the scheduled property was not practica and as such Defendant No. 1, 2 and 4 to 5 desired to sell he property and distribute the sale proceeds between them. D Defendant No'. 1, 2 and 4 to 5 executed agreement of sale in favour of appellant and received an advance amount. Subsequentjy, wife of 'M' died. The defendants did not execute the/sale deeds and as a result the appellant filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court decreed the E suit and directed the defendant to execute the sale deed in terms of the agreement of sale. The defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 7 filed an appeal. The defendant No. 3 was not a party to the agreement and he proposed to purchase the 9/11th share by paying the value to the appellant. The F High Court fixed the market value of the property. The counsel for the appellant on instructions from the appellant agreed to the said proposal on the condition that defendant No. 3 would pay the said amount within three months, in default, the appellant would be entitled G to the relief of specific performance. The High Court directed defendant No. 1, 2, 4 to 7 to execute the sale deed of their share to the extent of 9/11 area in the suit property by making a convenient division of the property. Thereafter, an application was filed for deleting some G H [2011) 6 S.C.R. ## 394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS A words from the judgment and the same was dismissed. Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeals. ## Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Since defendant No. 3 was not a party to B the agreement of sale, he is not bound by the agreement executed by other defendants to the extent of his share. From the evidence and the materials, it is clear that the suit property Is _dwelling house. In view of s. 4 of the Partition Act, 1893, defendant No. 3 has right to purchase C to exclude the outsider who holds an equitable right of purchase of the shares of other defendants. [Paras 5 and 6) [399-A-C; G-H] 1.2. The appellant was aware that defendant No. 3 who was a minor had a share in the property and the D application made by the other defendants before the civil court for appointment of defendant No. 2 as guardian of the said minor was not pursued and was dismissed, consequently, his share remained unsold to the appellant. As a matter of fact, agreement of sale did not E refer to defendant No. 3 at all or his share in the property. However, in the plaint, the appellant clearly admitted the share of defendant No. 3 who was a minor and the fact that no guardian was appointed for the minor and Defendant No. 2 was not his natural guardian. Without F defendant No. 3 joining the other co-sharers, no agreement of sale could be entered with the appellant for the entire property including the minor's share. · Consequently, the agreement of sale covering the entire property was void and Ineffective. (Paras 7 and 8) (399G H; 400-A-D] 1.3. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 confers discretionary powers. The value of property escalates in urban areas very fast and it would not be equitable to H grant specific performance after a lapse of long period of ## VIMALESHWAR NAGAPPA SHET _v._ NOOR AHMED 395 SHERIFF & ORS. time. Apart from all the material aspects before the High Court, both parties including the appellant agreed for a reasonable market valuation. [Paras 9, 1 OJ [400-E-G] A· _M. Meenakshi and Ors._ vs. _Metadin Agarwal_ (2006) 7 SCC 470; _Nirmala Anand_ vs. _Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. and_ B _Ors._ (2002) 5 SCC 481; _Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's_ Son _Mathrew_ vs. _Nedumbar Karuvila's_ Son _and Ors._ (1987) Supp. sec 340 - relied on C 1.4. A concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is binding on the client, but if it is on a question of law, it is not binding. The High Court has recorded in the impugned judgment that the counsel agreed with instructions from the plaintiff and reiterated this fact in its order passed in the application while rejecting the plea 0 of the counsel for the appellant that he did not give consent that he had no instructions from his clients. The statement made by the counsel before the High Court, as recorded in the.impugned judgment and order, cannot be challenged before this Court. [Paras 11 and 12) [401-C· ~ E # _State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr._ (1982) 2 SCC 463; _Shankar K. Manda/ and ·ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors._ (2003) 9 SCC 519; _Roop Kumar vs. Mohan Thedani_ (2003) 6 SCC 595; _Guruvayoor Devaswom_ . _Managing Committee and Anr. vs. C. K. Rajan and Ors._ (2003) 7 SCC 546; _Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs Sampati Subba Rao and Anr._ (1963) 2 SCR 208, 225; B.S. _Bajwa and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors._ (1998) 2 SCC 523 - relied on. F G 1.5. As per Section 96 (3) of the Civil Procedure Code, no appeal lies from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. The reading of the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, more particularly, the concluding paragraph, clearly show that it is a H [2011] 6 S.C.R. ## 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A consent order. Thus, under Article 136, generally this Court would not interfere with the order of the High Court which has done substantial justice. [Paras 13 and 14) [401-G-H; 402-A-B] - 1.6. Since the impugned order of the High Court was - 8 stayed, whil~ ordering of notice, defendant No. 3 is granted 3 months' time from today to pay Rs. 11,42,590/ - and in the event of default, the directions of the High - Court are to be applied and implemented. Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 4 to 7 are directed to return the sum of Rs.1,53,000/ - C - which they have received towards sale consideration with interest at the rate of 9 per cent from the date of payment within a period of eight weeks from today to the plaintiff. [Para 15] [402-C] ## D ## Case Law Reference: E F G ||Case Law Reference:|Case Law Reference:|| |---|---|---|---| |(2006)|_1_sec470|Relied on.|Para 9| |(2002) 5|(2002) 5sec481|Relied on.|Para 9| |(1987) Supp.|(1987) Supp.SCC340Relied on.||Para 9| |(1982) 2|(1982) 2sec463|Relied on.|Para11| |(2003) 9|(2003) 9sec519|Relied on.|Para11| |(2003) 6|(2003) 6sec595|Relied on.|Para11| |(2003)|_1_sec546|Relied on.|Para11| |(1963) 2|(1963) 2SCR208|Relied on.|Para 12| |(1998) 2|(1998) 2sec523|Relied on.|Para 12| CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4279-4280 of 2011. From the Judgment & Order dated 3.3.2009 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA flto. ,52 of 2000 & H 28.8.2009 in MCVL No. 13474 of 2009. VIMALESHWAR NAGAPPA SHET _v._ NOOR AHMED 397 SHERIFF & ORS. S.N. Bhat for the Appellant. A P.P. Rao, Mahalakshmi Pavani, Utav Sidhu, Filza Moonis, G. Balaji, Apeksha Sharan for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B **P. SATHASIVAM,** J. 1. Leave granted. 2. These appeals are directed against the final judgment and orders dated 03.03.2009 and 28.08.2009 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RF.A. C No. 52 of 2000 and Misc. Civil No. 13474 of 2009 in RF.A. No. 52 of 2000 respectively whereby the High Court disposed of the appeal and dismissed the application. 3. B'rief facts: D (a) The property in question originally belonged to one C.S. Abdul Momin Sheriff and he died leaving behind his wife Hajiba Tabsasum and Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 (sons), Defendant Nos. 5 to 7 (daughters) and Defendallt No. 3, who is the son of Late Ismail Sheriff, son of Abdul Momin Shariff. After his E demise, each of the surviving sons succeeded to an extent of 2/11th share and each of the daughters succeeded to 1/11th share in the property. As the division in the scheduled property was impractical, Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 7 desired to sell the schedule property and to distribute sale. proceeds between F them. On 02.05.1988, they agreed to sell the property to one Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet-plaintiff (appellant herein) for a consideration of Rs.3, 10,000/-, executed agreement of sale and received advance consideration of Rs.10,000/-. Subsequently, on 06.05.1988, the wife of C.S Abdul Momin Sheriff died. G (b) Till 15.06.1989, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.1,53,000/ -, in all, on various dates. As the defendants did not execute the sale deed, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance being O.S. No. 91 of 1991 in the Court of the Civil Judge at H [2011] 6 S.C.R. ## 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS A Chikmangalur. By order dated 01.10.1999, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and directed the defendants to execute the sale deed in terms of agreement of sale dated 02.05.1988. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the trial Court, Defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 7 filed appeal B being R.F.A. No. 52 of 2000 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. (c) The High Court taking into account the submission of the counsel for the appellants and respondents, fixed the market value of property at Rs.300/- per sq. ft. The total area of property C is 4,655 sq. ft. (48' x 90'), therefore, the total market value of property would be Rs.13,96,500/-. The High Court, by its judgment dated 03.03.2009, while holding that as Defendant No.3 was not a party to the agreement and he proposes to purchase the 9/11 th share by paying value to the plaintiff and D the value of 9/11th share woulrl be Rs. 11,42,590/- and the counsel for the plaintiff on the instruction from the plaintiff agreed to the said proposal on the condition that Defendant No.3 would pay the said amount within three months, in default, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief of specific performance E disposed of the appeal directing defendant Nos. 1,2 and 4 to 7 to execute the sale deed of their share to the extent of 9/11 area in the suit property by making convenient division of the property. C F (d) Thereafter, an application being Misc. Civil No 13474 of 2009 in RF.A. No. 52 of 2000 was filed for deleting some words from the judgment and the same was dismissed. Challenging the judgment of the High Court in appeal and the order made in the application, the appellant-plaintiff has filed G these appeals by way of special leave petitions before this Court. 4. Heard Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents. H VIMALESHWAR NAGAPPA SHET _v._ NOOR AHMED 399 SHERIFF & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] 5. It is not in dispute that the property in question belonged A to Abdul Momin Sheriff. After his death, each of the surviving sons succeeded to an extent of 2/11 th share and each of the daughters succeeded to 1/11th share. It is also not in dispute that the agreement of sale was executed only by Defendant Nos .. 1, 2 and 4 to 7. The total share of Defendant Nos. 1, 2 B and 4 to 7 is 9/11 and the share of the Defendant No. 3 who did not join the execution of agreement of sale would be 2/11. Inasmuch as the Defendant No. 3 was not a party to the agreement, he is not bound by the agreement executed by other defendants to the extent of his share. c 6. From the evidence and the materials, it is clear that the suit property is dwelling house. In that event, Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 is relevant which reads as under:- "4. Partition suit by transferee of share in dwelling-house.-. D > (1) Where a share of a dwelling-house belonging to an undivided family has been transferred to a person who is not a member of such family and such transferee sues for > partition, the court shall, if any member of the family being a shareholder shall undertake to buy the share of such transferee, make a valuation of such share in such manner > as it thinks fit and direct the sale of such share to such shareholder, and may give all necessary and proper directions in that behalf. (2) If in any case described in sub-section (1) two or more members of the family being such shareholders severally undertake to buy such share, the court shall follow the procedure prescribed by sub-section (2) of the last foregoing section." E F G In view of the above provision, Defendant No. 3 has right to purchase to exclude the outsider who holds an equitable right of purchase of the shares of other defendants. 7. It is pertinent to point out that plaintiff was aware that H 400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R. 1 1 A Defendant No. 3 who was a minor had a share in the property and the application made by the other defendants before the Civil Court for appointment of Defendant No. 2 as guardian of the said minor was not pursued and in fact it was dismissed, consequently, his share remained unsold to the plaintiff. B 8. As a matter of fact, agreement of sale dated 02.05.1988 does not refer to Defendant No. 3 at all or his share in the property. However, in the plaint, the plaintiff clearly admitted the share of Defendant No. 3 who was a minor and the fact that no guardian was appointed for the minor and Defendant No. 2 C was not his natural guardian. Without Defendant No. 3 joining the other co-sharers, no agreement of sale could be entered with the plaintiff for the entire property including the minor's share. Consequently, the agreement of sale covering the entire property was void and ineffective. D 9. It is settled law that Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 confers discretionary powers. [vide: _M. Meenakshi_ & _Ors._ vs. _Metadin Agarwal_ (2006) 7 SCC 470, _Nirma/a Anand_ vs. _Advent Corporation (P) Ltd._ & _Ors._ (2002) 5 SCC 481, E _Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's_ Son _Mathrew_ vs. _Nedumbara Karuvi/a's_ Son & _Ors._ (1987) Supp. SCC 340]. It is also well settled that the value of property escalates in urban areas very · fast and it would not be equitable to grant specific performance after a lapse of long period of time. F 10. Apart from all these material aspects before the High Court, both parties including the plaintiff/present appellant agreed for a reasonable market valuation. This factual position is clear from paragraph 7 of the High Court judgment which reads as under:- G "7. The counsel for appellants and respondents submitted that the market value of property is Rs. 300/- per sq. ft. The total 1 area of property is 4,655 sq. ft. (48' x 90'). The total market . value of property would be Rs. 13,96,500/-. The value of 9/11th · H share would be Rs. 11,42,590/-. Defendant No. 3 proposes to VIMALESHWAR NAGAPPA SHET _v._ NOOR AHMED 401 SHERIFF & ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.] purchase the 9/11 th share by paying value to the plaintiff. The A counsel for the plaintiffs with the instructions from the plaintiff agreed to the said proposal on the condition that the Defendant No. 3 should pay the said amount within three months. In the event of default, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief of specific performance. The Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 7 shall B execute sale deed of their share to the extent of 9/11 area in the suit property by making convenient division of the property. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of." 11. The statement made by fhe counsel before the High Court, as recorded in the impugned judgment and order, cannot be challenged before this Court.[vide: _State of Maharashtra_ vs. _Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak_ & _Anr._ (1982) 2 SCC 463, _Shankar K. Manda/_ & _Ors._ vs. _State of Bihar_ & _Ors._ (2003) 9 SCC 519, _Roop Kumar_ vs. _Mohan Thedani_ (2003) 6 SCC 595, _Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee_ & _Anr._ vs. _C.K. Rajan_ & _Ors._ (2003) 7 SCC 546] C D 12. It is also clear that the High Court has recorded in the impugned judgment dated 03.03.2009 that the counsel agreed with instructions from the plaintiff and reiterated this fact in its E order dated 28.08.2009 in Misc. Civil No. 13474 of 2009 in the above-mentioned RFA while rejecting the plea of the counsel for the appellant herein that he did not give consent that he had no instructions from his clients A concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is binding on the client, but if it is F on a question of law, it is not binding. [vide: _Nedunuri Kameswaramma_ vs _Sampati Subba Rao_ & _Anr._ (1963) 2 SCR 208, 225, _B._ S. _Bajwa_ & _Anr. vs. State of Punjab_ & _Ors._ (1998) 2 sec 523, 525-5261 E 13. As stated earlier and the reading of the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, more particularly, para 7, which is concluding paragraph, clearly show that it is a consent order. As per Section 96 (3) of the Civil Procedure Code, no appeal lies from a decree passP.d by the court with the consent of the parties. G H 402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R. A 14. For all these reasons, more particularly, the statement of fact as noted in para 7 of the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, under Article 136, generally this Court will not interfere with the order of the High Court which has done substantial justice. 8 15. Since this Court has stayed the impugned order of the High Court while ordering of notice on 08.07.2010, Defendant No. 3 is granted 3 months' time from today to pay the amount as noted in para 7 of the impugned judgment and in the event of default, the directions of the High Court in the same para ·ate C to be applied and implemented. Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 4 to 7 are directed to return the sum of Rs.1,53,000/- which they have received towards sale consideration with interest at the rate of 9 per cent from the date of payment within a period of eight weeks from today to the plaintiff. D 16. Accordingly, the appeals fail and the same are dismissed with the above direction. No order as to costs. N.J. dismissed. Appeals dismissed.