```
INTHEHIGHCOURTOFKERALAATERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THEHONOURABLEMR.JUSTICERAJAVIJAYARAGHAVANV
WEDNESDAY,THE31[ST]DAYOFMAY2023/10THJYAISHTA,1945
CRL.MCNO.6901OF2017
CCNO.360/2015OFJUDICIALMAGISTRATEOFFIRSTCLASS,
,NEDUMKANDOM
```
## **`PETITIONER/ACCUSED:`**
```
VENUPILLAIV.A.
AGED59YEARS,R/ATBLOCKNO.661,BALAGRAM,
KARUNAPURAMVILLAGE,UDUMBANCHOLATALUK,IDUKKI
-
DISTRICT,PIN685552
BYADVS.
SRI.TOMJOSE
SMT.GEETHAJOB
```
## **`RESPONDENTS/STATE & DE FACTO COMPLAINANT:`**
```
1STATEOFKERALA
REPRESENTEDBYTHEPUBLICPROSECUTOR,
HIGHCOURTOFKERALA,ERNAKULAM-682031
2SUBINSPECTOROFPOLICE
NEDUMKANDAMPOLICESTATION,NEDUMKANDAMP.O,
IDUKKIDISTRICT-PIN685553
3INDIRA
W/O.GOPI,BLOCKNO.97,PATTAMCOLONY,MUNDIYERUMA,
UDUMBANCHOLATALUK,NEDUMKANDAM,IDUKKIDISTRICT,
PIN-685553
BYADVS.
SMT.ATHIRAA.MENON
SRI.VIPINNARAYAN,SRPUBLICPROSECUTOR
```
```
THISCRIMINALMISC.CASEHAVINGCOMEUPFORADMISSIONON
31.05.2023,THECOURTONTHESAMEDAYPASSEDTHEFOLLOWING:
```
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
2
## **ORDER**
The petitioner herein is the accused in C.C No.360 of 2015 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Nedumkandam. In the aforesaid case, he is accused of having committed offences punishable under Sections 3, 13 r/w Section 17 of the Kerala Money Lenders Act and Section 420 of the IPC.
2. The prayer in this petition is to quash Annexure-B FIR and all further proceedings in C.C.No. 360/2015 on the file of the JFMC, Nedumkandam.
3. Sri. Tom Jose, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would rely on Annexure-B to H documents, and it is argued that evaluation of the same would disclose that the dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner herein has not violated any of the provisions of the Money Lenders Act.
4. In response, it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that though the petitioner has approached this Court to quash the proceedings in C.C.No. 360/2015 pending on the files of the learned Magistrate, the petitioner has not produced the final report submitted by the police after completing the investigation in Annexure-B FIR. It is submitted that the allegations in the FIR
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
3
do disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the investigation having been committed and final report having been laid, this Court will not be justified in relying on extraneous documents produced by the accused to quash the proceedings. It is submitted that along with the final report, the investigating officer has recorded the statement of the witnesses which would reveal the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the offence.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.
6. I find that though the petitioner has sought to quash all further proceedings in CC.No. 360/2015 pending on the files of the learned Magistrate, the petitioner has not chosen to submit the final report submitted by the police after the investigation. The petitioner has produced certain materials before this Court as Annexures-B to G. This Court will not be justified in relying on those documents, which cannot be said to be unimpeachable.
7. In **State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy** [2004(6) SCC 522], the Apex Court had occasion to succinctly lay down the principles that should guide the court while considering a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Paragraph Nos. 5-8 of the judgment reads as under:
**5.** Exercise of power under S.482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
4
exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. Ail courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercises of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
5
initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
**6.** In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866] this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6)
- (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
- (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
- (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
**7.** In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
6
in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognisable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
“ 102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognisable offence, justifying an investigation by police
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
7
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognisable offence but constitute only a non-cognisable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
8
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
**8.** As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
9
constitute the offence of which cognisance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/FIR has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/FIR is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686], State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222] , Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194] , State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651] , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705] , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397] , Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728] , Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259] and State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC 89].
8. It is no more res integra that the exercise of power under S.482
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
10
CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge sheet does not constitute the ingredients of the offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under S.482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the Court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under S.482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offense alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding (see **Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab and Ors [** 2020 (2) KLJ 463]. The observations and directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. M/s. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors** [AIR 2021 SC 1918] is also instructive. Having considered all the relevant inputs, I do not find any exceptional reason for this Court to invoke the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the criminal proceedings as against the petitioner.
This petition is accordingly dismissed. It is made clear that the observation made above was made solely for the purpose of disposal of this petition and shall
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
11
not be considered as any observations on the merits of the case of the petitioner. It would be open to the petitioner to raise all his contentions before the learned Magistrate at the appropriate stage. It is also made clear that the right of the petitioner to plea discharge is also left open. If any such application is filed at the appropriate stage, the learned Magistrate shall consider the same and pass expeditious orders.
Sd/-
**RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V, JUDGE**
```
IAP
```
Crl.M.C No.6901 of 2017
12
## **`APPENDIX OF CRL.MC 6901/2017`**
```
PETITIONER’SANNEXURES:
```
```
ANNEXUREATRUECOPIESOFTHEPOLICECOMPLAINT
PREFERREDBYP.TSHEELA,THANKAMANIAND
P.TSATHYARAJAN
ANNEXUREBATRUECOPYOFTHEF.I.RLODGEDINCRIME
NO339/2015
ANNEXURECATRUECOPYOFTHE3RDRESPONDENT
EXECUTEDADOCUMENTINFAVOUROFTHE
PETITIONERASDOCUMENTNO.2139/99OF
MUNDIYERUMAS.R.O
```
```
ANNEXUREBATRUECOPYOFTHEF.I.RLODGEDINCRIME
NO339/2015
```
```
ANNEXUREDATRUECOPYOFTHEDECREEINO.SNO
59/2007BEFORETHEHON'BLEMUNSIFF'S
COURT,KATTAPPANA
```
```
ANNEXUREEATRUECOPYOFTHEORDERINIANO62/2008
INOSNO59/2007
```
```
ANNEXUREFATRUECOPYOFTHEJUDGMENTINOSNO
90/2004BEFORETHEMUNSIFFCOURT,
KATTAPPANADATED16/09/2006
```
```
ANNEXUREGATRUECOPYOFTHEREPORTPUBLISHEDIN
MALAYALAMANORAMADAILYDATED08/06/2014
```
```
ANNEXUREHATRUECOPYOFTHEJUDGMENTOFHONOURABLE
HIGHCOURTOFKERALAINO.P(C)2993/2014
DATED07-11-2016
```