Venugopal v. State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA** **WEDNESDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 21ST MAGHA,1942** **CRL.A.No.296 OF 2017** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN SC 603/2015 DATED 07-10-2016 OF DISTRICT COURT & SESSIONS COURT, PALAKKAD** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CP 13/2015 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS -I,PALAKKAD** **CRIME NO.734/2014 OF Kottayi Police Station , Palakkad** ## **APPELLANT:** **VENUGOPAL, C.NO.947/2016, CENTRAL JAIL AND CORRECTIONAL HOME, KANNUR** **BY ADV. SMT.PREETHY.R.NAIR (STATE BRIEF)** ## **RESPONDENT:** **STATE OF KERALA** ## **OTHER PRESENT:** **SMT.S.AMBIKA DEVI, SPECIAL GOVERNMENT PLEADER,ATROCITIES AGAINST WOMAN AND CHILD** **THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 01.02.2021, THE COURT ON 10-02-2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-2-** **K. Vinod Chandran & M.R.Anitha, JJ. ------------------------------------Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017 -----------------------------------Dated, this the 10[th] day of February, 2021** ## **JUDGMENT** **Vinod Chandran, J.** **A mindless act of the husband, leading to the death of the wife resulting in the conviction of the former on the evidence of the son is the judgment from which the present appeal is filed. The accused-husband was sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.25000/- with default sentence of RI of three months.** **2. Smt.Preethy R Nair, State Brief appointed for the appellant-accused argued that the conviction was based on the sole evidence of PW17 who was not an eye witness to the incident. It is argued that PW17 did not have a version in the evidence consistent to his statement before the Police. The contradictions marked as D2 to D4 can result only in the conclusion that PW17s evidence is not safe to be believed. It is also argued that the accused is entitled to Exception 1 of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The act if at all pinned on the accused, was not premeditated and in all probability would have been committed due to a provocation on** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-3-** **the part of the deceased. Alternatively it is contended that except for PW17 none spoke of the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence. The arrest said to have been made by the Investigating Officer on the next day of the incident is disproved by the evidence of PW17 and the SI of Police examined as PW12, both of whom spoke of the presence of the accused in the Police Station. PW17 admitted to have seen his father in the Police Station on the night of the incident. PW12 asserts to have seen the accused in the Police Station on the next day morning; while the arrest is said to have been made on the afternoon of the next day. There is no scientific evidence to connect the accused in the crime since neither his hands or his dress showed any trace of blood.** **3. Learned Special Government Pleader for Atrocities against Woman and Children Smt. S. Ambikadevi opposed the claim of the accused under Exception 1 on the ground that a hapless woman was killed by the accused without any provocation and in a ghastly manner. The Postmortem report noticed 14 ante mortem injuries, which according to the Doctor could have been caused by MO3 granite stone which was recovered by the Investigating Officer from the homestead which was the place of occurrence. The injuries could have been caused only by repeated clobbering on the head of the** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-4-** **poor woman with the granite stone. The stone reveals traces of blood, which was not of sufficient quantity to discern the exact Group. That an accident of a free fall could not have led to the injuries was specifically spoken of by the Doctor who conducted the Postmortem(PW21). PW17 though not an eye witness saw his parents quarreling immediately before the incident, upon which he retired to a room in the house. While he was sitting inside the room, within a few minutes, he heard a cry and on coming out, saw his mother lying down on the floor, her head drenched in blood. He also spoke of having seen his father, the accused going away from the scene of occurrence and throwing away the granite stone. It is argued that it is not the number of witnesses that matter, but, the credibility of the witness who spoke on the specific facts leading to the occurrence and what transpired immediately later. The learned Government Pleader would seek for dismissal of the appeal.** **4. The incident leading to the crime occurred on 16.10.2014 at about 7.00 p.m. The FIS was by PW1 who is the brother of the deceased. He was informed by another sister about the death of his sister Sumathi, allegedly at the hands of her husband, Venugopal, the accused herein. He did not witness the incident and he was informed of the cause of** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-5-** **death by PW18 the elder son of the deceased who was in the hospital along with others who accompanied the deceased from her house. That the death was caused in the lean-to attached to the house in which the accused and deceased were residing is established. PW17 who came out of the room hearing a sound categorically spoke about having seen his mother on the floor with her head drenched in blood. This much of the occurrence is confirmed by PW 3 & 16 the other inmates of the house.** **5. PW 3 and 16 are respectively the brother and sister in law of the accused who were staying in the very same house on the western portion. Both of these witnesses turned hostile. PW3 deposed to his having seen Sumathi lying down, dead. He also spoke of having heard the scream of his wife (PW 16), upon which, he rushed to the spot and saw Sumathi lying down, dead. He also admitted that the 3[rd] son of the accused, PW17 was in the house at that time. He was declared hostile since he refused to subscribe to his earlier statement to the Police, that the death was caused by his brother and that his wife told him that his brother had hit Sumathi with a granite stone. PW16, PW3's wife, also came to the spot of the occurrence on hearing a sound, upon** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-6-** **which, she saw Sumathi lying on the floor, with a pool of blood near her head. She too retracted from her statement to the Police that it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Sumathi. But she admitted the presence of Pw17 in the house at that time.** **6. The prosecution case is that the deceased was murdered within the lean-to in front of the house in which she was residing. PW 16, the sister-in-law of the accused though turned hostile with respect to material particulars of the crime, admitted that she saw the deceased lying in a pool of blood in the lean-to; which was affirmed by PW 3, her husband. PW 3 also stated that the house in which they were residing was the family house in which one portion was occupied by himself and his wife, with a retarded brother and another portion by the accused who was living there along with his wife and three children. PW3 also stated that the entire house was allotted to his share and the share of the accused was a vacant land, lying to the south of the house. The site plan prepared by PW 13, the Village Officer shows the house facing north with the lean-to in front of the house. On the inside of the lean-to for entrance into the house there are two doors and there also exists two windows, all facing north. PW 17 exited from one of the said doors and** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-7-** **saw his mother lying in a pool of blood. The description in the site plan [Ext.P12] tallies with the site mahazar [Ext.P7] prepared by PW 23 and attested by PW 8. Ext.P7 scene mahazar is attested by PW8 who has spoken of having witnessed the Circle Inspector preparing the same at the place of occurrence. The house stands in the name of Chamy the father of the accused and PW 3, as is evidenced from Ext.P13 Certificate of Ownership issued by PW 14.** **7. Ext.P8 is the seizure mahazar by which the blood samples collected from the place of occurrence by PW 2 Scientific Officer was seized by PW12, Sub Inspector. The sample collection is conformed by PW9, the Civil Police Officer who witnessed Ext.P8. The viscera samples collected at the time of Postmortem by PW21, District Police Surgeon was seized by PW23 Investigating Officer as per the Seizure Mahazar Ext.P14 which is affirmed by PW15. ExtP20 is the list of property wherein item No.1 includes the cotton swab with blood stain collected from the varantha and control sample. Ext.P21 is the forwarding note. Ext.P22 is the report of the Joint Director, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory. The blood stain on the cotton swab with blood collected from the site of occurrence showed the same to be of human origin and the group was detected as Group B. This was the group of** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-8-** **blood found in the dress of the deceased which was seized at the time of inquest numbered as item No. 8 to 10. The evidence discussed above establishes without doubt that the deceased suffered the injuries within the lean-to and that she died on the spot.** **8. The cause of death as spoken of by PW21 Doctor could have been by reason of the injuries caused by the granite stone recovered. In this context it has to be mentioned that though the recovery of the granite stone was based on the confession statement of the accused the witnesses who admitted their signatures on the seizure mahazar turned hostile. PW21 spoke of fourteen ante mortem injuries as seen from Ext.P17 postmortem certificate. In his opinion the deceased died due to head injury, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The external injuries 1 to 3 and 5 to 10 resulted in the corresponding internal injuries described in Ext.P17. Even if recovery of MO3 is discarded, the Doctor's statement in cross-examination was also that the injuries can be caused by a hard object. To a specific question, whether the injuries 2 and 3 could be caused by the deceased falling on a rough surface or object, the answer was in the negative. PW21 unequivocally stated that such a possibility can be** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-9-** **reasonably ruled out when all the injuries are considered together and in view of the depressed comminuted fracture of skull at the right frontal bone. The suggestion that the fracture to the skull could be caused by a fall, on a rough object or surface was denied and it was submitted that the nature and the distributed number of injuries, reasonably rule out such a possibility. The suggestion with respect to other injuries being caused by a fall was also negatived. The Doctors testimony remains unshaken in cross-examination and the possibility of the deceased having suffered the injuries in a free fall can be definitely ruled out. The death is established to have been caused by a hard object with which the deceased was hit on the head; more aptly put as, clobbered repeatedly on the head. Any reasonable person would have the knowledge that such repeated clobbering, especially on the head would result in grievous injuries which could lead to the death of the person who is at the receiving end. 9. We respectfully notice the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in** _**Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, 1966 Supp SCR 230 : AIR 1966 SC 1874**_ **wherein the guiding principles for determining the applicability of Section 300 is dilated upon.** **9. The first clause says that culpable homicide is murder if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. An intention to kill a person brings the matter so clearly within the general principle** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-10-** **of mens rea as to cause no difficulty. Once the intention to kill is proved, the offence is murder unless one of the exceptions applies, in which case the offence is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As there is no question of any of the exceptions they need not be mentioned. But it is plain that the appellants did not contemplate killing the Lt. Commander. No part of their preparations shows an intention to kill. Had they so desired, they had ample time and opportunity to effectuate that purpose without going to the trouble of using cotton soaked in chloroform to stuff the nostrils. They had only to hold his nose closed for a few minutes. The confession to which we have referred also shows that the news of the death of the Lt. Commander came to them with as much surprise as shock. In these circumstances, the first clause of Section 300 cannot apply.** **10. The second clause deals with acts done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom harm is caused. The mental attitude here is two-fold. There is first the intention to cause bodily harm and next there is the subjective knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury. English Common Law made no clear distinction between intention and recklessness but in our law the foresight of the death must be present. The mental attitude is thus made of two elements— (** _**a**_ **) causing an intentional injury and (** _**b**_ **) which injury the offender has the foresight to know would cause death. Here the injury or harm was intended. The appellants intended tying up the victim, closing his mouth by sticking adhesive plaster and plugging his nose with cotton wool soaked in chloroform. They intended that the Lt. Commander should be rendered unconscious for some time but they did not intend to do more harm than this. Can it be said that they had the subjective knowledge of the fatal consequences of the bodily harm they were causing? We think that on the facts the answer cannot be in the affirmative. To say that the act satisfied the test of subjective knowledge would be really tantamount to saying that the appellants intended to commit the murder of the Lt. Commander which, as said already, was not the case.** **11. The third clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It deals with acts done with the intention of causing bodily injury to a person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In this clause the result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. If the injury that the offender intends causing and does cause is sufficient to cause death in the** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-11-** **ordinary way of nature the offence is murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and whether the offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequences or not. As was laid down in** _**Virsa Singh**_ **v.** _**State of Punjab**_ **[[1953] SCR 1495] for the application of this clause it must be first established that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is established.** ## **10. This decision has been reiterated and affirmed** **recently in** _**2021 (1) SCC 596 [Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra].**_ **Here the accused had pursuant to a quarrel with the intention of causing bodily injury, picked up a hard object and clobbered the deceased, on the head, causing 14 ante-mortem injuries of which 1 to 3 and 5 to 10 were injuries possible of causing the internal injuries. The deceased died of head injury as spoken of by the Doctor [PW 21}. The instant crime can be brought under Section 300, Thirdly; where the person who inflicted the injury having done so with the intention of causing bodily injur(y)/(ies), which in the ordinary course of nature are sufficient to cause death.** **11. Now the question arises as to who is responsible for the murder of the accused and the motive, if there is any. Motive immediate or in the near past is not an** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-12-** **imperative circumstance to arrive at the conclusion of guilt or otherwise. It is only one of the factors that could be considered in arriving at the guilt or dismissing or excluding any or every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. As to the marital relationship, the witnesses spoke differently. PW3 and PW16 the brother and sister in law of the accused, who turned hostile, deposed that the accused and deceased were having a good life. PW1 the brother of the deceased spoke off intermittent discords in the marital life of his sister. He deposed that after the birth of their first child, his sister and the child, due to allegations raised by the accused, were staying with him. In cross-examination he also deposed that the eldest son of the accused, Rajagopalan (PW18) had once beaten his father for having assaulted his mother with a sickle on account of which the accused and deceased were hospitalised. PW3 the brother of the accused also in cross-examination by the prosecution, after having been declared hostile, admitted that there was an instance where the son hit the father. This incident was spoken of by both the sons, PW's 17 & 18. The sister of the deceased who was examined as PW19 spoke of the marital discords in the family of the deceased. It can be safely assumed that the marriage had seen rough weather and it was** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-13-** ## **definitely not a smooth sail for the couple.** **12. The immediate provocation, in the nature of a quarrel, is spoken of by PW17, the son, who is the crucial witness. His presence in the house is admitted even by PW3 and PW16, hostile witnesses. There is a minor discrepancy in the evidence of PW's 16 and 17 as to who first saw the deceased lying on the floor, in a pool of blood, which however is not relevant. PW16 states that she first saw the deceased and that on hearing her scream PW17 came out of the room, followed by her husband who was in the bathroom. PW17 in chief examination stated that it was hearing his cry that PW16 came to the spot. The facts remain that when PW16 and 17 came to the lean-to they saw the deceased lying in a pool of blood. PW 16, as per Ext.P15(a) contradiction marked, stated that she saw the accused standing near the supine deceased and that she queried him as to his deed. It was denied by her before Court. PW3 also retracted from his earlier statement of having seen the accused at the scene of occurrence and denied he having stated before the Police that his wife told him that the accused had hit the deceased on the head. PW17 though stated in chief examination that he saw his father hitting his mother on the head with a stone, such a statement was not available in the 161 statement, that** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-14-** **given to the Police, as suggested in cross-examination; which is a material omission.** **13. At the risk of repetition it is to be stated that the presence of PW17 in the house is admitted by the other residents, who turned hostile on the material aspects of the crime. PW17, the son, spoke against his father and his evidence has a ring of truth. What can be indubitably accepted in his evidence is that just prior to the incident he saw his father and mother quarreling. He then spoke of his father having displayed frustration for not being able to raise a loan for the construction of a house in the vacant land adjacent to the scene of occurrence. PW3 also spoke of the fact that his brother, the accused was trying to build a house in the vacant plot allotted to his share. PW17 and PW18 spoke of the general irritability of their father. PW17 went to his room and switched on the TV while the quarrel between his father and mother continued in the lean-to. Then he heard his mother screaming and came out to see his father clobbering his mother with a stone. Even if the eye-witness account, as spoken of in the box, is eschewed, PW17 spoke of having seen his mother lying in a pool of blood and his father standing there with a stone in his hands; immediately prior to which he heard his father quarreling with his** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-15-** **mother. He also spoke of his father having thrown away the stone while leaving the scene of occurrence.** **14. There was no other person present in the house as spoken of by PW's 3, 16 and 17. PW17 also spoke of he having informed his elder brother PW18, who came to the house immediately thereafter so as to take their mother to the hospital. PW18 stated in the box that he heard the death of his mother and the narration of what transpired, from his brother. PW1, who first came to the hospital, also spoke of PW18 having told him that, PW18 came to know of the incident from PW17, over the telephone. The circumstances conclusively point an accusing finger at the husband. The contradictions marked from the statement of PW17 are not significant to disbelieve his version regarding the circumstances in which his mother died, though he cannot be said to be an eye witness. The hostile witnesses at best spoke of the absence of the accused in the premise which cannot be accepted in view of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary as spoken of by PW17, the son of the accused and deceased, who cannot be said to have any ulterior motive in accusing his father.** **15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in** _**AIR 1990 SC 2140 Kishore Chand v. State of H.P**_ **spoke on how the evidence has to be evaluated where the accusation regarding the guilt is** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-16-** **based purely on the immediate and surrounding circumstances.** **We extract the following from the above decision:** **4. The question, therefore, is whether the prosecution proved guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. In a case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully and cogently established. All the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The proved circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and definite tendency, unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. They should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. The circumstances must be satisfactorily established and the proved circumstances must bring home the offences to the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not necessary that each circumstance by itself be conclusive but cumulatively must form unbroken chain of events leading to the proof of the guilt of the accused. If those circumstances or some of them can be explained by any of the reasonable hypothesis then the accused must have the benefit of that hypothesis.** **16. It is hence incumbent upon every Court looking into the guilt of the accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. Though the absence of the accused, at the scene of occurrence, was attempted to be projected by the hostile witnesses there was no alibi as such offered by the accused. The presence of the accused has been spoken of by PW17, whose evidence is found to be trustworthy. As early as in** _**V.Thevar Vs. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC**_ **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-17-** _**614)**_ **, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that corroboration not being insisted upon by the statute, there cannot be a rule of law that conviction cannot be based on the testimony of a single witness. However, even as a rule of prudence, it was held that the insistence of corroboration would always depend on the circumstances of the case as also the quality of evidence. On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the propositions that are firmly established were stated by the Supreme Court as follows:-** **"(1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.** **(2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.** **(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes”** **17. "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted" said the Supreme Court in** _**Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra ((2007) 14 SCC 150)**_ **and** _**Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of**_ **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-18-** _**Gujarat ((2011) 10 SCC 158)**_ **. The testimony of a solitary witness can be made the basis for conviction if the credibility of the witness is free from blemish and suspicion as also the quality of his evidence impresses the Court as natural, wholly truthful and convincing. The Court can in such circumstances unhesitatingly record a conviction. In the present case, the evidence of PW 17, the son of the accused, is one which inspires the confidence of Court. PW 17's presence is unerringly established and his credibility stands unchallenged. We are of the definite opinion that P.W.17's evidence is wholly truthful and utterly reliable.** **18. The learned State Brief sought to urge that though the Police is said to have arrested the accused on the next day, his presence in the Police Station on the previous day and the morning of the next day has been spoken of by PW17 and PW12. PW17, the son of the accused, deposed in the box that he saw his father in the Police Station in the night on which the incident occurred. PW12, Sub Inspector of Police and Station House Officer of Kottayi Police station, who took the FI statement, spoke of the accused being in police custody at 8.00 a.m on 17.10.2014, the next day of the incident. True, there is a discrepancy insofar as the accused having been arrested at 2.30 p.m on the next day from near** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-19-** **an ATM. The accused obviously was not present in the hospital after his injured wife was brought there and he was not present in the house after the incident. His conduct after the incident is a very relevant aspect. His presence in the Police Station on the previous night and the next day morning neither shakes the prosecution case nor does it lead to any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. Further more the accused has no contention regarding the specific discrepancy and during cross-examination of PW23 no question was put to him in this regard. The discrepancy regarding the arrest is hence not material to upset the evidence regarding the crime and there can be no bias visited on the accused; which rules out any ground of miscarriage of justice having been occasioned.** **19. The accused has no explanation as to his whereabouts at the time the incident occurred, even in his Section 313 statement. The death of the wife occurred in the lean-to of the house in one portion of which the husband and wife are living, along with their children; and the other occupied by the husbands brother and family. One of the sons whose presence in the house is established; as spoken of even by the other occupants, who turned hostile on the material aspects of the crime, accuses his father of having caused the** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-20-** **death of his mother. In cases of uxoricide, especially within the confines of a home the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considered Section 106 of the Evidence Act and said so in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006 (10) SCC 681):** **16.In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)].** **17.Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-21-** **accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime.** **20. Considering the entire evidence, it definitely indicates a chain of circumstances without any weak link, conclusively leading to the inevitable finding of the accused having murdered his wife, in a fit of anger, as supported by the scientific and medical evidence regarding the cause of death. The quarrel between the husband and wife, the sound which emanated from the scene which brought running the witnesses who saw the wife supine and lifeless, the abrupt disappearance of the accused from the scene of occurrence, the injuries caused on her head, the unimpeachable medical evidence regarding the cause of death, the subsequent conduct of the accused-husband and the absence of any explanation on his whereabouts at the time of occurrence are all links in an unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the unerring conclusion of guilt. We have no doubt that the guilt of the accused is conclusively established by the prosecution. The State Brief valiantly tried to bring it under one of the exceptions on the ground of a provocation on the part of the** **Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017** **-22-** **deceased; which we find to be not a reasonable inference possible from the circumstances of the case. The appeal, hence, is devoid of merit and the same stands dismissed affirming the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court.** **Sd/K.VINOD CHANDRAN JUDGE Sd/M.R. ANITHA JUDGE** **jma**