High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed.

Vijay Singh v. Union of India and Ors.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 7212 of 2005
Neutral Citation:[2007] 3 S.C.R.

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • H.K. Sema
  • B. Sudershan Reddy
Judgment Date
2007-02-23
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The order of dismissal is set aside; Vijay Singh is reinstated forthwith. The no-work-no-pay principle applies, so no back wages are granted from the date of dismissal until reinstatement. The judgment notes that a fresh enquiry may be initiated from the stage of obtaining prior approval if advised, following the principle in ECIL Karunakar.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Vijay Singh

Respondents

  • Union of India and Others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M.N. Krishnamani
  • • Ashwani Bhardwaj
  • • S. Pani

Counsels for Respondents

  • • B. Datta
  • • A.S.G.
  • • T.S. Doabia
  • • Imtiaz Ahmed
  • • Anil Katiyar
  • • D.S. Mehra
  • • A Indra Sawhney
  • • Sushma Suri

Case Synopsis & Summary

Vijay Singh, a Head Constable in the Delhi Police, challenged his dismissal following a departmental enquiry conducted for alleged misconduct—overwriting in the Daily Diary and other procedural lapses in recording statements. The central legal issue was whether Rule 15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 requiring prior approval from the Additional Commissioner of Police for conducting a departmental enquiry after a preliminary enquiry, was violated, thereby invalidating the entire enquiry and the dismissal. The Supreme Court held that Rule 15(2) is mandatory and must be observed in letter and spirit. It explained that Rule 15(1) and (2) collectively govern when a preliminary enquiry is appropriate and when a departmental enquiry may be ordered directly; crucially, the Additional Commissioner’s prior approval is required to protect the delinquent officer from prejudice. In the present case, the record did not show such prior approval. Consequently, the order of dismissal was set aside and the appellant reinstated, with no back wages from the date of dismissal to reinstatement, applying the no-work-no-pay principle. The Court left open the possibility of a fresh enquiry from the stage of obtaining prior approval if the disciplinary authority chooses to pursue it, citing Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors. The decision affirmed that procedural irregularities in this context render the enquiry void.

Provisions of Law Cited

Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, Rule 15(2)Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980, Rule 15(1)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • No work no pay

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The applicants argued that Rule 15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980 is mandatory and requires prior approval from the Additional Commissioner of Police for conducting a departmental enquiry where a preliminary enquiry reveals a cognizable offence. Since such prior approval was not obtained, the entire enquiry and resulting dismissal are vitiated. They contended that the disciplinary process should be nullified and the appellant reinstated; back wages may be excluded under the no-work-no-pay principle given the period of absence. They also argued that where specific information is available, a departmental enquiry may be ordered directly, but in this case the mandatory pre-approval was not secured.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the record showed no prior approval was obtained, or that prior approval was not required in the circumstances presented, and that the preliminary enquiry dictates whether a criminal case should be registered or a departmental enquiry conducted. They relied on the structure of Rule 15(1) and (2) to justify the process and maintain that dismissal could stand where due procedure may be justified; they supported the continuance of departmental actions or the possibility of a fresh enquiry only with prior approval, while arguing against automatic reinstatement without due process.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors.[1993] 4 SCC 727PositiveCited as a supporting principle governing how disciplinary proceedings may proceed (or be renewed) from the stage of obtaining the required prior approval, and in relation to the no-work-no-pay framework referenced in this judgment.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

-\ . ## VIJAY SINGH _v._ UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ## FEBRUARY 23, 2007 ) ## [H.K. SEMA AND B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, JJ.] _Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980-r. 15(2)-Requirement under-Of prior approval from Additional Commissioner of Police for conducting departmental enquily-Held,_ is _mandatory-On facts, Appellant_ c _Head Constable was dismissed for misconduct pursuant to departmental enquiry which was conducted without prior approval as required under r. 15(2)-/t being a case of violation of mandatory provisions of law, order of dismissal set aside-Service Law-Dismissal._ > Appellant, a Head Constable in Delhi Police, was served with the charge D that he did not follow the procedure while entering a statement in the Dai\y Diary and also made some overwriting therein with ulterior motive. The charge . was framed after a preliminary enquiry. Subsequently Departmental enquiry was held and Appellant was dismissed from service. > The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal is E whether there was violation of Rule 15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 inasmuch as departmental enquiry was ordered without obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police, therefore the entire enquiry was vitiated and hence the dismissal of Appellant is liable to be set aside. F _}_ ## Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. A cursory reading of sub-rule 2 of Rule 15 would clearly show that the said Rule is mandatory. It has to be followed strictly in letter and spirit. !Para 5) 114-E] G 1.2. A reading of Rule 15(1) & (2) together and the language employed - therein clearly discloses that a preliminary enquiry is held only in cases of allegation, which is of weak character and, therefore, a preliminary enquiry 11 H 12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R. A is to be held to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter; to collect the prosecution evidence; to judge quantum of default and to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In cases, where specific information is available, a preliminary enquiry is not necessary and a departmental enquiry may be ordered by the dis<:iplinary B authority straightaway. It is because of this reason sub-rule 2 of Rule 15 is couched in such a way as a defence to the delinquent officer. The Additional Commissioner of Police being higher in hierarchy next to DGP, the requirement of his approval is mandatory, so that the delinquent officer is not prejudiced or harassed unnecessarily in a departmental enquiry. Such approval, if any, must also be accorded after due application of mind. It is a C case of violation of mandatory provisions of law. Therefore, the appeal must succeed. The appellant was dismissed by an order preceded by an enquiry. The order of dismissal is set aside. The appellant shall be re-instated forthwith. [Para 7[ [15-C, D, E) 2. The appellant was dismissed on 21.1.1998 and since then he is out of D service till date. The appellant would be attaining the age of superannuation on March 31, 2012. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and the nature of misconduct that is alleged to have been committed by the appellant as a police officer and applying the principle of 'no work no pay' he shall not be entitled to back wages from 21.1.1998 till re-instatement. Also E keeping in view the nature of misconduct said to have been committed by the appellant, as a police officer, this order would not preclude the disciplinary authority to initiate a fresh proceeding from the stage of obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police, if so advised. In the event of the authority deciding to hold fresh enquiry from the stage of obtaining prior approval from Additional Commissioner of Police, they may resort to F the principle laid down by this Court in _Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors._ v. _B. Karunakar & Ors.,_ [Paras 8 and 91 [15-F-HI _j_ _Managing Director, EC/L, Hyderabad & Ors._ v. _B. Karunakar & Ors.,_ 11993[ 4 sec 727, referred to. G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7212 of2005. From the Judgment and Final Order dated 9.7.2003 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.W. No. 4220/2003. M.N. Krishnamani, Ashwani Bhardwaj and S. Pani for the Appellant. H 13 VJJA Y SINGH _v._ U. 0.1. [SEMA. J.] -1 B. Datta, A.S.G., T.S. Doabia, Imtiaz Ahmed, Anil Katiyar, D.S. Mehra, A Indra Sawhney and Sushma Suri for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by _y_ H.K. SEMA, J. I. The appellant was head constable in Delhi Police. He was served with the charge, substance of which reads:- B "On 29.3.95 a case FIR No.236/95 u/s 325/34 !PC PS Sultanpuri was registered by HC Vijay Singh No.310/NW after the receipt of MLC report of Sh. Nand Kishore. In the FIR, the HC showed the name of Sh. Ram Raj as an accused including the other persons. The HC also mentioned that he recorded the statement of Sh. Nand Kishore on C 4.3.95. On scrutiny it was found that there was overwriting in DD No. JO, dated 4.3.95 which was written by the HC on 4.3.95 and is very much visible. As per procedure HC Vijay Singh, was supposed to enter the statement of Sh. Nand Kishore in the daily diary on the same day to avoid doubt, but the HC failed to do so and did not follow the D procedure and also made some over writing in daily diary with ulterior motive." 2. Admittedly, the charge was framed after a preliminary enquiry was conducted by PW-4 Sh.Bhairo Singh, ACP Kamla Market, Delhi. An enquiry was conducted by PW-4 and its report was submitted to DCP/North-West E Dist!. Delhi on 21.8.95 which was marked as Exhibit PW-4/A. _>_ 3. Many grounds have been urged before us. The principle contention of Mr. Krishnamani, learned senior counsel is, however, rested on the question of violation of Rule 15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 ( in short 'the Rules' ). It is contended by the counsel that Rule 15(2) F mandates that in a case in which a preliminary enquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered and investigated or a departmental enquiry should be held. He would further contend that in the present case a departmental enquiry was held preceded by a preliminary enquiry conducted G by PW-4 but no prior approval was obtained from the Additional Commissioner of Police, therefore, the entire enquiry vitiates. This being the pure question of law, we have directed the respondent to produce the record as to whether prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police was obtained or not. H 14 . [2007] 3 S.C.R. ## SUPREME COURT REPORTS - A Mr.Dutta, learned ASG fairly submitted that the record does not disclose that prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police was obtained. A supplementary affidavit was, however, filed by one Mr.Ajay Kumar, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Police Control Room, Delhi. It is averred in paragraph 2 of the supplementary affidavit that no preliminary enquiry was ordered, - B hence the prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police as required under Rule 15(2) of the Rules for conducting departmental enquiry was neither required nor the same was taken. To say the least, this averment is contrary to the statement of PW-4. A preliminary enquiry is a fact f:nding enquiry. Its purpose is (i) to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter(s), (ii) to collect prosecution evidence, (iii) to judge quantum of default and (iv) -.,· - C to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In the present case, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by PW-4 himself and a report was submitted by him, marked as Exhibit PW-4/A during the enquiry. 4. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 15 reads: D - "In cases in which a preliminary enquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with the pubic, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered and - E investigated or a departmental enquiry should be held". 5. A cursory reading of sub-rule 2 would clearly show that the said Rule is mandatory. It has to be followed strictly in letter and spirit. 6. To appreciate the present controversy in proper perspective Rule F 15( I) & (2) of the Rules are reproduced: - "IS.Preliminary enquiries -(I) A preliminary enquiry is a fact finding enquiry. Its purpose is (i) to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter(s), (ii) to collect prosecution evidence, (iii) to judge quantum of default and (iv) to bring relevant documents on - G record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In cases where specific information covering the above-mentioned points exists a Preliminary Enquiry need not be held and Departmental enquiry may be ordered by the disciplinary authority straightaway. Jn all other cases, a preliminary enquiry shall normally precede a departmental ,_ - H 15 VJ.TAY SINGH v. U.0.1. [SEMA. J.] A enquiry. (2) In cases in which a preliminary enquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with the pubic, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered and B investigated or a departmental enquiry should be held". (3) ................. " ·• 7. A reading of Rule 15(1 )&(2) together and the language employed therein clearly discloses that a preliminary enquiry is held only in cases of C allegation, which is of weak character and, therefore, a preliminary enquiry is to be held to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter; to collect the prosecution evidence; to judge quantum of default and to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In cases, where specific information is available, a preliminary enquiry is not necessary and a departmental enquiry may be ordered by the disciplinary D authority straightaway. It is because of this reason sub-rule 2 of Rule 15 is couched in such a way as a defence to the delinquent officer. The Additional Commissioner of Police being higher in hierarchy next to DGP, the requirement of his approval is mandatory, so that the delinquent officer is not prejudiced or harassed unnecessarily in a departmental enquiry. Such approval, if any, E must also be accorded after due application of mind. It is a case of violation of mandatory provisions of law. Therefore, the appeal must succeed. The appellant was dismissed by an order dated 21.1.1998 preceded by an enquiry. The order of dismissal is set aside. The appellant shall be re-instated forthwith. The orders of the Appellate Authority, the Revisional Authority and the High Court are set aside. F F 8. This takes us to consider as to what relief the appellant is entitled to. The appellant was dismissed on 21. I .1998 and since then he is out of service till date. The appellant would be attaining the age of superannuation on March 31,2012. G 9. Having regards the facts and circumstances of this case and the nature of misconduct that is alleged to have been committed by the appellant as a police officer and applying the principle of 'no work no pay' he shall not be entitled to back wages from 21.1.1998 till re-instatement. Also keeping in H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 3 S.C.R. 16 J - A view the nature of misconduct said to have been committed by the appellant, as a police officer, this order would not preclude the disciplinary authority to initiate a fresh proceeding from the stage of obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police, if so advised. In the event of the authority so decide to hold fresh enquiry from the stage of obtaining prior approval - B from Additional Commissioner of Police, they may resort to the principle laid down by this Court in paragraph 3 l in _Managing Director, EC/l, Hyderabad & Ors._ v. _B. Karunakar & Ors.,_ [1993] 4 SCC 727. Subject to the aforestated·· observation, this appeal is allowed. No costs. B.B.B. Appeal allowed. _>·_